Henry Shue
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199267217
- eISBN:
- 9780191601118
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267219.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Employs historical analysis and philosophical reasoning to argue that sovereignty is inherently limited. The writings of classical theorists such as Grotius and Vattel indicate that aspirations to ...
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Employs historical analysis and philosophical reasoning to argue that sovereignty is inherently limited. The writings of classical theorists such as Grotius and Vattel indicate that aspirations to sovereignty and non-intervention have always been tempered by considerations above and beyond the state. Philosophically, it must be remembered that sovereignty is a right, and the concept of a right makes no sense in the absence of a corresponding duty. The duties that are constitutive of the rights of sovereignty constrain the behaviour of every sovereign belonging to international society. Two conclusions follow. First, there are limits on how states may treat their own citizens within their own territory. Second, other states face specific limits concerning the ill-treatment of residents within the territory of other states that they are free to ignore. In particular, genocide and massive violations of human rights are a matter of concern for all states in contemporary international society.Less
Employs historical analysis and philosophical reasoning to argue that sovereignty is inherently limited. The writings of classical theorists such as Grotius and Vattel indicate that aspirations to sovereignty and non-intervention have always been tempered by considerations above and beyond the state. Philosophically, it must be remembered that sovereignty is a right, and the concept of a right makes no sense in the absence of a corresponding duty. The duties that are constitutive of the rights of sovereignty constrain the behaviour of every sovereign belonging to international society. Two conclusions follow. First, there are limits on how states may treat their own citizens within their own territory. Second, other states face specific limits concerning the ill-treatment of residents within the territory of other states that they are free to ignore. In particular, genocide and massive violations of human rights are a matter of concern for all states in contemporary international society.
George F. DeMartino and Jonathan D. Moyer
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781474414470
- eISBN:
- 9781474427005
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474414470.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter presents three cosmopolitan approaches to global health care justice: Thomas Pogge's negative duties based approach, Gillian Brock's minimal needs view, and Henry Shue's model of basic ...
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This chapter presents three cosmopolitan approaches to global health care justice: Thomas Pogge's negative duties based approach, Gillian Brock's minimal needs view, and Henry Shue's model of basic rights. While these approaches share a common focus on attempting to justify the existence of global duties to aid, held by the wealthy and owed to the global poor, each offers a distinct interpretation of why such duties exist and suggests a range of options for fulfilling them. Importantly, while the chapter argues that Shue's approach to global duties is the most effective of the three, it considers that they all offer important insight into the problem of global poverty and provide a variety of possible practical solutions to this problem.Less
This chapter presents three cosmopolitan approaches to global health care justice: Thomas Pogge's negative duties based approach, Gillian Brock's minimal needs view, and Henry Shue's model of basic rights. While these approaches share a common focus on attempting to justify the existence of global duties to aid, held by the wealthy and owed to the global poor, each offers a distinct interpretation of why such duties exist and suggests a range of options for fulfilling them. Importantly, while the chapter argues that Shue's approach to global duties is the most effective of the three, it considers that they all offer important insight into the problem of global poverty and provide a variety of possible practical solutions to this problem.
Jeremy Waldron
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter addresses the question of whether we should give up any of our rights for the sake of security. It considers the notion that security might be a precondition for enjoying any rights at ...
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This chapter addresses the question of whether we should give up any of our rights for the sake of security. It considers the notion that security might be a precondition for enjoying any rights at all. In doing so, it uses an earlier analysis of the relation between security and rights, set out in Henry Shue’s book, Basic Rights.Less
This chapter addresses the question of whether we should give up any of our rights for the sake of security. It considers the notion that security might be a precondition for enjoying any rights at all. In doing so, it uses an earlier analysis of the relation between security and rights, set out in Henry Shue’s book, Basic Rights.
Thomas Pogge
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter analyses the stages of Shue’s argument in Basic Rights, which starts from the premise that human beings have moral rights, specifically claim rights in Hohfeld’s sense. This premise ...
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This chapter analyses the stages of Shue’s argument in Basic Rights, which starts from the premise that human beings have moral rights, specifically claim rights in Hohfeld’s sense. This premise leaves open the content of our moral rights as well as their importance relative to one another and relative to other reasons for action. Noting considerable disagreement about these matters, Shue proposed a criterion for identifying the content, or (as he calls it) substance, of our most weighty, most important rights. Employing this criterion, he argues that four clusters of rights — security rights, subsistence rights, liberty rights, and political participation rights — satisfy this criterion. Shue concludes that these four rights clusters ‘are everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity’. Because all four clusters of rights impose both negative and positive duties, the common libertarian dismissal of subsistence rights fails.Less
This chapter analyses the stages of Shue’s argument in Basic Rights, which starts from the premise that human beings have moral rights, specifically claim rights in Hohfeld’s sense. This premise leaves open the content of our moral rights as well as their importance relative to one another and relative to other reasons for action. Noting considerable disagreement about these matters, Shue proposed a criterion for identifying the content, or (as he calls it) substance, of our most weighty, most important rights. Employing this criterion, he argues that four clusters of rights — security rights, subsistence rights, liberty rights, and political participation rights — satisfy this criterion. Shue concludes that these four rights clusters ‘are everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity’. Because all four clusters of rights impose both negative and positive duties, the common libertarian dismissal of subsistence rights fails.
Nigel Biggar
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198861973
- eISBN:
- 9780191894770
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198861973.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
During the discussion of natural rights-talk in Chapters 1 to 5, it was argued that claims to an absolute status do not survive scrutiny. Moreover, a main conclusion was that such rights-talk, ...
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During the discussion of natural rights-talk in Chapters 1 to 5, it was argued that claims to an absolute status do not survive scrutiny. Moreover, a main conclusion was that such rights-talk, trading on the legal paradigm’s connotations of stability and security, tends to obscure the conditionality of a putative natural right upon a range of moral considerations. Further, John Finnis’s absolute rights were judged to be either not natural, or too abstract and unspecified to be practically illuminating. This chapter returns to the topic, to consider whether, and how, it can make good sense to talk of absolute rights—that is, rights against kinds of action wrong per se, which must therefore be always granted and never suspended, regardless of the circumstances, especially the consequences. Since the right against torture is the paradigm of an absolute right, that is the focus here. The chapter concludes that there are kinds of action that are absolutely wrong by definition, and one of these is (sadistic, domineering, humiliating) ‘torture’. Therefore, there is a natural moral duty never to perform such an action. However, since there are no natural moral rights at all, there is no natural right against this. Nonetheless, there are good moral reasons of prudence why there should always be an absolute legal right against ‘torture’, so defined as to encompass all instances of non-consensual pain infliction, even though rare cases of the latter might be morally permissible. There is, therefore, at least one absolute legal right.Less
During the discussion of natural rights-talk in Chapters 1 to 5, it was argued that claims to an absolute status do not survive scrutiny. Moreover, a main conclusion was that such rights-talk, trading on the legal paradigm’s connotations of stability and security, tends to obscure the conditionality of a putative natural right upon a range of moral considerations. Further, John Finnis’s absolute rights were judged to be either not natural, or too abstract and unspecified to be practically illuminating. This chapter returns to the topic, to consider whether, and how, it can make good sense to talk of absolute rights—that is, rights against kinds of action wrong per se, which must therefore be always granted and never suspended, regardless of the circumstances, especially the consequences. Since the right against torture is the paradigm of an absolute right, that is the focus here. The chapter concludes that there are kinds of action that are absolutely wrong by definition, and one of these is (sadistic, domineering, humiliating) ‘torture’. Therefore, there is a natural moral duty never to perform such an action. However, since there are no natural moral rights at all, there is no natural right against this. Nonetheless, there are good moral reasons of prudence why there should always be an absolute legal right against ‘torture’, so defined as to encompass all instances of non-consensual pain infliction, even though rare cases of the latter might be morally permissible. There is, therefore, at least one absolute legal right.
Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter begins with an overview of Henry Shue’s seminal work on political philosophy, Basic Rights. It characterizes the important central argument of the book and poses some ...
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This introductory chapter begins with an overview of Henry Shue’s seminal work on political philosophy, Basic Rights. It characterizes the important central argument of the book and poses some preliminary questions about both its persuasiveness and its implications. These questions situate the research agenda launched by Basic Rights, which each of the subsequent chapters assess and further extend.Less
This introductory chapter begins with an overview of Henry Shue’s seminal work on political philosophy, Basic Rights. It characterizes the important central argument of the book and poses some preliminary questions about both its persuasiveness and its implications. These questions situate the research agenda launched by Basic Rights, which each of the subsequent chapters assess and further extend.
William Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195173475
- eISBN:
- 9780199835331
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195173473.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this chapter, Talbott explains the development of autonomy rights as a response to the failure of paternalistic defenses of autocracy (e.g., Plato’s Republic and the Marxist dictatorships of the ...
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In this chapter, Talbott explains the development of autonomy rights as a response to the failure of paternalistic defenses of autocracy (e.g., Plato’s Republic and the Marxist dictatorships of the 20th century). Talbott discusses two alternative ways of explaining the importance of autonomy rights, one consequentialist and one nonconsequentialist. Talbott focuses on the consequentialist account. Talbott proposes a non-metaphysical conception of autonomy as involving good judgment (making generally reliable judgments about one's own good) and self-determination (making choices on the basis of one's judgments). Talbott claims that one of the most important discoveries in the development of human rights is the discovery that the claim of first person authority is true—that is, the discovery, first announced by J.S. Mill, that, given the necessary education and training, all normal human beings are capable of becoming generally reliable judges of what is good for them. Talbott defines two categories of autonomy rights—development-of-judgment rights and exercise-of-judgment rights— that are necessary for the judgments of normal adults to be generally reliable. He argues that for a government to reliably promote the well-being of its citizens, the government must obtain and be appropriately responsive to reliable feedback from its citizens about the effects of its policies. This is the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem. Talbott argues that guarantees of autonomy rights are essential parts of any solution to the reliable feedback problem. The chapter concludes with a list of eight autonomy rights.Less
In this chapter, Talbott explains the development of autonomy rights as a response to the failure of paternalistic defenses of autocracy (e.g., Plato’s Republic and the Marxist dictatorships of the 20th century). Talbott discusses two alternative ways of explaining the importance of autonomy rights, one consequentialist and one nonconsequentialist. Talbott focuses on the consequentialist account. Talbott proposes a non-metaphysical conception of autonomy as involving good judgment (making generally reliable judgments about one's own good) and self-determination (making choices on the basis of one's judgments). Talbott claims that one of the most important discoveries in the development of human rights is the discovery that the claim of first person authority is true—that is, the discovery, first announced by J.S. Mill, that, given the necessary education and training, all normal human beings are capable of becoming generally reliable judges of what is good for them. Talbott defines two categories of autonomy rights—development-of-judgment rights and exercise-of-judgment rights— that are necessary for the judgments of normal adults to be generally reliable. He argues that for a government to reliably promote the well-being of its citizens, the government must obtain and be appropriately responsive to reliable feedback from its citizens about the effects of its policies. This is the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem. Talbott argues that guarantees of autonomy rights are essential parts of any solution to the reliable feedback problem. The chapter concludes with a list of eight autonomy rights.
Andrew Hurrell
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter begins by situating Shue’s analysis of basic rights within the broader development of a liberal solidarist conception of international society, especially as this was understood in the ...
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This chapter begins by situating Shue’s analysis of basic rights within the broader development of a liberal solidarist conception of international society, especially as this was understood in the period immediately following the Cold War. It then sketches some of the principal arguments in favour of the view that we are witnessing a return to Westphalia, and draws out the implications of these arguments for basic rights. The concluding section suggests why such a view is at least incomplete and why the idea of basic rights continues to show a perhaps surprising degree of resilience.Less
This chapter begins by situating Shue’s analysis of basic rights within the broader development of a liberal solidarist conception of international society, especially as this was understood in the period immediately following the Cold War. It then sketches some of the principal arguments in favour of the view that we are witnessing a return to Westphalia, and draws out the implications of these arguments for basic rights. The concluding section suggests why such a view is at least incomplete and why the idea of basic rights continues to show a perhaps surprising degree of resilience.
Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
Politically, as well as philosophically, concerns with human rights have permeated many of the most important debates on social justice worldwide for fully a half-century. Henry Shue’s 1980 book on ...
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Politically, as well as philosophically, concerns with human rights have permeated many of the most important debates on social justice worldwide for fully a half-century. Henry Shue’s 1980 book on Basic Rights proved to be a pioneering contribution to those debates, and one that continues to elicit both critical and constructive comment. This book brings together many of the most influential contemporary writers in political philosophy and international relations to explore some of the most challenging theoretical and practical questions that Shue’s work provokes. These range from the question of the responsibilities of the global rich to redress severe poverty to the permissibility of using torture to gain information to fight international terrorism. The chapters explore the continuing value of the idea of ‘basic rights’ in understanding moral challenges as diverse as child labour and global climate change.Less
Politically, as well as philosophically, concerns with human rights have permeated many of the most important debates on social justice worldwide for fully a half-century. Henry Shue’s 1980 book on Basic Rights proved to be a pioneering contribution to those debates, and one that continues to elicit both critical and constructive comment. This book brings together many of the most influential contemporary writers in political philosophy and international relations to explore some of the most challenging theoretical and practical questions that Shue’s work provokes. These range from the question of the responsibilities of the global rich to redress severe poverty to the permissibility of using torture to gain information to fight international terrorism. The chapters explore the continuing value of the idea of ‘basic rights’ in understanding moral challenges as diverse as child labour and global climate change.
