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Teleological Agency

Christopher Yeomans

in Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency

This chapter applies the results of chapter 10 (i.e., the reconstruction of Hegel's theory of causal productivity) to the problem of chapter 9 (i.e., the doubts about the reality of free will ... More

This chapter applies the results of chapter 10 (i.e., the reconstruction of Hegel's theory of causal productivity) to the problem of chapter 9 (i.e., the doubts about the reality of free will grounded in the idea that sufficient reasons cause what they explain). In the first section, Hegel's argument is profiled against some other arguments against determinism and other understandings of the relations between causal mechanisms and goal-directedness. In the second section, Hegel's theory of teleology is used to reconstruct a theory of action in conversation with the contemporary debate between interpretivist theories of action such as Anscombe's and causal theories of action such as Davidson's.Less

The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation

Christopher Yeomans

in Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency

This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses ... More

This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses that had seemed to plague the notion of self-determination or substantive free will. It focuses on the versions of the regress argument presented, in different ways, by Galen Strawson and G.E.M. Anscombe. The similarities between Hegel's view and Robert Nozick's conception of self-subsumption are then investigated in the light of arguments in the contemporary philosophy of action and Kant's Third Antinomy.Less

Practical Knowledge

John Schwenkler

in Anscombe's Intention: A Guide

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 44-48 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by situating her appeal to the concept of practical knowledge in relation to the philosophy of Thomas ... More

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 44-48 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by situating her appeal to the concept of practical knowledge in relation to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Following this, the chapter shows how several elements in Aquinas’ account are drawn on by Anscombe in her argument that an agent’s self-knowledge of her act is “the cause of what it understands”. It is argued that Anscombe meant to characterize an agent’s practical knowledge as both formal and efficient cause of its object. Finally, the chapter considers whether Anscombe succeeds in defending her thesis that intentional action is necessarily known without observation. Here it is argued, first, that knowledge of one’s act is not a strict requirement of doing something intentionally, and second, that the role of observation in an agent’s self-knowledge is different from that of evidence in observational knowledge of the world.Less

Beginnings of an Account

John Schwenkler

in Anscombe’s Intention: A Guide

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 5-18 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering Anscombe’s reasons for defining the concept of intentional action according to “a certain ... More

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 5-18 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering Anscombe’s reasons for defining the concept of intentional action according to “a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’”. Following this, the chapter considers Anscombe’s discussion of several ways that this question can be refused application, each of which leads her to introduce a necessary condition of intentional action. Important concepts that are discussed in this chapter include those of knowledge without observation, mental causality, motive, and the relation between causes and reasons for acting. Anscombe’s account of these matters is contrasted in several places with that of Gilbert Ryle, and it is argued, contrary to Donald Davidson, that Anscombe was not in fact an “anti-causalist” about action explanation. The chapter also considers the possibility of doing something intentionally but “for no reason”, or for reasons that one cannot easily identify or express.Less

The Unity of Action

John Schwenkler

in Anscombe's Intention: A Guide

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 19-27 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering Anscombe’s arguments that action is not intentional because of an “extra feature” of the ... More

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 19-27 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering Anscombe’s arguments that action is not intentional because of an “extra feature” of the agent, and that the concept of intentional action, as something to which a special sense of “Why?” can be given application, depends on the possibility of expressing intention for the future and describing one’s further intentions in acting. The chapter then considers Anscombe’s treatment of these last two concepts, showing how they yield a rich account of action as a teleological unity. Consideration is paid to the difference between Anscombe’s account of the unity of action and that of Donald Davidson. Finally, Anscombe’s account of the distinction between intention and foresight is discussed, with particular attention to the way that foreseen consequences stand in a different relation of dependency to an action than things that a person brings about intentionally.Less

Knowledge without Observation

John Schwenkler

in Anscombe's Intention: A Guide

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 28–32 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by relating Anscombe’s thesis that intentional action is known without observation to Wittgenstein’s ... More

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 28–32 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by relating Anscombe’s thesis that intentional action is known without observation to Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Blue Book of the knowledge of oneself “as subject” and Anscombe’s discussion in “The First Person” of unmediated self-knowledge. Following this, the chapter explores the difficulties that herself Anscombe raises for her thesis, and considers her reasons for thinking that the scope of an agent’s non-observational self-knowledge is not limited to her interior states or immediate bodily movements. Finally, it considers how the difficulties that Anscombe has raised are supposed to be addressed by her discussion of how descriptions of one’s intentional action can be contradicted, and of the difference between a list that has the role of an order and one whose role is to provide an accurate description of some facts.Less

