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The chapter is highly critical of the Wilson cabinet's failure to defend Northern Ireland's first consociational experiment, the Sunningdale Agreement, although it concedes that this agreement may have had an inevitable encounter with a coroner. It analyses the government's reaction to the 1974 strike by the Ulster Workers Council, which led to the demise of Sunningdale. The chapter also illustrates the limits of the Callaghan government's policies in Northern Ireland, including its flawed experiments in ‘Ulsterization’, ‘normalization’, and ‘criminalization’.

This chapter explores the political and theatrical context of the 1960s to establish why and how — after so many failed attempts — theatre censorship was finally abolished with the passing of the 1968 Theatres Act. It demonstrates that this was only made possible by the simultaneous efforts of playwrights (notably John Osborne and Edward Bond), directors, critics, and Members of both Houses of Parliament. The combined efforts of these different groups persuaded the government of Harold Wilson to establish in 1966 a Joint Select Committee to investigate theatre censorship. The chapter then shows how, despite growing opposition from Wilson, the committed support of the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins ensured that the unanimous recommendations of the Joint Select Committee were implemented in new legislation. The attempts by the Queen, Wilson, and the Lord Chamberlain (Lord Cobbold) to oppose the complete abolition of theatre censorship are documented. Possible reasons for the anxieties of the Royal Household are suggested.

With the Labour Party winning by a narrow majority, Harold Wilson prioritized science and technology, the arts, and education. Welfare, penal reform, and race relations were also tackled. The huge balance-of-payments deficit was unsuccessfully addressed through an unpopular series of tax increases, which in turn led to a heavy run on the pound halted only by an increase in the bank rates. The promise of the new term quickly faded under issues of a stagnant economy, the weak economic structure, and political indirection due to internal bickering. Labour relations deteriorated leading to nationwide strikes that crippled the administration further. In contrast, a flourishing pop culture helped provide some relief from the bleak economic situation. Unrelenting pressure on the sterling and gold reserves led to the eventual devaluation of the sterling and failure to improve relations in Europe over the crisis in Rhodesia heralded the downfall of the Labour party's dominance.

This chapter discusses the events leading up to Britain's decision in 1967 to reapply for membership of the European Community and bilateral contacts with Germany after the application was rejected. Harold Wilson proved to be the key figure in establishing British policy towards membership of the EEC, as he coaxed a divided Labour government into supporting a second application. The chapter argues that although this strategy did not succeed, it did serve to demonstrate a more convincing commitment to Europe and placed Britain in a position from which membership of the EEC could be negotiated once de Gaulle had left the scene. Again, Britain's approach to Europe and the strategy of a close relationship with Germany were key foreign policy issues of the period.

Harold Wilson was re-elected in March 1974 with a Labour Party minority administration and immediately took steps to deal with the price explosions and inflationary pressures stemming from the oil crisis. Foreign policy involved strengthening relations with the United States and trying to renegotiate Britain's terms of entry into the European Common Market. The government also contended with issues of devolution in Scotland and Wales, and the violent conflicts in Northern Ireland. Headway was made in appeasing the trade unions through compromise agreements that ensured some measure of industrial peace. Wilson stepped down in the middle of his term and was replaced by James Callaghan who was forced to use public spending and budget cuts coupled with a loan from the International Monetary Fund to stabilize the pound and calm the markets. Britain's debtor status, coupled with continued divisiveness within the two political parties continued to drag morale down.

Chapter 4 charts the conduct of US–UK relations following the return to office of Harold Wilson in March 1974. Wilson sought to re-establish closer US–UK relations and hoped it would engender a level of influence on US policy and that, in turn, it would allow the British to play a more decisive and influential world role. Wilson, however, was ultimately unsuccessful because his continual defence cutbacks to the UK military weakened the utility of Britain as an ally for the US, and the Cyprus crisis of 1974 demonstrated that British policy-makers had limited influence over US policy. Wilson's defence cuts would be a constant irritant to Washington and again the intelligence and nuclear relationship between the two countries was utilised as a diplomatic tool by Washington to convince Wilson to limit the scope of his defence cuts. Ultimately, such efforts proved rather ineffectual. Yet, this chapter balances such judgments by demonstrating that political cooperation between the two sides remained remarkably close. Wilson continued to support the main currents of US international policy, and, even though threats were made about its cancellation, the nuclear and intelligence partnership continued.

This chapter highlights both the obvious limitations and marked successes of the SD’s strategy of influencing Labour policy as Harold Wilson became prime minister. Taking the ‘surcharge crisis’ as its starting point, it explains in greater detail why the SD responded negatively to the European policy of the new Wilson government and how throughout the winter and spring of 1964–65 SD leader Jens Otto Krag set about not only reducing the surcharge but also transforming the issue into a much more fundamental debate about the future of British and Danish ties with the EEC. It then explores the oft-discussed bridge-building initiative that emerged in early 1965 in part precisely because of this effort, before exploring what meetings between Krag and Wilson at the end of 1965 can tell us about the exact timing of Labour’s warming to the idea of a second EEC bid. The final part of the chapter addresses relations between the two parties in the first half of 1966, a period which for the SD at least began with high hopes of an imminent British bid but ended with disappointment over a lack of clarity about the nature of Britain’s future relationship with the EEC.

