C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199272174
- eISBN:
- 9780191602061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272174.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Gilbert Harman develops a theory of moral relativism in which rightness or wrongness depends on a framework. Differences in moral frameworks reflect differences in situation, power, and status. ...
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Gilbert Harman develops a theory of moral relativism in which rightness or wrongness depends on a framework. Differences in moral frameworks reflect differences in situation, power, and status. Harman’s relativism thus slides quickly into nihilism. He leaves us with no rational basis for criticizing evil people who do not adopt ‘our’ moral framework. Even a Hitler cannot be criticized so long as he consistently follows his own moral framework. Divine command theory responds to this moral confusion by asserting that our obligations are universal in scope because God commands them.Less
Gilbert Harman develops a theory of moral relativism in which rightness or wrongness depends on a framework. Differences in moral frameworks reflect differences in situation, power, and status. Harman’s relativism thus slides quickly into nihilism. He leaves us with no rational basis for criticizing evil people who do not adopt ‘our’ moral framework. Even a Hitler cannot be criticized so long as he consistently follows his own moral framework. Divine command theory responds to this moral confusion by asserting that our obligations are universal in scope because God commands them.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the philosophies of Harman and Mackie with a view to highlighting six claims of central concern: (1) whether issues of objectivity should be raised ‘reflexively’ at the ...
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This chapter discusses the philosophies of Harman and Mackie with a view to highlighting six claims of central concern: (1) whether issues of objectivity should be raised ‘reflexively’ at the meta-level of enquiry; (2) whether the best account of objectivity will essentially vindicate itself in its own terms; (3) the reducibility of moral properties figuring in moral explanations; (4) whether moral explanations are ever the best explanations of belief; (5) the appropriateness in this context of a causal theory of knowledge; and (6) whether the concepts deployed in morality are to a certain extent local or perspectival in the sense of tied in to our particular sensibilities. It is argued that the framework of minimalism about truth is the best way of prosecuting debates over objectivity.Less
This chapter discusses the philosophies of Harman and Mackie with a view to highlighting six claims of central concern: (1) whether issues of objectivity should be raised ‘reflexively’ at the meta-level of enquiry; (2) whether the best account of objectivity will essentially vindicate itself in its own terms; (3) the reducibility of moral properties figuring in moral explanations; (4) whether moral explanations are ever the best explanations of belief; (5) the appropriateness in this context of a causal theory of knowledge; and (6) whether the concepts deployed in morality are to a certain extent local or perspectival in the sense of tied in to our particular sensibilities. It is argued that the framework of minimalism about truth is the best way of prosecuting debates over objectivity.
Gilbert Harman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238027
- eISBN:
- 9780191597633
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238029.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a ...
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Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive: theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects; meaning depends on how words are used to think with i.e. on how concepts function in reasoning, perception and action; the relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world; translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning.Less
Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive: theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects; meaning depends on how words are used to think with i.e. on how concepts function in reasoning, perception and action; the relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world; translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning.
Gilbert Harman
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238041
- eISBN:
- 9780191597626
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238045.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where ...
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Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self‐defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person's values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter, are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?Less
Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self‐defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person's values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter, are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Particularism is commonly associated with a moral epistemology that takes perception as a model. This chapter argues that in so far as moral judgments are made by ‘just looking’, this does nothing to ...
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Particularism is commonly associated with a moral epistemology that takes perception as a model. This chapter argues that in so far as moral judgments are made by ‘just looking’, this does nothing to support particularism. A close examination of the role of rules and principles in chess helps make this point. Although metaphors of vision are commonplace in discussions of chess (the master ‘just sees’ that the position is weak), this rightly does nothing to undermine the confidence that rules and principles play an important role both in constituing the game of chess itself and in helping people find good moves. In the former case, there are rules which are constitutive of the game (bishops move diagonally). In the latter case, there are strategic maxims (a knight on the rim is dim). Here, the distinctions between different conceptions of principles drawn in Chapter 1 do some work. In particular, heavy use is made of the distinction between the theoretical and action-guiding roles of moral principles.Less
Particularism is commonly associated with a moral epistemology that takes perception as a model. This chapter argues that in so far as moral judgments are made by ‘just looking’, this does nothing to support particularism. A close examination of the role of rules and principles in chess helps make this point. Although metaphors of vision are commonplace in discussions of chess (the master ‘just sees’ that the position is weak), this rightly does nothing to undermine the confidence that rules and principles play an important role both in constituing the game of chess itself and in helping people find good moves. In the former case, there are rules which are constitutive of the game (bishops move diagonally). In the latter case, there are strategic maxims (a knight on the rim is dim). Here, the distinctions between different conceptions of principles drawn in Chapter 1 do some work. In particular, heavy use is made of the distinction between the theoretical and action-guiding roles of moral principles.
