Stephen Hetherington
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199247349
- eISBN:
- 9780191697654
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Where this chapter stands on the issue of what epistemologists call the ‘Gettier problem’ is much as Chapter 2 stood on the issue of sceptical worries. It argues for a correspondingly non-standard ...
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Where this chapter stands on the issue of what epistemologists call the ‘Gettier problem’ is much as Chapter 2 stood on the issue of sceptical worries. It argues for a correspondingly non-standard interpretation of Gettier cases, the kind of puzzling cases first described by Edmund Gettier (1963). This interpretation will also provide further support for the hypothesis that epistemic absolutism is false.Less
Where this chapter stands on the issue of what epistemologists call the ‘Gettier problem’ is much as Chapter 2 stood on the issue of sceptical worries. It argues for a correspondingly non-standard interpretation of Gettier cases, the kind of puzzling cases first described by Edmund Gettier (1963). This interpretation will also provide further support for the hypothesis that epistemic absolutism is false.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds ...
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This chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so. This is how Gettier understands justification. A person can also be justified in the sense that he commands grounds or reasons that establish the truth of p. Knowledge claims are, however, sensitive to levels of scrutiny. What counts as adequate grounds in one context may not in another because of its nonstandard features. Gettier problems in all their forms arise when a person, S, responsibly judges that p, but in a context where we, who are privy to information S lacks, see that his grounds do not meet the standards appropriate for the situation he in fact is in.Less
This chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so. This is how Gettier understands justification. A person can also be justified in the sense that he commands grounds or reasons that establish the truth of p. Knowledge claims are, however, sensitive to levels of scrutiny. What counts as adequate grounds in one context may not in another because of its nonstandard features. Gettier problems in all their forms arise when a person, S, responsibly judges that p, but in a context where we, who are privy to information S lacks, see that his grounds do not meet the standards appropriate for the situation he in fact is in.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of ...
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This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.Less
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.
Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.
Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.
John Greco
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that by attending to the illocutionary force of knowledge attributions — specifically, that they serve to give credit to the believer for getting things right — fallibilists can ...
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This chapter argues that by attending to the illocutionary force of knowledge attributions — specifically, that they serve to give credit to the believer for getting things right — fallibilists can assuage two problems plaguing their concept of knowledge: namely, the lottery problem and the Gettier problem. Borrowing work from Joel Fienberg on blaming, an account of credit attribution is developed that stresses the relationship between causal salience and causal responsibility. Because causal salience is context sensitive, resolutions to the lottery problem and the Gettier problem contain a significant contextual element. Just as an agent must be causally responsible in order to receive credit for athletic feats, so too must an agent's cognitive character or intellectual virtue be a necessary element to explain why an agent is deserving of credit for obtaining a true belief. This account is tested against cases relative to the above problems and ends with how this account can explain the value of knowledge.Less
This chapter argues that by attending to the illocutionary force of knowledge attributions — specifically, that they serve to give credit to the believer for getting things right — fallibilists can assuage two problems plaguing their concept of knowledge: namely, the lottery problem and the Gettier problem. Borrowing work from Joel Fienberg on blaming, an account of credit attribution is developed that stresses the relationship between causal salience and causal responsibility. Because causal salience is context sensitive, resolutions to the lottery problem and the Gettier problem contain a significant contextual element. Just as an agent must be causally responsible in order to receive credit for athletic feats, so too must an agent's cognitive character or intellectual virtue be a necessary element to explain why an agent is deserving of credit for obtaining a true belief. This account is tested against cases relative to the above problems and ends with how this account can explain the value of knowledge.
Luciano Floridi
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199232383
- eISBN:
- 9780191594809
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232383.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The chapter eliminates a potential obstacle towards an informational analysis of knowledge. In the last decades, epistemology has been largely confined to the tripartite account of propositional, ...
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The chapter eliminates a potential obstacle towards an informational analysis of knowledge. In the last decades, epistemology has been largely confined to the tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief. Such approach can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of truth and justification can be achieved. But such coordination problem is unsolvable because it is equivalent to the ‘coordinated attack’ problem, which is demonstrably unsolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed. The positive result is that the tripartite account should be abandoned in favour of a non-doxastic, informational approach to the analysis of knowledge.Less
The chapter eliminates a potential obstacle towards an informational analysis of knowledge. In the last decades, epistemology has been largely confined to the tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief. Such approach can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of truth and justification can be achieved. But such coordination problem is unsolvable because it is equivalent to the ‘coordinated attack’ problem, which is demonstrably unsolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed. The positive result is that the tripartite account should be abandoned in favour of a non-doxastic, informational approach to the analysis of knowledge.
