Mark de Rond
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781501705489
- eISBN:
- 9781501707940
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501705489.001.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
This book is a candid account of a trauma surgical team based, for a tour of duty, at a field hospital in Helmand, Afghanistan. It tells of the highs and lows of surgical life in hard-hitting detail, ...
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This book is a candid account of a trauma surgical team based, for a tour of duty, at a field hospital in Helmand, Afghanistan. It tells of the highs and lows of surgical life in hard-hitting detail, bringing to life a morally ambiguous world in which good people face impossible choices and in which routines designed to normalize experience have the unintended effect of highlighting war's absurdity. With stories that are at once comical and tragic, the book captures the surreal experience of being a doctor at war. It lifts the cover on a world rarely ever seen, let alone written about, and provides a poignant counterpoint to the archetypical, adrenaline-packed, macho tale of what it is like to go to war. Here the crude and visceral coexist with the tender and affectionate. The book tells of well-meaning soldiers at hospital reception, there to deliver a pair of legs in the belief that these can be reattached to their comrade, now in mid-surgery; of midsummer Christmas parties and pancake breakfasts and late-night sauna sessions; of interpersonal rivalries and banter; of caring too little or too much; of tenderness and compassion fatigue; of hell and redemption; of heroism and of playing God. This is one of the first books ever to bring to life the experience of the doctors and surgical teams tasked with mending what war destroys.Less
This book is a candid account of a trauma surgical team based, for a tour of duty, at a field hospital in Helmand, Afghanistan. It tells of the highs and lows of surgical life in hard-hitting detail, bringing to life a morally ambiguous world in which good people face impossible choices and in which routines designed to normalize experience have the unintended effect of highlighting war's absurdity. With stories that are at once comical and tragic, the book captures the surreal experience of being a doctor at war. It lifts the cover on a world rarely ever seen, let alone written about, and provides a poignant counterpoint to the archetypical, adrenaline-packed, macho tale of what it is like to go to war. Here the crude and visceral coexist with the tender and affectionate. The book tells of well-meaning soldiers at hospital reception, there to deliver a pair of legs in the belief that these can be reattached to their comrade, now in mid-surgery; of midsummer Christmas parties and pancake breakfasts and late-night sauna sessions; of interpersonal rivalries and banter; of caring too little or too much; of tenderness and compassion fatigue; of hell and redemption; of heroism and of playing God. This is one of the first books ever to bring to life the experience of the doctors and surgical teams tasked with mending what war destroys.
Nigel D. White
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218592
- eISBN:
- 9780191705595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218592.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
The war on terrorism, starting in earnest with the military action in Afghanistan October 2001, involved British troops acting alongside the United States against al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the ...
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The war on terrorism, starting in earnest with the military action in Afghanistan October 2001, involved British troops acting alongside the United States against al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the basis of the right of self-defence, the same right that was invoked in the Falklands War. Was the British reliance on the right of self-defence controversial either domestically or internationally? Was the fact that the action seemed to have approval from the Security Council, as well as NATO, important? While the initial operation — Operation Enduring Freedom — was based upon article 51 of the UN Charter preserving the right of self-defence, once the Taliban had been removed and al-Qaeda routed, Britain led a Security Council authorized security presence in and around Kabul providing stability while a nascent Afghan government tried to assert authority over the country. Concern was expressed in parliament at ‘mission creep’ as the functions of the NATO force (ISAF) changed, and British troops faced a resurgent Taliban in Helmand province from 2006 onwards.Less
The war on terrorism, starting in earnest with the military action in Afghanistan October 2001, involved British troops acting alongside the United States against al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the basis of the right of self-defence, the same right that was invoked in the Falklands War. Was the British reliance on the right of self-defence controversial either domestically or internationally? Was the fact that the action seemed to have approval from the Security Council, as well as NATO, important? While the initial operation — Operation Enduring Freedom — was based upon article 51 of the UN Charter preserving the right of self-defence, once the Taliban had been removed and al-Qaeda routed, Britain led a Security Council authorized security presence in and around Kabul providing stability while a nascent Afghan government tried to assert authority over the country. Concern was expressed in parliament at ‘mission creep’ as the functions of the NATO force (ISAF) changed, and British troops faced a resurgent Taliban in Helmand province from 2006 onwards.
Mark de Rond
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781501705489
- eISBN:
- 9781501707940
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501705489.003.0003
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
The author describes Camp Bastion and its fifty-bed field hospital. Prior to its handover in late 2014, Camp Bastion covered eight square miles of desert in southwestern Afghanistan and served as the ...