This chapter sets the scene for the book. It establishes the state of relations between Britain and Germany as the Labour government took office, as a yardstick against which to determine whether continuity or change marked the following six years. It also explores the domestic pressures — economic, party political and public opinion — that motivated actions by Harold Wilson and his ministers, especially in the period immediately after October 1964. In this period, there were incidents that might have had a damaging and lasting effect upon the understanding between Britain and Germany, but both governments recognised that ultimately their interests were better served by a good relationship, and agreed to increase their bilateral contacts to ensure that the improvement in relations that had been fostered by the previous Conservative government was maintained.

The build-up to the second application for British EEC membership, launched in May 1967, is the subject of this chapter. Despite the Labour landslide general election victory in March 1966 and public protestations to the contrary, by June 1966 very little progress towards a second British membership bid appeared to have been made. This chapter delineates several factors – notably the July 1966 sterling crisis – that are already acknowledged as having helped change this state of affairs. But it further highlights how the threat of a possible lone Scandinavian application for EEC entry, a policy pursued with some enthusiasm by Krag, also encouraged the Labour leader to review his still cautious European stance. Attention subsequently turns to the decision by Wilson, publicly announced in November 1966, to ‘probe’ the six EEC members as to whether the conditions for entry existed, the chapter focusing on the internal Labour and SD responses to this manoeuvre. It ends by exploring how and when the probe translated into the decision formally to apply to join the EEC, and the various party political tussles that took place as the Labour and SD governments each prepared the ground to lodge a second application with Brussels.

This chapter identifies and analyses the ways in which Harold Wilson’s New Britain programme, frequently identified as the apex of modernity, was held back by the nostalgic opposition marshalled against it within the party. It argues that existing historical interpretations of the Labour Party between 1963 and 1970 as ‘progressive’ and ‘modernising’ require reconsideration and revaluation. From the outset, Labour’s rank- and-file members were generally suspicious of the ‘new’ scientific and technological age that Wilson outlined in his ‘White heat’ speech at Labour’s 1963 annual conference. A nostalgic attachment to the traditional industries of the past informed the party’s hostility to notions of change and modernity. As the 1960s wore on, the party membership’s nostalgic backlash against the 1964-70 Labour Governments’ domestic policies intensified. Nostalgia dictated the parameters within which the Labour leadership could operate. It shaped the options that were available to Wilson and his allies and forced them to make both rhetorical and substantive nostalgic concessions.

This chapter starts by reviewing the disagreements within both Labour and the SD over EEC entry that spilled over from 1960 and became still more acute as the British Conservative government announced its decision to launch a bid for full EEC membership in July 1961. Thereafter it follows three strands. First, it focuses on the efforts of the SD government, which itself opted to apply for EEC membership, to negotiate Danish entry while seeking to manage an ever more divided party. Second, it considers how and why in this same period the Labour leadership’s hitherto balanced assessment of EEC membership slowly came undone, the culmination of which was Hugh Gaitskell’s infamous October 1962 ‘thousand years of history’ conference speech. Third, it evaluates the period from the January 1963 veto to the eve of Labour’s general electoral victory in October 1964, placing emphasis on the twin issues of possible isolated Danish accession to the EEC and the European policy of new Labour leader Harold Wilson. In so doing, it introduces a recurrent theme of the book: how the SD used its links with the Labour Party in a bid to secure changes to the shape and tone of Britain’s relationship with its European neighbours.

This chapter surmises the findings from the six main empirical chapters before offering some broader lessons that come from a study of Labour and SD European policy between 1958 and 1972. It suggests that both leaderships viewed European integration with more composure, foresight and consistency than often assumed. It also suggests that, for both parties, the European integration process was not distinct from but rather intimately linked with the cold war. More significantly, it reminds us why the Anglo-Danish relationship, and the Labour-SD nexus in particular, is worthy of study. Denmark was not condemned simply to follow Britain but actively to challenge British policy, engage in British politics and confront British policymakers – and ties between the two centre-left groups was a particularly apt vehicle through which to exert such pressure. In much the same way, Britain found it could not simply ignore the wishes or whims of a country of just 5 million people. As Labour quickly learnt, the relationship with the SD was crucial if it hoped to access information about, and manage relations with, Scandinavia. The relationship between Harold Wilson and Jens Otto Krag was at times especially crucial to their parties’ approach to European affairs.

This chapter examines the events surrounding the UWC strike in May 1974. Scholars remain divided about whether-or-not the strike could have been defeated by the British government. This chapter argues that the British government could not have successfully broken the strike. The UWC controlled electricity generating stations, and the available evidence suggests the Army lacked the ability to generate enough power for essential services. Plans to bring British engineers to Northern Ireland to distribute power were considered, but the Executive collapsed before this could be attempted. The chapter examines Harold Wilson's infamous ‘Doomsday’ proposals - secret documents which considered giving Northern Ireland dominion status, and British disengagement from the region. However, the document was never more than a contingency plan, and its significance should not be overstated.

This chapter takes the story to the United Kingdom and the global politics surrounding the Labour government's domestic economic agenda from 1964 to 1967. While the Labour government promised a new social democratic model of economic growth and a defense of the pound sterling, it was unable make good on either. This chapter shows how Labour's dependency on short-term financing of its payments deficits gave the international critics of Labour's economic plan leverage to compel the Wilson government to impose austerity measures.

This chapter considers the course of British nuclear diplomacy during Harold Wilson’s first two terms of office. The prime minister’s objectives were complex and shifting. Wilson often modified his own ambitions in response to a wide array of competing interests. British nuclear diplomacy was a series of compromises, an intricate blend of political, economic, and strategic considerations. Cabinet debate, financial crises, and international tensions all influenced nuclear policy-making in the two Labour governments of this period.