Nigel Biggar
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198861973
- eISBN:
- 9780191894770
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198861973.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter completes the testing of the Sceptical Tradition’s objections to natural rights, by examining the thought of a selection of contemporary thinkers, in addition to that of John Finnis (in ...
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This chapter completes the testing of the Sceptical Tradition’s objections to natural rights, by examining the thought of a selection of contemporary thinkers, in addition to that of John Finnis (in Chapter 4). Those selected are Onora O’Neill (and in relation to her, John Tasioulas, Elizabeth Ashford, and Henry Shue), Nicholas Wolterstorff, and James Griffin (and in relation to him, Allen Buchanan). From this examination the conclusion is drawn that the arguments made by Shue, Tasioulas, Ashford, and Griffin fail to dislodge O’Neill’s ‘radical’ critique, namely, that where capable holders of feasible correspondent duties have not been identified, universal human rights are illusory. This implies that rights are contingent on the circumstances of feasibility and capability, and that there is no constant natural right. The chapter then proceeds to draw general conclusions from the testing of natural rights-talk in Chapters 2 to 5. One seminal conclusion is that the paradigm of a right is positively legal, commanding the support of such institutions as police and courts. This is what explains its distinctive authority vis-à-vis other claims. It follows that a natural right, existing apart from civil society and so lacking institutional support, is, at best, analogous to a proper, legal right. However, since the very concept of a right connotes the stability and security of a legal right, natural rights-talk misleads and is best avoided. Therefore, while there is natural right or law or morality, and while there are legal rights justified by natural morality, there are no natural rights.Less
This chapter completes the testing of the Sceptical Tradition’s objections to natural rights, by examining the thought of a selection of contemporary thinkers, in addition to that of John Finnis (in Chapter 4). Those selected are Onora O’Neill (and in relation to her, John Tasioulas, Elizabeth Ashford, and Henry Shue), Nicholas Wolterstorff, and James Griffin (and in relation to him, Allen Buchanan). From this examination the conclusion is drawn that the arguments made by Shue, Tasioulas, Ashford, and Griffin fail to dislodge O’Neill’s ‘radical’ critique, namely, that where capable holders of feasible correspondent duties have not been identified, universal human rights are illusory. This implies that rights are contingent on the circumstances of feasibility and capability, and that there is no constant natural right. The chapter then proceeds to draw general conclusions from the testing of natural rights-talk in Chapters 2 to 5. One seminal conclusion is that the paradigm of a right is positively legal, commanding the support of such institutions as police and courts. This is what explains its distinctive authority vis-à-vis other claims. It follows that a natural right, existing apart from civil society and so lacking institutional support, is, at best, analogous to a proper, legal right. However, since the very concept of a right connotes the stability and security of a legal right, natural rights-talk misleads and is best avoided. Therefore, while there is natural right or law or morality, and while there are legal rights justified by natural morality, there are no natural rights.
Judith Lichtenberg
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
In Basic Rights Shue argued that subsistence rights — rights to a minimum level of well-being, sometimes called welfare rights or economic rights — are on a par with rights to physical security, ...
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In Basic Rights Shue argued that subsistence rights — rights to a minimum level of well-being, sometimes called welfare rights or economic rights — are on a par with rights to physical security, rights ‘not to be subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault’. Shue challenged the standard view that security rights are prior to or more important than subsistence rights — or even that the arguments establishing their priority imply that subsistence rights do not exist. His account of rights is sufficiently demanding to raise the question of whether there are any rights of the sort he is discussing. This chapter examines the charge that basic rights are unacceptably demanding to see whether it stands up.Less
In Basic Rights Shue argued that subsistence rights — rights to a minimum level of well-being, sometimes called welfare rights or economic rights — are on a par with rights to physical security, rights ‘not to be subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault’. Shue challenged the standard view that security rights are prior to or more important than subsistence rights — or even that the arguments establishing their priority imply that subsistence rights do not exist. His account of rights is sufficiently demanding to raise the question of whether there are any rights of the sort he is discussing. This chapter examines the charge that basic rights are unacceptably demanding to see whether it stands up.