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The author describes Camp Bastion and its fifty-bed field hospital. Prior to its handover in late 2014, Camp Bastion covered eight square miles of desert in southwestern Afghanistan and served as the coalition's logistical hub in Helmand. Some 600 aircraft flew in and out of the camp every day. The hospital featured an ordinary and intensive care ward, a six-bed resuscitation bay (or emergency department), a four-theater (or bed) operating room, GP and dentist practices, and a pharmacy. Each day in the hospital began and ended with a meeting of department chiefs and included many of the surgeons. It was here that patients were discussed on an individual basis and life-or-death decisions made. The author discusses the hospital facilities, services, and amenities as well as day-to-day activities.Less
The author describes Camp Bastion and its fifty-bed field hospital. Prior to its handover in late 2014, Camp Bastion covered eight square miles of desert in southwestern Afghanistan and served as the coalition's logistical hub in Helmand. Some 600 aircraft flew in and out of the camp every day. The hospital featured an ordinary and intensive care ward, a six-bed resuscitation bay (or emergency department), a four-theater (or bed) operating room, GP and dentist practices, and a pharmacy. Each day in the hospital began and ended with a meeting of department chiefs and included many of the surgeons. It was here that patients were discussed on an individual basis and life-or-death decisions made. The author discusses the hospital facilities, services, and amenities as well as day-to-day activities.
David Ucko and Robert Egnell
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231164276
- eISBN:
- 9780231535410
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231164276.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This book provides a detailed account of the British army's involvement in the Basra and Helmand campaigns. It looks at the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, and ...
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This book provides a detailed account of the British army's involvement in the Basra and Helmand campaigns. It looks at the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, and exposes a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. The book recounts how the British military, long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, has encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. It shows how, in its effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, the British army has failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume provides an assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by under-governed spaces. It underscores the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.Less
This book provides a detailed account of the British army's involvement in the Basra and Helmand campaigns. It looks at the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, and exposes a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. The book recounts how the British military, long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, has encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. It shows how, in its effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, the British army has failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume provides an assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by under-governed spaces. It underscores the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231164276
- eISBN:
- 9780231535410
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231164276.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines the British counterinsurgency operations in Helmand, Afghanistan, between the years 2006 and 2012. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the British ...
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This chapter examines the British counterinsurgency operations in Helmand, Afghanistan, between the years 2006 and 2012. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the British government as one of its contributing nations, granted the control of Afghan provinces, including Helmand, to its member-nations. It was an effort to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a terrorist sanctuary. In April 2006, the UK deployed its armed forces into Helmand and implemented traditional counterinsurgency methods, thereby initiating stability and reconstruction that could be expanded over time. The armed forces, however, were unprepared, undermanned, and ill-equipped to deal with the attacks of Taliban fighters and drug lords. Various misguided and ill-conceived attempts to overcome the poor start of deployment ensued between 2007 and 2010. In stark contrast, only the efforts expended at the tactical level in 2012 were considered the correct approach.Less
This chapter examines the British counterinsurgency operations in Helmand, Afghanistan, between the years 2006 and 2012. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the British government as one of its contributing nations, granted the control of Afghan provinces, including Helmand, to its member-nations. It was an effort to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a terrorist sanctuary. In April 2006, the UK deployed its armed forces into Helmand and implemented traditional counterinsurgency methods, thereby initiating stability and reconstruction that could be expanded over time. The armed forces, however, were unprepared, undermanned, and ill-equipped to deal with the attacks of Taliban fighters and drug lords. Various misguided and ill-conceived attempts to overcome the poor start of deployment ensued between 2007 and 2010. In stark contrast, only the efforts expended at the tactical level in 2012 were considered the correct approach.
Peter Rundell
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198725015
- eISBN:
- 9780191792472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198725015.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Transition forced the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to refocus on gains that could be sustained, to prevent the instability that would come from disappointed expectations or Helmandis’ ...
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Transition forced the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to refocus on gains that could be sustained, to prevent the instability that would come from disappointed expectations or Helmandis’ experience of deterioration. It identified areas of success—notably in sub-national governance—as well as areas where pressure to deliver had swiftly built up Government infrastructure beyond what could be maintained. Recognizing that only authorities seen as legitimate would survive transition, the PRT shifted its ways of working to fit within Afghan Government channels. Drawing lessons from its own experience as well as the literature, it identified ‘Seven Deadly Sins’ of stabilization practice, encapsulated in a Guidance for Transition note.Less
Transition forced the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to refocus on gains that could be sustained, to prevent the instability that would come from disappointed expectations or Helmandis’ experience of deterioration. It identified areas of success—notably in sub-national governance—as well as areas where pressure to deliver had swiftly built up Government infrastructure beyond what could be maintained. Recognizing that only authorities seen as legitimate would survive transition, the PRT shifted its ways of working to fit within Afghan Government channels. Drawing lessons from its own experience as well as the literature, it identified ‘Seven Deadly Sins’ of stabilization practice, encapsulated in a Guidance for Transition note.