Jay F. Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251339
- eISBN:
- 9780191598326
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251339.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Addresses the classical ‘justified true belief’ account of knowledge. Examines Robert Fogelin's reinterpretation of the traditional analysis as conjoining assessments of epistemic propriety and ...
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Addresses the classical ‘justified true belief’ account of knowledge. Examines Robert Fogelin's reinterpretation of the traditional analysis as conjoining assessments of epistemic propriety and truth‐determinativeness, and the diagnosis of Gettier problems suggested by it. A perspectivalist revision of Fogelin's account is advanced, defended, and distinguished from widespread ‘contextualist’ views. Concludes with a demonstration that the revised analysis avoids various forms of scepticism.Less
Addresses the classical ‘justified true belief’ account of knowledge. Examines Robert Fogelin's reinterpretation of the traditional analysis as conjoining assessments of epistemic propriety and truth‐determinativeness, and the diagnosis of Gettier problems suggested by it. A perspectivalist revision of Fogelin's account is advanced, defended, and distinguished from widespread ‘contextualist’ views. Concludes with a demonstration that the revised analysis avoids various forms of scepticism.
John Greco
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130058
- eISBN:
- 9780199833481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130057.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In ”Virtues in Epistemology,” John Greco presents and evaluates two main notions of intellectual virtue. The first concerns Ernest Sosa's development of this concept as a disposition to grasp truth ...
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In ”Virtues in Epistemology,” John Greco presents and evaluates two main notions of intellectual virtue. The first concerns Ernest Sosa's development of this concept as a disposition to grasp truth and avoid falsehood. Greco contrasts this with moral models of intellectual virtue that include a motivational component in their definition, namely a desire for truth. Instead, Greco argues that a minimalist reliabilist account of intellectual virtue “in which the virtues are conceived as reliable cognitive abilities or powers,” can be illuminating in an account of knowledge. He sets out to support this on the grounds that his approach to intellectual virtue can adequately address three major problems on the theory of knowledge: Humean skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the problem of showing that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.Less
In ”Virtues in Epistemology,” John Greco presents and evaluates two main notions of intellectual virtue. The first concerns Ernest Sosa's development of this concept as a disposition to grasp truth and avoid falsehood. Greco contrasts this with moral models of intellectual virtue that include a motivational component in their definition, namely a desire for truth. Instead, Greco argues that a minimalist reliabilist account of intellectual virtue “in which the virtues are conceived as reliable cognitive abilities or powers,” can be illuminating in an account of knowledge. He sets out to support this on the grounds that his approach to intellectual virtue can adequately address three major problems on the theory of knowledge: Humean skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the problem of showing that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.
Paul K. Moser (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130058
- eISBN:
- 9780199833481
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130057.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book includes 19 essays on the theory of knowledge by leading philosophers in the field. Its essays cover all the key areas in the field while making original contributions. Written in a manner ...
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This book includes 19 essays on the theory of knowledge by leading philosophers in the field. Its essays cover all the key areas in the field while making original contributions. Written in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates as well as graduate students and professionals in philosophy, the book explains the main ideas and problems of contemporary epistemology while avoiding technical detail. Contributing to contemporary debates over the analysis, sources, and limits of human knowledge, the book represents such central topics as the nature of epistemic justification, the Gettier problem, skepticism, epistemic rationality, the internalism‐externalism debate, scientific knowledge, a priori knowledge, virtues in epistemology, epistemological duties, epistemology and ethics, mind and knowledge, the role of explanation in knowledge, epistemology in the philosophy of religion, and formal problems about knowledge. The various discussions share a concern for conceptual clarity and argumentative rigor in epistemology. The book ends with substantial bibliography on epistemology.Less
This book includes 19 essays on the theory of knowledge by leading philosophers in the field. Its essays cover all the key areas in the field while making original contributions. Written in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates as well as graduate students and professionals in philosophy, the book explains the main ideas and problems of contemporary epistemology while avoiding technical detail. Contributing to contemporary debates over the analysis, sources, and limits of human knowledge, the book represents such central topics as the nature of epistemic justification, the Gettier problem, skepticism, epistemic rationality, the internalism‐externalism debate, scientific knowledge, a priori knowledge, virtues in epistemology, epistemological duties, epistemology and ethics, mind and knowledge, the role of explanation in knowledge, epistemology in the philosophy of religion, and formal problems about knowledge. The various discussions share a concern for conceptual clarity and argumentative rigor in epistemology. The book ends with substantial bibliography on epistemology.
