Jeffrey Gray
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198520917
- eISBN:
- 9780191584916
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198520917.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
How does conscious experience arise out of the functioning of the human brain? How is it related to the behaviour that it accompanies? How does the perceived world relate to the real world? Between ...
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How does conscious experience arise out of the functioning of the human brain? How is it related to the behaviour that it accompanies? How does the perceived world relate to the real world? Between them, these three questions constitute what is commonly known as the Hard Problem of consciousness. Despite vast knowledge of the relationship between brain and behaviour, and rapid advances in our knowledge of how brain activity correlates with conscious experience, the answers to all three questions remain controversial, even mysterious. This book analyses these core issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment. To many its conclusions will be surprising and even unsettling: (1) The entire perceived world is constructed by the brain. The relationship between the world we perceive and the underlying physical reality is not as close as we might think. (2) Much of our behaviour is accomplished with little or no participation from conscious experience. (3) Our conscious experience of our behaviour lags the behaviour itself by around a fifth of a second: we become aware of what we do only after we have done it. (4) The lag in conscious experience applies also to the decision to act: we only become aware of our decisions after they have been formed. (5) The self is as much a creation of the brain as is the rest of the perceived world.Less
How does conscious experience arise out of the functioning of the human brain? How is it related to the behaviour that it accompanies? How does the perceived world relate to the real world? Between them, these three questions constitute what is commonly known as the Hard Problem of consciousness. Despite vast knowledge of the relationship between brain and behaviour, and rapid advances in our knowledge of how brain activity correlates with conscious experience, the answers to all three questions remain controversial, even mysterious. This book analyses these core issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment. To many its conclusions will be surprising and even unsettling: (1) The entire perceived world is constructed by the brain. The relationship between the world we perceive and the underlying physical reality is not as close as we might think. (2) Much of our behaviour is accomplished with little or no participation from conscious experience. (3) Our conscious experience of our behaviour lags the behaviour itself by around a fifth of a second: we become aware of what we do only after we have done it. (4) The lag in conscious experience applies also to the decision to act: we only become aware of our decisions after they have been formed. (5) The self is as much a creation of the brain as is the rest of the perceived world.
Jeffrey Gray
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198520917
- eISBN:
- 9780191584916
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198520917.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter begins with a brief description of different spaces of conscious experience. It then distinguishes between the contents of consciousness and states of consciousness. This is followed by ...
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This chapter begins with a brief description of different spaces of conscious experience. It then distinguishes between the contents of consciousness and states of consciousness. This is followed by the discussion of the four different points of view (‘stances’) that one can adopt towards the problem of consciousness. The first (‘naïve’) stance is taken by all of us before we have thought much about consciousness. This stance takes conscious experience for granted, as the firm ground from which to approach all other problems. The second (‘normal science’) stance is taken by a large number of scientists and philosophers, some of whom have thought about consciousness very little, others a great deal. The third (‘new theory’) stance accepts the importance of these normal-science problems. The fourth (‘non-scientific’) stance agrees with the new-theory stance that there is a Hard Problem, but rejects the likelihood that this will find a solution within science.Less
This chapter begins with a brief description of different spaces of conscious experience. It then distinguishes between the contents of consciousness and states of consciousness. This is followed by the discussion of the four different points of view (‘stances’) that one can adopt towards the problem of consciousness. The first (‘naïve’) stance is taken by all of us before we have thought much about consciousness. This stance takes conscious experience for granted, as the firm ground from which to approach all other problems. The second (‘normal science’) stance is taken by a large number of scientists and philosophers, some of whom have thought about consciousness very little, others a great deal. The third (‘new theory’) stance accepts the importance of these normal-science problems. The fourth (‘non-scientific’) stance agrees with the new-theory stance that there is a Hard Problem, but rejects the likelihood that this will find a solution within science.
Jeffrey Gray
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198520917
- eISBN:
- 9780191584916
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198520917.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter examines the Hard Problem of consciousness at a finer level of detail, by considering the nature of the gap between consciousness and brain activity. It argues that intentionality can ...
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This chapter examines the Hard Problem of consciousness at a finer level of detail, by considering the nature of the gap between consciousness and brain activity. It argues that intentionality can attach to processes that are achieved unconsciously. Thus, it is unlikely that a deeper scrutiny of the properties of intentionality will lead ipso facto to a solution of the Hard Problem of consciousness. The laws of physics and chemistry plus the principles of cybernetics are able in principle to accommodate, without residual mystery, intentionality and representation. These conclusions free us to look at what consciousness per se brings to the party, over and above these powerful but comprehensible capacities of the unconscious brain/mind.Less
This chapter examines the Hard Problem of consciousness at a finer level of detail, by considering the nature of the gap between consciousness and brain activity. It argues that intentionality can attach to processes that are achieved unconsciously. Thus, it is unlikely that a deeper scrutiny of the properties of intentionality will lead ipso facto to a solution of the Hard Problem of consciousness. The laws of physics and chemistry plus the principles of cybernetics are able in principle to accommodate, without residual mystery, intentionality and representation. These conclusions free us to look at what consciousness per se brings to the party, over and above these powerful but comprehensible capacities of the unconscious brain/mind.