Divine Commands and Secular Demands: On Darwall on Anscombe on ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’

Robert Stern

in Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation

This chapter considers Stephen Darwall’s recent attempt to overturn Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim that moral obligation only really makes sense in terms of a divine command account, where he argues that ... More

This chapter considers Stephen Darwall’s recent attempt to overturn Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim that moral obligation only really makes sense in terms of a divine command account, where he argues that in fact this account must give way to a more secularized and humanistic position if it is to avoid incoherence and an adequate account of divine authority. It is suggested that Darwall’s attempt to establish this is flawed, and thus that his internal critique of divine command ethics fails, where it is argued that the divine command theorist can account for God’s authority on the one hand, while consistently holding that he alone is capable of possessing this authority on the other.Less

Adorno’s Negative Dialectic as a Form of Life: Expression, Suffering, and Freedom

Martin Shuster

in Autonomy After Auschwitz: Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity

This chapter is the cornerstone of the book and accomplishes four large tasks. First, it elaborates Adorno’s theory of practical reason, including his notion of ‘the addendum,’ his philosophy of ... More

This chapter is the cornerstone of the book and accomplishes four large tasks. First, it elaborates Adorno’s theory of practical reason, including his notion of ‘the addendum,’ his philosophy of action, and his ethical theory. Second, it puts Adorno into a complex dialogue with Stanley Cavell, showing how their philosophies of language and also their ethical views intersect. Third, it elaborates what it means to be autonomous ‘after Auschwitz,’ showing the moral stakes of such an environment. Fourth, and finally, it puts Adorno’s theory of morality and action into dialogue with figures like Anscombe, Kant, and Davidson, amongst others.Less

Practical Reasoning

John Schwenkler

in Anscombe's Intention: A Guide

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations ... More

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations from which a person reasons in deciding what she will do, are not supposed to provide a proof of the conclusion that is drawn from them. Close attention is paid to the difference between Anscombe’s position and that of R.M. Hare, and several objections to her argument are considered. Following this, the chapter explores Anscombe’s Aristotelian account of practical reasoning as a way of calculating means to an end. The chapter also discusses the role of desire in practical reasoning, the thesis that desire for an object involves seeing it “under the aspect of some good”, and Anscombe’s argument that a practical syllogism represents a means–end order that is present in action itself.Less

Knowledge Justified

Jason Stanley

in Know How

Knowledge is a standard more demanding than justified true belief. In section 1, the more demanding standard is justified in the face of apparent Gettier-style counterexamples. The second section ... More

Knowledge is a standard more demanding than justified true belief. In section 1, the more demanding standard is justified in the face of apparent Gettier-style counterexamples. The second section returns to the case of expert performance. One might worry that if knowing how to do something is a kind of propositional knowledge, it should take the form of codified maxims that provide clear instructions for action in every situation. But expert knowledge how often requires adjusting appropriately to novel situations, ones not covered by previously codified instructions. The third section explains the role knowledge how has in explaining knowledge of action, and in particular how we know without observation what we are doing.Less

Absolute Prohibitions without Divine Promises

Sabina Lovibond

in Essays on Ethics and Feminism

This essay reconstructs the reasoning of Elizabeth Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ with an eye to Anscombe’s defence of certain absolute (non-negotiable) Judaeo-Christian moral principles ... More

This essay reconstructs the reasoning of Elizabeth Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ with an eye to Anscombe’s defence of certain absolute (non-negotiable) Judaeo-Christian moral principles against the compromises of twentieth-century Realpolitik. In particular, it reads the famous paper (with its strictures on killing the innocent) in conjunction with another, roughly contemporary piece by Anscombe on the ethics of war, the latter being informed by Catholic tradition on just and unjust warfare. The present essay considers what can be done on the basis of a purely secular ethics to shore up the ‘clean hands’ position of Anscombe. Appeal is made for this purpose to an alternative, ‘Enlightenment’ tradition. That tradition too, it is argued, should be able to provide orientation for moral thinking in the heat of action, not merely at a safe distance.Less

The Individuation of Action

Alvin I. Goldman

in Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition

This chapter explains the theory of act individuation initially through G. E. M. Anscombe's interpretation, which states that there is a natural ordering of the descriptions of actions. However, this ... More

This chapter explains the theory of act individuation initially through G. E. M. Anscombe's interpretation, which states that there is a natural ordering of the descriptions of actions. However, this idea is problematic since the ordering only applies to descriptions pertaining to specific acts. The chapter then looks at Donald Davidson's insight through his workThe Individuation of Events, which is similar to Anscombe's except he suggested a criterion of act individuation. It also addresses the so-called temporal problem, initiated by Lawrence Davis and Judith Jarvis Thomson, of the Anscombe-Davidson concept which calls for a deeper understanding of the ontological condition of an act. The chapter then presents an analysis of action sentences, citing the works of Romane Clark and Terence Parsons in the discussion of act type and act property.Less

Betwixt Feeling and Thinking: Two-Level Accounts of Experience

M. G. F. Martin

in Acquaintance: New Essays

What sense can we make of Hume’s notorious distinction between impressions and ideas? We look at two sense-datum theories of experience that offer competing accounts of the contrast between sensation ... More

What sense can we make of Hume’s notorious distinction between impressions and ideas? We look at two sense-datum theories of experience that offer competing accounts of the contrast between sensation and imagination. John Foster’s two-level account of experience presented in The Case for Idealism and The Nature of Perception is contrasted with Bertrand Russell’s discussion of sensation, imagination, and memory in The Theory of Knowledge. The key elements of both approaches are sketched. Foster’s appeal simply to a ‘subjectively manifest’ difference is rejected as inadequate. A problem with Russell’s conception of experience of past is canvassed, and then further elaborated in relation to previous awareness condition on personal memories. The contrasting views of memory are extended to the case of imagination. The chapter concludes with more general morals to be drawn about the relation between the first-person perspective on experience and the underlying psychological properties which explain experience’s being so.Less

Concluding Discussion

John Schwenkler

in Anscombe's Intention: A Guide

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 49-52 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering her account of the relation between intentional and voluntary action. Following this, ... More

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 49-52 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering her account of the relation between intentional and voluntary action. Following this, the chapter considers Anscombe’s closing treatment of the concept of intention for the future, emphasizing her view that intention is expressed in a statement about what is going to happen, and considering how her discussion of this position mirrors elements in Wittgenstein’s discussion of Moore’s paradox.Less

Perceptual Concepts as Non-causal Concepts

Paul Snowdon

in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

The question discussed is whether our perceptual concepts should be thought of as causal concepts. The notion of a causal concept is clarified, as is the nature of the question, and it is argued that ... More

The question discussed is whether our perceptual concepts should be thought of as causal concepts. The notion of a causal concept is clarified, as is the nature of the question, and it is argued that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that perceptual concepts are causal concepts. It is also argued that in the nature of the case it is very hard to demonstrate that the concepts are non-causal. Part of the evidence considered is that provided in earlier publications by Bill Child. An alternative, although partial, treatment of these concepts is sketched.Less

Practical Truth in Aristotle

Sarah Broadie

in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 57

In explaining the nature of phronēsis in Nicomachean Ethics 6, Aristotle invokes what he calls ‘practical truth’. The paper distinguishes and adjudicates between several interpretations of the ... More

In explaining the nature of phronēsis in Nicomachean Ethics 6, Aristotle invokes what he calls ‘practical truth’. The paper distinguishes and adjudicates between several interpretations of the puzzling phrase, including that of G. E. M. Anscombe. Its main tool of analysis is a distinction between semantic or assertoric truth, and truth in some richer-than-semantic sense. This distinction is illustrated from Aristotelian texts outside the Nicomachean Ethics. In conclusion, the paper reflects on the question of what the notion of practical truth contributes to the argument of the Nicomachean Ethics.Less

What Good Is a Will?

J. David Velleman

in Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman

A defense of Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception of intention as “practical knowledge,” based on Bratman’s insights into the functional role of intention.

Aristotle in the Ethic Wars

Sylvia Berryman

in Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life

Beginning from a short history of ethics offered in Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, this chapter notes the practice—dating back to Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’—of offering narratives ... More

Beginning from a short history of ethics offered in Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, this chapter notes the practice—dating back to Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’—of offering narratives about the history of modern ethics in order to unsettle the metaphysical picture underlying the rise of non-cognitivism or subjectivism in ethics. These narratives often feature Aristotelian virtue ethics as a potential alternative, and have shaped the reading of Aristotle’s ethics. The supposed ‘gap’ separating ancient and modern ethics is questioned, and with it the claim that Aristotle was unreflective about the grounding of his ethics; the supposition is also disputed that he regarded human nature as an ‘Archimedean Point’ to ground the demands of ethics, as the work of Williams and Foot might suggest. From a survey of modern appropriations of his ideas, two research questions are isolated: was Aristotle an Archimedean naturalist, and was he metaethically naive?Less