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This chapter defines pragmatism and pragmatic religious naturalism through a reading of pragmatists William James, John Dewey, and George Santayana. It shows how Du Bois constructs crucial notions of black identity, double consciousness, and black peoplehood with anti-essentialist pragmatist tools such as James's radical empiricism. It goes on to show how Du Bois's religious voice is fully inhabited by four key characteristics of pragmatic religious naturalisms: 1) skepticism of supernatural revelation; 2) conceiving of religion's powers as coming from finite human trusts; 3) finding religion's genius in its pairing of the real with the ideal; and finally 4) a meliorism in which hopefulness only emerges from a frank confrontation with real struggle and loss.

This chapter examines George Santayana’s notion of philosophy as a discipline of “aesthetic enlightenment,” a way of life that leads toward an ideal of “the sage” reminiscent of Hellenistic systems. It also takes up Santayana’s claim that his philosophy is “a discipline of the mind and heart, a lay religion” and what it means. It considers his philosophy in relation to the ancient Hellenistic ideals of the “sophos” and how he perceives the aesthetic discipline of the sage. In particular, it discusses four major archetypes that contribute to Santayana’s ideal of the sage: the discipline of matter, the discipline of the infinite, the discipline of essence, and the discipline of spirit.

This chapter presents two ways in which George Santayana's contribution to twentieth-century philosophy may be appraised. Santayana could be taken as a writer about the human condition who was also interested in philosophy, or else who was also a theorist in various branches of philosophy who wrote essays, literary criticism, histories of ideas, social commentaries, volumes of poetry, a best-selling novel, and so forth. Both approaches to his talent must be employed, and interwoven, in order to attain a clear idea of what Santayana accomplished in his books. More than any other great philosopher in the English language, Santayana not only harmonized literary and philosophical writing but also made harmonization of this sort a fundamental resource in his doctrinal outlook. Despite its systematic structure, Santayana's philosophy was intended to be an expression of the author's personal experience and imaginative interpretation of his life as he lived it.

This chapter explores the reasons why the theories of George Santayana on the nature of love have never been adequately studied. Santayana’s works have, in recent years, enjoyed a revival of scholarly attention. Being the greatest proponent of Platonism in the twentieth century, Santayana combined his Platonism with an antithetical materialism. It is from this materialism that he often begins his analysis. Santayana’s “humanism” or the humanistic voice that separates itself from his Platonism and materialism is the most promising element in his philosophy. Santayana is an admirer of Schopenhauer and his assertion of the material grounding of all experience and of all reality. In his attempt to dismiss Romantic ideas about the will heroically contriving to deny itself through acts of contemplation or proud defiance, Santayana accentuates and extends Schopenhauer’s reductivistic belief that brute matter is the only substance which sustains being of any kind.

This chapter examines how an aesthetic philosophy may address the problem of evil by focusing on George Santayana’s analysis of Plotinus’s position. It argues that Santayana’s idea of aesthetics, which is one of disengagement, is not the only possible attitude and that the practice of “insight meditation” (or vipassanā) in Buddhism implies the same attentiveness to experience but stresses compassionate insight and conduct. It considers what the quest for a beatific vision has to do with the “problem of evil” in a naturalistic mysticism such as Santayana’s. The chapter also discusses Santayana’s vision of the spiritual life as a naturalistic contemplative discipline in relation to Platonism and Neoplatonism, how a contemplative spirituality may acknowledge the existence of evil and develop a compassionate response to it without surrendering the ideal of contemplative detachment, and the relation between morality and spirituality.

In this defense of epiphenomenalism, Lachs highlights Santayana's use of the Aristotelian distinction between process and activity to argue that mental life is an impotent byproduct of the body. Processes involve movement from potentiality to actuality and so are temporally differentiated. Activity by contrast is complete and self-contained, lacking heterogeneous parts or any essential temporal reference. Consciousness (or spirit, to use Santayana's terminology) is the actualization of physiological processes, possessing the perfections of pure activity. Being fully actualized, it lacks the power to bring anything into existence. Lachs argues that this position preserves our experience of the duality of mind and body while also leaving the world open to scientific investigation, unimpaired by mental or nonphysical forces.