Arthur S. Reber
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190854157
- eISBN:
- 9780190854188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190854157.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Two strategies are used to review the many efforts to solve (or resolve or dissolve) the Hard Problem. One searches for the neurocorrelates of consciousness, the effort to answer the question: “How ...
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Two strategies are used to review the many efforts to solve (or resolve or dissolve) the Hard Problem. One searches for the neurocorrelates of consciousness, the effort to answer the question: “How does the brain make the mind?” The other looks for the first appearance of true consciousness in phylogenesis. Both approaches are reviewed and found wanting. The reason is they all begin with human consciousness and use it as the basis for the explorations. This, it is argued, has lead to a “category error” where the H. sap. mind is treated as a distinct type and not as a token on the same existential continuum as other minds. It also reveals the existence of the “emergentist’s dilemma” or the difficulty of determining how consciousness could spring into existence when one cosmic moment before, it didn’t exist. The chapter ends by anticipating criticism of these arguments and of the CBC and providing prophylactic arguments.Less
Two strategies are used to review the many efforts to solve (or resolve or dissolve) the Hard Problem. One searches for the neurocorrelates of consciousness, the effort to answer the question: “How does the brain make the mind?” The other looks for the first appearance of true consciousness in phylogenesis. Both approaches are reviewed and found wanting. The reason is they all begin with human consciousness and use it as the basis for the explorations. This, it is argued, has lead to a “category error” where the H. sap. mind is treated as a distinct type and not as a token on the same existential continuum as other minds. It also reveals the existence of the “emergentist’s dilemma” or the difficulty of determining how consciousness could spring into existence when one cosmic moment before, it didn’t exist. The chapter ends by anticipating criticism of these arguments and of the CBC and providing prophylactic arguments.
Jeffrey Gray
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198520917
- eISBN:
- 9780191584916
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198520917.003.0017
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The feverish modernity, in the last few chapters, of neuroscience and quantum mechanics has perhaps obscured the hoary antiquity of the problems we are dealing with: the nature of consciousness, the ...
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The feverish modernity, in the last few chapters, of neuroscience and quantum mechanics has perhaps obscured the hoary antiquity of the problems we are dealing with: the nature of consciousness, the reality of the external world, and so on. The questions tackled in this chapter are no less hoary. They keep steady company with the Hard Problem. Whose consciousness is it anyway? What is this mysterious ‘self’ to which conscious experiences are automatically attributed?Less
The feverish modernity, in the last few chapters, of neuroscience and quantum mechanics has perhaps obscured the hoary antiquity of the problems we are dealing with: the nature of consciousness, the reality of the external world, and so on. The questions tackled in this chapter are no less hoary. They keep steady company with the Hard Problem. Whose consciousness is it anyway? What is this mysterious ‘self’ to which conscious experiences are automatically attributed?
Michael Tye
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012737
- eISBN:
- 9780262255172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter’s discussion puts to task the views developed in previous chapters in an attempt to solve four famous philosophical puzzles: the Puzzle of Mary, the Explanatory Gap, the Hard Problem of ...
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This chapter’s discussion puts to task the views developed in previous chapters in an attempt to solve four famous philosophical puzzles: the Puzzle of Mary, the Explanatory Gap, the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and the Possibility of Zombies. How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what form does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? These are all questions that are addressed in this chapter.Less
This chapter’s discussion puts to task the views developed in previous chapters in an attempt to solve four famous philosophical puzzles: the Puzzle of Mary, the Explanatory Gap, the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and the Possibility of Zombies. How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what form does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? These are all questions that are addressed in this chapter.
Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262036115
- eISBN:
- 9780262339773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036115.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 2 introduces REC’s Equal Partner Principle, according to which invoking neural, bodily, and environmental factors all make equally important contributions when it comes to explaining ...
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Chapter 2 introduces REC’s Equal Partner Principle, according to which invoking neural, bodily, and environmental factors all make equally important contributions when it comes to explaining cognitive activity. In line with that principle, it is made clear how REC can accept that cognitive capacities depend on structural changes that occur inside organisms and their brains, without understanding such changes in information processing and representationalist terms.
This chapter explicates the Hard Problem of Content, aka the HPC, as basis for a compelling argument for REC. The HPC is a seemingly intractable theoretical puzzle for defenders of unrestricted CIC. A straight solution to the HPC requires explaining how it is possible to get from informational foundations that are noncontentful to a theory of mental content using only the resources of a respectable explanatory naturalism that calls on the resources of the hard sciences.
It is revealed how the need to deal with the HPC can be avoided by adopting REC’s revolutionary take on basic cognition, and why going this way has advantages over other possible ways of handling the HPC.Less
Chapter 2 introduces REC’s Equal Partner Principle, according to which invoking neural, bodily, and environmental factors all make equally important contributions when it comes to explaining cognitive activity. In line with that principle, it is made clear how REC can accept that cognitive capacities depend on structural changes that occur inside organisms and their brains, without understanding such changes in information processing and representationalist terms.
This chapter explicates the Hard Problem of Content, aka the HPC, as basis for a compelling argument for REC. The HPC is a seemingly intractable theoretical puzzle for defenders of unrestricted CIC. A straight solution to the HPC requires explaining how it is possible to get from informational foundations that are noncontentful to a theory of mental content using only the resources of a respectable explanatory naturalism that calls on the resources of the hard sciences.
It is revealed how the need to deal with the HPC can be avoided by adopting REC’s revolutionary take on basic cognition, and why going this way has advantages over other possible ways of handling the HPC.
Arthur S. Reber
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190854157
- eISBN:
- 9780190854188
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190854157.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The book presents a novel theory of the origins of mind and consciousness dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC). It argues that sentience emerged with life itself. The most primitive ...
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The book presents a novel theory of the origins of mind and consciousness dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC). It argues that sentience emerged with life itself. The most primitive unicellular species of bacteria are conscious, though it is a sentience of a primitive kind. They have minds, though they are tiny and limited in scope. There is nothing even close to this thesis in the current literature on consciousness. Hints that cells might be conscious can be found in the writings of a few cell biologists, but a fully developed theory has never been put forward before. Other approaches to the origins of consciousness are examined and shown to be seriously or fatally flawed, specifically ones based on: (a) the assumption that minds are computational and can be captured by an artificial intelligence (AI), (b) efforts to discover the neurocorrelates of mental experiences, the so-called Hard Problem, and (c) looking for consciousness in less complex species by identifying those that possess precursors of those neurocorrelates. Each of these approaches is shown to be either essentially impossible (the AI models) or so burdened by philosophical and empirical difficulties that they are effectively unworkable. The CBC approach is developed using standard models of evolutionary biology. The remarkable repertoire of single-celled species that micro- and cell-biologists have discovered is reviewed. Bacteria, for example, have sophisticated sensory and perceptual systems, learn, form memories, make decisions based on information about their environment relative to internal metabolic states, communicate with one another, and even show a primitive form of altruism. All such functions are indicators of sentience. Conversations with a caterpillar function as a literary vehicle Finally, the implications of the CBC model are discussed along with a number of related issues in evolutionary biology, philosophy of mind, the possibility of sentient plants, the ethical repercussions of universal animal sentience, and the long-range impact of adopting the CBC stance.Less
The book presents a novel theory of the origins of mind and consciousness dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC). It argues that sentience emerged with life itself. The most primitive unicellular species of bacteria are conscious, though it is a sentience of a primitive kind. They have minds, though they are tiny and limited in scope. There is nothing even close to this thesis in the current literature on consciousness. Hints that cells might be conscious can be found in the writings of a few cell biologists, but a fully developed theory has never been put forward before. Other approaches to the origins of consciousness are examined and shown to be seriously or fatally flawed, specifically ones based on: (a) the assumption that minds are computational and can be captured by an artificial intelligence (AI), (b) efforts to discover the neurocorrelates of mental experiences, the so-called Hard Problem, and (c) looking for consciousness in less complex species by identifying those that possess precursors of those neurocorrelates. Each of these approaches is shown to be either essentially impossible (the AI models) or so burdened by philosophical and empirical difficulties that they are effectively unworkable. The CBC approach is developed using standard models of evolutionary biology. The remarkable repertoire of single-celled species that micro- and cell-biologists have discovered is reviewed. Bacteria, for example, have sophisticated sensory and perceptual systems, learn, form memories, make decisions based on information about their environment relative to internal metabolic states, communicate with one another, and even show a primitive form of altruism. All such functions are indicators of sentience. Conversations with a caterpillar function as a literary vehicle Finally, the implications of the CBC model are discussed along with a number of related issues in evolutionary biology, philosophy of mind, the possibility of sentient plants, the ethical repercussions of universal animal sentience, and the long-range impact of adopting the CBC stance.