Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical ...
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The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.Less
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.
On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.
Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.
Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, ...
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Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Less
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, Stroud analyses the response to scepticism given by G. E. Moore in his famous ‘Proof of an External World’.Moore seeks to prove that the proposition that there are no external things ...
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In this chapter, Stroud analyses the response to scepticism given by G. E. Moore in his famous ‘Proof of an External World’.Moore seeks to prove that the proposition that there are no external things is in fact false. His proof consists of two premisses and a conclusion: ‘Here is one hand’, ‘And here is another’, therefore ‘Two human hands exist’; the conclusion follows from the premisses, and establishes conclusively that there are external things.Contrasting his interpretation with those of N. Malcolm and A. Ambrose, Stroud argues that Moore in his proof fails to refute philosophical scepticism, but nevertheless makes a significant and legitimate use of the words ‘I know’ in formulating it and succeeds in establishing his conclusion from premisses he knows. Stroud argues that Moore, although he himself does not speak in those terms, can be understood to be giving a conclusive internal answer to the question whether he knows that there are external objects: a response from within his current knowledge to a question about knowledge that merely asks whether a piece of knowledge is already included among all the things he knows, or can be included among them by finding good reason to accept that thing on the basis of other things he already knows; but while this is a perfectly common and legitimate use of the expression ‘know’, it does nothing to answer the external question about knowledge that purports to cast doubt on all knowledge claims at once, and it is this question that must be answered if the sceptic is to be refuted.Less
In this chapter, Stroud analyses the response to scepticism given by G. E. Moore in his famous ‘Proof of an External World’.
Moore seeks to prove that the proposition that there are no external things is in fact false. His proof consists of two premisses and a conclusion: ‘Here is one hand’, ‘And here is another’, therefore ‘Two human hands exist’; the conclusion follows from the premisses, and establishes conclusively that there are external things.
Contrasting his interpretation with those of N. Malcolm and A. Ambrose, Stroud argues that Moore in his proof fails to refute philosophical scepticism, but nevertheless makes a significant and legitimate use of the words ‘I know’ in formulating it and succeeds in establishing his conclusion from premisses he knows. Stroud argues that Moore, although he himself does not speak in those terms, can be understood to be giving a conclusive internal answer to the question whether he knows that there are external objects: a response from within his current knowledge to a question about knowledge that merely asks whether a piece of knowledge is already included among all the things he knows, or can be included among them by finding good reason to accept that thing on the basis of other things he already knows; but while this is a perfectly common and legitimate use of the expression ‘know’, it does nothing to answer the external question about knowledge that purports to cast doubt on all knowledge claims at once, and it is this question that must be answered if the sceptic is to be refuted.
Jamie Derier
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter traces Moore's attempts — beginning in Principia Ethica up though his 1922 ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’ — to characterize the difference between natural and non-natural ...
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This chapter traces Moore's attempts — beginning in Principia Ethica up though his 1922 ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’ — to characterize the difference between natural and non-natural properties, finding the most plausible characterization in terms of a distinctive kind of non-logical supervenience relation that links the property of goodness to the natural properties upon which it supervenes. The problem with the appeal to a kind of non-logical supervenience is that it does not really help us to understand the idea that goodness is supposed to be non-natural: the property of being yellow does not logically follow from a characterization of those properties upon which it supervenes, but yellow is a paradigm natural property for Moore. Based on certain textual clues, the chapter proposes that Moore mis-described the distinction he sought to capture in his natural/non-natural properties distinction. What Moore was after is more aptly put as a distinction between description and evaluation; a distinction central to expressivist views. So why wasn't Moore an expressivist? Expressivists generally agree with Moore that there is a conceptual gap between the descriptive and the evaluative. It is argued that for the Moorean, this gap is a gap between properties, while for the expressivist it is not.Less
This chapter traces Moore's attempts — beginning in Principia Ethica up though his 1922 ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’ — to characterize the difference between natural and non-natural properties, finding the most plausible characterization in terms of a distinctive kind of non-logical supervenience relation that links the property of goodness to the natural properties upon which it supervenes. The problem with the appeal to a kind of non-logical supervenience is that it does not really help us to understand the idea that goodness is supposed to be non-natural: the property of being yellow does not logically follow from a characterization of those properties upon which it supervenes, but yellow is a paradigm natural property for Moore. Based on certain textual clues, the chapter proposes that Moore mis-described the distinction he sought to capture in his natural/non-natural properties distinction. What Moore was after is more aptly put as a distinction between description and evaluation; a distinction central to expressivist views. So why wasn't Moore an expressivist? Expressivists generally agree with Moore that there is a conceptual gap between the descriptive and the evaluative. It is argued that for the Moorean, this gap is a gap between properties, while for the expressivist it is not.
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a ...
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According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘constitutive generalism’. This chapter defends a form of generalism and it argues against constitutive generalism by deploying a version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument.Less
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘constitutive generalism’. This chapter defends a form of generalism and it argues against constitutive generalism by deploying a version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument.
Panayot Butchvarov
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ...
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This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.Less
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One ...
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This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One consequence of this thesis is a disagreement with G. E. Moore regarding the intrinsic value of a beautiful world devoid of sentience, a famous thought experiment from hisPrincipia Ethica. But a more important consequence is the underlining of an intimate connection between the notion of a richly sentient life and the very idea of intrinsic value.Less
This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One consequence of this thesis is a disagreement with G. E. Moore regarding the intrinsic value of a beautiful world devoid of sentience, a famous thought experiment from hisPrincipia Ethica. But a more important consequence is the underlining of an intimate connection between the notion of a richly sentient life and the very idea of intrinsic value.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter sketches a theory of intrinsic value that aims to incorporate certain elements of Moore's theory, but which goes beyond it in important ways while also avoiding commitment to many of ...
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This chapter sketches a theory of intrinsic value that aims to incorporate certain elements of Moore's theory, but which goes beyond it in important ways while also avoiding commitment to many of Moore's controversial normative and metaethical views. Moore held that experiences, and non-experiential items such as art works, can be the bearers of intrinsic value. By contrast, the chapter defends experientialism — according to which the bearers of intrinsic value are concrete experiences — partly by arguing that it is experiences that seem to have the kind of Aristotelian ‘finality’ and thus ‘choiceworthiness’ that is appropriate for anything's having intrinsic value. In order to accommodate the Moorean idea that items such as art works are in some sense ‘good in themselves’ (and not merely instrumentally good), the notion of inherent value is introduced; a species of value that is possessed by something whenever an appropriate experience of it is intrinsically good. A painting, for example, can be inherently good because an appropriate aesthetic experience of that object is itself intrinsically good. The concepts of intrinsic and inherent value, along with a Moorean principle of organic unities (suitably broadened), provide the basis for a nuanced theory of value whose merits include the recognition and explanation of a wide range of intuitively plausible value judgments, as well as contributing to a general theory of practical reason.Less
This chapter sketches a theory of intrinsic value that aims to incorporate certain elements of Moore's theory, but which goes beyond it in important ways while also avoiding commitment to many of Moore's controversial normative and metaethical views. Moore held that experiences, and non-experiential items such as art works, can be the bearers of intrinsic value. By contrast, the chapter defends experientialism — according to which the bearers of intrinsic value are concrete experiences — partly by arguing that it is experiences that seem to have the kind of Aristotelian ‘finality’ and thus ‘choiceworthiness’ that is appropriate for anything's having intrinsic value. In order to accommodate the Moorean idea that items such as art works are in some sense ‘good in themselves’ (and not merely instrumentally good), the notion of inherent value is introduced; a species of value that is possessed by something whenever an appropriate experience of it is intrinsically good. A painting, for example, can be inherently good because an appropriate aesthetic experience of that object is itself intrinsically good. The concepts of intrinsic and inherent value, along with a Moorean principle of organic unities (suitably broadened), provide the basis for a nuanced theory of value whose merits include the recognition and explanation of a wide range of intuitively plausible value judgments, as well as contributing to a general theory of practical reason.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199265169
- eISBN:
- 9780191601385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926516X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible ...
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Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.Less
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.
Paul Bloomfield
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter begins by noting that the 20th century beneficiary of the open question argument has been (rather ironically) the class of non-realist views, including non-cognitivism and expressivism. ...
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This chapter begins by noting that the 20th century beneficiary of the open question argument has been (rather ironically) the class of non-realist views, including non-cognitivism and expressivism. It contends that Moore did not properly diagnose the openness of the relevant questions about goodness; it is not simplicity versus complexity, and it is not indefinability versus definability. Rather, it is the normativity involved in moral judgments and concepts that keeps Moorean questions open and blocks definitions of ‘good’; the same sort of normativity that keeps questions open in relation to concepts like ‘plus’, ‘mass’, and ‘triangle’. The issue of normativity in semantics, epistemology, and ethics is basically the same. ‘How can features of the world establish conditions under which it makes sense for us to think that there are ways we ought to conduct ourselves (with regard to our actions, our speech, or our beliefs) and other ways which ought not to be followed?’ A clear implication of this line of argument is that those working in metaethics have often laboured under the mistaken assumption that moral terms like ‘good’ are especially problematic.Less
This chapter begins by noting that the 20th century beneficiary of the open question argument has been (rather ironically) the class of non-realist views, including non-cognitivism and expressivism. It contends that Moore did not properly diagnose the openness of the relevant questions about goodness; it is not simplicity versus complexity, and it is not indefinability versus definability. Rather, it is the normativity involved in moral judgments and concepts that keeps Moorean questions open and blocks definitions of ‘good’; the same sort of normativity that keeps questions open in relation to concepts like ‘plus’, ‘mass’, and ‘triangle’. The issue of normativity in semantics, epistemology, and ethics is basically the same. ‘How can features of the world establish conditions under which it makes sense for us to think that there are ways we ought to conduct ourselves (with regard to our actions, our speech, or our beliefs) and other ways which ought not to be followed?’ A clear implication of this line of argument is that those working in metaethics have often laboured under the mistaken assumption that moral terms like ‘good’ are especially problematic.
Nicholas Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198244530
- eISBN:
- 9780191680786
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Russell's modern analytic philosophy was born around the turn of the century, largely through Bertrand Russell's and G. E. Moore's reaction against the neo-Hegelianism which dominated British ...
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Russell's modern analytic philosophy was born around the turn of the century, largely through Bertrand Russell's and G. E. Moore's reaction against the neo-Hegelianism which dominated British philosophy in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It is well known that Russell had himself been a neo-Hegelian, but hitherto little has been known about his work during that period. Yet this work was important, not only for Russell's development as a philosopher, but also for the development of analytic philosophy. Based mainly on unpublished papers held in the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, this book is the first detailed study of this early period of Russell's philosophical career. The first three chapters are concerned with Russell's philosophical education at Cambridge in the early 1890s and his conversion to neo-Hegelianism. The remaining chapters outline his ambitious plans for a neo-Hegelian dialectic of the sciences, and the problems which ultimately led him to reject it.Less
Russell's modern analytic philosophy was born around the turn of the century, largely through Bertrand Russell's and G. E. Moore's reaction against the neo-Hegelianism which dominated British philosophy in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It is well known that Russell had himself been a neo-Hegelian, but hitherto little has been known about his work during that period. Yet this work was important, not only for Russell's development as a philosopher, but also for the development of analytic philosophy. Based mainly on unpublished papers held in the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, this book is the first detailed study of this early period of Russell's philosophical career. The first three chapters are concerned with Russell's philosophical education at Cambridge in the early 1890s and his conversion to neo-Hegelianism. The remaining chapters outline his ambitious plans for a neo-Hegelian dialectic of the sciences, and the problems which ultimately led him to reject it.
Lenn E. Goodman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195328820
- eISBN:
- 9780199870172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328820.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
Christine Korsgaard surveys several ways of warranting ethics (Hobbes, Puffendorff, Moore, Ross, Nagel, Hutcheson, Hume, Mill, Williams). She chooses a neo‐Kantian approach. But Goodman finds her ...
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Christine Korsgaard surveys several ways of warranting ethics (Hobbes, Puffendorff, Moore, Ross, Nagel, Hutcheson, Hume, Mill, Williams). She chooses a neo‐Kantian approach. But Goodman finds her solution suppositious and her problematic artificial. Ethics, he argues, needs no justification. The dependence of all values on God does not imply an arbitrary authority. Indeed, monotheism finds incoherent the notion that divine authority would be arbitrary. Goodman engages critically with exponents of Jewish legal positivism and with Hare regarding divine command ethics, arguing against the ideas of original sin and the inadequacy of the Mosaic law.Less
Christine Korsgaard surveys several ways of warranting ethics (Hobbes, Puffendorff, Moore, Ross, Nagel, Hutcheson, Hume, Mill, Williams). She chooses a neo‐Kantian approach. But Goodman finds her solution suppositious and her problematic artificial. Ethics, he argues, needs no justification. The dependence of all values on God does not imply an arbitrary authority. Indeed, monotheism finds incoherent the notion that divine authority would be arbitrary. Goodman engages critically with exponents of Jewish legal positivism and with Hare regarding divine command ethics, arguing against the ideas of original sin and the inadequacy of the Mosaic law.
Athol Fitzgibbons
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198283201
- eISBN:
- 9780191596254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198283202.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Describes how Keynes derived his ethics from the philosophy of G. E. Moore, explains his attacks on utilitarianism, and relates Keynes's ethics to his theory of probability.
Describes how Keynes derived his ethics from the philosophy of G. E. Moore, explains his attacks on utilitarianism, and relates Keynes's ethics to his theory of probability.
Judith Jarvis Thomson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that the legacy in question is that the force of the open question argument, together with the rejection of the Moorean idea that there are non-natural properties, motivate two ...
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This chapter argues that the legacy in question is that the force of the open question argument, together with the rejection of the Moorean idea that there are non-natural properties, motivate two related claims: the no normative truth value thesis, according to which no normative sentences have truth value; and the expressivist thesis, that in uttering or thinking a normative sentence, what one does is express a favourable or unfavourable attitude toward the object of evaluation. The chapter explores two main sources of reason for rejecting the first thesis: appeals to minimalism about truth, and the so-called Frege–Geach problem. It argues that appeals to minimalism about truth are ultimately circular. However, the Frege–Geach problem represents a more serious challenge to those who embrace the no normative truth value thesis. Attempts — particularly by expressivists — to rebut this challenge falter, but rather than embrace the Moorean position (or any metaethical position that would countenance the property goodness, or rightness), the chapter denies the claim that ‘is good’ is a logical predicate. Rather, sentences of the form, ‘A is good’ are semantically incomplete and thus ‘is good’ is not (in the requisite sense) a logical predicate. Normative claims that predicate goodness or rightness in a way, as when someone claims that so and so is a good baseball player or that a certain move in chess was the right move to make, are predicating genuine properties that are arguably natural. If this is correct, then Moore's open question argument has misled philosophers to fix upon the pseudo-property of goodness.Less
This chapter argues that the legacy in question is that the force of the open question argument, together with the rejection of the Moorean idea that there are non-natural properties, motivate two related claims: the no normative truth value thesis, according to which no normative sentences have truth value; and the expressivist thesis, that in uttering or thinking a normative sentence, what one does is express a favourable or unfavourable attitude toward the object of evaluation. The chapter explores two main sources of reason for rejecting the first thesis: appeals to minimalism about truth, and the so-called Frege–Geach problem. It argues that appeals to minimalism about truth are ultimately circular. However, the Frege–Geach problem represents a more serious challenge to those who embrace the no normative truth value thesis. Attempts — particularly by expressivists — to rebut this challenge falter, but rather than embrace the Moorean position (or any metaethical position that would countenance the property goodness, or rightness), the chapter denies the claim that ‘is good’ is a logical predicate. Rather, sentences of the form, ‘A is good’ are semantically incomplete and thus ‘is good’ is not (in the requisite sense) a logical predicate. Normative claims that predicate goodness or rightness in a way, as when someone claims that so and so is a good baseball player or that a certain move in chess was the right move to make, are predicating genuine properties that are arguably natural. If this is correct, then Moore's open question argument has misled philosophers to fix upon the pseudo-property of goodness.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245871
- eISBN:
- 9780191598630
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245878.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Explores the S‐use sensitivity of proof, arguing that there is no clear separation between an epistemic and non‐epistemic notion of proof, but that epistemology is involved in what actually entails ...
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Explores the S‐use sensitivity of proof, arguing that there is no clear separation between an epistemic and non‐epistemic notion of proof, but that epistemology is involved in what actually entails what (which is thus an occasion‐sensitive matter). It defends a view of G. E. Moore.Less
Explores the S‐use sensitivity of proof, arguing that there is no clear separation between an epistemic and non‐epistemic notion of proof, but that epistemology is involved in what actually entails what (which is thus an occasion‐sensitive matter). It defends a view of G. E. Moore.
Philip Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter offers a partial defence of Scanlon's buck-passing account of the relation between base properties, goodness, and practical reasons. Jonathan Dancy and Roger Crisp have both argued that ...
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This chapter offers a partial defence of Scanlon's buck-passing account of the relation between base properties, goodness, and practical reasons. Jonathan Dancy and Roger Crisp have both argued that even if Scanlon's buck-passing account is superior to the Moorean account, there are other contending accounts that Scanlon does not consider. Against Dancy and Crisp, Stratton–Lake and Hooker argue that these proposed accounts, although genuine alternatives to the Moorean and buck-passing accounts, are nevertheless deeply problematic and do nothing to harm the case for Scanlon's account. Regarding Scanlon's two arguments, the authors find that the parsimony argument, once clarified, does offer some support for the buck-passing view, but that the appeal to value pluralism does not. Finally, they defend Scanlon's account against an ‘open question’ worry about the relation between the fact that something has reason-giving properties and its goodness.Less
This chapter offers a partial defence of Scanlon's buck-passing account of the relation between base properties, goodness, and practical reasons. Jonathan Dancy and Roger Crisp have both argued that even if Scanlon's buck-passing account is superior to the Moorean account, there are other contending accounts that Scanlon does not consider. Against Dancy and Crisp, Stratton–Lake and Hooker argue that these proposed accounts, although genuine alternatives to the Moorean and buck-passing accounts, are nevertheless deeply problematic and do nothing to harm the case for Scanlon's account. Regarding Scanlon's two arguments, the authors find that the parsimony argument, once clarified, does offer some support for the buck-passing view, but that the appeal to value pluralism does not. Finally, they defend Scanlon's account against an ‘open question’ worry about the relation between the fact that something has reason-giving properties and its goodness.
Martin Gustafsson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates ...
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This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates Austin’s philosophy in its original intellectual milieu, focusing in particular on the significance of his immediate predecessors, G. E. Moore and H. A. Prichard. It then looks at the various ways in which Austin’s ideas have been appropriated by speech act theorists (via Grice and Searle), by performativity theorists (via Derrida and Butler), in discussions of pornography and free speech (via Hornsby and Langton), and by others such as Quentin Skinner, H. L. A. Hart, Stanley Cavell, Charles Travis, and Mark Kaplan. Finally it provides an overview of the remaining chapters of the book.Less
This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates Austin’s philosophy in its original intellectual milieu, focusing in particular on the significance of his immediate predecessors, G. E. Moore and H. A. Prichard. It then looks at the various ways in which Austin’s ideas have been appropriated by speech act theorists (via Grice and Searle), by performativity theorists (via Derrida and Butler), in discussions of pornography and free speech (via Hornsby and Langton), and by others such as Quentin Skinner, H. L. A. Hart, Stanley Cavell, Charles Travis, and Mark Kaplan. Finally it provides an overview of the remaining chapters of the book.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a three-part response to radical scepticism, a response which mirrors in key respects the ‘commonsense’ proposal often ascribed to G. E. Moore (and which is regarded with almost ...
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This chapter presents a three-part response to radical scepticism, a response which mirrors in key respects the ‘commonsense’ proposal often ascribed to G. E. Moore (and which is regarded with almost wholesale derision). Here this chapter calls this anti-sceptical proposal, Mooreanism. The first part of this anti-sceptical response is to focus on an everyday proposition which we paradigmatically take ourselves to know, such as that one has two hands, and to insist that we do indeed know this proposition. The second part of the response is to note that since this everyday proposition is manifestly inconsistent with the target radical sceptical hypothesis, it follows that if one knows the everyday proposition, then one must know the denial of the radical sceptical hypothesis as well. Finally, the third part of the response is the extraction of the antisceptical conclusion that one knows the denial of the target radical sceptical hypothesis, in this case that one is not a brain-in-a-vat.Less
This chapter presents a three-part response to radical scepticism, a response which mirrors in key respects the ‘commonsense’ proposal often ascribed to G. E. Moore (and which is regarded with almost wholesale derision). Here this chapter calls this anti-sceptical proposal, Mooreanism. The first part of this anti-sceptical response is to focus on an everyday proposition which we paradigmatically take ourselves to know, such as that one has two hands, and to insist that we do indeed know this proposition. The second part of the response is to note that since this everyday proposition is manifestly inconsistent with the target radical sceptical hypothesis, it follows that if one knows the everyday proposition, then one must know the denial of the radical sceptical hypothesis as well. Finally, the third part of the response is the extraction of the antisceptical conclusion that one knows the denial of the target radical sceptical hypothesis, in this case that one is not a brain-in-a-vat.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter aims to undertake an explication of the structural philosophy on moral theory in analytic philosophy with emphasis on Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethic of self-actualization. It ...
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This chapter aims to undertake an explication of the structural philosophy on moral theory in analytic philosophy with emphasis on Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethic of self-actualization. It discusses David Hume’s arguments on fact/value distinction and analyses G. E. Moore’s use of Hume’s distinction by means of the naturalistic fallacy argument and the intuitionist theory Moore developed in Principia Ethica. This chapter also considers the kinds of questions natural law theory might respond to in working out a consistent ethical naturalism.Less
This chapter aims to undertake an explication of the structural philosophy on moral theory in analytic philosophy with emphasis on Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethic of self-actualization. It discusses David Hume’s arguments on fact/value distinction and analyses G. E. Moore’s use of Hume’s distinction by means of the naturalistic fallacy argument and the intuitionist theory Moore developed in Principia Ethica. This chapter also considers the kinds of questions natural law theory might respond to in working out a consistent ethical naturalism.
Connie S. Rosati
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter challenges one aspect of Moore's view. In his critical remarks about egoism as a theory of motivation, Moore argued that the notion of ‘good-for’, which figures in claims about this or ...
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This chapter challenges one aspect of Moore's view. In his critical remarks about egoism as a theory of motivation, Moore argued that the notion of ‘good-for’, which figures in claims about this or that activity or pursuit being (non-morally, intrinsically) good for an individual, is incoherent. The chapter argues that Moore is mistaken and defends an account of the good-for relation modeled on the interpersonal relation of successful loving. Success in an interpersonal loving relationship is characterized by the same general sorts of features as the relation involved in something's being good for an individual; part of her personal good. The property good-for is a second-order relational property that is realized in a person's life when she stands in the right sort of relation to some pursuit or activity. The chapter defends this view in two ways. First, it appeals to certain dualities of human nature and experience. On the one hand, we are biological creatures who can discover what is good for us, as when one discovers that she has a natural talent for music and proceeds to develop her musical talent, so that playing music becomes part of her personal good. But on the other hand, we are autonomous agents for whom our personal good is partly a matter of our own making; something invented rather than simply discovered. In order for playing music to be part of her personal good, the would-be musician must cultivate her talent. In this way she makes playing music part of her personal good. The account of personal good nicely accommodates such dualities in that the various relations involved in something's being good for oneself depend partly on facts about oneself that are beyond one's control, but also partly on what one does. The second way the chapter defends its view is by responding to certain possible Moorean objections.Less
This chapter challenges one aspect of Moore's view. In his critical remarks about egoism as a theory of motivation, Moore argued that the notion of ‘good-for’, which figures in claims about this or that activity or pursuit being (non-morally, intrinsically) good for an individual, is incoherent. The chapter argues that Moore is mistaken and defends an account of the good-for relation modeled on the interpersonal relation of successful loving. Success in an interpersonal loving relationship is characterized by the same general sorts of features as the relation involved in something's being good for an individual; part of her personal good. The property good-for is a second-order relational property that is realized in a person's life when she stands in the right sort of relation to some pursuit or activity. The chapter defends this view in two ways. First, it appeals to certain dualities of human nature and experience. On the one hand, we are biological creatures who can discover what is good for us, as when one discovers that she has a natural talent for music and proceeds to develop her musical talent, so that playing music becomes part of her personal good. But on the other hand, we are autonomous agents for whom our personal good is partly a matter of our own making; something invented rather than simply discovered. In order for playing music to be part of her personal good, the would-be musician must cultivate her talent. In this way she makes playing music part of her personal good. The account of personal good nicely accommodates such dualities in that the various relations involved in something's being good for oneself depend partly on facts about oneself that are beyond one's control, but also partly on what one does. The second way the chapter defends its view is by responding to certain possible Moorean objections.