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Barry Dainton

in The Phenomenal Self

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199288847
eISBN:
9780191710742
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Accounts of personal identity that are grounded in experiential continuity are by no means new. This chapter compares the merits of C-theory with some of its competitors. According to one tradition, ... More


Agent Causation and Control

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at ... More


The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation

Christopher Yeomans

in Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199794522
eISBN:
9780199919253
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses ... More


The Externality of Explanations and The Problem of an Infinite Regress

Christopher Yeomans

in Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199794522
eISBN:
9780199919253
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter presents a form of doubt or scepticism about free will that derives from basic commitments to the form of explanation that the principle of sufficient reason requires us to hold as valid ... More


Incompatibilist Autonomy and Autonomous Action

Alfred R. Mele

in Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195150438
eISBN:
9780199869091
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195150430.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Develops a modest libertarian view that avoids traditional libertarians’ problems with luck and control. Ultimate and proximal control are distinguished; Galen Strawson's regress argument against ... More


The Relevance of Free Will

Richard Swinburne

in Responsibility and Atonement

Published in print:
1989
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198248491
eISBN:
9780191598555
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198248490.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Moral responsibility (and so praiseworthiness or blameworthiness) requires free will in the sense of agents having the power to choose independently of all the causal influences acting on them. ... More


Diachronicity, Episodicity, Synchronicity

Patrick Stokes

in The Naked Self: Kierkegaard and Personal Identity

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780198732730
eISBN:
9780191797033
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732730.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Galen Strawson has developed a heavily discussed distinction between two types of ‘temporal temperament’: ‘Diachronics’, who have a sense that the self they experience themselves as being right now ... More


Sourcehood: Playing the Cards That Are Dealt You

John Martin Fischer

in Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199742981
eISBN:
9780190267537
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199742981.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses the source of moral responsibility by examining specifically the notion of “ultimate control” or “self-creation”, which is in contrast with the assumption of causal ... More


WEIRD Anger

Owen Flanagan

in The Geography of Morals: Varieties of Moral Possibility

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780190212155
eISBN:
9780190212186
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190212155.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

There are four main arguments against eliminating anger. “Impossible,” “Attachment,” “Injustice,” and “Catharsis.” In this chapter I examine the first argument “Impossible,” which claims that anger ... More


Introduction

Neil Levy

in Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199601387
eISBN:
9780191729256
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This brief chapter serves as an introduction. The view for which the book will argue is introduced, and some of the key terms, such as ‘free will’ and ‘moral responsibility’, are defined. The concern ... More


Are There Brute Facts about Consciousness?

Torin Alter

in Brute Facts

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
November 2018
ISBN:
9780198758600
eISBN:
9780191818523
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198758600.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

Anti-materialist arguments such as the knowledge argument, the conceivability argument, and the explanatory gap argument do not establish the existence of brute phenomenal facts about consciousness. ... More


Self and Diachronic Unity

Dan Zahavi

in Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199590681
eISBN:
9780191789656
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590681.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The narrative account of the self accentuates the temporal dimension of selfhood and is primarily addressing the issue of long-term diachronic identity and persistency. But what about the ... More


The Problem of Self-Creation

Agnes Callard

in Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780190639488
eISBN:
9780190639518
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190639488.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

The new values, acquisition of which constitutes my act of self-creation, must be either continuous or discontinuous with the ones I already have. If they are continuous, I am not changing but rather ... More


Freedom and Scepticism: Incompatibilism

Thomas Pink

in Self-Determination: The Ethics of Action, Volume 1

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
January 2017
ISBN:
9780199272754
eISBN:
9780191833205
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272754.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The chapter addresses freedom as a form of self-determination that involves power to determine alternatives. One form of modern scepticism about the existence of such a power assumes incompatibilism ... More


Mental Action, Autonomy, and the Perspective of Practical Reason

Soteriou Matthew

in The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199678457
eISBN:
9780191757952
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678457.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter investigates the place and role of mental agency in suppositional reasoning and self-critical reflection. It considers Descartes’ suggestion that when one is engaged in these activities, ... More


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