David Luban
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter analyses the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ (TBS), which is frequently used to justify torture. Topics covered include myth and fact in the TBS; the TBS and the innocent victim; the evils of ...
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This chapter analyses the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ (TBS), which is frequently used to justify torture. Topics covered include myth and fact in the TBS; the TBS and the innocent victim; the evils of torture; Shue’s 2005 paper on torture; the costs and benefits of a torture bureaucracy; and the limits of moral rationality.Less
This chapter analyses the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ (TBS), which is frequently used to justify torture. Topics covered include myth and fact in the TBS; the TBS and the innocent victim; the evils of torture; Shue’s 2005 paper on torture; the costs and benefits of a torture bureaucracy; and the limits of moral rationality.
Simon Caney
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
Shue’s analysis of climate change makes very little use of the concept of rights in general, and basic rights in particular. This chapter suggests that a rights-centred approach provides a fruitful ...
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Shue’s analysis of climate change makes very little use of the concept of rights in general, and basic rights in particular. This chapter suggests that a rights-centred approach provides a fruitful way of thinking about climate change, and argues that anthropogenic climate change jeopardizes fundamental human rights. This prompts the question ‘who is duty-bound to uphold these rights’? An account of the responsibilities generated by these rights is developed, which is then contrasted with the account defended by Shue.Less
Shue’s analysis of climate change makes very little use of the concept of rights in general, and basic rights in particular. This chapter suggests that a rights-centred approach provides a fruitful way of thinking about climate change, and argues that anthropogenic climate change jeopardizes fundamental human rights. This prompts the question ‘who is duty-bound to uphold these rights’? An account of the responsibilities generated by these rights is developed, which is then contrasted with the account defended by Shue.
Christian Reus-Smit
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter takes Henry Shue’s two ideas on rights and turns them to new purposes. The first idea comes from his oft-quoted article, ‘Mediating Duties’. Shue believes that we ought to look to ...
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This chapter takes Henry Shue’s two ideas on rights and turns them to new purposes. The first idea comes from his oft-quoted article, ‘Mediating Duties’. Shue believes that we ought to look to institutions to satisfy universal human rights where our capacities to do so as individuals are limited. The chapter recasts the mediating role of institutions as an empirical-theoretic proposition. It suggests that rights are necessarily ‘institutionally referential’, that (among other things) the most basic individual rights require an institution that is charged with satisfying and protecting them. For this reason, struggles for individual rights have always championed an institutional solution, a particular institutional arrangement that can meet the needs of rights claimants. The second idea — the idea of rights as power mediators — is found in his classic work, Basic Rights. Shue’s purpose is to explain the nature of rights as distinctive moral claims and to justify why they should condition our political practices. Explaining their nature and function as power mediators is not his objective, nor is it that of most rights theorists. The chapter attempts to flesh out what it means to think of rights in this way, to explore their role in structuring social power relations.Less
This chapter takes Henry Shue’s two ideas on rights and turns them to new purposes. The first idea comes from his oft-quoted article, ‘Mediating Duties’. Shue believes that we ought to look to institutions to satisfy universal human rights where our capacities to do so as individuals are limited. The chapter recasts the mediating role of institutions as an empirical-theoretic proposition. It suggests that rights are necessarily ‘institutionally referential’, that (among other things) the most basic individual rights require an institution that is charged with satisfying and protecting them. For this reason, struggles for individual rights have always championed an institutional solution, a particular institutional arrangement that can meet the needs of rights claimants. The second idea — the idea of rights as power mediators — is found in his classic work, Basic Rights. Shue’s purpose is to explain the nature of rights as distinctive moral claims and to justify why they should condition our political practices. Explaining their nature and function as power mediators is not his objective, nor is it that of most rights theorists. The chapter attempts to flesh out what it means to think of rights in this way, to explore their role in structuring social power relations.
