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This chapter examines the investment policies of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global (GPF-G). One of the world's largest investors, this sovereign wealth fund (SWF) has an explicit mission to integrate long-term investment policies with a two-sided ethical commitment. The Norwegian fund's ethical mandate is remarkable when compared to other SWFs. However, this mandate is best understood in terms of procedural rather than substantive justice. The chapter argues that the primary reason for the ethical policies within the GPF-G is to secure domestic legitimacy; its ethical impact is of secondary importance. This argument is sustained by reference to recent work on the nature of state authority and legitimacy in democratic societies, the logic of institutional governance, and the functional integration of decision-making. The chapter concludes with implications for situating the functional performance of the fund in the context of changing global financial markets.

Chapter 6 examines the crucial contexts of funding and administration. What scale of resources is needed to ensure adult social care is able to meet anticipated need? And how can local government be strengthened to fulfil its statutory functions?

This chapter assesses how the management of the nation’s long-term savings in what is now the Government Pension Fund Global brought Norges Bank a brand new responsibility from the mid-1990s, and an unusual one for a central bank. While many central banks have historically played an important part in contributing to government financing and investing government debt in liquid securities, this had never been one of Norges Bank’s main roles. Indeed, one of the key aims of the acts of 1816 and 1891 was to prevent the government from funding itself through the central bank. From the mid-1990s, however, Norges Bank was in a way given the opposite task: a separate mandate to manage the country’s financial wealth on behalf of the government by investing it abroad in long-term bonds, shares, and eventually real estate. Within twenty years, thanks to high oil prices and substantial inflows from the government, the fund’s market value soared from nothing to around NOK 7 trillion. In recent years, the fund’s rapid expansion and financial importance have brought Norges Bank—and Norway—at least as much international attention as the bank’s more traditional roles in monetary policy and financial stability.

This chapter discusses the political background and organisational aspects of the 1966 World Cup. Prime Minister Harold Wilson seemed to have little idea about the World Cup in the year prior to the finals coming to England, but by the time of England’s victory he was so drawn to the golden glow of the Jules Rimet trophy as to create a ‘legacy’ for the way in which politicians would regard the World Cup into the future. His government provided some funding for infrastructure and became involved in planning ahead of the tournament. The chapter addresses hosting issues and adopts a case study approach by focussing on Liverpool as a host city and Everton Football Club’s home ground, Goodison Park, as a match venue. The concentrated study draws on a range of materials to provide insight into the cultural particularity of Liverpool’s hosting experience.

In this chapter Helge Ryggvik and Berit Kristoffersen argue that even if Norway avoided the classic symptoms of the oil curse, it nonetheless has been deeply affected, first by the sheer wealth, then by the power of its own national oil company. Political realism in Norway includes fossil fuel dominance—economic and political. Voices are being heard within Norway questioning the net benefit presumption of continued extraction, let alone expansion. They are saying that enough is enough. Fossil fuels, some are beginning to argue, are no longer legitimate nationally or globally as Norway’s well-being is tied to that of the rest of the planet. What is more, if boom conditions have been difficult to moderate, then bust will be as well; it is time to start stopping.

This chapter narrates how from the mid-1980s the World Bank began to lobby key functionaries of the Union and some state governments to avail Bank funding for primary education. It also elaborates why Indian academia and Anil Bordia were opposed to access Bank funding for elementary education. It explains the reasons why the Indian Government decided to explore Bank funding and to pose a ‘test case’ project in Uttar Pradesh (UP). It describes the beginning of the engagement with the World Bank, the unusual seminar on the UP organized at the National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration (NIEPA), the divergent perceptions of the Union Education Ministry, Finance Ministry and Planning Commission, and the agreements reached between the Union Education Department and the Bank Mission which attended the NIEPA seminar.