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The contemporary literature on nonviolent politics relies upon a sharp distinction between strategic and principled nonviolence. Gandhi and King are associated with the latter, defined as a strict moral commitment to nonviolence that both scholars and activists view as unnecessary for the successful practice of nonviolent politics. I argue the distinction between strategic and principled nonviolence is misleading. It misunderstands the most distinctive feature of classical nonviolent politics, namely, how Gandhi and King tethered ethical practice—practices of self-discipline or suffering—to political strategy. This chapter reconstructs an alternative account of nonviolent action—nonviolence as disciplined action—and argues that it is also strategic in orientation but premised upon a different theory of politics and political action. Disciplined action is underpinned by a skeptical ontology of action which highlights the affective dynamics of action. I contrast this to the prevailing model of nonviolence as collective power, which focuses on techniques of mass mobilization and the generation of social power. I distinguish the conceptual logic of these competing theories of nonviolent politics and the differing forms of protest and dissent they recommend.

Whether or not the costs of a military establishment are worth bearing will depend on, among other things, the availability of alternative arrangements for national defence. Gene Sharp spent his career advocating for what he called a ‘post-military’ civilian-based defence system. It would perform the core functions currently entrusted to armed forces, including national defence against external aggression, but it would rely on non-violent means and methods—the very same that citizens might employ to depose a local dictator. Sharp envisaged a world in which the energies and resources currently spent on militaries would be redirected into these radically different-looking defence institutions. He called this process ‘trans-armament’, as opposed to disarmament, to emphasize that it would not involve throwing our weapons down, but rather replacing them with other (in Sharp’s estimation, better) ones. The epilogue examines Sharp’s proposal.

This chapter begins with a discussion of how the book combines a longstanding interest of the author, namely the Indian nationalist movement and Gandhi’s role in it, with a more recent engagement with the theory and practice of nonviolent resistance. The ways in which Indian nationalism has been understood by historians over the past fifty years is considered critically, and the ways that this can be related to theories of strategic nonviolent resistance – particularly those of Gene Sharp –is reviewed. While the importance of this theory is acknowledged, its shortcomings are also examined, for example its neglect of Gandhi’s constructive program. The main themes of the following chapters are summarized.