Neta C. Crawford
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter begins with a discussion of three related discourses on moral responsibility. The first is an argument over whether we are obliged to act to help distant others, and if so, just exactly ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of three related discourses on moral responsibility. The first is an argument over whether we are obliged to act to help distant others, and if so, just exactly what we owe them. In the second discourse, the argument is no longer whether we can or ought to care about others, or what we specifically owe them, but the procedures for enacting our responsibilities. In other words, the second discourse is about how to act: what arrangements and procedures could produce more just outcomes? The third discourse is provoked by the frustration occasioned by specific cases and conditions. How shall humans increase our capacities so that we know when to act, how to act, and when to stop acting to promote global basic rights? The chapter describes how discourse in world politics has moved from the first to the second discourse. It then suggests a parallel set of capacities as prerequisites for building more responsible individual actors and social institutions. These prerequisites are dispositions (to see, empathize, and act), embedded in general and particular knowledge (of moral language and about historical relations of self and other), supported by procedures for deliberation.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of three related discourses on moral responsibility. The first is an argument over whether we are obliged to act to help distant others, and if so, just exactly what we owe them. In the second discourse, the argument is no longer whether we can or ought to care about others, or what we specifically owe them, but the procedures for enacting our responsibilities. In other words, the second discourse is about how to act: what arrangements and procedures could produce more just outcomes? The third discourse is provoked by the frustration occasioned by specific cases and conditions. How shall humans increase our capacities so that we know when to act, how to act, and when to stop acting to promote global basic rights? The chapter describes how discourse in world politics has moved from the first to the second discourse. It then suggests a parallel set of capacities as prerequisites for building more responsible individual actors and social institutions. These prerequisites are dispositions (to see, empathize, and act), embedded in general and particular knowledge (of moral language and about historical relations of self and other), supported by procedures for deliberation.
Hilary Greaves
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- April 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198824770
- eISBN:
- 9780191863486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198824770.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
Rights-based and consequentialist approaches to ethics are often seen as being diametrically opposed to one another. This is entirely understandable, since to say that X has a (moral) right to Y is ...
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Rights-based and consequentialist approaches to ethics are often seen as being diametrically opposed to one another. This is entirely understandable, since to say that X has a (moral) right to Y is in part to assert that there are (moral) reasons to provide X with Y even if doing so foreseeably will not lead to better consequences. However, a ‘global’ form of consequentialism raises the possibility of some sort of reconciliation: it could be that the best framework for the regulation of international affairs (say) is one that employs a notion of rights, but if so, that (according to global consequentialism) is the case because regulating international affairs in that manner tends, as a matter of empirical fact, to lead to better consequences. By way of case study, this chapter applies these ideas to a recent dispute about the morality and laws of war, between Jeff McMahan and Henry Shue.Less
Rights-based and consequentialist approaches to ethics are often seen as being diametrically opposed to one another. This is entirely understandable, since to say that X has a (moral) right to Y is in part to assert that there are (moral) reasons to provide X with Y even if doing so foreseeably will not lead to better consequences. However, a ‘global’ form of consequentialism raises the possibility of some sort of reconciliation: it could be that the best framework for the regulation of international affairs (say) is one that employs a notion of rights, but if so, that (according to global consequentialism) is the case because regulating international affairs in that manner tends, as a matter of empirical fact, to lead to better consequences. By way of case study, this chapter applies these ideas to a recent dispute about the morality and laws of war, between Jeff McMahan and Henry Shue.
Elizabeth Ashford
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter reinforces two of Shue’s principal arguments against the existence of a fundamental distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights, such that only the former are genuine human ...
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This chapter reinforces two of Shue’s principal arguments against the existence of a fundamental distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights, such that only the former are genuine human rights. The first argument is that the enjoyment of the right to subsistence is essential to the enjoyment of any other rights, and so has to be acknowledged as a basic human right. The second argument addresses the duties imposed by welfare rights. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses Shue’s account of the interdependence between the right to subsistence and other rights. Section 2 argues for a substantive interdependence between them. Section 3 analyses the Kantian rationale for the claim that duties of justice must be perfect in nature, and that positive duties, unlike negative duties, cannot be general duties of justice. Section 4 discusses Onora O’Neill’s account of coercion, and argues that child labour plausibly constitutes coercion on this account. Section 5 argues that, because of the interdependence of the right against child labour and the right to subsistence, then unless the right to subsistence has been secured, the right against child labour is more plausibly seen as imposing imperfect duties. It concludes that the standard dichotomies between positive and negative duties are overly rigid.Less
This chapter reinforces two of Shue’s principal arguments against the existence of a fundamental distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights, such that only the former are genuine human rights. The first argument is that the enjoyment of the right to subsistence is essential to the enjoyment of any other rights, and so has to be acknowledged as a basic human right. The second argument addresses the duties imposed by welfare rights. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses Shue’s account of the interdependence between the right to subsistence and other rights. Section 2 argues for a substantive interdependence between them. Section 3 analyses the Kantian rationale for the claim that duties of justice must be perfect in nature, and that positive duties, unlike negative duties, cannot be general duties of justice. Section 4 discusses Onora O’Neill’s account of coercion, and argues that child labour plausibly constitutes coercion on this account. Section 5 argues that, because of the interdependence of the right against child labour and the right to subsistence, then unless the right to subsistence has been secured, the right against child labour is more plausibly seen as imposing imperfect duties. It concludes that the standard dichotomies between positive and negative duties are overly rigid.
