Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces and argues for the importance of a cognitive state that the author calls alief. Roughly speaking, an alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is ...
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This chapter introduces and argues for the importance of a cognitive state that the author calls alief. Roughly speaking, an alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective, and behavioral, and that is activated—consciously or unconsciously—by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment. The notion of alief explains a number of otherwise perplexing phenomena, including cases discussed by David Hume, H. H. Price, David Velleman, Paul Rozin, and John Bargh. The notion also has implications for the role of thought experiments and intuitions in philosophy, and for neo‐Aristotelian ethical theories.Less
This chapter introduces and argues for the importance of a cognitive state that the author calls alief. Roughly speaking, an alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective, and behavioral, and that is activated—consciously or unconsciously—by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment. The notion of alief explains a number of otherwise perplexing phenomena, including cases discussed by David Hume, H. H. Price, David Velleman, Paul Rozin, and John Bargh. The notion also has implications for the role of thought experiments and intuitions in philosophy, and for neo‐Aristotelian ethical theories.
C. A. J. Coady
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235514
- eISBN:
- 9780191597220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235518.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Continues the critique of important discussions of testimony in the philosophical tradition by discussing H. H. Price's complex defence of our reliance upon the word of others. Price rejects the ...
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Continues the critique of important discussions of testimony in the philosophical tradition by discussing H. H. Price's complex defence of our reliance upon the word of others. Price rejects the attempt at an inductive justification for the reliance, since he thinks that this treats the reliability of testimony as a factual claim, and, moreover, one that is impossible to establish. He thinks that it is really a policy justification that is required, but Coady argues that the reasons Price provides, and some others that could be developed from his comments, fail to vindicate the reliability of testimony in the way required.Less
Continues the critique of important discussions of testimony in the philosophical tradition by discussing H. H. Price's complex defence of our reliance upon the word of others. Price rejects the attempt at an inductive justification for the reliance, since he thinks that this treats the reliability of testimony as a factual claim, and, moreover, one that is impossible to establish. He thinks that it is really a policy justification that is required, but Coady argues that the reasons Price provides, and some others that could be developed from his comments, fail to vindicate the reliability of testimony in the way required.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The logical positivists’ critical attitude towards metaphysics is sketched. Strawson’s conception of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is described. Revisionary metaphysics is argued to be ...
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The logical positivists’ critical attitude towards metaphysics is sketched. Strawson’s conception of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is described. Revisionary metaphysics is argued to be chimerical, and descriptive metaphysics is argued not to be a form of metaphysics at all. Strawson’s failure to account for the status of propositions of descriptive metaphysics is held to be remediable by reference to Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical propositions that express norms of representation.Less
The logical positivists’ critical attitude towards metaphysics is sketched. Strawson’s conception of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is described. Revisionary metaphysics is argued to be chimerical, and descriptive metaphysics is argued not to be a form of metaphysics at all. Strawson’s failure to account for the status of propositions of descriptive metaphysics is held to be remediable by reference to Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical propositions that express norms of representation.
Tyler Burge
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672028
- eISBN:
- 9780191751929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
‘A Warrant for Belief in Other Minds’ (1999, 2011) articulates a way of knowing other minds–through comprehending speech‐‐that has been under‐appreciated in the history of philosophy. Only H.H. Price ...
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‘A Warrant for Belief in Other Minds’ (1999, 2011) articulates a way of knowing other minds–through comprehending speech‐‐that has been under‐appreciated in the history of philosophy. Only H.H. Price seems to have produced a closely related argument. The essay discusses traditional arguments from analogy and arguments from inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation. It argues that although they are part of the account of how we know other minds, most such arguments focus on too high a cognitive level to account for the primitiveness of one central warrant we have for believing in other minds. The relevant warrant depends primarily on an entitlement to rely on one’s capacity to comprehend speech, and on an entitlement to determine (fallibly) whether one has initiated an utterance.Less
‘A Warrant for Belief in Other Minds’ (1999, 2011) articulates a way of knowing other minds–through comprehending speech‐‐that has been under‐appreciated in the history of philosophy. Only H.H. Price seems to have produced a closely related argument. The essay discusses traditional arguments from analogy and arguments from inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation. It argues that although they are part of the account of how we know other minds, most such arguments focus on too high a cognitive level to account for the primitiveness of one central warrant we have for believing in other minds. The relevant warrant depends primarily on an entitlement to rely on one’s capacity to comprehend speech, and on an entitlement to determine (fallibly) whether one has initiated an utterance.
