E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the ...
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The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.Less
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Molnar's four propositions are introduced. They present an important dilemma. C.B. Martin's distinction between limits and absences is then introduced. It is argued that there are objective limits in ...
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Molnar's four propositions are introduced. They present an important dilemma. C.B. Martin's distinction between limits and absences is then introduced. It is argued that there are objective limits in the world, totality states of affairs or ‘allnesses’. In this sense there is negation in the world. Totalities may even be perceived. But absences are not required as truthmakers. Mereology is introduced to elucidate the form that totality states of affairs take. Limits are not ‘additions of being’ and, arguably, do not clash with the Eleatic Principle.Less
Molnar's four propositions are introduced. They present an important dilemma. C.B. Martin's distinction between limits and absences is then introduced. It is argued that there are objective limits in the world, totality states of affairs or ‘allnesses’. In this sense there is negation in the world. Totalities may even be perceived. But absences are not required as truthmakers. Mereology is introduced to elucidate the form that totality states of affairs take. Limits are not ‘additions of being’ and, arguably, do not clash with the Eleatic Principle.
Stephen Mumford
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- November 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198831532
- eISBN:
- 9780191869303
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198831532.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Truths are supposed to be made true by something that exists, such as a fact, according to truthmaker theory. What, though, of apparent truths concerning what is not the case? How can they be made ...
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Truths are supposed to be made true by something that exists, such as a fact, according to truthmaker theory. What, though, of apparent truths concerning what is not the case? How can they be made true by something that is? This paradox of negative judgement has been re-articulated by Molnar. We must either meet his challenge, of identifying the positive truthmakers for the negative truths, or we must reject at least one of the premises that jointly entailed that there were such truthmakers. Attempts to solve this problem have all failed. Candidate positive truthmakers usually rely on smuggling in some negative aspect. It also looks difficult to reject any of Molnar’s premises since doing so comes at a seemingly high price. At present, this problem remains unresolved.Less
Truths are supposed to be made true by something that exists, such as a fact, according to truthmaker theory. What, though, of apparent truths concerning what is not the case? How can they be made true by something that is? This paradox of negative judgement has been re-articulated by Molnar. We must either meet his challenge, of identifying the positive truthmakers for the negative truths, or we must reject at least one of the premises that jointly entailed that there were such truthmakers. Attempts to solve this problem have all failed. Candidate positive truthmakers usually rely on smuggling in some negative aspect. It also looks difficult to reject any of Molnar’s premises since doing so comes at a seemingly high price. At present, this problem remains unresolved.
