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This chapter discusses the second phase of UN involvement in Iraq, which seemed to herald the emergence of the Security Council as a New World Order Policeman. The Security Council’s capacity to legitimize the use of force provided a legal basis for international action to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. The chapter recounts the diplomatic and military success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm — mandated to compel the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and conducted by a coalition of states — drawing legitimacy from Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII also provided a newly assertive basis for traditional activities, such as ceasefire implementation and border-monitoring tasks, the Council gave to a new mission, UNIKOM, deployed along the border between Iraq and Kuwait. This new police role for UN peace operations was part of a larger ‘New World Order’ heralded by President George H. W. Bush, which seemed to hold the promise of an international rule of law, enforced by a united P-5 operating through the Security Council.

Moving to an application of the worldviews of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, this chapter examines the decisions to go to war with Iraq. Beginning with George H.W. Bush, the chapter examines the administration’s policy toward Iraq prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It then analyzes how George H.W. Bush and his administration responded to the invasion. Turning to George W. Bush, the chapter explores the pre-September 11th administration policy toward Iraq and the impact of the September 11th attacks on the United States on that policy. Returning to George H.W. Bush, the chapter explains how the president and his advisors pursued a policy of multilateralism, building a coalition to defend Saudi Arabia and, if necessary, evict Iraq from Kuwait. Finally, the chapter concludes by focusing on George W. Bush’s argument for regime change in Iraq, focusing on how the president and his advisors made that case. Throughout, the chapter demonstrates how the “enlightened” realist and “cowboy” liberal worldviews played a role in each administration’s decisions and policies.

George H. W. Bush was raised in a devout Episcopalian family and remained affiliated with this denomination for almost all his life. However, Bush’s theology and social policies had more in common with evangelicals than with more liberal Protestants. Bush’s faith was very important to him and helped shape a number of his presidential policies. He continually exhorted Americans to seek God’s aid to deal with the nation’s challenges and problems. No other chief executive argued as often as Bush that the United States was “one nation under God” and was accountable to Him. Bush frequently accentuated faith, morality, service, and family values. He maintained generally cordial relations with many leading evangelicals by supporting the sanctity of life, voluntary school prayer, religiously based child care, and parental control of education. Bush’s faith substantially influenced his policy in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 1991, most notably Operation Desert Storm’s liberation of Kuwait.

Drawing on the introductory chapter’s discussion of “enlightened” realism and “cowboy” liberalism, this chapter compares and contrasts the lives and experiences of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, beginning to illustrate the contrasts between these two presidents. Shifting back and forth between the lives of the two men, the chapter begins by examining George H.W. Bush’s call to service. It then turns to George W. Bush’s Midland, Texas upbringing and the impact that Midland had on his development. From there, the chapter compares George H.W. Bush’s successes and seemingly natural rise to the presidency with George W. Bush’s more difficult rise to the presidency. Drawing on these observations, the chapter begins to make the case for the two men’s contrasting worldviews.

Continuing from the previous chapter, this chapter examines George H.W. Bush’s and George W. Bush’s decisions related to the course and conclusion of the Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. It begins by focusing on George H.W. Bush’s decision to launch Operation Desert Storm. Discussing the challenges posed by possible Israeli retaliation and Soviet diplomacy, the chapter illustrates George H.W. Bush’s skilful use of diplomacy. Next, the chapter turns to Operation Iraqi Freedom and George W. Bush. Emphasizing the challenges posed by events in Iraq, the chapter demonstrates the “cowboy” liberal approach of George W. Bush. The chapter ends by comparing George H.W. Bush’s decision to stop short of Baghdad with George W. Bush’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Throughout, the chapter emphasizes the role of each president’s worldview in contributing to these decisions and policies.

This chapter investigates the central role of trust-building for the George H. W. Bush administration and its crucial significance in navigating the political transformations of 1990–91. Portraying Bush's foreign policy as driven by an effort to establish trust among adversaries to minimize risk and maintain order, this chapter shows how Bush and his key advisers, Secretary of State James A. Baker III and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, crafted a strategy of personal diplomacy and caution. Analyzing in particular the demise of the Soviet Union in late 1991 as well as the 1990–91 Kuwait crisis, the chapter highlights the Bush administration's prioritization of reliability, steadfastness, and personal relationships in fostering a culture of mutual trust as key assets for U.S. foreign policy before.

This chapter discusses the attempts of the next administration to handle U.S. policy and the unsettling precedent of the Clinton years. However, the Bush administration drew directly on the lessons of the 1990s in framing an expansive response to 9/11. George H. W. Bush took care to avoid his predecessor's error of failing to articulate a persuasive, overarching conception of the international role of the United States. The nation slowly returned to a foreign policy that was no less clear or straightforward than containment, and the Americans also subscribed to Bush's worldview.

Like his predecessors, George H. W. Bush regarded communism as a grave existential danger and worried that Gorbachev’s reforms would not endure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 confirmed the demise of the “red threat,” however, the Bush administration moved “beyond containment” and sought to establish a New World Order. Although the triumph of containment did not alter U.S. assumptions about the Middle East, where oil and Israel remained top priorities, Bush #41 hoped to broker peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Prospects for a new Middle East took a grim turn in August 1990, when Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait, prompting Bush #41 to send half a million U.S. troops to reverse the Iraqi invasion. While Bush savored his victory in the Persian Gulf, critics warned that he had paid too little attention to a rising tide of Muslim extremism from Afghanistan to Algieria.

