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Contemporary Meta‐Ethical Alternatives: Relativism and Nihilism

C. Stephen Evans

in Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199272174
eISBN:
9780191602061
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199272174.003.0012
Subject:
Religion, Philosophy of Religion

Gilbert Harman develops a theory of moral relativism in which rightness or wrongness depends on a framework. Differences in moral frameworks reflect differences in situation, power, and status. ... More


The Problem of Moral Knowledge

Alan Thomas

in Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780198250173
eISBN:
9780191604072
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250177.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses the philosophies of Harman and Mackie with a view to highlighting six claims of central concern: (1) whether issues of objectivity should be raised ‘reflexively’ at the ... More


Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind

Gilbert Harman

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238027
eISBN:
9780191597633
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238029.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a ... More


Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy

Gilbert Harman

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238041
eISBN:
9780191597626
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238045.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where ... More


Moral Vision

Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge

in Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199290659
eISBN:
9780191603617
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199290652.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Particularism is commonly associated with a moral epistemology that takes perception as a model. This chapter argues that in so far as moral judgments are made by ‘just looking’, this does nothing to ... More


Williams on Ought

John Broome

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199599325
eISBN:
9780191741500
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter interprets and assesses Williams's ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’, together with a later unpublished lecture of his on ‘ought’. It describes a notion of ownership for oughts. For ... More


Supervenience and Causation

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism: A Defence

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199259755
eISBN:
9780191601835
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259455.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the ... More


Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical

Michael E. Bratman

in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190867850
eISBN:
9780190867898
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken ... More


Modality De Re: Objections

Alvin Plantinga

in The Nature of Necessity

Published in print:
1978
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198244141
eISBN:
9780191598241
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198244142.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I discuss three objections to essentialism. The first objection is from Gilbert Harman, who claims that because numbers can be identified or reduced to sets it follows that numbers cannot have ... More


Trouble for Virtue Ethics? Some Implications for Normative Ethics

Christian Miller

in Character and Moral Psychology

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199674367
eISBN:
9780191760754
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674367.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter turns to the field of normative ethical theory, and in particular to the view known as virtue ethics. Section one begins with the line of criticism by Gilbert Harman and John Doris which ... More


Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality

Michael E. Bratman

in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190867850
eISBN:
9780190867898
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It ... More


Reasons and Moral Relativism

Julia Markovits

in Moral Reason

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199567171
eISBN:
9780191758966
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567171.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter introduces the internalist account of what reasons are, according to which what we have reason to do depends in some way on our antecedent desires, contrasting it with externalism about ... More


Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality

Justin Clarke-Doane

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780198738695
eISBN:
9780191802515
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the ... More


Beliefs and Subdoxastic States

Stephen Stich

in Collected Papers, Volume 1: Mind and Language, 1972–2010

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734108
eISBN:
9780190267513
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199734108.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It makes a plausible case for the claim that the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states ... More


Survival Lotteries

Torbjörn Tännsjö

in Taking Life: Three Theories on the Ethics of Killing

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780190225575
eISBN:
9780190225605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190225575.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Survival lotteries play a considerable role in philosophers’ thinking on the ethics of killing. They have also entered popular culture. The lotteries are not widely accepted, yet they seem to be ... More


Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia

Brian Loar

in Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780199673353
eISBN:
9780191758935
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In this chapter, Loar attempts to combine the representationist insight of Harman, Dretske, and others about the transparency of normal visual experience with the qualiphile commitment to ... More


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