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This chapter analyzes events in 1950 when U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced at the New York Conference that the U.S. government was willing to send “substantial forces” to Europe. The American combat force would be part of a collective force with a unified command structure, a force that would ultimately be capable of defending Western Europe on the ground. But the Americans were willing to take that step only if the European allies, for their part, were prepared to do what was necessary to “make this defense of Europe a success.” The U.S. government, he said, had come to the conclusion that the whole effort could not succeed without a German military contribution. So if the NATO allies wanted the American troops, they would have to accept the idea of German rearmament.

This chapter explores the aftermath of the twelve Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NMT) trials. Section 1 recounts the events that preceded John J. McCloy's appointment as High Commission of Germany in June 1949, focusing on General Clay's review of the NMT convictions, the deactivation of the OCC, and Tribunal IV's surprising decision to reconsider its judgment in Ministries. Section 2 then discusses McCloy's creation of the Advisory Board on War Criminals, which likely violated Control Council Law No. 10, and his decision in mid-1951 to grant clemency to the overwhelming majority of the convicted NMT defendants. Finally, Section 3 explores the events that followed McCloy's clemency decisions, focusing on the work of the U.S.-German Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board and its permanent successor.

During the 1950s, intensive debates over the potential supply of nuclear weapons systems to the Bundeswehr, the newly founded West German army, agitated the public in the Federal Republic. During the conflicts over the NATO dual-track solution since 1979, a similar set of anxieties was widely articulated and internationally registered as a specific German angst. In both cases, peace protesters, politicians and Bundeswehr officers shared the perception that nuclear war would very likely entail the self-destruction of the German nation. This notion of a ‘nuclear war in front of the apartment door’ was a crucial feature of the Cold War as an imaginary war in the Federal Republic.

In this chapter I address Taylor’s command experiences in Germany and Berlin (1949-1951), as army administrator at the Pentagon, and in Korea (February 1953- mid-1955). Taylor deftly handled Cold War crises, helped build alliance relationships, linked politics, economics, diplomacy, and military affairs, and worked at the intersection of operational command and strategic planning. He and the army also coped with strategy shifts as the Truman administration endorsed a buildup of conventional and nuclear forces and President Eisenhower returned to nuclear deterrence and emphasis on the air force. In 1955, Taylor drafted a plan for a strategy of flexible response that combined nuclear and conventional armaments. Eisenhower nevertheless appointed Taylor chief of staff of the army because he trusted in his loyalty.

This chapter considers the case of the veteran pacifist Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt who was forced to flee Germany in 1933 and seek refuge in Britain. Here he attempted to warn against the dangers to peace posed by German rearmament, for instance by means of his book Germany's Air Force (1935), an exposé of the secret German aircraft programme in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles. MI5 became interested in his activities, his contacts in Britain (such as the former editor of The Times, Wickham Steed), his sources, as well as a collaborator of his, the refugee bacteriologist and fellow-pacifist Helmuth Simons. To this day, the two pacifists are covered in one joint MI5 file.