Lachs argues that what is distinctive about American philosophy is its transcendence of the materialism-idealism option and with it a host of related dichotomies (subject-object, mind-matter, process-product). Criticizing Santayana's insistence on the impotent mind, and with it his emphasis on the realm of essence, Lachs argues that Santayana's view of animal faith, with its emphasis on human action, offers vital insights for a philosophy of life.

This chapter presents an essay on the importance of Ralph Waldo Emerson for classical American philosophy. It explains that despite the differences and disagreements among several classic American philosophers including William James, Josiah Royce and John Dewey, they have one influence in common, and that is the thought of Emerson. Even George Santayana, another major figure of the American classical period, had an abiding interest in Emerson's thought and he frequently referred to Emerson in his own writings.

Lachs notes seven important similarities Santayana and Peirce share, including commitments to realism, naturalism, and the existence of universals. Despite these commonalities, Lachs finds their respective views of the individual (isolated or social) and of reality (independent or communal) to be the source of their more apparent differences, especially with respect to Peirce's optimism and what Lachs calls Santayana's more “sober assessment” of reality.

This chapter compares John Dewey’s embodied aesthetics with George Santayana’s contemplative or “spiritual” concept of the aesthetic life. Both men view the aesthetic as central to existence, but adopt quite different approaches to realize it. Both are also aesthetic philosophers who put philosophy to service toward the end of a life incarnate with wisdom and beauty, that is, a “spiritual life.” The chapter first looks at the classical conceptions of ontology found in the Greeks before turning to the postmodernism of Dewey and Santayana. It shows how Santayana approached the question of “Nature” or “Being” and argues that the aesthetic may be a more important domain of philosophical inquiry, especially for metaphysics, than previously assumed. It also discusses the role of imagination in the philosophical enterprise.

Of equal importance as the development of pragmatism and instrumentalism, although more narrowly and professionally focused, was the development of realism, a view that argued for the independent existence of the material world in space and time. This movement began in the first decade of the twentieth century led by Harvard's neo‐realist, Ralph Perry. It continued with the more significant Critical Realists of the second decade of the century—George Santayana, Arthur Lovejoy, and Roy Wood Sellars. C.I. Lewis, the most important inter‐war philosopher and another Harvard professor, known for his conceptual pragmatism, also embraced realistic ideas. In the second half of the century, Wilfrid Sellars influentially defended this point of view.

Lachs argues that the individual is the only moral substance (not atoms, not the state), for it alone is the seat of consciousness and desire required for action. Communities and organizations may “act” but only through the actions of their individual members. Individuals are ultimate in the social world, and the hallmark of a good society is tolerance of different individuals with their different goods. Lachs offers a theory of mediation as an explanation of social life.

The ends–means continuum can shed light on the nature of aesthetic experience. The aesthetic manifests the imagination creating consummatory possibilities, and its reliance upon harmonious unity between ends and means can also help resolve problems in the fields of ethics and religion. Arthur Schopenhauer himself extolled the aesthetic as a path of salvation which defeats our bondage to the will and argued that art can provide this spiritual service only if it turns away from anything that is useful for preserving and prolonging life. For his part, George Santayana makes a distinction between “servile” arts and “fine” arts. His aesthetics is not wholly inconsistent with John Dewey’s ideas about the continuum of ends and means. Nineteenth-century proponents of art for art’s sake insisted that art need not conform to any of the standards which pertain to ethics, philosophy, or religion.

This chapter examines the key authors and texts that provided conservative liberalism and Ordo-liberalism with a distinctive aristocratic character: its paternalism, its scepticism about democracy, its discomfort with the commercial aspects of capitalism, and its belief in a hierarchy of ability. From their interwar origins, conservative liberalism and Ordo-liberalism were about more than the economic order. They were fundamentally about the kind of social and cultural order that was appropriate to a sustainable liberal society and that would stem the crisis of moral and intellectual values. Referencing of canonical texts with which the cultivated bourgeois intelligentsia was familiar had the additional value of endowing conservative liberals and Ordo-liberals with prestige. This chapter examines the most cited authors and texts in this literature: Lord John Acton, Julien Benda, Jacob Burckhardt, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Gustave Le Bon, Frédéric Le Play, José Ortega y Gasset, Bertrand Russell, George Santayana, and Alexis de Tocqueville. It also looks at Friedrich Hayek’s attempt to establish the Acton-Tocqueville Society. These authors embodied a faith in an aristocracy of knowledge, a distrust of plebeian culture, and a belief in the quality of the inner life and in character as the foundation of a liberal society. Aristocratic liberalism rested on two fears: of unbridled democracy and of the despotic state; of anarchy and servitude. The chapter closes with reflections on the changing fortunes of aristocratic liberalism and their implication for conservative liberalism and Ordo-liberalism.

This conclusion examines some episodes in the formation of the narrative about 'the genteel tradition'. Having shown that Henry Adams, Henry James, Edith Wharton and their friend Barrett Wendell all contribute to a realist critique of a liberal idealism, American Snobs notes here that when George Santayana makes his own influential commentary on the 'genteel', he is responding to the same liberal Harvard milieu that provokes that realist critique. Wendell's Harvard students Van Wyck Brooks and Vernon Louis Parrington adapt this critique as they develop the narrative about the genteel for their own ends. Brooks, the conclusion shows, contributes to the distortions of that narrative by conflating Charles Eliot Norton's perspective with that of the much more reactionary Wendell. The book closes by considering the unsexy femininity that frequently figures the genteel, linking it to Reconstruction-era evocations of the schoolmarm and later references to sterile Anglo-Saxon womanhood that hastens racial decline. In later iterations of the narrative about the genteel, negative representations of this unsexy white femininity tend to serve progressive ends; in earlier iterations like those surveyed in American Snobs, however, such representations tend to serve a conservatism that is sceptical about democracy and understands itself as realist.

Interestingly enough, Hume’s notion of our psychologically “fusing” the sentiment of beauty onto objects, and perceiving them as if the beauty is in the object, re-emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century in George Santayana’s once popular book, The Sense of Beauty. Santayana’s view is explored in Chapter 11. And it is argued that Santayana had exactly the right explanation for why we engage in disputes over taste. It is, simply, because we believe, although wrongly, that we are disputing over matters of fact; we project the pleasure that “beautiful” objects arouse in us onto the objects and perceive this pleasure as a property of the object.

This book explores an “aesthetics of human existence” in terms of an ecological, humanistic naturalism. It argues that human beings seek to live with a concrete, embodied experience of meaning and value in the world, a “Human Eros.” It discusses the Human Eros and the related themes of imagination and education, as well as themes dealing with the role of the aesthetic as the fulfillment of the Human Eros in life, focusing on the philosophy of John Dewey, George Santayana, and Ralph Waldo Emerson along with Native American culture. It also examines the question of “spirit” and looks at cultural ecologies and the related concept of “eco-ontology”.

This chapter examines the aesthetic as self-realization in nature as found in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s transcendentalist view of human existence in nature and compares it with classical Chinese philosophy. John Dewey’s aesthetics is absolutely one of integration, while that of George Santayana is one of liberation. Both integration and liberation are present and equally significant in Emerson’s philosophy. In all three thinkers, the idea of “lived aesthetics” is a central concern for realizing human existence, and integration and liberation are reflected in the tensive relation between nature and spirit. The chapter discusses postmodernism and Romanticism in relation to Emerson’s transcendentalism.