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Even independent of McCarthy, the years 1950–1954 marked the climax of anti-communism in American life. The Korean stalemate generated both a bruising debate over containment and sourness in national politics. Korea's sapping effect and a series of minor scandals heightened the Democratic Party's anemia. In addition, the 1950 congressional campaign, revealing McCarthyism's apparent sway over the voters and encouraging the GOP's right wing, signaled that anti-communism occupied the core of American political culture. Senate resistance to McCarthy was scattered and weak. In the House, HUAC did much as it pleased. Truman upheld civil liberties with occasional eloquence, but he remained on the defensive. Rampant anti-communism narrowed the range of selection open to associations, utterances, and ideas. People were constrained by both external pressures and the inner checks with which they reactively restricted their own affairs.

This chapter analyzes how Edward Brooke's election was a moment of profound achievement for both black Republicans and the larger Grand Old Party (GOP) apparatus. Viewed as a political phenomenon, he not only represented the abstract goals of the National Negro Republican Assembly (NNRA) but also captured an image that moderate and liberal Republican leaders had struggled to harness since Barry Goldwater's unnerving rise in 1964. For a party traumatized in the aftermath of defeat, Brooke provided much needed proof that moderate Republican candidates could appeal to an interracial cross section of the American public. Drawing on a broader black middle-class tradition of respectability politics, he won his elections by running a campaign that was simultaneously race neutral and race conscious—a paradox, to be sure, but one that allowed an interracial audience to embrace him and his politics.

This chapter studies how, as the 1970s progressed, black Republicans were able to claim clear victories in their march toward equality: the expansion of the National Black Republican Council (NBRC); the incorporation of African Americans into the Republican National Committee (RNC) hierarchy; scores of black Republicans integrating state and local party hierarchies; and individual examples of black Republican success. African American party leaders could even point to their ability to forge a consensus voice among the disparate political ideas of black Republicans. Despite their ideological differences, they collectively rejected white hierarchies of power, demanding change for blacks both within the Grand Old Party (GOP) and throughout the country. Nevertheless, black Republicans quickly realized that their strategy did not reform the party institution.

This chapter discusses how for African Americans, the events of the mid-1970s only served to reinforce an already contentious relationship with the Grand Old Party (GOP)—frustrations that were born out of the party's years of equivocation over issues of black concern. The GOP's extreme electoral woes with African Americans were rooted in Goldwater's enduring legacy. More than a decade later, black voters still held an image of a national party driven by states' rights advocates, white southern conservatives, anti-civil rights politicians, and wealthy elites who disdained the “common man.” The Washington Post observed that the Republican Party appeared to be a political machine engaged in constant antagonisms and reactionary battles and had done very little to dispel its negative identity with black communities.

This chapter demonstrates the dramatic transformation that occurred over the last half-century in the region by providing a detailed description of the Southern political landscape from the 1950s through the present day. The chapter first examines the increasing success of Southern GOP candidates at the national, state, and substate levels. Next, growth in individual-level identification with the Republican Party using longitudinal survey data is documented. As noted by a number of existing studies, Southern whites were drawn to Republican Party candidates—particularly at the presidential level—before they viewed themselves (or identified) as Republicans.

Although much of the book focuses on explaining GOP growth in the South, this chapter explains how GOP growth also influenced the political mobilization of the African American population. The theory of relative advantage also suggests that, in areas with large black populations, Republican growth will boost black mobilization. This chapter includes empirical results that suggest GOP growth played a role in black mobilization in the Deep South, which standard models of mobilization—the empowerment and resource models—do not address. Evidence is also found at the substate level within Louisiana and North Carolina to support the conclusion that Republican growth led to black mobilization.

One of the more obscure gods was Zalmoxis. He could easily have been the god of elections. In the American political system, every fourth year witnesses the spectacle of a presidential election, where candidates make sweeping, grandiose promises for change, peace, and prosperity—and then the rhetoric disappears for three years until it returns again for the next campaign. In 1968, the Zalmoxis effect reared its head as Republican presidential aspirants jockeyed for position, with Vietnam acting as a fulcrum for the primary contests. The war also figured prominently in the fall campaign between Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, exerting broad influence despite the candidates' best efforts and nearly determining the outcome of the election. This chapter is devoted to examining how the GOP grappled with Vietnam on multiple fronts—internally, against the Johnson administration, and during the race for the White House—during 1968.

