Search Results

This chapter discusses Gerald Ford's role in quenching the drug use issue that still existed within the United States. It reviews the 1976 federal strategy report, which summarized the areas where development had been made. This report is noted for insisting that the White Paper's argument on drug policy makers and their need to recognize the various social effects of drugs, to establish priorities, and to limit the federal funds is valid. The report is also shown to contain important steps that were used to manage the increasing cocaine traffic from Colombia and address criminal justice issues. This chapter also talks about the drug priority concept.

Even without encouragement from Republican politicians, Christian activists in the mid-1970s launched campaigns against cultural liberalism, uniting evangelicals with conservative Catholics and reshaping the Republican Party. In the early 1970s, Phyllis Schlafly, a Catholic, led evangelical women in a successful campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment. Evangelicals’ opposition to feminism and the sexual revolution also prompted them to join Catholics in speaking out against abortion. During the presidential election of 1976, cultural conservatives forced Gerald Ford to move to the right on abortion and challenged Jimmy Carter after his controversial interview with Playboy. Though an organized Religious Right had not yet developed, evangelicals were discovering their power to influence national politics.

This chapter examines the internationalism of former U.S. President Gerald Ford. Ford wanted to reinvigorate American internationalism, but he felt bound by the same constraints that affected his handling of economic and energy policies. Congress resisted presidential authority and was eager to shape the country's diplomacy itself, and the people were weary of bleak international news and reluctant to rally behind the White House. In his travels abroad and through his personal diplomacy, Ford resisted a trend toward isolationism and made no attempts to introduce bold new doctrines in foreign policy.

This chapter examines former U.S. President Gerald Ford's vision for the U.S. From the moment Ford stepped into the executive branch, liberals in Congress decried his vision for the country, or lack of one. During his presidency, Ford's views ignited ideological opposition from Congress and Democrats took a traditional approach to correcting the country's economic ills, emphasizing full employment and an active role for the federal government, with less concern about inflation and budgetary deficits. This chapter suggests that Ford's conciliatory leadership produced legislation while also preventing an exacerbation of the executive-legislative tension inherent in divided government.

This chapter tells of how the newly appointed U.S. president, Gerald Rudolph Ford Jr., managed the escalating conflict between North and South Vietnam. Ford and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger continued to implement the insurance policy—belittling Indochina's continuing significance for U.S. foreign policy toward Asia. In particular, Ford portrayed Vietnam as an irritant to more important foreign policy initiatives. For example, the president told the Japanese prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, “Some in America became sour on the role of the U.S. in Asia due to Vietnam. Now that that is settled, we are free to broaden and concentrate on a wider area.” The remainder of the chapter recounts how Ford and Kissinger blamed the Congress for the defeat of Saigon by North Vietnam.

This chapter examines the 1976 presidential elections in the U.S. and its impact on the presidency of Gerald Ford and his Republican Party. It suggests that though Gerald Ford lost to his Democratic opponent Jimmy Carter, he succeeded in reviving his party and improving the economy. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Ford left both the economy and his party in better shape than when he took office.

This chapter examines the Americans' hunger for heroes when Gerald Ford stepped into the U.S. presidency in August 1974. It suggests that Ford's most controversial action was pardoning former President Richard Nixon. This enraged supporters and opponents alike and there were even others who accused him of conspirational behavior. His presidency never fully recovered. By damaging Ford's reputation and political strength, the pardon hampered his ability to promote the policies that he later introduced. Ultimately, it may have also cost him election to a full term.

This chapter examines the image and reputation of former U.S. President Gerald Ford during his term. Though Ford tried to maintain good press relations, reporters often ignored substance for the sake of an entertaining caricature and he became the favorite subject of many a television show's presidential satire. Despite his accomplishments in increasing real gross national product (GNP), increasing employment rate, and reducing inflation rate, his approval rating was just 46 percent in January 1976.

The election of 1976 took place in very unusual circumstances. Yet, in many ways, the election campaign itself was fairly conventional. Much of the election cycle, however, also revolved around the issues of presidential authority and credibility, and, in these areas, foreign policy was crucial. That Gerald Ford came so close to snatching the election in the finals days and weeks of the campaign suggests that foreign policy could have made the difference and that the president’s refusal or inability to exploit Republican foreign policy positions and divisions between his policies and those of his opponents, Ronald Reagan for the nomination and Jimmy Carter for the election, hampered his ability to develop a winning campaign.

This chapter examines economic initiatives launched by former U.S. President Gerald Ford in 1975 and 1976. It explains that the 1970s economy was unforgiving to incumbent presidents because stagflation often led voters to blame their president and seek a new economic steward. But despite all the criticism against Ford, he was able to reduce inflation to just 4.8 percent by the time he left office and the unemployment rate to only 7.3 percent. Not all presidents can leave office saying that their fundamental goals were intact, especially during the 1970s.