John Broome
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter interprets and assesses Williams's ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’, together with a later unpublished lecture of his on ‘ought’. It describes a notion of ownership for oughts. For ...
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This chapter interprets and assesses Williams's ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’, together with a later unpublished lecture of his on ‘ought’. It describes a notion of ownership for oughts. For instance, in 'Alison ought to get a sun hat' the ought is intuitively owned by Alison, whereas in 'Alex ought to get a severe punishment' the ought is intuitively not owned by Alex. It argues that Williams in ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’ meant to deny that any oughts are owned. It also argues, however, that actually some oughts are owned.Less
This chapter interprets and assesses Williams's ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’, together with a later unpublished lecture of his on ‘ought’. It describes a notion of ownership for oughts. For instance, in 'Alison ought to get a sun hat' the ought is intuitively owned by Alison, whereas in 'Alex ought to get a severe punishment' the ought is intuitively not owned by Alex. It argues that Williams in ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’ meant to deny that any oughts are owned. It also argues, however, that actually some oughts are owned.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259455.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the ...
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Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.Less
Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190867850
- eISBN:
- 9780190867898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken ...
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This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken by, among others, Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, and R. Jay Wallace. I explain several problems for such cognitivism: there are problems posed by the possibility of false beliefs about what one intends; and there are problems posed by the need to distinguish intended means from expected side effects. In response to a challenge from Velleman, I sketch an alternative approach, one that sees these planning norms as fundamentally practical norms and that notes a parallel with Peter Strawson’s treatment of the framework of reactive attitudes.Less
This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken by, among others, Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, and R. Jay Wallace. I explain several problems for such cognitivism: there are problems posed by the possibility of false beliefs about what one intends; and there are problems posed by the need to distinguish intended means from expected side effects. In response to a challenge from Velleman, I sketch an alternative approach, one that sees these planning norms as fundamentally practical norms and that notes a parallel with Peter Strawson’s treatment of the framework of reactive attitudes.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
I discuss three objections to essentialism. The first objection is from Gilbert Harman, who claims that because numbers can be identified or reduced to sets it follows that numbers cannot have ...
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I discuss three objections to essentialism. The first objection is from Gilbert Harman, who claims that because numbers can be identified or reduced to sets it follows that numbers cannot have essential properties. In the second objection, William Kneale argues for the conclusion that objects have essential properties only relative to a certain way of specifying or selecting the object. Kneale's argument suffers from a de re/de dicto confusion and the disambiguated reading of his argument is unsound. The third objection, Quine's mathematical cyclist, contains a similar confusion.Less
I discuss three objections to essentialism. The first objection is from Gilbert Harman, who claims that because numbers can be identified or reduced to sets it follows that numbers cannot have essential properties. In the second objection, William Kneale argues for the conclusion that objects have essential properties only relative to a certain way of specifying or selecting the object. Kneale's argument suffers from a de re/de dicto confusion and the disambiguated reading of his argument is unsound. The third objection, Quine's mathematical cyclist, contains a similar confusion.
Christian Miller
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674367
- eISBN:
- 9780191760754
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674367.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter turns to the field of normative ethical theory, and in particular to the view known as virtue ethics. Section one begins with the line of criticism by Gilbert Harman and John Doris which ...
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This chapter turns to the field of normative ethical theory, and in particular to the view known as virtue ethics. Section one begins with the line of criticism by Gilbert Harman and John Doris which has been leveled against the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics using studies of morally relevant behavior in psychology. Section two assesses the positive account of local character traits that Harman and Doris propose we adopt as a more empirically informed alternative. The next section then turns to what is the best response for virtue ethicists to make to the Harman/Doris challenge. Ultimately, however, this response is used as a springboard to formulate what is the real challenge to virtue ethics arising from the experimental results. Finally section four argues that the other responses offered in the literature to Harman and Doris do not succeed on their own, and neither do they adequately face this new challenge.Less
This chapter turns to the field of normative ethical theory, and in particular to the view known as virtue ethics. Section one begins with the line of criticism by Gilbert Harman and John Doris which has been leveled against the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics using studies of morally relevant behavior in psychology. Section two assesses the positive account of local character traits that Harman and Doris propose we adopt as a more empirically informed alternative. The next section then turns to what is the best response for virtue ethicists to make to the Harman/Doris challenge. Ultimately, however, this response is used as a springboard to formulate what is the real challenge to virtue ethics arising from the experimental results. Finally section four argues that the other responses offered in the literature to Harman and Doris do not succeed on their own, and neither do they adequately face this new challenge.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190867850
- eISBN:
- 9780190867898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It ...
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This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya, and John Broome. The essay sketches a proposed alternative to such cognitivism: the practical commitment view of instrumental rationality. The essay explores the challenge posed for cognitivism by the possibility of false beliefs about one’s own intentions; and the essay also explores the idea that, while belief aims at truth, intention aims at coordinated, effective control of action.Less
This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya, and John Broome. The essay sketches a proposed alternative to such cognitivism: the practical commitment view of instrumental rationality. The essay explores the challenge posed for cognitivism by the possibility of false beliefs about one’s own intentions; and the essay also explores the idea that, while belief aims at truth, intention aims at coordinated, effective control of action.
Julia Markovits
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199567171
- eISBN:
- 9780191758966
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567171.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter introduces the internalist account of what reasons are, according to which what we have reason to do depends in some way on our antecedent desires, contrasting it with externalism about ...
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This chapter introduces the internalist account of what reasons are, according to which what we have reason to do depends in some way on our antecedent desires, contrasting it with externalism about reasons. Drawing on the internalist views of David Hume and Bernard Williams, it sets out the worry that accepting internalism about reasons commits us to moral relativism. Indeed, Gilbert Harman embraced such relativism on internalist grounds. The chapter considers and rejects one way to resist Harman’s relativist conclusions (endorsed at times by Williams and Philippa Foot): abandoning the tie between what we morally ought to do and what we have reason to do. We seem to be left with a choice: we must accept moral relativism, or reject internalism about reasons.Less
This chapter introduces the internalist account of what reasons are, according to which what we have reason to do depends in some way on our antecedent desires, contrasting it with externalism about reasons. Drawing on the internalist views of David Hume and Bernard Williams, it sets out the worry that accepting internalism about reasons commits us to moral relativism. Indeed, Gilbert Harman embraced such relativism on internalist grounds. The chapter considers and rejects one way to resist Harman’s relativist conclusions (endorsed at times by Williams and Philippa Foot): abandoning the tie between what we morally ought to do and what we have reason to do. We seem to be left with a choice: we must accept moral relativism, or reject internalism about reasons.
Justin Clarke-Doane
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198738695
- eISBN:
- 9780191802515
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the ...
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In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles.” What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? This chapter argues that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what the chapter calls the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D—the challenge to justify our D-beliefs—with the reliability challenge for D-realism—the challenge to explain the reliability of our D-beliefs. Harman’s contrast is relevant to the first, but not, evidently, to the second. One upshot of the discussion is that genealogical debunking arguments are fallacious. Another is that indispensability considerations cannot answer the Benacerraf–Field challenge for mathematical realism.Less
In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles.” What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? This chapter argues that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what the chapter calls the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D—the challenge to justify our D-beliefs—with the reliability challenge for D-realism—the challenge to explain the reliability of our D-beliefs. Harman’s contrast is relevant to the first, but not, evidently, to the second. One upshot of the discussion is that genealogical debunking arguments are fallacious. Another is that indispensability considerations cannot answer the Benacerraf–Field challenge for mathematical realism.
Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199734108
- eISBN:
- 9780190267513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199734108.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It makes a plausible case for the claim that the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states ...