Edmund L. Gettier
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198724551
- eISBN:
- 9780191840142
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The contributions to this volume reflect and deepen the Gettier Problem’s impact on epistemology and on philosophical methodology. Fifty-four years ago, in his three-page paper, Edmund Gettier taught ...
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The contributions to this volume reflect and deepen the Gettier Problem’s impact on epistemology and on philosophical methodology. Fifty-four years ago, in his three-page paper, Edmund Gettier taught us that the generally accepted account of factual knowledge was defective because there are cases of true justified beliefs that are not knowledge. Most of the issues on our epistemological agenda since then are closely related to his lesson. To reflect on the very latest developments in the scholarship on this problem, we gathered the papers of twenty-six experts, including many of the most influential epistemologists of our time. This is the largest, most authoritative collection of essays on the Gettier Problem. The contributions to this volume reflect the state of the art on the subject.Less
The contributions to this volume reflect and deepen the Gettier Problem’s impact on epistemology and on philosophical methodology. Fifty-four years ago, in his three-page paper, Edmund Gettier taught us that the generally accepted account of factual knowledge was defective because there are cases of true justified beliefs that are not knowledge. Most of the issues on our epistemological agenda since then are closely related to his lesson. To reflect on the very latest developments in the scholarship on this problem, we gathered the papers of twenty-six experts, including many of the most influential epistemologists of our time. This is the largest, most authoritative collection of essays on the Gettier Problem. The contributions to this volume reflect the state of the art on the subject.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines a series of attempts to produce an analysis of knowledge that avoids Gettier problems by adding some further restriction (fourth clause) to the doctrine that knowledge is ...
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This chapter examines a series of attempts to produce an analysis of knowledge that avoids Gettier problems by adding some further restriction (fourth clause) to the doctrine that knowledge is justified true belief. The common feature in all Gettier examples is that S's claim to know that p is defeated by some fact he is not privy to (though not negligent in failing to check on it). To avoid such defeators, an indefeasibility clause is added to the standard definition. This produced a long series of new and more complex fourth clauses that were met with new, more exotic counterexamples. The chapter examines the contributions of Lehrer, Paxson, Swain, and Pappas in this endeavor.Less
This chapter examines a series of attempts to produce an analysis of knowledge that avoids Gettier problems by adding some further restriction (fourth clause) to the doctrine that knowledge is justified true belief. The common feature in all Gettier examples is that S's claim to know that p is defeated by some fact he is not privy to (though not negligent in failing to check on it). To avoid such defeators, an indefeasibility clause is added to the standard definition. This produced a long series of new and more complex fourth clauses that were met with new, more exotic counterexamples. The chapter examines the contributions of Lehrer, Paxson, Swain, and Pappas in this endeavor.
Ram Neta
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199287512
- eISBN:
- 9780191713620
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
Timothy Williamson has urged us to regard the Gettier problem as insoluble and so to forego the search for the elusive ‘fourth condition’ on knowledge. He has also defended the popular thesis that ...
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Timothy Williamson has urged us to regard the Gettier problem as insoluble and so to forego the search for the elusive ‘fourth condition’ on knowledge. He has also defended the popular thesis that knowledge is defeasible by the addition of further evidence. And finally, he has argued that an agent's evidence set consists of all and only those propositions that the agent knows to be true. The present chapter argues that, if we give up Williamson's identification of evidence with knowledge in favor of an alternative conception of evidence, then we can obtain a satisfactory solution to the Gettier problem, as well as an argument against the defeasibility of knowledge by the addition of further evidence.Less
Timothy Williamson has urged us to regard the Gettier problem as insoluble and so to forego the search for the elusive ‘fourth condition’ on knowledge. He has also defended the popular thesis that knowledge is defeasible by the addition of further evidence. And finally, he has argued that an agent's evidence set consists of all and only those propositions that the agent knows to be true. The present chapter argues that, if we give up Williamson's identification of evidence with knowledge in favor of an alternative conception of evidence, then we can obtain a satisfactory solution to the Gettier problem, as well as an argument against the defeasibility of knowledge by the addition of further evidence.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the nature of memory causation. This involves identifying the vehicle of memory causation, specifying the strength of the causal relation constitutive of memory, and ruling out ...
