Leila Haaparanta
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195137316
- eISBN:
- 9780199867912
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137316.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter gives a survey of the field of philosophy where (1) the philosophical foundations of modern logic were discussed and (2) where such themes of logic were discussed that were on the ...
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This chapter gives a survey of the field of philosophy where (1) the philosophical foundations of modern logic were discussed and (2) where such themes of logic were discussed that were on the borderline between logic and other branches of the philosophical enterprise, such as metaphysics and epistemology. The contributions made by Gottlob Frege and Charles Peirce are included since their work in logic is closely related to and also strongly motivated by their philosophical views and interests. In addition, the chapter pays attention to a few philosophers to whom logic amounted to traditional Aristotelian logic and to those who commented on the nature of logic from a philosophical perspective without making any significant contribution to the development of formal logic.Less
This chapter gives a survey of the field of philosophy where (1) the philosophical foundations of modern logic were discussed and (2) where such themes of logic were discussed that were on the borderline between logic and other branches of the philosophical enterprise, such as metaphysics and epistemology. The contributions made by Gottlob Frege and Charles Peirce are included since their work in logic is closely related to and also strongly motivated by their philosophical views and interests. In addition, the chapter pays attention to a few philosophers to whom logic amounted to traditional Aristotelian logic and to those who commented on the nature of logic from a philosophical perspective without making any significant contribution to the development of formal logic.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, ...
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Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Less
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to ...
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Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to be implicitly committed to a two-category ontology of particulars and universals. A system of sortal logic is described, which exhibits some features of traditional formal logic and some of modern quantified predicate logic, such as its deployment of a symbol for identity. It is argued that this system represents more perspicuously than other systems the ontological distinctions of the four-category ontology, and that this counts as a distinct advantage in its favour.Less
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to be implicitly committed to a two-category ontology of particulars and universals. A system of sortal logic is described, which exhibits some features of traditional formal logic and some of modern quantified predicate logic, such as its deployment of a symbol for identity. It is argued that this system represents more perspicuously than other systems the ontological distinctions of the four-category ontology, and that this counts as a distinct advantage in its favour.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter formulates the main question to be addressed in the first three chapters of the book, the question of what holds the constituents of propositions together. It considers the answers ...
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This chapter formulates the main question to be addressed in the first three chapters of the book, the question of what holds the constituents of propositions together. It considers the answers Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell offered to this question. These answers are rejected, motivating the search for a new answer.Less
This chapter formulates the main question to be addressed in the first three chapters of the book, the question of what holds the constituents of propositions together. It considers the answers Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell offered to this question. These answers are rejected, motivating the search for a new answer.
Christian Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195137316
- eISBN:
- 9780199867912
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137316.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter explores Gottlob Frege's contribution to logic. Frege has been called the greatest logician since Aristotle, but he failed to gain influence on the mathematical community of his time and ...
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This chapter explores Gottlob Frege's contribution to logic. Frege has been called the greatest logician since Aristotle, but he failed to gain influence on the mathematical community of his time and the depth and pioneering character of his work was acknowledged only after the collapse of his logicist program due to the Zermelo–Russell antinomy in 1902. Frege, by proving his theorem χ without recourse to Wertverläufe, exhibited an inconsistency (or at least an incoherence) in the traditional notion of the extension of a concept. He prompted our awareness of a situation the future analyses of which will hopefully not only deepen our systematic control of the interplay of concepts and their extensions but also improve our understanding of the historical development of the notion of “extension of a concept” and its historiographical assessment.Less
This chapter explores Gottlob Frege's contribution to logic. Frege has been called the greatest logician since Aristotle, but he failed to gain influence on the mathematical community of his time and the depth and pioneering character of his work was acknowledged only after the collapse of his logicist program due to the Zermelo–Russell antinomy in 1902. Frege, by proving his theorem χ without recourse to Wertverläufe, exhibited an inconsistency (or at least an incoherence) in the traditional notion of the extension of a concept. He prompted our awareness of a situation the future analyses of which will hopefully not only deepen our systematic control of the interplay of concepts and their extensions but also improve our understanding of the historical development of the notion of “extension of a concept” and its historiographical assessment.
TYLER BURGE
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199278534
- eISBN:
- 9780191706943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278534.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of how Gottlob Frege's name and work remain unknown to the wider intellectual public. It then describes Frege's contributions to philosophy, ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of how Gottlob Frege's name and work remain unknown to the wider intellectual public. It then describes Frege's contributions to philosophy, including concentration on language in the expression of knowledge and a recognition of the power of logic to illuminate the structure of language and its contribution to the expression of knowledge. It shows how Frege's positivist successors used his innovations against a background of philosophical attitudes that Frege did not share. They differed with him, in absolutely fundamental ways, about both meaning and knowledge. The chapter make some more specific philosophical remarks about Frege's contributions, as discussed in these three parts: truth, structure, and method; sense and cognitive value; and rationalism.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of how Gottlob Frege's name and work remain unknown to the wider intellectual public. It then describes Frege's contributions to philosophy, including concentration on language in the expression of knowledge and a recognition of the power of logic to illuminate the structure of language and its contribution to the expression of knowledge. It shows how Frege's positivist successors used his innovations against a background of philosophical attitudes that Frege did not share. They differed with him, in absolutely fundamental ways, about both meaning and knowledge. The chapter make some more specific philosophical remarks about Frege's contributions, as discussed in these three parts: truth, structure, and method; sense and cognitive value; and rationalism.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The formal ontological concept of an object is explicated and contrasted with that of a property. F. P. Ramsey’s objections to this distinction are challenged. The sense in which objects possess an ...
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The formal ontological concept of an object is explicated and contrasted with that of a property. F. P. Ramsey’s objections to this distinction are challenged. The sense in which objects possess an individuality not exhibited by entities of certain other types is discussed. The object/property distinction is distinguished from that between universals and particulars. The ontological status of events and processes, and that of abstract entities such as numbers, are examined. Gottlob Frege’s treatment of number and his object/concept distinction are criticized, and an alternative account of the ontological status of concepts is advanced.Less
The formal ontological concept of an object is explicated and contrasted with that of a property. F. P. Ramsey’s objections to this distinction are challenged. The sense in which objects possess an individuality not exhibited by entities of certain other types is discussed. The object/property distinction is distinguished from that between universals and particulars. The ontological status of events and processes, and that of abstract entities such as numbers, are examined. Gottlob Frege’s treatment of number and his object/concept distinction are criticized, and an alternative account of the ontological status of concepts is advanced.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272044
- eISBN:
- 9780191699573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272044.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This chapter works out an interpretation of Immanuel Kant's theory of syntheticity. More precisely, it sketches the basics of Kant's theory of syntheticity in relation to Gottlob Frege's theory, and, ...
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This chapter works out an interpretation of Immanuel Kant's theory of syntheticity. More precisely, it sketches the basics of Kant's theory of syntheticity in relation to Gottlob Frege's theory, and, in the course of so doing, offers good historical and philosophical reasons for challenging the vigorous anti-intuitionism that generally characterizes the analytic tradition after Frege and right up to Willard Van Orman Quine. This chapter discusses the argument's three stages. According to Kant, a true proposition is synthetic if and only if it is consistently deniable and its truth and meaning are intuition-dependent. In turn, an intuition is an immediate, sensibility-related, thought-prior, singular, object-dependent (existential, actual) means of semantic reference. Thus, the fundamental feature of Kantian syntheticity and intuition alike is their essential indexicality.Less
This chapter works out an interpretation of Immanuel Kant's theory of syntheticity. More precisely, it sketches the basics of Kant's theory of syntheticity in relation to Gottlob Frege's theory, and, in the course of so doing, offers good historical and philosophical reasons for challenging the vigorous anti-intuitionism that generally characterizes the analytic tradition after Frege and right up to Willard Van Orman Quine. This chapter discusses the argument's three stages. According to Kant, a true proposition is synthetic if and only if it is consistently deniable and its truth and meaning are intuition-dependent. In turn, an intuition is an immediate, sensibility-related, thought-prior, singular, object-dependent (existential, actual) means of semantic reference. Thus, the fundamental feature of Kantian syntheticity and intuition alike is their essential indexicality.
Tyler Burge
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241279
- eISBN:
- 9780191597107
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241279.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In his contribution, Burge contrasts the use Kant and Frege make of the a priori in their work. Burge argues that for Kant, the conscious states of pure intuition are states that entitle a subject to ...