This chapter examines former U.S. President Gerald Ford's battle against California Governor Ronald Reagan in the 1976 Republican primary. Although the Reagan challenge caught Ford off guard, he expected to win the nomination easily because he believed that Reagan's solutions to the country's problems were simplistic and his nine-to-five work ethic would prove inadequate for a rigorous campaign. Winning the nomination and hearing the acclamation of his supporters was one of the highlights of Ford's presidency. After their bitter 1976 face-off, Ford reconciled with Reagan and campaigned for him in 1980.

Congress passed the first amendments to FOIA in 1974 over Nixon's objections during the height of the Watergate Scandal. Nixon's expansion in the use and scope of executive privilege not only brought about a Supreme Court decision but pushed Congress into amending FOIA. On the day Nixon resigned from office and Ford was sworn in as president, the FOIA amendment bill was sitting in a conference committee. The conference committee reached out to Ford his first week in office to inform him that a final version of the bill was done and would be passed immediately. Ford asked for time, opening what would become several months of negotiations between the White House and Congress over amending FOIA. Unable to sway Congress enough, Ford threatened to and then ultimately vetoed the amendment bill, which Congress overrode. The interactions between the executive and legislative branches during this bargaining period highlights key factors of understanding the issues of executive privilege and FOIA in the post-Nixon period.

This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about former U.S. President Gerald Ford and the challenges faced by his presidency during the 1970s. This book examines the three major issues affecting Ford's presidency and the nation as a whole. These include the high cost of living and concerns related to the Watergate scandal such as lack of trust in government, corruption in government, and the energy crisis. This book also analyses how Ford dealt with these problems and discusses the highlights of his career.

This chapter examines the challenge for former U.S. President Gerald Ford in repairing the relations between the White House and the Ninety-fourth Congress, which was badly damaged by his predecessor. In his repair work, Ford used his liaison staff who functioned as the telegraph lines that convey the president's wishes to Congress, marshal votes, and keep information and the traffic of ideas moving smoothly. His most notable accomplishments were his extraordinary string of vetoes and his ability to have most sustained.

By the mid- and late 1970s, the symbols and themes emerging from the decade's neighborhoods movement had powerfully infused national electoral politics. Chapter 11 explores the uses of neighborhood imagery in two presidential elections. In 1976, both major parties responded to a cresting neighborhoods movement by adopting a rhetoric of localism, self-sufficiency, decentralization, and communalism. However, strategists for Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford came to define the city neighborhood's identity primarily with reference to mythologies of European immigration, religiosity, and self-help. This contest laid the groundwork for the Ronald Reagan campaign of 1980, in which the conservative insurgent would court disaffected blue-collar whites by trumpeting the virtues of neighborhood integrity as an alternative to state intervention. As Democratic leaders ceded the language of neighborhood to the right, this chapter suggests, the allure of the neighborhood as haven from outside intrusion temporarily swept competing visions from the national political stage.

This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the challenges faced by former U.S. President Gerald Ford during the 1970s. The 1970s was no ordinary era and Ford led a country that trembled on the cusp of ominous changes and where cynicism and distrust permeated politics. Despite various criticisms against him, Ford ameliorated the decade's problems. He restored economic stability, revived his Republican Party, and reduced inflation and unemployment rates.

This chapter focuses on the conclusion of the Vietnam-era G.I. Bill saga, highlighted by the clash between Congress and President Gerald Ford over a proposed increase in Vietnam War veterans' education benefits. Throughout his brief term as president, Ford surpassed Richard Nixon's attempts to bring a culture of economic sacrifice to government spending. As a former member of the House Appropriations Committee, Ford demonstrated a strong interest in and knowledge of economics. Three days after taking office, he identified inflation as “public enemy number one.” This chapter examines Ford's attempt to kill a G.I. Bill that passed both the Senate and the House by vetoing an increase in veterans' education benefits and how that veto was overridden by Congress. It concludes with a discussion of the final rounds of debates over funding levels at the end of the 1970s, along with the continued influence of Olin Teague on limiting the benefits offered to Vietnam veterans.

This chapter examines former U.S. President Gerald Ford's 1975 State of the Union Address. In this speech, Ford first introduced his new energy program, then explained his plan to fight unemployment. He also described a $16 billion tax cut proposal and promised to return quickly to the economy the new revenues from energy conservation taxes, totalling $30 billion. This chapter also discusses the reaction of the Democratic members of Congress to Ford's speech and his proposed economic policy.

This chapter examines the lack of action to address the energy crisis in the U.S. in 1975. The response to former President Gerald Ford's energy proposals was generally negative. Business leaders voiced objections, while utility and petrochemical executives complained that the imposition of an import fee on petroleum products would hurt their industries. In addition, there was also no congressional action on the issue, which led some experts to believe that energy became a victim of the visceral desire of the members of the Ninety-fourth Congress to stay in office.