This chapter offers an analysis of the lessons, both general and specific one can draw from a comparison of the Bush presidencies’ policies in the Middle East. The chapter begins by offering lessons from the analysis of the wars in Iraq, citing the importance of experience in the presidency, and arguing that the experience of George H.W. Bush contributed to policies that produced far better results than the policies of George W. Bush. Emphasizing the fact that experience coupled with each man’s worldview contributed to the policies and policy outcomes, the chapter suggests that it is important to understand the beliefs of presidents. The chapter next turns to an analysis of the lessons that emerged from the comparison of the peace process, stressing the pivotal importance of personal relations. Finally, the chapter offers a general analysis arguing for the study of presidential worldviews more generally.

This epilogue discusses the death of civil defense proclaimed by President George H. W. Bush and then by President Bill Clinton, followed by its resurrection in 2001. The current Homeland Security provisions are compared to previous civil defense measures. The emergence of a large grassroots resistance movement against the Patriot Act is described.

This chapter examines the factors that led to the creation of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, as well as those developments that strengthened and weakened the coalition from its origins. The major ideological differences separating Syrian and Iranian leaders created barriers to cooperation that required very strong incentives to overcome. When the forces for alignment weakened—but were by no means eliminated—the effects of ideological differences created conflicts of interest that at times virtually ended cooperation. These dynamics created an opportunity for other countries. The more that external powers can help bring states’ ideological differences to the forefront of their foreign policies, the more likely that alliances among ideological enemies will weaken. While the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations took advantage of this opportunity of using ideologies as “wedge” strategies to separate Syria and Iran, the George W. Bush presidency failed in this objective.

Over the years, Congress has consistently increased the jurisdiction of federal courts over crime, from 17 specified offenses when the nation was founded to several thousand now. More than 40% of federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have appeared since 1970. The most dramatic growth was in drug cases, which composed 5% of the federal caseload in 1947 but amounted to 36 percent just 50 years later. An Armed Career Criminal Act in 1984 allowed federal prosecutors to charge suspects who had three local felony convictions. Later laws made carjacking a federal crime and gave the FBI authority over “deadbeat dads” who cross state lines and terrorism involving abortion clinics. A few measures were struck down by the Supreme Court, including one involving use of firearms at schools and another allowing federal civil cases by sexual‐assault victims. In the executive branch, the administration of President George H. W. Bush created a program called ‘Operation Triggerlock’ to pursue firearms cases, and both Bush and successor Bill Clinton directed the FBI to put more emphasis on investigating local violent crime. By 2001, the federal government had taken a prominent role in many categories of crime prosecution that once were the province of states and localities.

This chapter focuses on the evolution of the United States’ role in international affairs from the first Bush to the Obama administration. The essay evaluates the longstanding and cyclical debate about American decline, stressing the speculative nature of such discussions. The chapter also stresses the relative continuity in American foreign policy since the early 1990s, paying particular attention to one central notion embraced by all post-Cold War administrations: American primacy in a post-cold war liberal international order. Indeed, the United States has been mostly successful in maintaining its central position in a world that is increasingly linked together via growing trade links, technological innovations, and international institutions. But the price of this success is ironic. As the remit of what used to be called the ‘free world’ has grown, as democracy and free markets have spread, the United States has become ‘less special’ than before.

George H.W. Bush pursued an aggressive and competent foreign policy. He intervened unilaterally to force regime change in Panama. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, he assembled a coalition of nations and received congressional authorization to conduct the first Gulf War, which successfully freed Kuwait. He managed adjustments to foreign policy to adapt to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Domestically, he entered a budget deal with Congress that structurally addressed deficits. Bill Clinton adopted the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy for gays in the military. In humanitarian interventions, he bombed Serbia and Kosovo without congressional authorization. He struggled with Congress over the budget, and his veto led to a government shutdown. After being investigated by an independent counsel, he escaped conviction after being impeached for his sexual misconduct.

This chapter examines the United States's Wilsonianism in the post-Cold War era, first under George H. W. Bush and then under Bill Clinton. It considers how Bush, who became president as the Soviet Union was disintegrating and its leaders were looking for a new framework of understanding with the West, used Wilsonianism to address the question of establishing a world order favorable to American national security. It also discusses various Bush initiatives that were designed to establish a new world order after the cold war, Clinton's selective approach to liberal democratic internationalism, the effects of liberal economic practices on American national security, and the link between nationalism and liberal democracy. Finally, it assesses some of the challenges involved in the United States' efforts to bring about stable constitutional governance in many parts of the world.

This chapter examines the AFL-CIO’s history during the presidency of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993). Overall, the Bush era was a moderate improvement for the AFL-CIO, and for American working people. During Reagan’s presidency, vice-president Bush had forged a workable relationship with the AFL-CIO, and the Federation’s leaders viewed him in a more positive light. Bush was not as hostile to labor as Reagan, and – helped by the improved economy – organizing picked up, there were some defensive victories in labor disputes, and the AFL-CIO also found common ground with the Bush administration in foreign affairs. As one AFL-CIO staffer put it, these years were characterized by a partial détente. Ultimately, however, there was no fundamental turnaround in labor’s fortunes.

Recognizing that US taxpayers would not cover the entire SSC cost, the Bush Administration began trying to internationalize the laboratory by seeking large foreign contributions. But the only serious prospect was Japan, which was initially hesitant to commit to such a partnership. In 1990, before the extent of the cost overrun was fully recognized, the US House of Representatives capped the federal SSC contribution at $5 billion while requiring at least 20 percent foreign contributions. When estimated total costs grew to $8.25 billion, this stipulation meant that a total of $1.7 billion was needed from other countries. That summer, amendments to terminate the SSC were defeated by comfortable margins in both House and Senate despite worsening public perceptions of the project. But thus chastened, high Administration officials redoubled their efforts that fall to secure a billion-dollar Japanese commitment but obtained only a promise to consider partnering in the SSC laboratory.

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.