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In his contribution, Burge contrasts the use Kant and Frege make of the a priori in their work. Burge argues that for Kant, the conscious states of pure intuition are states that entitle a subject to make judgements of geometrical principles and provide a justification that is independent of perceptual experience. This conception Burge contrasts with Frege's philosophical explication of the a priori in The Foundation of Arithmetic.Less
In his contribution, Burge contrasts the use Kant and Frege make of the a priori in their work. Burge argues that for Kant, the conscious states of pure intuition are states that entitle a subject to make judgements of geometrical principles and provide a justification that is independent of perceptual experience. This conception Burge contrasts with Frege's philosophical explication of the a priori in The Foundation of Arithmetic.
Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations ...
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This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations that are accurate are usually said to be true, to correspond to the facts—this is the foundation of correspondence theories of truth. A number of prominent philosophers have tried to undermine the idea that propositions, facts, and correspondence can play any useful role in philosophy, and formal arguments have been advanced to demonstrate that, under seemingly uncontroversial conditions, such entities collapse into an undifferentiated unity. The demise of individual facts is meant to herald the dawn of a new era in philosophy, in which debates about scepticism, realism, subjectivity, representational and computational theories of mind, possible worlds, and divergent conceptual schemes that represent reality in different ways to different persons, periods, or cultures evaporate through lack of subject matter. By carefully untangling a host of intersecting metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and logical issues, and providing original analyses of key aspects of the work of Donald Davidson, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Kurt Gödel (to each of whom a chapter is dedicated), Stephen Neale demonstrates that arguments for the collapse of facts are considerably more complex and interesting than ever imagined. A number of deep semantic facts emerge along with a powerful proof: while it is technically possible to avoid the collapse of facts, rescue the idea of representations of reality, and thereby face anew the problems raised by the sceptic or the relativist, doing so requires making some tough semantic decisions about predicates and descriptions. It is simply impossible, Neale shows, to invoke representations, facts, states, or propositions without making hard choices—choices that may send many philosophers scurrying back to the drawing board. The book will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, the philosophy of language and mind, and logic, and will have profound implications far beyond.Less
This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations that are accurate are usually said to be true, to correspond to the facts—this is the foundation of correspondence theories of truth. A number of prominent philosophers have tried to undermine the idea that propositions, facts, and correspondence can play any useful role in philosophy, and formal arguments have been advanced to demonstrate that, under seemingly uncontroversial conditions, such entities collapse into an undifferentiated unity. The demise of individual facts is meant to herald the dawn of a new era in philosophy, in which debates about scepticism, realism, subjectivity, representational and computational theories of mind, possible worlds, and divergent conceptual schemes that represent reality in different ways to different persons, periods, or cultures evaporate through lack of subject matter. By carefully untangling a host of intersecting metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and logical issues, and providing original analyses of key aspects of the work of Donald Davidson, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Kurt Gödel (to each of whom a chapter is dedicated), Stephen Neale demonstrates that arguments for the collapse of facts are considerably more complex and interesting than ever imagined. A number of deep semantic facts emerge along with a powerful proof: while it is technically possible to avoid the collapse of facts, rescue the idea of representations of reality, and thereby face anew the problems raised by the sceptic or the relativist, doing so requires making some tough semantic decisions about predicates and descriptions. It is simply impossible, Neale shows, to invoke representations, facts, states, or propositions without making hard choices—choices that may send many philosophers scurrying back to the drawing board. The book will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, the philosophy of language and mind, and logic, and will have profound implications far beyond.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272044
- eISBN:
- 9780191699573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272044.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
The history of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to Willard Van Orman Quine is the history of the rise and fall of the concept of analyticity, whose origins and parameters both lie in Immanuel ...
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The history of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to Willard Van Orman Quine is the history of the rise and fall of the concept of analyticity, whose origins and parameters both lie in Immanuel Kant's first Critique. This chapter also has a broader Kantian moral that might be summarized as follows. All creatures minded are compelled to think via concepts. Otherwise put, concepts are cognitively indispensable because they are the proper outputs of the natural activation of the discursive side of our psychological constitution. Since concepts are cognitively indispensable, philosophy must admit the legitimacy of the concept CONCEPT. However, the concept CONCEPT leads directly to the idea of a conceptually necessary truth — the analytic proposition. The function of an analytic truth is to express intrinsic features of the form and content of the several concepts included within our total conceptual repertoire. Therefore, this admits the legitimacy of the concept of analyticity. Analyticity is a genuine concept which philosophy is better off with.Less
The history of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to Willard Van Orman Quine is the history of the rise and fall of the concept of analyticity, whose origins and parameters both lie in Immanuel Kant's first Critique. This chapter also has a broader Kantian moral that might be summarized as follows. All creatures minded are compelled to think via concepts. Otherwise put, concepts are cognitively indispensable because they are the proper outputs of the natural activation of the discursive side of our psychological constitution. Since concepts are cognitively indispensable, philosophy must admit the legitimacy of the concept CONCEPT. However, the concept CONCEPT leads directly to the idea of a conceptually necessary truth — the analytic proposition. The function of an analytic truth is to express intrinsic features of the form and content of the several concepts included within our total conceptual repertoire. Therefore, this admits the legitimacy of the concept of analyticity. Analyticity is a genuine concept which philosophy is better off with.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691138664
- eISBN:
- 9781400833931
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691138664.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses the foundations of philosophical semantics, covering the work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Frege, along with Russell, did more than anyone else to create the subject. ...
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This chapter discusses the foundations of philosophical semantics, covering the work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Frege, along with Russell, did more than anyone else to create the subject. The development of symbolic logic, the analysis of quantification, the application of logical ideas and techniques to the semantics of natural language, the distinction between sense and reference, the linking of representational content to truth conditions, and the compositional calculation of the contents of compound expressions from the semantic properties of their parts are all due to Frege and Russell. Philosophy of language, as we know it today, would not exist without them.Less
This chapter discusses the foundations of philosophical semantics, covering the work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Frege, along with Russell, did more than anyone else to create the subject. The development of symbolic logic, the analysis of quantification, the application of logical ideas and techniques to the semantics of natural language, the distinction between sense and reference, the linking of representational content to truth conditions, and the compositional calculation of the contents of compound expressions from the semantic properties of their parts are all due to Frege and Russell. Philosophy of language, as we know it today, would not exist without them.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth, comparing it with Frege’s. Of central importance is the relation between the conceptual and the non‐conceptual, and, in particular, how to ...
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This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth, comparing it with Frege’s. Of central importance is the relation between the conceptual and the non‐conceptual, and, in particular, how to understand the generality that characterizes the conceptual. Frege thinks of it in terms of a function mapping objects onto truth‐values, such that once the function is determined it will not be left open how to apply it in a particular case. Austin rejects the very idea of such determinacy. For him, a concept does determine something, but what it determines leaves its application in particular cases negotiable. Still, he retains many of Frege’s central insights, such as the indefinability of truth, the shareability of content, and the notion of a fundamental distinction between the generality of the conceptual and particularity of the non‐conceptual. Frege’s and Austin’s views might even be fully reconcilable, given the different purposes for which they were proposed.Less
This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth, comparing it with Frege’s. Of central importance is the relation between the conceptual and the non‐conceptual, and, in particular, how to understand the generality that characterizes the conceptual. Frege thinks of it in terms of a function mapping objects onto truth‐values, such that once the function is determined it will not be left open how to apply it in a particular case. Austin rejects the very idea of such determinacy. For him, a concept does determine something, but what it determines leaves its application in particular cases negotiable. Still, he retains many of Frege’s central insights, such as the indefinability of truth, the shareability of content, and the notion of a fundamental distinction between the generality of the conceptual and particularity of the non‐conceptual. Frege’s and Austin’s views might even be fully reconcilable, given the different purposes for which they were proposed.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272044
- eISBN:
- 9780191699573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272044.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This book presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between ...
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This book presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Immanuel Kant's philosophy in Europe. However, the book shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their ideas only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the Critical Philosophy. This book therefore comprises both an interpretative study of Kant's massive and seminal Critique of Pure Reason and a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to Willard Van Orman Quine.Less
This book presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Immanuel Kant's philosophy in Europe. However, the book shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their ideas only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the Critical Philosophy. This book therefore comprises both an interpretative study of Kant's massive and seminal Critique of Pure Reason and a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to Willard Van Orman Quine.
Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Looks at the work of Gottlob Frege on truth and composition. It investigates Frege's idea that a sentence refers to a truth‐value, his Principle of Composition, and his abandonment of what Donald ...
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Looks at the work of Gottlob Frege on truth and composition. It investigates Frege's idea that a sentence refers to a truth‐value, his Principle of Composition, and his abandonment of what Donald Davidson calls ‘semantic innocence’. Neale explains what kinds of slingshotian considerations prevented Frege from accepting facts as denotations of sentences and made him see sentences rather as names of truth‐values. The three sections of the chapter are: Reference and Composition; Innocence Abandoned; and The Reference of a Sentence.Less
Looks at the work of Gottlob Frege on truth and composition. It investigates Frege's idea that a sentence refers to a truth‐value, his Principle of Composition, and his abandonment of what Donald Davidson calls ‘semantic innocence’. Neale explains what kinds of slingshotian considerations prevented Frege from accepting facts as denotations of sentences and made him see sentences rather as names of truth‐values. The three sections of the chapter are: Reference and Composition; Innocence Abandoned; and The Reference of a Sentence.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199254057
- eISBN:
- 9780191698194
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254057.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the role of language theory and unity of thought on the contradictions in the limits of thought. It is natural for a theory of language to have implications about what can and ...
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This chapter examines the role of language theory and unity of thought on the contradictions in the limits of thought. It is natural for a theory of language to have implications about what can and what cannot be expressed, and modern theories of language always seem to render important things beyond the limit of expression. This chapter analyses philosopher Gottlob Frege's postulates on the existence of concepts, and suggests that his claims about them are beyond the limit of the expressible. It also evaluates Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of form, and suggests that his account for unity of thought is beyond the expressible.Less
This chapter examines the role of language theory and unity of thought on the contradictions in the limits of thought. It is natural for a theory of language to have implications about what can and what cannot be expressed, and modern theories of language always seem to render important things beyond the limit of expression. This chapter analyses philosopher Gottlob Frege's postulates on the existence of concepts, and suggests that his claims about them are beyond the limit of the expressible. It also evaluates Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of form, and suggests that his account for unity of thought is beyond the expressible.
Jan von Plato
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691174174
- eISBN:
- 9781400885039
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691174174.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter considers Gottlob Frege as the founder of contemporary logic through his little book Begriffsschrift that came out in 1879. The name stands for something like “writing for concepts,” in ...
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This chapter considers Gottlob Frege as the founder of contemporary logic through his little book Begriffsschrift that came out in 1879. The name stands for something like “writing for concepts,” in the sense of a notation, and there is a long subtitle that specifies the notation as “a formula language of pure thinking, modeled upon that of arithmetic.” The actual notation in Frege's book made a rather bizarre impression on many, and no one else ever used it. Luckily he had Bertrand Russell among his few readers; some 25 years after the Begriffsschrift, Russell rewrote Frege's formula language in a style, adopted from Giuseppe Peano, that later evolved into the standard logical and mathematical notation we have today.Less
This chapter considers Gottlob Frege as the founder of contemporary logic through his little book Begriffsschrift that came out in 1879. The name stands for something like “writing for concepts,” in the sense of a notation, and there is a long subtitle that specifies the notation as “a formula language of pure thinking, modeled upon that of arithmetic.” The actual notation in Frege's book made a rather bizarre impression on many, and no one else ever used it. Luckily he had Bertrand Russell among his few readers; some 25 years after the Begriffsschrift, Russell rewrote Frege's formula language in a style, adopted from Giuseppe Peano, that later evolved into the standard logical and mathematical notation we have today.
John Collins
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199694846
- eISBN:
- 9780191732027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694846.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
The present chapter is organised as follows. First, the unity problem will be presented as it struck Bertrand Russell in 1903. Russell’s articulation of the problem is a useful and traditional ...
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The present chapter is organised as follows. First, the unity problem will be presented as it struck Bertrand Russell in 1903. Russell’s articulation of the problem is a useful and traditional starting place. Second, it will be argued that there are in fact two unity problems. The first is what I call the interpretive problem, which bears on how we can compositionally describe what a given unity means. This problem presupposes that there are unities around; the problem is how to specify their content in the appropriate way. Although historically deep, the basic problem here is resolvable in a fairly straightforward way. The second unity problem I call the combinatorial problem. This problem does not presuppose that there are unities, but asks how there can be unities at all, or, as it is often put, what’s the difference between a sentence and a list. The remainder of the present chapter and the next one will argue that none of a range of entertained solutions to the combinatorial problem is satisfactory. The arguments to be presented will be based upon three desiderata on an adequate solution. Chapter 5 will attempt something like a solution that meets the three desiderata, and chapters 6 and 7 will clarify and defend the solution.Less
The present chapter is organised as follows. First, the unity problem will be presented as it struck Bertrand Russell in 1903. Russell’s articulation of the problem is a useful and traditional starting place. Second, it will be argued that there are in fact two unity problems. The first is what I call the interpretive problem, which bears on how we can compositionally describe what a given unity means. This problem presupposes that there are unities around; the problem is how to specify their content in the appropriate way. Although historically deep, the basic problem here is resolvable in a fairly straightforward way. The second unity problem I call the combinatorial problem. This problem does not presuppose that there are unities, but asks how there can be unities at all, or, as it is often put, what’s the difference between a sentence and a list. The remainder of the present chapter and the next one will argue that none of a range of entertained solutions to the combinatorial problem is satisfactory. The arguments to be presented will be based upon three desiderata on an adequate solution. Chapter 5 will attempt something like a solution that meets the three desiderata, and chapters 6 and 7 will clarify and defend the solution.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160726
- eISBN:
- 9781400850464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter discusses the methodology that guided logico-linguistic analysis from Gottlob Frege’s 1879 Begriffsschrift to Rudolf Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language. In the first four ...
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This chapter discusses the methodology that guided logico-linguistic analysis from Gottlob Frege’s 1879 Begriffsschrift to Rudolf Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language. In the first four decades of this period, culminating with Bertrand Russell’s 1918–19 lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, analysis was viewed as an increasingly powerful tool employed in the service of solving traditional philosophical problems. The logicist reduction of arithmetic to what was taken to be logic was the driving force, providing the exemplar of philosophical analysis and the model for extending it beyond the philosophy of mathematics. The methodology is indicated by the role played by A2 in answering Frege’s guiding philosophical questions Q1 and Q2.Less
This chapter discusses the methodology that guided logico-linguistic analysis from Gottlob Frege’s 1879 Begriffsschrift to Rudolf Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language. In the first four decades of this period, culminating with Bertrand Russell’s 1918–19 lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, analysis was viewed as an increasingly powerful tool employed in the service of solving traditional philosophical problems. The logicist reduction of arithmetic to what was taken to be logic was the driving force, providing the exemplar of philosophical analysis and the model for extending it beyond the philosophy of mathematics. The methodology is indicated by the role played by A2 in answering Frege’s guiding philosophical questions Q1 and Q2.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272044
- eISBN:
- 9780191699573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272044.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This book has two intimately intertwined topics. First, it is an interpretive study of Immanuel Kant's massive and seminal Critique of Pure Reason; but secondly and equally, it is a critical essay on ...
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This book has two intimately intertwined topics. First, it is an interpretive study of Immanuel Kant's massive and seminal Critique of Pure Reason; but secondly and equally, it is a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to Willard Van Orman Quine. By Kant's own reckoning, the first Critique is an extended reflection on a single question: ‘Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?’. Translated out of Kant's jargon, this question raises a deep and broadly applicable philosophical difficulty: how can the same judgement be at once necessarily true, referred to the real or natural world in a substantive way, yet cognizable by creatures minded like us apart from all sense experience? For easy reference, the chapter calls this ‘the Modal Problem’.Less
This book has two intimately intertwined topics. First, it is an interpretive study of Immanuel Kant's massive and seminal Critique of Pure Reason; but secondly and equally, it is a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to Willard Van Orman Quine. By Kant's own reckoning, the first Critique is an extended reflection on a single question: ‘Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?’. Translated out of Kant's jargon, this question raises a deep and broadly applicable philosophical difficulty: how can the same judgement be at once necessarily true, referred to the real or natural world in a substantive way, yet cognizable by creatures minded like us apart from all sense experience? For easy reference, the chapter calls this ‘the Modal Problem’.