James Dunsby
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198725015
- eISBN:
- 9780191792472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198725015.003.0018
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Dunsby argues that contractors have become more significant in Western military operations, but their role is not well understood. Having defined contractors and their role, Dunsby examines their ...
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Dunsby argues that contractors have become more significant in Western military operations, but their role is not well understood. Having defined contractors and their role, Dunsby examines their contribution to the stabilization of southern Afghanistan, but notes that private contractors have been strangely absent from planning in transition. He acknowledges some of the problems with local contractors, difficult relationships with governments, and the business imperative for all companies, but argues that they have been useful in training local security forces, protection, and logistics. They may develop their coordination systems for reconstruction but re-tasking during withdrawal presents contractors with very similar problems as state organizations.Less
Dunsby argues that contractors have become more significant in Western military operations, but their role is not well understood. Having defined contractors and their role, Dunsby examines their contribution to the stabilization of southern Afghanistan, but notes that private contractors have been strangely absent from planning in transition. He acknowledges some of the problems with local contractors, difficult relationships with governments, and the business imperative for all companies, but argues that they have been useful in training local security forces, protection, and logistics. They may develop their coordination systems for reconstruction but re-tasking during withdrawal presents contractors with very similar problems as state organizations.
Oliver Lewis and Andrew Britton
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198725015
- eISBN:
- 9780191792472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198725015.003.0019
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the British experience in Helmand Province of the October 2011 shift in the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan from direct counter-insurgency to ‘security force assistance’. The ...
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This chapter discusses the British experience in Helmand Province of the October 2011 shift in the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan from direct counter-insurgency to ‘security force assistance’. The authors were members of the task force headquarters and use this personal experience alongside the campaign documentation to make theoretical interventions about military reflexivity and catharsis. The authors discuss the receipt of irregular forms of knowledge into military institutions with ambiguous and interconnected chains of command. The chapter proposes that recent military doctrinal interventions in Afghanistan are a cathartic act of self-recognition of past failures rather than purely a prescription for the conduct of operations.Less
This chapter discusses the British experience in Helmand Province of the October 2011 shift in the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan from direct counter-insurgency to ‘security force assistance’. The authors were members of the task force headquarters and use this personal experience alongside the campaign documentation to make theoretical interventions about military reflexivity and catharsis. The authors discuss the receipt of irregular forms of knowledge into military institutions with ambiguous and interconnected chains of command. The chapter proposes that recent military doctrinal interventions in Afghanistan are a cathartic act of self-recognition of past failures rather than purely a prescription for the conduct of operations.
David Mansfield
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190608316
- eISBN:
- 9780190638535
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608316.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Chapter 10 charts the livelihood trajectories of different population groups in central Helmand in response to the state's efforts to eliminate both opium production and the concurrent ...
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Chapter 10 charts the livelihood trajectories of different population groups in central Helmand in response to the state's efforts to eliminate both opium production and the concurrent counterinsurgency effort. It examines the diverse and complex socio-economic, political and ecological terrains in which the statebuilding project has taken place. It draws on political economy and rural livelihoods frameworks to show how efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation, as well as the wider statebuilding project, have reshaped the economic and political landscape of central Helmand. Particular attention is given to the underlying socio-economic and political processes that led to the encroachment of the desert land north of the Boghra Canal, and to the critical role played by the prohibition of opium poppy in the Food Zone. The chapter points to the impact of the statebuilding venture in central Helmand and how the costs and benefits have been distributed so unevenly across the rural population. Finally, it contrasts the experiences and livelihood trajectories of different population groups: those who have benefited from the international intervention, those who have suffered as a consequence of it, and those who have been driven out by the social-economic processes that it created.Less
Chapter 10 charts the livelihood trajectories of different population groups in central Helmand in response to the state's efforts to eliminate both opium production and the concurrent counterinsurgency effort. It examines the diverse and complex socio-economic, political and ecological terrains in which the statebuilding project has taken place. It draws on political economy and rural livelihoods frameworks to show how efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation, as well as the wider statebuilding project, have reshaped the economic and political landscape of central Helmand. Particular attention is given to the underlying socio-economic and political processes that led to the encroachment of the desert land north of the Boghra Canal, and to the critical role played by the prohibition of opium poppy in the Food Zone. The chapter points to the impact of the statebuilding venture in central Helmand and how the costs and benefits have been distributed so unevenly across the rural population. Finally, it contrasts the experiences and livelihood trajectories of different population groups: those who have benefited from the international intervention, those who have suffered as a consequence of it, and those who have been driven out by the social-economic processes that it created.
David Mansfield
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190608316
- eISBN:
- 9780190638535
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608316.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Chapter 9 examines the many disparate institutions that were behind the effort to ban opium production in the “Helmand Food Zone” between 2008 and 2013. It examines how drug control became such a ...