The election of Barack Obama has brought race relations and racism to the forefront of America’s consciousness, particularly among Republicans who have recently attempted to woo minority voters into their ranks. However, we argue and provide evidence that suggests that many Republicans are still consciously and unconsciously prejudiced toward Blacks and other disadvantaged minorities. This may explain Republicans’ failure to make substantial policy changes to support minority groups, particularly Blacks. Instead, the GOP appears to be superficially promoting diversity by “propping up” unique minority group candidates who strongly endorse conservative policies in the Republican Party and attempting to minimize the impact of numerous racially offensive and insensitive remarks made by prominent Republicans since Obama’s election. In sum, the GOP still has to make a more concerted policy-based effort to show that they are an organization that is accepting of minorities and their concerns.

The elections of the 1930s represented the lowest point in the history of the Republican Party. The once dominating political party that held major seats in the government for more than 50 years since the Civil War was defeated and overthrown from being the ruling class. This chapter discusses the defeat of the Republican Party in the 1930s elections and its struggle to regain dominance in the government as well as the much-needed coloured votes. It examines how the GOP coped with its exile from governmental and political seats and the measures it undertook to assure its existence as a political party. In the chapter, the GOP's neglect of the African Americans is chronicled from the vantage point of its widening problems, internal conflicts, and the looming party divisions during the early years of the New Deal.

Stung with another defeat in the 1940 elections, the GOP embarked on another period of soul searching. After the elections of 1940, the GOP was faced with the prospect of making up a unified stand on the issue of foreign policy. Faced with the looming conflict and war, Republicans strongly believed that America could avoid entanglements with the Axis power and hence forwarded for isolationism. This changed however on the eve of December 7, 1941. Isolationism, which was the Republicans' foreign policy, was discredited, causing them to frantically search for an alternative. This chapter discusses yet another struggle faced by the Republican Party to forge unity in an otherwise divided GOP party. It discusses the challenges faced by the Republicans to make the two different foreign policies dominating within the party create an image of unity and oneness within it. With the 1944 elections looming, the Republicans were forced to create, if not dismiss, foreign policies that threatened the unity of the party. They created the Mackinac agreement, which resulted in a veneer of harmony between isolationists and internationalists—a harmony that was essential in the forthcoming 1944 presidential elections. The chapter also provides an overview of the changing and evolving allegiance of the African American voters. Faced with the looming war and the hardship that came with it, including the New Deal, the Republicans, having changed their foreign policy from isolationism to internationalism, somehow managed to earn a small number of black voters, yet this was too insignificant to carry them to electoral success. The chapter also discusses the new political measures of the GOP found in the introduction of potential new Republican leaders, the most notable of whom was Thomas Dewey, who ran for presidency yet lost the race due to their failure to win the affection of black voters, who played a determining role in the results of the elections.

As the election of 1948 and the prospect of the Truman defeat approached, the Republicans gained a confidence that made them believe that the 1948 presidential election would be theirs. This chapter discusses the GOP's strategy and approach for the election of 1948 wherein they exuded much confidence owing to the death of the long-time nemesis of the party, Franklin Roosevelt, and their increasing control of both houses in Congress. It chronicles the presidential race between Truman and Dewey wherein both tried to outdo one another in the hope of winning the presidential seat. The Republicans took advantage of the looming split of the Democrats and advocated the antilynching bill, the poll tax, and the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) which would guarantee blacks equality and opportunity in employment. However, despite their efforts to regain the much-coveted spot in the White House, Republicans were once again defeated, partly due to the overconfidence of Dewey, who neglected the power of special-interest voters, and partly to the failure of the party to gain the trust and confidence of African Americans.

At the beginning of 1952, Robert Taft seemed destined to finally secure the presidential nomination he craved. His reelection in 1950 made him the triumphant symbol of resurgent conservatism. Although claiming without much conviction that he had no interest in running, it was apparent that Taft's reelection made him not just a potential presidential candidate, but the man most likely to secure the Republican nomination. This chapter focuses on the elections of the 1952, wherein the conservative faction of the Republican Party rooted for Robert Taft, a candidacy which was dreaded by African Americans. Taft repeatedly courted the South and was the de facto leader of the GOP in a Congress that had pointedly failed to pass any civil rights legislation. The unattractiveness and the lack of appeal of the Taft candidacy among black voters forced the Republicans to seek another presidential candidate in Dwight Eisenhower.

