Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693818
- eISBN:
- 9780191731907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that ...
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The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that establish that the action has some value; and that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An examination of the nature of intentions and intentional actions leads to successive modification of the theses, concluding with a new position, a recognizable variant of the Guise of the Good Thesis, and true to its ambition of being a key to the explanation of intentions, and of actions for intentions.Less
The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that establish that the action has some value; and that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An examination of the nature of intentions and intentional actions leads to successive modification of the theses, concluding with a new position, a recognizable variant of the Guise of the Good Thesis, and true to its ambition of being a key to the explanation of intentions, and of actions for intentions.
Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195382440
- eISBN:
- 9780199870158
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional ...
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Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.Less
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190692476
- eISBN:
- 9780190692506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190692476.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 5 draws on the first sentence of NE I, but goes beyond interpretation in putting forward a new version of the Guise of the Good (GG). This proposal is Aristotelian in spirit, but defended on ...
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Chapter 5 draws on the first sentence of NE I, but goes beyond interpretation in putting forward a new version of the Guise of the Good (GG). This proposal is Aristotelian in spirit, but defended on philosophical grounds. GG theorists tend to see their views as broadly speaking Aristotelian. And yet they address particular actions in isolation: agents, the thought goes, are motivated to perform a given action by seeing the action or its outcome as good. The chapter argues that the GG is most compelling if we distinguish between three levels: the motivation of small-scale actions, the motivation of mid-scale actions or pursuits, and the desire to have one’s life go well. The chapter analyzes the relation between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation in terms of Guidance, Substance, and Motivational Dependence. In its Aristotelian version, the argument continues, the GG belongs to the theory of the human good.Less
Chapter 5 draws on the first sentence of NE I, but goes beyond interpretation in putting forward a new version of the Guise of the Good (GG). This proposal is Aristotelian in spirit, but defended on philosophical grounds. GG theorists tend to see their views as broadly speaking Aristotelian. And yet they address particular actions in isolation: agents, the thought goes, are motivated to perform a given action by seeing the action or its outcome as good. The chapter argues that the GG is most compelling if we distinguish between three levels: the motivation of small-scale actions, the motivation of mid-scale actions or pursuits, and the desire to have one’s life go well. The chapter analyzes the relation between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation in terms of Guidance, Substance, and Motivational Dependence. In its Aristotelian version, the argument continues, the GG belongs to the theory of the human good.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- February 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780192847003
- eISBN:
- 9780191939419
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192847003.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter considers the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason that it is, as the agent believes, bad. Besides, can agents, without having any relevant false ...
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The chapter considers the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason that it is, as the agent believes, bad. Besides, can agents, without having any relevant false beliefs, perform actions motivated by their badness? The worry is the compatibility of action for the sake of the bad with the thesis of the Guise of the Good (intended actions are undertaken because agents see them as good in some respects). How can reason explanations and the more widely understood normative explanations explain actions, in light of the conditions for the rationality of actions and the bearing of masking beliefs on the explanation of their actions? Various conceptual mistakes are possible. Given the variety of human motivations, the chapter focuses on the interpretation of one case: the Luciferian motive, understood, roughly, as the drive to defy the limits of thought or of rational thought.Less
The chapter considers the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason that it is, as the agent believes, bad. Besides, can agents, without having any relevant false beliefs, perform actions motivated by their badness? The worry is the compatibility of action for the sake of the bad with the thesis of the Guise of the Good (intended actions are undertaken because agents see them as good in some respects). How can reason explanations and the more widely understood normative explanations explain actions, in light of the conditions for the rationality of actions and the bearing of masking beliefs on the explanation of their actions? Various conceptual mistakes are possible. Given the variety of human motivations, the chapter focuses on the interpretation of one case: the Luciferian motive, understood, roughly, as the drive to defy the limits of thought or of rational thought.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190692476
- eISBN:
- 9780190692506
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190692476.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book defends a novel and distinctive approach in ethics that is inspired by ancient philosophy. Ethics, according to this approach, starts from one question and its most immediate answer: “what ...