Marcia Baron
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226529387
- eISBN:
- 9780226529554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226529554.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
Recent literature arguing for, or reaffirming, the impermissibility of torture has deplored the ticking bomb hypothetical and its frequent invocation. Examples of such arguments are found in the work ...
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Recent literature arguing for, or reaffirming, the impermissibility of torture has deplored the ticking bomb hypothetical and its frequent invocation. Examples of such arguments are found in the work of David Luban and Henry Shue. This chapter shares their views, by and large, but at the same time holds that just what is so problematic about the hypothetical remains somewhat unclear. This chapter differentiates this use of a hypothetical, or thought experiment from those famously put forward by Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson, arguing that the ticking bomb hypothetical has the singular problem that it relies for its effectiveness on the plausibility of the scenario, and yet it is put forward as if like other hypotheticals its plausibility does not matter. In the rest of the chapter the author shows how very implausible the hypothetical is, drawing from the work of Darius Rejali, former FBI agent Ali Soufan, and others. In brief, it relies on the false notion that torture is more effective in eliciting the truth than "non-enhanced" interrogation or that a combination of the two works better than the latter.Less
Recent literature arguing for, or reaffirming, the impermissibility of torture has deplored the ticking bomb hypothetical and its frequent invocation. Examples of such arguments are found in the work of David Luban and Henry Shue. This chapter shares their views, by and large, but at the same time holds that just what is so problematic about the hypothetical remains somewhat unclear. This chapter differentiates this use of a hypothetical, or thought experiment from those famously put forward by Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson, arguing that the ticking bomb hypothetical has the singular problem that it relies for its effectiveness on the plausibility of the scenario, and yet it is put forward as if like other hypotheticals its plausibility does not matter. In the rest of the chapter the author shows how very implausible the hypothetical is, drawing from the work of Darius Rejali, former FBI agent Ali Soufan, and others. In brief, it relies on the false notion that torture is more effective in eliciting the truth than "non-enhanced" interrogation or that a combination of the two works better than the latter.
Richard W. Miller
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
Henry Shue’s Basic Rights is an especially influential, enduring, and insightful effort in the quest to alleviate global poverty. But despite admiration for the resourcefulness and insight of Shue ...
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Henry Shue’s Basic Rights is an especially influential, enduring, and insightful effort in the quest to alleviate global poverty. But despite admiration for the resourcefulness and insight of Shue and other leaders of the quest, some questers have lost faith in this and other established expeditions. This chapter sketches some reasons for discouragement, and then lays out a new approach, which could reach the goal if the old paths are blocked. The approach relies on specific characterizations, established through empirical scrutiny of current transnational activity, in arguing that people in developed countries have a demanding responsibility to transform their current relationships to people in developing countries in order to avoid taking advantage of them. This can bridge the gap between the sadness of the fact that so many suffer from unmet desperate needs and a demanding duty, pervasive in developed countries, to help foreigners to meet them.Less
Henry Shue’s Basic Rights is an especially influential, enduring, and insightful effort in the quest to alleviate global poverty. But despite admiration for the resourcefulness and insight of Shue and other leaders of the quest, some questers have lost faith in this and other established expeditions. This chapter sketches some reasons for discouragement, and then lays out a new approach, which could reach the goal if the old paths are blocked. The approach relies on specific characterizations, established through empirical scrutiny of current transnational activity, in arguing that people in developed countries have a demanding responsibility to transform their current relationships to people in developing countries in order to avoid taking advantage of them. This can bridge the gap between the sadness of the fact that so many suffer from unmet desperate needs and a demanding duty, pervasive in developed countries, to help foreigners to meet them.