Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-20 of 79 items

  • Keywords: Gettier x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification

Robert J. Fogelin

Published in print:
1994
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195089875
eISBN:
9780199833238
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195089871.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of ... More


The Nature of Memory Causation

Sven Bernecker

in Memory: A Philosophical Study

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199577569
eISBN:
9780191722820
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines the nature of memory causation. This involves identifying the vehicle of memory causation, specifying the strength of the causal relation constitutive of memory, and ruling out ... More


Gettier cases

Stephen Hetherington

in Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199247349
eISBN:
9780191697654
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Where this chapter stands on the issue of what epistemologists call the ‘Gettier problem’ is much as Chapter 2 stood on the issue of sceptical worries. It argues for a correspondingly non-standard ... More


Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases

Jennifer Nagel

in Knowledge Ascriptions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199693702
eISBN:
9780191741265
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain ... More


The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief

Richard Foley

in When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691154725
eISBN:
9781400842308
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter returns to Gettier's article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” and considers its impact on the theory of knowledge and the theory of justified belief. It first discusses the ... More


Gettier Problems

Robert J. Fogelin

in Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification

Published in print:
1994
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195089875
eISBN:
9780199833238
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195089871.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds ... More


Inferential Knowledge

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199656073
eISBN:
9780191742132
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter addresses the following question: assuming that E provides adequate support for H, as explicated in Chapter 4, how would a subject have to be related to E and to the relationship between ... More


The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies

Tamar Szabó Gendler

in Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199589760
eISBN:
9780191595486
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter attempts to show that a particular intuition that has played a central role in discussions of epistemology for roughly a quarter‐century is highly unstable. This is the intuition that, ... More


Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge

Richard Foley

in When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691154725
eISBN:
9781400842308
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter considers accounts of identifying what has to be added to true belief in order to get knowledge. One tradition says that what is needed is something like an argument in defense of the ... More


Knowing How without Knowing That

Yuri Cath

in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780195389364
eISBN:
9780199932368
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In this chapter, I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge how is a kind of knowledge that. Knowledge that is widely thought to be subject to an antiluck condition, a ... More


Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195187724
eISBN:
9780199786121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195187725.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or ... More


Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson

Herman Cappelen

in Philosophy without Intuitions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199644865
eISBN:
9780191739026
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections and Comparison to Williamson Generalizations about thought experiments are drawn, which underscore the diversity of roles they play in philosophy, and it is ... More


Two Varieties of Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ ... More


Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive ... More


Extensions and Consequences

Christopher Peacocke

in The Realm of Reason

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780199270729
eISBN:
9780191600944
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199270724.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Traces out some of the ramifications the explanation of the character and source of perceptual entitlement has and indicates some applications beyond the case of perceptual entitlement. These ... More


Knowledge as Credit for True Belief

John Greco

in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199252732
eISBN:
9780191719288
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that by attending to the illocutionary force of knowledge attributions — specifically, that they serve to give credit to the believer for getting things right — fallibilists can ... More


How to be a Virtue Epistemologist

Christopher Hookway

in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199252732
eISBN:
9780191719288
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and ... More


The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Paul K. Moser (ed.)

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195130058
eISBN:
9780199833481
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195130057.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book includes 19 essays on the theory of knowledge by leading philosophers in the field. Its essays cover all the key areas in the field while making original contributions. Written in a manner ... More


Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries

Jonathan Kvanvig

in Williamson on Knowledge

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199287512
eISBN:
9780191713620
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

One of the central claims of Williamson's ground-breaking epistemology is the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. This chapter contends that this viewpoint is mistaken. It first explains ... More


Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility

Ram Neta

in Williamson on Knowledge

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199287512
eISBN:
9780191713620
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

Timothy Williamson has urged us to regard the Gettier problem as insoluble and so to forego the search for the elusive ‘fourth condition’ on knowledge. He has also defended the popular thesis that ... More


View: