Thomas J. Laub
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199539321
- eISBN:
- 9780191715808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539321.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Military History, European Modern History
At the start of the Occupation, Theodor Dannecker and junior SS officials built an apparatus to facilitate the deportation of Jews while superiors like Helmut Knochen accrued power. Once vested with ...
More
At the start of the Occupation, Theodor Dannecker and junior SS officials built an apparatus to facilitate the deportation of Jews while superiors like Helmut Knochen accrued power. Once vested with executive authority, Adolf Eichmann, Heinz Röthke, and other SS leaders pressed for the immediate deportation of Jews, but personnel shortages hamstrung the efforts of the Black Corps. Previous disagreements with Otto von Stülpnagel precluded substantial support from the military administration. Pierre Laval's enthusiasm for racial deportations evaporated as French opposition to deportations mounted, Germany's prospects for victory dimmed, and cooperation with the SS yielded few diplomatic concessions. With a brief limited to security, Oberg could not accommodate other French and German institutions and secure broad‐based support for the Final Solution. As a result, three‐quarters of the Jews who lived in France managed to survive World War II.Less
At the start of the Occupation, Theodor Dannecker and junior SS officials built an apparatus to facilitate the deportation of Jews while superiors like Helmut Knochen accrued power. Once vested with executive authority, Adolf Eichmann, Heinz Röthke, and other SS leaders pressed for the immediate deportation of Jews, but personnel shortages hamstrung the efforts of the Black Corps. Previous disagreements with Otto von Stülpnagel precluded substantial support from the military administration. Pierre Laval's enthusiasm for racial deportations evaporated as French opposition to deportations mounted, Germany's prospects for victory dimmed, and cooperation with the SS yielded few diplomatic concessions. With a brief limited to security, Oberg could not accommodate other French and German institutions and secure broad‐based support for the Final Solution. As a result, three‐quarters of the Jews who lived in France managed to survive World War II.
Thomas J. Laub
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199539321
- eISBN:
- 9780191715808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539321.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History, European Modern History
On the morning of 21 August 1941, French Communist Party activists launched a wave of symbolic assassinations by shooting Alfons Moser, a young German naval cadet. Although preoccupied by events on ...
More
On the morning of 21 August 1941, French Communist Party activists launched a wave of symbolic assassinations by shooting Alfons Moser, a young German naval cadet. Although preoccupied by events on the eastern front during the Moser attack, Hitler learned about subsequent assaults, condemned Stülpnagel's response of gradually increasing reprisals as ‘much too mild’, and ordered the execution of 50 to 100 hostages after every assassination. Wilhelm Keitel, Walther von Brauchitsch, Eduard Wagner, and other senior officers in Berlin condemned Stülpnagel's restraint, joined senior Nazis like Joseph Goebbels, and pressed for severe countermeasures against Jews who allegedly organized all resistance activity. Demonstrating the ideological purity of the SS, Helmut Knochen ordered SS minions to bomb seven Parisian Synagogues, embarrassed Stüpnagel, and earned the enmity of the German military administration. This chapter examines security debates between the military administration, SS, and German diplomats in Paris and a second argument between generals in Paris and Nazis in Berlin.Less
On the morning of 21 August 1941, French Communist Party activists launched a wave of symbolic assassinations by shooting Alfons Moser, a young German naval cadet. Although preoccupied by events on the eastern front during the Moser attack, Hitler learned about subsequent assaults, condemned Stülpnagel's response of gradually increasing reprisals as ‘much too mild’, and ordered the execution of 50 to 100 hostages after every assassination. Wilhelm Keitel, Walther von Brauchitsch, Eduard Wagner, and other senior officers in Berlin condemned Stülpnagel's restraint, joined senior Nazis like Joseph Goebbels, and pressed for severe countermeasures against Jews who allegedly organized all resistance activity. Demonstrating the ideological purity of the SS, Helmut Knochen ordered SS minions to bomb seven Parisian Synagogues, embarrassed Stüpnagel, and earned the enmity of the German military administration. This chapter examines security debates between the military administration, SS, and German diplomats in Paris and a second argument between generals in Paris and Nazis in Berlin.