Legend has it that the GOP was formed to abolish African American slavery, fought the Civil War to achieve this end, and then protected the newly enfranchised former slaves in its aftermath. This was a powerful legend to African Americans during the days of the Redemption in the South, and many of them took it with them when they moved north during the twentieth century. Of the most important steps made by the Republicans toward the welfare of the blacks, it was the amendment of the Constitution, which made African Americans citizens of the US, and the awarding of suffrage that were counted as the most significant. This chapter concludes that while these changes and amendments were Republican efforts, at the end of the Civil War the Republicans' enthusiasm for the African Americans and their rights progressed slowly if not came to a halt. During the Reconstruction period, certain traits that would be later become synonymous with the party begun to emerge. The party became predominantly pro-business and anti-government. The Republican Party, which was largely concerned with enriching America and regaining the former glory of the country in the aftermath of the Great Depression, began to forget African Americans and failed to react to the increasing sophistication of the black voters. As late as the 1930s, many Republicans still believed that African Americans owed them allegiance as it was they who freed the blacks. However, the impeding change of black allegiance cannot be further controlled or withheld. The loyalty of the African Americans bequeathed by Lincoln to the Republican Party between the 1920s and 1950s was lost, not to be found or regained again unless the conservatism, ignorance, and lack of political judgment within the Republican Party were abolished.

This chapter discusses the Old Guard and how it continued to undermine Thomas Dewey's control of the Republican Party. The congressional statement of policy had checked Dewey's plans to reshape the GOP as a moderate alternative to the New Deal and forced RNC chairman Herbert Brownell to change his tone or risk appearing out of step with the party he led. With the congressional elections of 1946 looming, the national chairmanship became even more critical for the presidential nomination. Midterm elections were essentially trial runs. Mounting a strong off-year campaign would demonstrate to party elites that a candidate's organization could manage a successful national election drive and make a strong case for their continued control. In April 1946 the Taftites capitalized on a bit of good timing and increased discontent with the Dewey faction to seize the chairmanship of the RNC.

This chapter shows how historians often tell the story of the 1948 presidential election from the point of view of the Democrats. Truman's upset victory reaffirming the principles of modern liberalism in the face of a badly divided party makes for a compelling narrative. Dewey and his self-important, ineffective campaign is often a sidelight depicted anecdotally through the infamous “DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN” headline in the Chicago Tribune. The election of 1948, however, had lasting repercussions for the Republican Party and its future. The loss took a heavy psychological toll on party leaders, pushing their desperation and anxiety over minority status to unprecedented depths and shattering any semblance of unity between the two dominant factions. The GOP was now in uncharted territory as the first major political party to lose five successive presidential elections since the Federalists, a group that did not last long after that fifth defeat.

This chapter focuses on the end of the preconvention campaign. Heading into the national convention in July, each faction claimed it had commitments from roughly 500 to 600 pledged delegates out of 1,209, a much tighter race than the previous two election cycles. The Dewey wing also expected to benefit from the return of Eisenhower, who in June resigned his military commission to actively seek the presidency. This marked the end of a difficult five months for Dewey and his organization, having been forced to fend off Taft's charges that Eisenhower lacked principles and experience. Eisenhower's appearance eroded Taft's position and weakened his arguments. Following Eisenhower's highly contested nomination, the Taftites struggled over their role in the GOP.

This chapter continues the discussion on the open competition race, the most common type of leadership race in the House of Representatives, focusing on the GOP. It begins with a detailed discussion of perhaps the most consequential GOP leadership election in the past three decades: the 1989 race for whip, in which Newt Gingrich (R-GA) narrowly bested Ed Madigan (R-IL) and positioned himself to become the first Republican Speaker of the House in forty years. It then considers three additional cases of open competition for GOP posts: the minority leader and whip races in 1980 and the majority whip contest in 1994. As in the previous chapter, the findings are consistent with the mixed-motive model of vote choice.

This chapter focuses on how race and war intersected in 1960s Tennessee to destroy the career of a relatively progressive southern senator. Postwar conservatives used coded racism to lure southerners from the Democratic column and to associate liberalism with African American special-interest-group politics. Al Gore failed to realize that his moderate position on civil rights alienated him from his white voters. No amount of Northern liberal support could save him as the Solid South began its defection to the GOP (Grand Old Party). Gore's defeat represented a generational shift in liberalism. Never again would it be acceptable to rely on an ethical reputation or class envy to secure reelection—liberals would have to find new ways of talking to their constituents and building trust.

This chapter argues that the Clinton interlude did nothing to dent the national political agenda the conservative Republicans had driven since 1980. Beginning in 1994, the GOP controlled Congress. And the same year, Republicans had assumed control of the North Carolina House of Representatives, long the domain of moderate to conservative Democrats. Republicans zealously pursued a tax-cutting agenda. Yet government continued to grow. From 1992 onward, the Democrats held the governorship. As the twentieth century ended, two figures towered above all others: Republican senator Jesse Helms and Democratic governor Jim Hunt. When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, Hunt and Helms had stood on the same lofty pedestals that they occupied two decades later, but they lacked immortality. Helms now had begun to fail both physically and mentally despite being at the zenith of his national power and influence. Hunt remained vigorous, but his long governorship was about to end.