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This chapter explores the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It makes a plausible case for the claim that the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states marks a real and psychologically interesting boundary. Moreover, it is a boundary that has been largely overlooked by contemporary work in cognitive simulation. The chapter also presents a critique of Gilbert Harman's view, that may be viewed as an attack on the psychological significance of the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It suggests that, like Harman, many of those concerned with cognitive simulation have been so captivated with the promise of inferential accounts of the mechanisms underlying perception and thought that they have failed to note the rather special and largely isolated nature of the inferential processes between beliefs and subdoxastic states.Less
This chapter explores the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It makes a plausible case for the claim that the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states marks a real and psychologically interesting boundary. Moreover, it is a boundary that has been largely overlooked by contemporary work in cognitive simulation. The chapter also presents a critique of Gilbert Harman's view, that may be viewed as an attack on the psychological significance of the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It suggests that, like Harman, many of those concerned with cognitive simulation have been so captivated with the promise of inferential accounts of the mechanisms underlying perception and thought that they have failed to note the rather special and largely isolated nature of the inferential processes between beliefs and subdoxastic states.
Torbjörn Tännsjö
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- June 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190225575
- eISBN:
- 9780190225605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190225575.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Survival lotteries play a considerable role in philosophers’ thinking on the ethics of killing. They have also entered popular culture. The lotteries are not widely accepted, yet they seem to be ...
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Survival lotteries play a considerable role in philosophers’ thinking on the ethics of killing. They have also entered popular culture. The lotteries are not widely accepted, yet they seem to be reasonable, if only we can set some of our taboos to one side. In this chapter, deontology, the moral rights theory, and utilitarianism are confronted with famous ‘survival lotteries’. Here this chapter examines cases such as John Harris’s organ lottery, John Taurek’s rescue lottery, and Gilbert Harman’s ‘organ’ thought experiments. In the final analysis, it is argued that utilitarianism can best explain our considered intuitions in relation to these lotteries. It is possible to debunk intuitions commonly held to the opposite effect, once they are submitted to cognitive psychotherapy.Less
Survival lotteries play a considerable role in philosophers’ thinking on the ethics of killing. They have also entered popular culture. The lotteries are not widely accepted, yet they seem to be reasonable, if only we can set some of our taboos to one side. In this chapter, deontology, the moral rights theory, and utilitarianism are confronted with famous ‘survival lotteries’. Here this chapter examines cases such as John Harris’s organ lottery, John Taurek’s rescue lottery, and Gilbert Harman’s ‘organ’ thought experiments. In the final analysis, it is argued that utilitarianism can best explain our considered intuitions in relation to these lotteries. It is possible to debunk intuitions commonly held to the opposite effect, once they are submitted to cognitive psychotherapy.
Brian Loar
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199673353
- eISBN:
- 9780191758935
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In this chapter, Loar attempts to combine the representationist insight of Harman, Dretske, and others about the transparency of normal visual experience with the qualiphile commitment to ...
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In this chapter, Loar attempts to combine the representationist insight of Harman, Dretske, and others about the transparency of normal visual experience with the qualiphile commitment to introspectible intrinsic qualia. He rejects both the standard view of raw qualia according to which qualia are not essentially representational, but rather, like paint on canvas, are individuated independently of their representational properties, and what he calls the standard representationist attack on qualia, according to which no matter how well you try to introspect your normal visual experience, all you will notice is the apparent objects and properties that your visual experience presents. The upshot is that non-relational, yet intentional, qualia are needed to explain certain intuitions about phenomenal sameness in mental content; and representationism doesn’t have the resources to do that. There is mental paint, and it points.Less
In this chapter, Loar attempts to combine the representationist insight of Harman, Dretske, and others about the transparency of normal visual experience with the qualiphile commitment to introspectible intrinsic qualia. He rejects both the standard view of raw qualia according to which qualia are not essentially representational, but rather, like paint on canvas, are individuated independently of their representational properties, and what he calls the standard representationist attack on qualia, according to which no matter how well you try to introspect your normal visual experience, all you will notice is the apparent objects and properties that your visual experience presents. The upshot is that non-relational, yet intentional, qualia are needed to explain certain intuitions about phenomenal sameness in mental content; and representationism doesn’t have the resources to do that. There is mental paint, and it points.