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Chapter 9 examines the many disparate institutions that were behind the effort to ban opium production in the “Helmand Food Zone” between 2008 and 2013. It examines how drug control became such a pressing priority for so many institutions and how reductions in cultivation became intimately tied to the wider statebuilding effort and individual performances of international and national actors. It documents how the ban on opium was imposed across the canal command area of Helmand and the way that a combination of agricultural inputs, crop destruction and increased state presence in the form of social provision and a significant uptick in national and international military forces, established the conditions for a reduction in opium poppy cultivation.Less
Chapter 9 examines the many disparate institutions that were behind the effort to ban opium production in the “Helmand Food Zone” between 2008 and 2013. It examines how drug control became such a pressing priority for so many institutions and how reductions in cultivation became intimately tied to the wider statebuilding effort and individual performances of international and national actors. It documents how the ban on opium was imposed across the canal command area of Helmand and the way that a combination of agricultural inputs, crop destruction and increased state presence in the form of social provision and a significant uptick in national and international military forces, established the conditions for a reduction in opium poppy cultivation.
Leslie Adrienne Payne
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190216726
- eISBN:
- 9780190492137
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190216726.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
The 2009 US military surge in Helmand Province, Afghanistan — a southern province wracked by Taliban violence—involved not only the withdrawal of British forces and the insertion of 33,000 US troops, ...
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The 2009 US military surge in Helmand Province, Afghanistan — a southern province wracked by Taliban violence—involved not only the withdrawal of British forces and the insertion of 33,000 US troops, but also the addition of scores of civilian enablers whose purpose was to act as force multipliers. The HTT to which the author was assigned was one such force multiplier. Together, the U.S. military and its many civilian enablers had to contend with two interlocking challenges: understanding the complex dynamics of Helmand Province and knowing how to best work with allied components — particularly the British — in order to achieve operational success. Tackling the latter challenge proved particularly difficult. Although the British forces transferred battlespace responsibility to the United States Marine Corps, many of its civilian components remained in order to drive the capacity building agenda. Their British civilian counterparts looked like them, thus naïveté led them to believe that collaboration would be effortless. But instead, they experienced something between stonewalling and reluctant cooperation, leading them to theorize about how to best achieve success within the ISAF framework. This chapter describes the introspective analysis that helped their individual and team maturation, performance, and production.Less
The 2009 US military surge in Helmand Province, Afghanistan — a southern province wracked by Taliban violence—involved not only the withdrawal of British forces and the insertion of 33,000 US troops, but also the addition of scores of civilian enablers whose purpose was to act as force multipliers. The HTT to which the author was assigned was one such force multiplier. Together, the U.S. military and its many civilian enablers had to contend with two interlocking challenges: understanding the complex dynamics of Helmand Province and knowing how to best work with allied components — particularly the British — in order to achieve operational success. Tackling the latter challenge proved particularly difficult. Although the British forces transferred battlespace responsibility to the United States Marine Corps, many of its civilian components remained in order to drive the capacity building agenda. Their British civilian counterparts looked like them, thus naïveté led them to believe that collaboration would be effortless. But instead, they experienced something between stonewalling and reluctant cooperation, leading them to theorize about how to best achieve success within the ISAF framework. This chapter describes the introspective analysis that helped their individual and team maturation, performance, and production.
Mike Martin
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- February 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190864545
- eISBN:
- 9780190943271
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190864545.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Based on interview data from Helmand Province, Afghanistan, this chapter explores the relationship between tribalism and jihadism from 1978-2015. The authors argue that local actors, predominantly ...
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Based on interview data from Helmand Province, Afghanistan, this chapter explores the relationship between tribalism and jihadism from 1978-2015. The authors argue that local actors, predominantly tribal, have taken on the mantles of different jihadi organizations in order to gain funding as a way of increasing their leverage in local conflicts with other actors. This relationship holds true in Helmand through the ‘jihad’ against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the civil war, the Taliban era, and the post-2001 US-led nation-building period. The author concludes that jihadi organizations, or other external organizations, need to understand and work with tribal dynamics in order to achieve their aims in tribal territories.Less
Based on interview data from Helmand Province, Afghanistan, this chapter explores the relationship between tribalism and jihadism from 1978-2015. The authors argue that local actors, predominantly tribal, have taken on the mantles of different jihadi organizations in order to gain funding as a way of increasing their leverage in local conflicts with other actors. This relationship holds true in Helmand through the ‘jihad’ against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the civil war, the Taliban era, and the post-2001 US-led nation-building period. The author concludes that jihadi organizations, or other external organizations, need to understand and work with tribal dynamics in order to achieve their aims in tribal territories.
