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Gilbert Harman develops a theory of moral relativism in which rightness or wrongness depends on a framework. Differences in moral frameworks reflect differences in situation, power, and status. Harman’s relativism thus slides quickly into nihilism. He leaves us with no rational basis for criticizing evil people who do not adopt ‘our’ moral framework. Even a Hitler cannot be criticized so long as he consistently follows his own moral framework. Divine command theory responds to this moral confusion by asserting that our obligations are universal in scope because God commands them.

This chapter discusses the philosophies of Harman and Mackie with a view to highlighting six claims of central concern: (1) whether issues of objectivity should be raised ‘reflexively’ at the meta-level of enquiry; (2) whether the best account of objectivity will essentially vindicate itself in its own terms; (3) the reducibility of moral properties figuring in moral explanations; (4) whether moral explanations are ever the best explanations of belief; (5) the appropriateness in this context of a causal theory of knowledge; and (6) whether the concepts deployed in morality are to a certain extent local or perspectival in the sense of tied in to our particular sensibilities. It is argued that the framework of minimalism about truth is the best way of prosecuting debates over objectivity.

Particularism is commonly associated with a moral epistemology that takes perception as a model. This chapter argues that in so far as moral judgments are made by ‘just looking’, this does nothing to support particularism. A close examination of the role of rules and principles in chess helps make this point. Although metaphors of vision are commonplace in discussions of chess (the master ‘just sees’ that the position is weak), this rightly does nothing to undermine the confidence that rules and principles play an important role both in constituing the game of chess itself and in helping people find good moves. In the former case, there are rules which are constitutive of the game (bishops move diagonally). In the latter case, there are strategic maxims (a knight on the rim is dim). Here, the distinctions between different conceptions of principles drawn in Chapter 1 do some work. In particular, heavy use is made of the distinction between the theoretical and action-guiding roles of moral principles.

This chapter interprets and assesses Williams's ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’, together with a later unpublished lecture of his on ‘ought’. It describes a notion of ownership for oughts. For instance, in 'Alison ought to get a sun hat' the ought is intuitively owned by Alison, whereas in 'Alex ought to get a severe punishment' the ought is intuitively not owned by Alex. It argues that Williams in ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’ meant to deny that any oughts are owned. It also argues, however, that actually some oughts are owned.

Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.

This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken by, among others, Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, and R. Jay Wallace. I explain several problems for such cognitivism: there are problems posed by the possibility of false beliefs about what one intends; and there are problems posed by the need to distinguish intended means from expected side effects. In response to a challenge from Velleman, I sketch an alternative approach, one that sees these planning norms as fundamentally practical norms and that notes a parallel with Peter Strawson’s treatment of the framework of reactive attitudes.

This chapter turns to the field of normative ethical theory, and in particular to the view known as virtue ethics. Section one begins with the line of criticism by Gilbert Harman and John Doris which has been leveled against the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics using studies of morally relevant behavior in psychology. Section two assesses the positive account of local character traits that Harman and Doris propose we adopt as a more empirically informed alternative. The next section then turns to what is the best response for virtue ethicists to make to the Harman/Doris challenge. Ultimately, however, this response is used as a springboard to formulate what is the real challenge to virtue ethics arising from the experimental results. Finally section four argues that the other responses offered in the literature to Harman and Doris do not succeed on their own, and neither do they adequately face this new challenge.

This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya, and John Broome. The essay sketches a proposed alternative to such cognitivism: the practical commitment view of instrumental rationality. The essay explores the challenge posed for cognitivism by the possibility of false beliefs about one’s own intentions; and the essay also explores the idea that, while belief aims at truth, intention aims at coordinated, effective control of action.

This chapter introduces the internalist account of what reasons are, according to which what we have reason to do depends in some way on our antecedent desires, contrasting it with externalism about reasons. Drawing on the internalist views of David Hume and Bernard Williams, it sets out the worry that accepting internalism about reasons commits us to moral relativism. Indeed, Gilbert Harman embraced such relativism on internalist grounds. The chapter considers and rejects one way to resist Harman’s relativist conclusions (endorsed at times by Williams and Philippa Foot): abandoning the tie between what we morally ought to do and what we have reason to do. We seem to be left with a choice: we must accept moral relativism, or reject internalism about reasons.

In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles.” What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? This chapter argues that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what the chapter calls the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D—the challenge to justify our D-beliefs—with the reliability challenge for D-realism—the challenge to explain the reliability of our D-beliefs. Harman’s contrast is relevant to the first, but not, evidently, to the second. One upshot of the discussion is that genealogical debunking arguments are fallacious. Another is that indispensability considerations cannot answer the Benacerraf–Field challenge for mathematical realism.

This chapter explores the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It makes a plausible case for the claim that the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states marks a real and psychologically interesting boundary. Moreover, it is a boundary that has been largely overlooked by contemporary work in cognitive simulation. The chapter also presents a critique of Gilbert Harman's view, that may be viewed as an attack on the psychological significance of the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It suggests that, like Harman, many of those concerned with cognitive simulation have been so captivated with the promise of inferential accounts of the mechanisms underlying perception and thought that they have failed to note the rather special and largely isolated nature of the inferential processes between beliefs and subdoxastic states.

Survival lotteries play a considerable role in philosophers’ thinking on the ethics of killing. They have also entered popular culture. The lotteries are not widely accepted, yet they seem to be reasonable, if only we can set some of our taboos to one side. In this chapter, deontology, the moral rights theory, and utilitarianism are confronted with famous ‘survival lotteries’. Here this chapter examines cases such as John Harris’s organ lottery, John Taurek’s rescue lottery, and Gilbert Harman’s ‘organ’ thought experiments. In the final analysis, it is argued that utilitarianism can best explain our considered intuitions in relation to these lotteries. It is possible to debunk intuitions commonly held to the opposite effect, once they are submitted to cognitive psychotherapy.

In this chapter, Loar attempts to combine the representationist insight of Harman, Dretske, and others about the transparency of normal visual experience with the qualiphile commitment to introspectible intrinsic qualia. He rejects both the standard view of raw qualia according to which qualia are not essentially representational, but rather, like paint on canvas, are individuated independently of their representational properties, and what he calls the standard representationist attack on qualia, according to which no matter how well you try to introspect your normal visual experience, all you will notice is the apparent objects and properties that your visual experience presents. The upshot is that non-relational, yet intentional, qualia are needed to explain certain intuitions about phenomenal sameness in mental content; and representationism doesn’t have the resources to do that. There is mental paint, and it points.