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This chapter examines the nature of memory causation. This involves identifying the vehicle of memory causation, specifying the strength of the causal relation constitutive of memory, and ruling out deviant causal chains. It is argued that the causal chains connecting the past and present representation must consist in a persisting memory trace. Memory traces are either dispositional beliefs or subdoxastic states. For a memory trace to give rise to a genuine memory it must at least be an INUS condition for one's present state of seeming to remember. If the memory trace is an independently sufficient condition for the state of seeming to remember, it may not be preempted by another independently sufficient condition. The dependence of memory states on past representations must support counterfactuals of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a particular proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it now. This chapter discusses, among other things, the possibility of trace transplants, connectionism, the Gettier problem, hypnosis, and suggestibility.Less
This chapter examines the nature of memory causation. This involves identifying the vehicle of memory causation, specifying the strength of the causal relation constitutive of memory, and ruling out deviant causal chains. It is argued that the causal chains connecting the past and present representation must consist in a persisting memory trace. Memory traces are either dispositional beliefs or subdoxastic states. For a memory trace to give rise to a genuine memory it must at least be an INUS condition for one's present state of seeming to remember. If the memory trace is an independently sufficient condition for the state of seeming to remember, it may not be preempted by another independently sufficient condition. The dependence of memory states on past representations must support counterfactuals of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a particular proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it now. This chapter discusses, among other things, the possibility of trace transplants, connectionism, the Gettier problem, hypnosis, and suggestibility.
Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter D. Klein (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198724551
- eISBN:
- 9780191840142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who ...
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This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the problem, and it also contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem. The volume also includes some skeptical voices according to which the Gettier Problem is not deeply problematic or some of the problems it raises are not genuine philosophical problems.Less
This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the problem, and it also contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem. The volume also includes some skeptical voices according to which the Gettier Problem is not deeply problematic or some of the problems it raises are not genuine philosophical problems.
Jason Baehr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199604074
- eISBN:
- 9780191729300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The guiding question of this chapter is whether the concept of intellectual virtue merits a central and fundamental role within traditional epistemology. It is argued, first, that the answer to this ...
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The guiding question of this chapter is whether the concept of intellectual virtue merits a central and fundamental role within traditional epistemology. It is argued, first, that the answer to this question depends on whether the concept of intellectual virtue merits a primary role in an analysis of knowledge. The rest of the chapter is an inquiry into the plausibility of a virtue‐based account of knowledge. The central focus is Linda's Zagzebski's (1996) account, according to which knowledge is (roughly) true belief arising from intellectually virtuous motives and actions. It is argued that Zagzebski's conditions for knowledge are neither necessary nor sufficient, and that the problems with her analysis are likely to plague any virtue‐based analysis of knowledge. It is concluded that the concept of intellectual virtue does not merit a central or fundamental role in traditional epistemology and thus that the stronger version of conservative character‐based virtue epistemology fails.Less
The guiding question of this chapter is whether the concept of intellectual virtue merits a central and fundamental role within traditional epistemology. It is argued, first, that the answer to this question depends on whether the concept of intellectual virtue merits a primary role in an analysis of knowledge. The rest of the chapter is an inquiry into the plausibility of a virtue‐based account of knowledge. The central focus is Linda's Zagzebski's (1996) account, according to which knowledge is (roughly) true belief arising from intellectually virtuous motives and actions. It is argued that Zagzebski's conditions for knowledge are neither necessary nor sufficient, and that the problems with her analysis are likely to plague any virtue‐based analysis of knowledge. It is concluded that the concept of intellectual virtue does not merit a central or fundamental role in traditional epistemology and thus that the stronger version of conservative character‐based virtue epistemology fails.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Externalist analyses of knowledge are motivated, at least in part, by the fact that in Gettier examples, S, the person who claims to know p, is right in believing that p, but only as a matter of ...
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Externalist analyses of knowledge are motivated, at least in part, by the fact that in Gettier examples, S, the person who claims to know p, is right in believing that p, but only as a matter of luck. The most natural way of ruling out these lucky hits on the truth is to demand that S's belief must stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the fact believed. The chapter examines an early version of this approach offered by Goldman. It also examines BonJour's objections to any purely causal (or reliabilist) account of knowledge.Less
Externalist analyses of knowledge are motivated, at least in part, by the fact that in Gettier examples, S, the person who claims to know p, is right in believing that p, but only as a matter of luck. The most natural way of ruling out these lucky hits on the truth is to demand that S's belief must stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the fact believed. The chapter examines an early version of this approach offered by Goldman. It also examines BonJour's objections to any purely causal (or reliabilist) account of knowledge.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187724
- eISBN:
- 9780199786121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187725.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or ...
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This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or impersonally. It explains the two main arguments against justified moral belief: the skeptical regress argument and the skeptical hypothesis or scenario argument. It concludes that these arguments pose a dilemma because their flaws are hard to detect, and their conclusions are hard to believe.Less
This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or impersonally. It explains the two main arguments against justified moral belief: the skeptical regress argument and the skeptical hypothesis or scenario argument. It concludes that these arguments pose a dilemma because their flaws are hard to detect, and their conclusions are hard to believe.
Christopher Hookway
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and ...
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This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.Less
This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.
Nathan Ballantyne
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190847289
- eISBN:
- 9780190847296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Epistemology involves reflection on human inquiry, but to what end? This chapter describes a multidisciplinary approach to epistemological questions: regulative epistemology. This type of theorizing ...
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Epistemology involves reflection on human inquiry, but to what end? This chapter describes a multidisciplinary approach to epistemological questions: regulative epistemology. This type of theorizing aims to generate guidance for inquiry and it calls for the blending of descriptive, normative, and practical perspectives.Less
Epistemology involves reflection on human inquiry, but to what end? This chapter describes a multidisciplinary approach to epistemological questions: regulative epistemology. This type of theorizing aims to generate guidance for inquiry and it calls for the blending of descriptive, normative, and practical perspectives.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198810346
- eISBN:
- 9780191847332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198810346.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A model theory for a logic of both knowledge and belief (epistemic logic) is spelled out and defended. The chapter explores some consequences of the assumptions that motivate the theory, some ...
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A model theory for a logic of both knowledge and belief (epistemic logic) is spelled out and defended. The chapter explores some consequences of the assumptions that motivate the theory, some alternative ways that the theory might be extended, and some ways in which this kind of model theory might throw light on traditional problems in epistemology. The main focus is the relation between knowledge and belief, and on some parallels between issues that emerged from the project of responding to the Gettier problem and issues in the more formal framework about the relations between the accessibility relations for belief and knowledge operators.Less
A model theory for a logic of both knowledge and belief (epistemic logic) is spelled out and defended. The chapter explores some consequences of the assumptions that motivate the theory, some alternative ways that the theory might be extended, and some ways in which this kind of model theory might throw light on traditional problems in epistemology. The main focus is the relation between knowledge and belief, and on some parallels between issues that emerged from the project of responding to the Gettier problem and issues in the more formal framework about the relations between the accessibility relations for belief and knowledge operators.
John Turri
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198746942
- eISBN:
- 9780191809156
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter enhances and extends a powerful and promising research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents that one can identify in ...
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This chapter enhances and extends a powerful and promising research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents that one can identify in contemporary epistemology, including the value problem, epistemic normativity, virtue epistemology, and the nature of knowledge. Performance-based epistemology offers at least three outstanding benefits: it explains the distinctive value that knowledge has, it places epistemic evaluation into a familiar and ubiquitous pattern of evaluation, and it solves the Gettier problem. But extant versions of performance-based epistemology have been the object of serious criticism. This chapter shows how to meet the objections without sacrificing the aforementioned benefits.Less
This chapter enhances and extends a powerful and promising research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents that one can identify in contemporary epistemology, including the value problem, epistemic normativity, virtue epistemology, and the nature of knowledge. Performance-based epistemology offers at least three outstanding benefits: it explains the distinctive value that knowledge has, it places epistemic evaluation into a familiar and ubiquitous pattern of evaluation, and it solves the Gettier problem. But extant versions of performance-based epistemology have been the object of serious criticism. This chapter shows how to meet the objections without sacrificing the aforementioned benefits.