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This book defends a novel and distinctive approach in ethics that is inspired by ancient philosophy. Ethics, according to this approach, starts from one question and its most immediate answer: “what is the good for human beings?”—“a well-going human life.” Ethics thus conceived is broader than moral philosophy. It includes a range of topics in psychology and metaphysics. Plato’s Philebus is the ancestor of this approach. Its first premise, defended also in Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, is that the final agential good is the good human life. Though Aristotle introduces this premise while analyzing human activities, it is absent from approaches in the theory of action that self-identify as Aristotelian. This absence is, the book argues, a deep and far-reaching mistake, one that can be traced back to Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential proposals. And yet, the book is Anscombian in spirit. It engages with ancient texts in order to contribute to philosophy today, and it takes questions about the human mind to be prior to, and relevant to, substantive normative matters. In this spirit, the book puts forward a new version of the Guise of the Good, namely, that desire to have one’s life go well shapes and sustains smaller-scale motivations. A theory of good human lives, it is argued, must make room for a plurality of good lives. Along these lines, the book lays out a non-relativist version of Protagoras’s Measure Doctrine and defends a new kind of realism about good human lives.Plato, Aristotle, Guise of the Good, theory of action, motivation, desire, good, good life, conception of a good life, Anscombe, ancient philosophy, contemporary ethics.Less
This book defends a novel and distinctive approach in ethics that is inspired by ancient philosophy. Ethics, according to this approach, starts from one question and its most immediate answer: “what is the good for human beings?”—“a well-going human life.” Ethics thus conceived is broader than moral philosophy. It includes a range of topics in psychology and metaphysics. Plato’s Philebus is the ancestor of this approach. Its first premise, defended also in Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, is that the final agential good is the good human life. Though Aristotle introduces this premise while analyzing human activities, it is absent from approaches in the theory of action that self-identify as Aristotelian. This absence is, the book argues, a deep and far-reaching mistake, one that can be traced back to Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential proposals. And yet, the book is Anscombian in spirit. It engages with ancient texts in order to contribute to philosophy today, and it takes questions about the human mind to be prior to, and relevant to, substantive normative matters. In this spirit, the book puts forward a new version of the Guise of the Good, namely, that desire to have one’s life go well shapes and sustains smaller-scale motivations. A theory of good human lives, it is argued, must make room for a plurality of good lives. Along these lines, the book lays out a non-relativist version of Protagoras’s Measure Doctrine and defends a new kind of realism about good human lives.Plato, Aristotle, Guise of the Good, theory of action, motivation, desire, good, good life, conception of a good life, Anscombe, ancient philosophy, contemporary ethics.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190692476
- eISBN:
- 9780190692506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190692476.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The Concluding Remarks ask what follows if the main lines of argument throughout the book are compelling. First, it is argued that the motivation of pursuits deserves more philosophical attention ...
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The Concluding Remarks ask what follows if the main lines of argument throughout the book are compelling. First, it is argued that the motivation of pursuits deserves more philosophical attention than it currently receives and that the Guise of the Good defended in the book provides resources to address well-known problem cases such as desiring the bad, accidie, and more. Second, the Concluding Remarks revisit one of the book’s main ambitions: to develop Aristotle’s first premise, that the human good is the good human life, such as to account for plurality of values and diversity of good lives. Third, the Concluding Remarks suggest that particular actions are set off by assent to what, to the agent, appears as to be done. This adds to the overall argument for situating the GG in the relationship between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation rather than in the analysis of particular actions.Less
The Concluding Remarks ask what follows if the main lines of argument throughout the book are compelling. First, it is argued that the motivation of pursuits deserves more philosophical attention than it currently receives and that the Guise of the Good defended in the book provides resources to address well-known problem cases such as desiring the bad, accidie, and more. Second, the Concluding Remarks revisit one of the book’s main ambitions: to develop Aristotle’s first premise, that the human good is the good human life, such as to account for plurality of values and diversity of good lives. Third, the Concluding Remarks suggest that particular actions are set off by assent to what, to the agent, appears as to be done. This adds to the overall argument for situating the GG in the relationship between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation rather than in the analysis of particular actions.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190692476
- eISBN:
- 9780190692506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190692476.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 6 argues that Socrates’s speech in Plato’s Symposium contains a compelling account of the role of mid-scale actions or pursuits in human motivation. This account, the chapter argues, ...
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Chapter 6 argues that Socrates’s speech in Plato’s Symposium contains a compelling account of the role of mid-scale actions or pursuits in human motivation. This account, the chapter argues, effectively responds to a long-standing charge against ancient ethics, namely, that it is exclusively concerned with the agent’s own happiness. The Symposium offers a list of typical human pursuits: having children, producing artifacts, earning a living through work, creating art, writing laws, formulating theories, and more. These pursuits are kinds of making. The agent’s commitment to that which is made extends her motivations beyond her own life. Once we are committed to such pursuits, they make demands on us that go beyond self-interest. The very way in which human beings desire happiness propels them into pursuits that are devoted to the good, pulling them away from what might appear to be, on narrow notions, their own happiness.Less
Chapter 6 argues that Socrates’s speech in Plato’s Symposium contains a compelling account of the role of mid-scale actions or pursuits in human motivation. This account, the chapter argues, effectively responds to a long-standing charge against ancient ethics, namely, that it is exclusively concerned with the agent’s own happiness. The Symposium offers a list of typical human pursuits: having children, producing artifacts, earning a living through work, creating art, writing laws, formulating theories, and more. These pursuits are kinds of making. The agent’s commitment to that which is made extends her motivations beyond her own life. Once we are committed to such pursuits, they make demands on us that go beyond self-interest. The very way in which human beings desire happiness propels them into pursuits that are devoted to the good, pulling them away from what might appear to be, on narrow notions, their own happiness.
