Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These ...
More
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.Less
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter develops and clarifies the institutional account proposed in the previous chapter by posing it against some of the important criticisms leveled against the institutional approach. ...
More
This chapter develops and clarifies the institutional account proposed in the previous chapter by posing it against some of the important criticisms leveled against the institutional approach. Special attention will be given to objections of the form advanced by G. A. Cohen, as well as to Cohen’s recent replies to his own critics. The chapter invokes and reinforces the idea advanced in Chapter 2, that in light of value pluralism the institutional focus provides a plausible understanding of the site of egalitarian justice, whereas a more encompassing trans-institutional approach does not provide proper space for valued and valuable personal pursuits. The latter thus contradicts the end of liberal justice, namely that of providing the appropriate framework within which persons may freely and equally, but permissibly and fervently, pursue their ends. It stresses that the institutional approach is not a compromise of justice against personal pursuits; in fact, the primacy of justice is preserved on this approach, for the rules of just institutions set the range of personal ends that persons may permissibly pursue and the means by which they can pursue them.Less
This chapter develops and clarifies the institutional account proposed in the previous chapter by posing it against some of the important criticisms leveled against the institutional approach. Special attention will be given to objections of the form advanced by G. A. Cohen, as well as to Cohen’s recent replies to his own critics. The chapter invokes and reinforces the idea advanced in Chapter 2, that in light of value pluralism the institutional focus provides a plausible understanding of the site of egalitarian justice, whereas a more encompassing trans-institutional approach does not provide proper space for valued and valuable personal pursuits. The latter thus contradicts the end of liberal justice, namely that of providing the appropriate framework within which persons may freely and equally, but permissibly and fervently, pursue their ends. It stresses that the institutional approach is not a compromise of justice against personal pursuits; in fact, the primacy of justice is preserved on this approach, for the rules of just institutions set the range of personal ends that persons may permissibly pursue and the means by which they can pursue them.
Claus Nielsen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199593859
- eISBN:
- 9780191731457
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter explores the practical implications of the cosmopolitan ideal of a just world order, and discusses ‘the guidance critique’ of this ideal: the claim that cosmopolitan theories are too ...
More
This chapter explores the practical implications of the cosmopolitan ideal of a just world order, and discusses ‘the guidance critique’ of this ideal: the claim that cosmopolitan theories are too idealistic to guide action in real-world circumstances. It argues that proponents of this critique either misapply cosmopolitan principles, or have unreasonable expectations regarding the sort of guidance a theory of justice can plausibly deliver. Theories of justice do not answer questions such as: ‘What specific actions ought we to take, here and now?’ Instead, they offer normative frameworks for guiding our thinking with respect to such questions. Because cosmopolitanism does provide a distinctive normative framework – that is, it insists that our international distributive duties are grounded in justice, as opposed to humanitarian assistance – it fulfils the guidance requirements that can plausibly be placed on a theory of justice.Less
This chapter explores the practical implications of the cosmopolitan ideal of a just world order, and discusses ‘the guidance critique’ of this ideal: the claim that cosmopolitan theories are too idealistic to guide action in real-world circumstances. It argues that proponents of this critique either misapply cosmopolitan principles, or have unreasonable expectations regarding the sort of guidance a theory of justice can plausibly deliver. Theories of justice do not answer questions such as: ‘What specific actions ought we to take, here and now?’ Instead, they offer normative frameworks for guiding our thinking with respect to such questions. Because cosmopolitanism does provide a distinctive normative framework – that is, it insists that our international distributive duties are grounded in justice, as opposed to humanitarian assistance – it fulfils the guidance requirements that can plausibly be placed on a theory of justice.
Ira Katznelson
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198279242
- eISBN:
- 9780191601910
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198279248.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The first of the two main sections of this chapter discusses Marx's goal and the elements of a Marxist tradition, and presents the views of various later scholars (David Little, Steven Lukes, Alvin ...
More
The first of the two main sections of this chapter discusses Marx's goal and the elements of a Marxist tradition, and presents the views of various later scholars (David Little, Steven Lukes, Alvin Goulder, Edward Thompson, Leonard Krieger, Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, and others) on these elements. The three distinctive but inter‐related projects elaborated in Marx's aim of reconstructing the post‐capitalist world are examined in detail: the construction of a theory of history to account for the change between epochs on the largest possible scale, which focuses on the struggles between social classes within the twin frame of the development of the forces of production, and the nature of the relationships joining people in the social features of the production process; the building of a model of the economy within the capitalist epoch; and the construction of a social theory capable of inventing explanations about specific capitalist societies (the focus of most of this book). Gramsci elaborated on the most promising lines of inquiry embedded in Marx's historical writings to develop the base–superstructure distinction as a complex web of relations in which the economic, political, and cultural elements of a situation are interconnected, and in which the historicity of social structure is made central. The final section of the chapter explores these issues of Marxist social theory in the work of Edward Thompson, Raymond Williams, Eric Hobsbawm, and G. A. Cohen (who demonstrate the repertoire of alternative theoretical moves developed since Gramsci), and points out that the capacity of Marxism to provide an attractive alternative to the differentiation problematic in studies of the city hinges on the character and persuasiveness of these linkages. In the concluding discussion, the author returns to the issue of the capaciousness of Marxist theory.Less
The first of the two main sections of this chapter discusses Marx's goal and the elements of a Marxist tradition, and presents the views of various later scholars (David Little, Steven Lukes, Alvin Goulder, Edward Thompson, Leonard Krieger, Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, and others) on these elements. The three distinctive but inter‐related projects elaborated in Marx's aim of reconstructing the post‐capitalist world are examined in detail: the construction of a theory of history to account for the change between epochs on the largest possible scale, which focuses on the struggles between social classes within the twin frame of the development of the forces of production, and the nature of the relationships joining people in the social features of the production process; the building of a model of the economy within the capitalist epoch; and the construction of a social theory capable of inventing explanations about specific capitalist societies (the focus of most of this book). Gramsci elaborated on the most promising lines of inquiry embedded in Marx's historical writings to develop the base–superstructure distinction as a complex web of relations in which the economic, political, and cultural elements of a situation are interconnected, and in which the historicity of social structure is made central. The final section of the chapter explores these issues of Marxist social theory in the work of Edward Thompson, Raymond Williams, Eric Hobsbawm, and G. A. Cohen (who demonstrate the repertoire of alternative theoretical moves developed since Gramsci), and points out that the capacity of Marxism to provide an attractive alternative to the differentiation problematic in studies of the city hinges on the character and persuasiveness of these linkages. In the concluding discussion, the author returns to the issue of the capaciousness of Marxist theory.
G. A. Cohen
Michael Otsuka (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148700
- eISBN:
- 9781400838660
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most ...
More
G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most significant papers. This is the first of three volumes to realize those plans. Drawing on three decades of work, it contains previously uncollected articles that have shaped many of the central debates in political philosophy, as well as papers published here for the first time. In these pieces, Cohen asks what egalitarians have most reason to equalize, he considers the relationship between freedom and property, and he reflects upon ideal theory and political practice. Included here are classic essays such as “Equality of What?” and “Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat,” along with more recent contributions such as “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice,” “Freedom and Money,” and the previously unpublished “How to Do Political Philosophy.” On ample display throughout are the clarity, rigor, conviction, and wit for which Cohen was renowned. Together, these essays demonstrate how his work provides a powerful account of liberty and equality to the left of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Isaiah Berlin.Less
G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most significant papers. This is the first of three volumes to realize those plans. Drawing on three decades of work, it contains previously uncollected articles that have shaped many of the central debates in political philosophy, as well as papers published here for the first time. In these pieces, Cohen asks what egalitarians have most reason to equalize, he considers the relationship between freedom and property, and he reflects upon ideal theory and political practice. Included here are classic essays such as “Equality of What?” and “Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat,” along with more recent contributions such as “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice,” “Freedom and Money,” and the previously unpublished “How to Do Political Philosophy.” On ample display throughout are the clarity, rigor, conviction, and wit for which Cohen was renowned. Together, these essays demonstrate how his work provides a powerful account of liberty and equality to the left of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Isaiah Berlin.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter recounts the justifications for the institutional approach, arguing in particular that an institutional focus allows for a way of balancing the demands of justice and the legitimate ...
More
This chapter recounts the justifications for the institutional approach, arguing in particular that an institutional focus allows for a way of balancing the demands of justice and the legitimate demands of personal life. The argument is not simply that institutions affect persons’ life prospects profoundly and pervasively from the start. More importantly, it stresses that an exclusive focus on institutions preserves space for individuals to engage in meaningful and valuable personal pursuits. On the reasonable presumption of value pluralism, the institutional approach provides the most plausible demarcation of the site of equality.Less
This chapter recounts the justifications for the institutional approach, arguing in particular that an institutional focus allows for a way of balancing the demands of justice and the legitimate demands of personal life. The argument is not simply that institutions affect persons’ life prospects profoundly and pervasively from the start. More importantly, it stresses that an exclusive focus on institutions preserves space for individuals to engage in meaningful and valuable personal pursuits. On the reasonable presumption of value pluralism, the institutional approach provides the most plausible demarcation of the site of equality.
Jonathan Wolff
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149004
- eISBN:
- 9781400848713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149004.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents a memoir of G. A. Cohen, who died on August 5, 2009. Cohen was born on April 14, 1941, into a Jewish Marxist family, and his life and character were woven into his philosophical ...
More
This chapter presents a memoir of G. A. Cohen, who died on August 5, 2009. Cohen was born on April 14, 1941, into a Jewish Marxist family, and his life and character were woven into his philosophical work in an unusual way. His upbringing, his family, his Jewishness (as distinct from Judaism), and his need to position his own beliefs in relation to Karl Marx and to Soviet Communism all played central roles in his life and work. Armed with the techniques of analytical philosophy, Cohen began his earliest project, resulting in Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, in which he sets out a clear account of the core of Marx's theory of history. This chapter considers Cohen's other writings which articulate his views on subjects ranging from capitalism and socialism to freedom and the nature and consequences of the thesis of self-ownership.Less
This chapter presents a memoir of G. A. Cohen, who died on August 5, 2009. Cohen was born on April 14, 1941, into a Jewish Marxist family, and his life and character were woven into his philosophical work in an unusual way. His upbringing, his family, his Jewishness (as distinct from Judaism), and his need to position his own beliefs in relation to Karl Marx and to Soviet Communism all played central roles in his life and work. Armed with the techniques of analytical philosophy, Cohen began his earliest project, resulting in Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, in which he sets out a clear account of the core of Marx's theory of history. This chapter considers Cohen's other writings which articulate his views on subjects ranging from capitalism and socialism to freedom and the nature and consequences of the thesis of self-ownership.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Part II of the book addresses the question why equality matters and defends luck egalitarianism against “democratic equality.” Chapter 4 begins by recalling the familiar core ideas of luck ...
More
Part II of the book addresses the question why equality matters and defends luck egalitarianism against “democratic equality.” Chapter 4 begins by recalling the familiar core ideas of luck egalitarianism and affirms its initial plausibility. It goes on to clarify the basic contours of luck egalitarianism. Specifically, it argues that the conceptual space of luck egalitarianism should be limited to the special domain of distributive justice, that its site is the basic institutions of a social order, and its limited justificatory purpose is that of explaining why equality matters. I refer to this version of luck egalitarianism as “institutional luck egalitarianism.” The key idea is that it is not mere facts such as good and bad luck in themselves that generate a problem of justice, but how entrenched social arrangements and practices handle luck that raises considerations of justice.Less
Part II of the book addresses the question why equality matters and defends luck egalitarianism against “democratic equality.” Chapter 4 begins by recalling the familiar core ideas of luck egalitarianism and affirms its initial plausibility. It goes on to clarify the basic contours of luck egalitarianism. Specifically, it argues that the conceptual space of luck egalitarianism should be limited to the special domain of distributive justice, that its site is the basic institutions of a social order, and its limited justificatory purpose is that of explaining why equality matters. I refer to this version of luck egalitarianism as “institutional luck egalitarianism.” The key idea is that it is not mere facts such as good and bad luck in themselves that generate a problem of justice, but how entrenched social arrangements and practices handle luck that raises considerations of justice.
Jonathan Wolff and G. A. Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149004
- eISBN:
- 9781400848713
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149004.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
G. A. Cohen was one of the leading political philosophers of recent times. He first came to wide attention in 1978 with the prize-winning book Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. In subsequent ...
More
G. A. Cohen was one of the leading political philosophers of recent times. He first came to wide attention in 1978 with the prize-winning book Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. In subsequent decades his published writings largely turned away from the history of philosophy, focusing instead on equality, freedom, and justice. However, throughout his career he regularly lectured on a wide range of moral and political philosophers of the past. This volume collects these previously unpublished lectures. Starting with a chapter centered on Plato, but also discussing the pre-Socratics as well as Aristotle, the book moves to social contract theory as discussed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume, and then continues with chapters on Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. The book also contains some previously published but uncollected papers on Marx, Hobbes, and Kant, among other figures. The collection concludes with a memoir of Cohen written by the volume editor who was a student of Cohen's. A hallmark of the lectures is Cohen's engagement with the thinkers he discusses. Rather than simply trying to render their thought accessible to the modern reader, he tests whether their arguments and positions are clear, sound, and free from contradiction. Ultimately, his lectures teach us not only about some of the great thinkers in the history of moral and political philosophy, but also about one of the great thinkers of our time: Cohen himself.Less
G. A. Cohen was one of the leading political philosophers of recent times. He first came to wide attention in 1978 with the prize-winning book Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. In subsequent decades his published writings largely turned away from the history of philosophy, focusing instead on equality, freedom, and justice. However, throughout his career he regularly lectured on a wide range of moral and political philosophers of the past. This volume collects these previously unpublished lectures. Starting with a chapter centered on Plato, but also discussing the pre-Socratics as well as Aristotle, the book moves to social contract theory as discussed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume, and then continues with chapters on Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. The book also contains some previously published but uncollected papers on Marx, Hobbes, and Kant, among other figures. The collection concludes with a memoir of Cohen written by the volume editor who was a student of Cohen's. A hallmark of the lectures is Cohen's engagement with the thinkers he discusses. Rather than simply trying to render their thought accessible to the modern reader, he tests whether their arguments and positions are clear, sound, and free from contradiction. Ultimately, his lectures teach us not only about some of the great thinkers in the history of moral and political philosophy, but also about one of the great thinkers of our time: Cohen himself.
Shlomi Segall
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661817
- eISBN:
- 9780191760877
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661817.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity. But the past twenty five years or so have seen a sea-change in egalitarian thinking about that concept. ‘Luck egalitarians’ ...
More
Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity. But the past twenty five years or so have seen a sea-change in egalitarian thinking about that concept. ‘Luck egalitarians’ such as G. A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and John Roemer have paved a new way of thinking about equality of opportunity, and infused it with radical egalitarian content. In this book, Shlomi Segall brings together these developments in egalitarian theory and offers a comprehensive account of ‘radical equality of opportunity’.Radical equality of opportunity (EOp) differs from more traditional conceptions on several dimensions. Most notably, while other accounts of equality of opportunity strive to neutralize legal and/or socio-economic obstacles to one’s opportunity-set the radical account seeks to remove also natural ones. Radical EOp, then, aims at neutralizing all obstacles that lie outside individuals’ control. This has far-reaching implications, and the book is devoted to exploring and defending them. The book touches on four main themes. First, it locates the ideal of radical EOp within egalitarian distributive justice. Segall advances there three claims in particular: that we ought to be concerned with equality in individual holdings (rather than merely social relations); that we ought to be bothered, as egalitarians, with unequal outcomes, and never equal ones; and that we ought to be concerned with disadvantages the absolute (rather than relative) badness of which, the agent could not have controlled. Second, the book applies the concept of radical equality of opportunity to office and hiring. It demonstrates that radical EOp yields an attractive account both with regard to justice in the allocation of jobs on the one hand, and discrimination, on the other. Third, the book offers an account of radical EOp in education and upbringing. Segall tries to defend there the rather radical implications of the account, namely that it may hold children responsible for their choices, and that it places quite demanding requirements on parents. Finally, the book develops an account of radical equality of opportunity for health, to rival Norman Daniels’s Rawlsian account. The proposed account is distinguished in the parity that it creates between social and natural causes of ill health.Less
Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity. But the past twenty five years or so have seen a sea-change in egalitarian thinking about that concept. ‘Luck egalitarians’ such as G. A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and John Roemer have paved a new way of thinking about equality of opportunity, and infused it with radical egalitarian content. In this book, Shlomi Segall brings together these developments in egalitarian theory and offers a comprehensive account of ‘radical equality of opportunity’.Radical equality of opportunity (EOp) differs from more traditional conceptions on several dimensions. Most notably, while other accounts of equality of opportunity strive to neutralize legal and/or socio-economic obstacles to one’s opportunity-set the radical account seeks to remove also natural ones. Radical EOp, then, aims at neutralizing all obstacles that lie outside individuals’ control. This has far-reaching implications, and the book is devoted to exploring and defending them. The book touches on four main themes. First, it locates the ideal of radical EOp within egalitarian distributive justice. Segall advances there three claims in particular: that we ought to be concerned with equality in individual holdings (rather than merely social relations); that we ought to be bothered, as egalitarians, with unequal outcomes, and never equal ones; and that we ought to be concerned with disadvantages the absolute (rather than relative) badness of which, the agent could not have controlled. Second, the book applies the concept of radical equality of opportunity to office and hiring. It demonstrates that radical EOp yields an attractive account both with regard to justice in the allocation of jobs on the one hand, and discrimination, on the other. Third, the book offers an account of radical EOp in education and upbringing. Segall tries to defend there the rather radical implications of the account, namely that it may hold children responsible for their choices, and that it places quite demanding requirements on parents. Finally, the book develops an account of radical equality of opportunity for health, to rival Norman Daniels’s Rawlsian account. The proposed account is distinguished in the parity that it creates between social and natural causes of ill health.
G. A. Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148809
- eISBN:
- 9781400845323
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148809.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This is the second of three volumes of posthumously collected writings of G. A. Cohen, who was one of the leading, and most progressive, figures in contemporary political philosophy. This volume ...
More
This is the second of three volumes of posthumously collected writings of G. A. Cohen, who was one of the leading, and most progressive, figures in contemporary political philosophy. This volume brings together some of Cohen's most personal philosophical and nonphilosophical essays, many of them previously unpublished. Rich in first-person narration, insight, and humor, these pieces vividly demonstrate why Thomas Nagel described Cohen as a “wonderful raconteur.” The nonphilosophical highlight of the book is Cohen's remarkable account of his first trip to India, which includes unforgettable vignettes of encounters with strangers and reflections on poverty and begging. Other biographical pieces include his valedictory lecture at Oxford, in which he describes his philosophical development and offers his impressions of other philosophers, and “Isaiah's Marx, and Mine,” a tribute to his mentor Isaiah Berlin. Other essays address such topics as the truth in “small-c conservatism,” who can and can't condemn terrorists, and the essence of bullshit. A recurring theme is finding completion in relation to the world of other human beings. Engaging, perceptive, and empathetic, these writings reveal a more personal side of one of the most influential philosophers of our time.Less
This is the second of three volumes of posthumously collected writings of G. A. Cohen, who was one of the leading, and most progressive, figures in contemporary political philosophy. This volume brings together some of Cohen's most personal philosophical and nonphilosophical essays, many of them previously unpublished. Rich in first-person narration, insight, and humor, these pieces vividly demonstrate why Thomas Nagel described Cohen as a “wonderful raconteur.” The nonphilosophical highlight of the book is Cohen's remarkable account of his first trip to India, which includes unforgettable vignettes of encounters with strangers and reflections on poverty and begging. Other biographical pieces include his valedictory lecture at Oxford, in which he describes his philosophical development and offers his impressions of other philosophers, and “Isaiah's Marx, and Mine,” a tribute to his mentor Isaiah Berlin. Other essays address such topics as the truth in “small-c conservatism,” who can and can't condemn terrorists, and the essence of bullshit. A recurring theme is finding completion in relation to the world of other human beings. Engaging, perceptive, and empathetic, these writings reveal a more personal side of one of the most influential philosophers of our time.
Carl Knight
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748638697
- eISBN:
- 9780748652815
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748638697.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter considers ‘equal opportunity for welfare’, as advocated by Richard Arneson and John Roemer, beginning by identifying the variety or varieties of bad luck that appear to be compensable. ...
More
This chapter considers ‘equal opportunity for welfare’, as advocated by Richard Arneson and John Roemer, beginning by identifying the variety or varieties of bad luck that appear to be compensable. It maintains that compensation for ‘bad-price luck’ is appropriate, and that G. A. Cohen 's broader view of which kinds of luck are compensable is unacceptable, for the luck egalitarian at least. The chapter defends the bad-price luck argument against a few objections raised by Ronald Dworkin. This ‘present-mood’ account of welfare focuses on affective states and appears to overcome many of the problems faced by better-known accounts. The discussion also resists Cohen's attempt to reintroduce a resourcist element to egalitarian justice at the close of the chapter.Less
This chapter considers ‘equal opportunity for welfare’, as advocated by Richard Arneson and John Roemer, beginning by identifying the variety or varieties of bad luck that appear to be compensable. It maintains that compensation for ‘bad-price luck’ is appropriate, and that G. A. Cohen 's broader view of which kinds of luck are compensable is unacceptable, for the luck egalitarian at least. The chapter defends the bad-price luck argument against a few objections raised by Ronald Dworkin. This ‘present-mood’ account of welfare focuses on affective states and appears to overcome many of the problems faced by better-known accounts. The discussion also resists Cohen's attempt to reintroduce a resourcist element to egalitarian justice at the close of the chapter.
Michael Otsuka
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243952
- eISBN:
- 9780191598142
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243956.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Delineates the nature of a libertarian right of self‐ownership. Assesses Robert Nozick's claim that taxation is on a par with forced labour. Contends that the most defensible version of the Lockean ...
More
Delineates the nature of a libertarian right of self‐ownership. Assesses Robert Nozick's claim that taxation is on a par with forced labour. Contends that the most defensible version of the Lockean ‘enough and as good’ proviso calls for acquisition of unowned natural resources that is consistent with equality of opportunity for welfare. Argues, contrary to both Nozick and G. A. Cohen, that a robust right of self‐ownership is compatible with this welfare‐egalitarian proviso across a wide range of circumstances.Less
Delineates the nature of a libertarian right of self‐ownership. Assesses Robert Nozick's claim that taxation is on a par with forced labour. Contends that the most defensible version of the Lockean ‘enough and as good’ proviso calls for acquisition of unowned natural resources that is consistent with equality of opportunity for welfare. Argues, contrary to both Nozick and G. A. Cohen, that a robust right of self‐ownership is compatible with this welfare‐egalitarian proviso across a wide range of circumstances.
G. A. Cohen
Michael Otsuka (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148700
- eISBN:
- 9781400838660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter explains a disagreement that Cohen had with his teacher and friend, Isaiah Berlin, about freedom and, more particularly, about the relationship between freedom and money. