Search Results

Nasser’s Dramatic Imagination, 1952–64

Margaret Litvin

in Hamlet's Arab Journey: Shakespeare's Prince and Nasser's Ghost

This chapter explains that much of what matters for Arab Hamlet appropriation in the postcolonial period—the international sources, the way they were absorbed, and the concerns they help express—was ... More

This chapter explains that much of what matters for Arab Hamlet appropriation in the postcolonial period—the international sources, the way they were absorbed, and the concerns they help express—was shaped by the legacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser's geopolitical and cultural priorities made a range of Hamlets available and conditioned how intellectuals received them. Beyond this, from the moment in 1954 when he declared to his people, “All of you are Gamal Abdel Nasser,” the Egyptian leader personally embodied his country's identity and acted out its drama of historical agency. Beyond Egypt's borders, he became (like his radio station) “the voice of the Arabs.”Less

Time Out of Joint, 1967–76

Margaret Litvin

in Hamlet's Arab Journey: Shakespeare's Prince and Nasser's Ghost

This chapter begins with the cultural impact of the June War and its coda, Gamal Abdel Nasser's death in 1970. As the chapter shows, the defeat fundamentally altered Arab conceptions of political ... More

This chapter begins with the cultural impact of the June War and its coda, Gamal Abdel Nasser's death in 1970. As the chapter shows, the defeat fundamentally altered Arab conceptions of political theatre's role. A well-developed high culture was no longer considered enough to guarantee the world's respect. Psychological interiority was irrelevant: what mattered was not deserving agentive power but seizing it. Disillusioned with their regimes, dramatists stopped addressing subtly allegorical plays to the government; instead, they appealed directly to audiences, trying to rouse them to participate in political life. Analyzing two early 1970s Hamlet adaptations from Egypt and Syria, the chapter demonstrates how the 1970s Hamlet became a Che Guevara in doublet and hose. Guilt and sadness over his father's death only sharpened his anger; his fierce pursuit of justice left no room for introspection or doubt.Less

"Each of You Shall Be Gamal"

Joel Gordon

in Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July RevolutionWith a New Introduction

This chapter examines Gamal Abdel Nasser' transformation from conspirator in the July revolution to public statesman. The revolution of the Free Officers began to take form in the third year of their ... More

This chapter examines Gamal Abdel Nasser' transformation from conspirator in the July revolution to public statesman. The revolution of the Free Officers began to take form in the third year of their military rule. Following the March crisis, the officers abandoned plans to restore democratic life in Egypt in the near future. They used the police to preserve order, and occasionally to create disorder. The chapter considers the assassination attempt on Nasser by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1954—known as the Manshiya incident—and the Command Council of the Revolution's (CCR) subsequent crackdown on its most serious adversaries, particularly the communists and the Muslim Brothers, and even Muhammad Nagib. It also discusses Nasser's personal consolidation of power with an eye towards cementing his role as sole leader of Egypt as well as redefining the role of the revolutionary council.Less

Wind in the Reeds

Wafaa EL Sadik and Rüdiger Heimlich

in Protecting Pharaoh's Treasures: My Life in Egyptology

This chapter focuses on the author's childhood in 1956. On July 26, 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that he was nationalizing the Suez Canal and would use the income from the canal's operations to ... More

This chapter focuses on the author's childhood in 1956. On July 26, 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that he was nationalizing the Suez Canal and would use the income from the canal's operations to finance the construction of the new dam at Aswan. The broadcast of the speech was the signal for the takeover of the canal office by an Egyptian military commando unit. This episode has gone into the history books as the Suez Crisis, a highly euphemistic term, for the “crisis” was a proper war, with many dead, wounded, prisoners of war, and massive destruction. The author also describes her experiences adapting to a new environment as they move from Kafr al-Arab and Fariskur to Cairo, Egypt's capital and the cultural and political center of the Arab world at the time.Less

Etatism: Theorizing Egypt's 1952 Revolution

in The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt

Egypt achieved nominal independence from Britain in 1922, and full independence in 1936 with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, yet its postcoloniality presumably began in 1952 when a ... More

Egypt achieved nominal independence from Britain in 1922, and full independence in 1936 with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, yet its postcoloniality presumably began in 1952 when a revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser broke out. This chapter argues that Egyptian history from the 1930s to the 1960s is part of a single historical bloc. It proposes an alternative framework, dubbed the “social-welfare mode of regulation,” for understanding the organization of the postcolonial Egyptian state and society. This social-welfare mode of regulation, underpinned by an economic system of etatism, is premised upon the state apparatus as arbiter of both economic development and social welfare. The chapter considers the new modes of governance, expertise, and social knowledge that defined a particular era of nationalist politics. It rejects an interpretation of Nasserism that focuses on populism and analyzes the extent to which Nasserism was based on an assemblage of institutional apparatuses, technocratic practices, and modes of knowledge production.Less

Fighting for Sadat, October 1970–August 1971

Craig Daigle

in The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973

This chapter discusses the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the accession to power of his successor, Anwar el-Sadat, in September 1970, which marked a change in the landscape of the Arab-Israeli ... More

This chapter discusses the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the accession to power of his successor, Anwar el-Sadat, in September 1970, which marked a change in the landscape of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nasser's sudden death opened the door for Egypt to move in an entirely new direction. Although his successor was very much a product of Nasser's pan-Arab movement and had served Nasser loyally for more than twenty years, Sadat had a far different vision of Egypt's role in the world. An ardent nationalist, Sadat detested the vast Soviet military presence inside Egypt that Nasser had cultivated, and he saw no reason for his country to maintain a hostile attitude toward the United States. He later told Secretary of State William P. Rogers that “There's no reason why the Arabs should be closely aligned to the Soviet Union. My people like the West better.”Less

Salvaging Status: Doubling Down in Russia, Egypt, and Great Britain

Jonathan Renshon

in Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics

This chapter examines whether status concerns lead decision makers to value status more highly by looking at three separate sets of decisions: Russia's decision to aggressively back Serbia in the ... More

This chapter examines whether status concerns lead decision makers to value status more highly by looking at three separate sets of decisions: Russia's decision to aggressively back Serbia in the 1914 July Crisis, Britain's decision to collude with Israel and France in launching the 1956 Suez Crisis, and Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1962 decision to intervene in the Yemen Civil War (and continue to escalate through the rest of the decade). These cases broadly substantiate the patterns found in the Weltpolitik case—decision makers tend to value status more highly due to status concerns—while highlighting the plausibility of several new mechanisms. They also show that status concerns are not confined to European countries, great powers or states in the pre-World War I era. Finally, they reveal the other side of status concerns: state behavior designed to salvage or defend status rather than increase it.Less

Rewriting the Revolution

Joel Gordon

in Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July RevolutionWith a New Introduction

This book examines the formative period of the Egyptian revolution that began on July 23, 1952, when the Free Officers, a group of army officers led by Muhammad Nagib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, staged a ... More

This book examines the formative period of the Egyptian revolution that began on July 23, 1952, when the Free Officers, a group of army officers led by Muhammad Nagib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, staged a coup d'etat that overthrew King Farouk. After forcing King Farouk to abdicate, the Free Officers established a military junta, decreed a land reform program, appointed Nagib as prime minister, and ordered all political parties to apply for recertification. They also abrogated the Constitution and outlawed all political parties, after which they declared a three-year “transition period” of martial law and proclaimed their movement a revolution. The book explores the political dynamics of this transition period by assessing and synthesizing a variety of interpretations of events and how the coup of July 23, undertaken in the name of social and political reform, became the “July Revolution.” It also considers the debate over the legacy of Nasser and the regime he founded in Egypt.Less

Regime Survival and the U.S. Military

Geoffrey F. Gresh

in Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing

This chapter examines the events that led to the eventual basing termination and expulsion of the U.S. military from its Saudi bases in 1962. With fewer external security concerns by the early 1960s, ... More

This chapter examines the events that led to the eventual basing termination and expulsion of the U.S. military from its Saudi bases in 1962. With fewer external security concerns by the early 1960s, the Saud monarchy turned its attention to domestic politics and rising concerns regarding Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s influence over pan-Arab national groups in the kingdom. By the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, domestic security concerns grew to a new high as the U.S. military’s presence exacerbated attacks on the legitimacy of a monarchy under mounting domestic pressure. Opposition groups portrayed the United States as an imperial occupying force, helping erode the power and damage the image of the monarchy domestically. The Saud monarchy appeared concerned about its survival and its association with the U.S. military and terminated its long-term basing contract in the spring of 1962.Less

The “Tripartite Aggression”

Jeremy Salt

in The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands

This chapter examines the history of the Tripartite Aggression. It suggests that this conflict was triggered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The ... More

This chapter examines the history of the Tripartite Aggression. It suggests that this conflict was triggered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The chapter discusses the violation of the 1949 armistice lines between Israel and the Arab states, and Israel's attacks across the armistice lines that included the assault on the Buraij refugee camp in Gaza in August 1953. It also provides an estimate of the human cost of this conflict.Less

LBJ's Other War

Jeremy Salt

in The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands

This chapter describes the events leading to the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt. It discusses Israel's frequent threat of launching pre-emptive strikes against Arab targets and Egyptian President ... More

This chapter describes the events leading to the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt. It discusses Israel's frequent threat of launching pre-emptive strikes against Arab targets and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's receipt of a false Soviet report that Israel was amassing troops near the Syrian border. The chapter suggests that the cause of this crisis was the not the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed along the armistice line but the unresolved Arab–Israeli conflict. It highlights the role of the United States in this conflict.Less

Welcome, Sadat

in Mongrels or Marvels: The Levantine Writings of Jacqueline Shohet Kahanoff

In this chapter, Jacqueline Shohet Kahanoff reflects on Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's state visit to Israel in November 1977. She also talks about her earlier writings about her childhood in ... More

In this chapter, Jacqueline Shohet Kahanoff reflects on Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's state visit to Israel in November 1977. She also talks about her earlier writings about her childhood in Egypt, including the story “Passover in Egypt,” and reimagines biblical narratives by likening Sadat's predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Pharaoh of Exodus. Here Jacqueline expresses her support for reconciliation and coexistence over displacement and the separation of Jews and other peoples.Less

The Suez Crisis

Irwin M. Wall

in France, the United States, and the Algerian War

This chapter discusses the direct causal connection for France between the Algerian insurrection and the Suez crisis. It explains that it was the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser who was the ... More

This chapter discusses the direct causal connection for France between the Algerian insurrection and the Suez crisis. It explains that it was the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser who was the principal source of support for the Algerian rebels and the root of the new radical brand of Arab nationalism rampant throughout the Middle East. The chapter discusses the French realization that the Algerian rebellion would dissipate if Nasser could be topped, and suggests that Western disunity to unseat Nasser during the Suez crisis was the defining development for the future structure of post-war relations between France, Britain, the United States, and Europe generally.Less

International Intrigue and the Origins of September 1962

Asher Orkaby

in Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68

The 1962 revolution in Yemen has often been attributed to the machinations of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The events of September 1962 were in a manifestation of two decades of growing ... More

The 1962 revolution in Yemen has often been attributed to the machinations of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The events of September 1962 were in a manifestation of two decades of growing Yemeni nationalism fostered by an educated cadre of expatriates known as the Famous Forty. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1962, Yemen had been drawn into the growing Cold War conflict. The Soviet Union paid for the construction of the new Hodeidah port while courting an alliance with the “red prince” Muhammad al-Badr, in the hopes that Yemen would become a logistical base for their regional operations. Fearing Soviet penetration on the Arabian Peninsula, the United Statesundertook a series of unsuccessful oil explorations to maintain a nominal presence in a country that could scarcely be identified by American policy makers.Less

My Enemy's Special Friend

Jeremy Salt

in The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands

This chapter examines the anti-imperialist campaigns in the Middle East led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. It discusses the participation of the United States and Britain to counter ... More

This chapter examines the anti-imperialist campaigns in the Middle East led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. It discusses the participation of the United States and Britain to counter efforts to overthrow Lebanese President Camille Chamoun and to save both Lebanon and Jordan from Nasser and Arab radicalism. The chapter explains that the United States' relationship with Israel started to warm up, with the acquisition of U.S. weaponry at the top of the Israeli agenda.Less

The Broken Promise

Ozan O. Varol

in The Democratic Coup d'État

This chapter analyzes coups that begin with promises of democratic rule but end with the establishment of dictatorship. Some coup makers lose their enthusiasm for democracy for irrational reasons. A ... More

This chapter analyzes coups that begin with promises of democratic rule but end with the establishment of dictatorship. Some coup makers lose their enthusiasm for democracy for irrational reasons. A successful victory against a dictator can foster self-indulgent fantasies about future possibilities. Although plenty of military leaders irrationally prefer dictatorship out of ignorance or ego, others choose dictatorship in a rational decision-making process. Although the costs of authoritarianism outweigh its benefits for many militaries, for some militaries, that calculus may be reversed. For example, the coup makers may believe that a loyalist dictator will benefit them more than democratic rule. Particularly when they’re confident the dictator will stay loyal to their interests for the long term, the coup makers may throw their support behind a dictator, as opposed to subjecting their future to the vagaries of democratic politics.Less

The Allure of Globalism: Continents, Colors, and the Cold War

Jeffrey James Byrne

in Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order

This chapter examines Third World international affairs from the perspective of independent Algeria’s new foreign policy apparatus. In the early and mid-1960s, many of the organizing themes of Third ... More

This chapter examines Third World international affairs from the perspective of independent Algeria’s new foreign policy apparatus. In the early and mid-1960s, many of the organizing themes of Third World solidarity were in conflict with one another. The Algerian government was forced to choose between the themes of Arab unity, Maghribi unity, and African unity, which exacerbated contestations of Algeria’s national identity. Algeria worked toward the unification of the Third World’s various groupings and regions, even as the Soviet-Chinese rivalry for influence in the developing world turned Afro-Asianism and nonalignment into competing agendas. Algerian foreign policy was ambitious but pragmatic: the country’s leaders took advantage of their position at the intersection of multiple regions and geopolitical currents to magnify their influence in each context. However, a border conflict with Morocco in October 1963 showed that the Algerian leadership could not fully escape geographical realities.Less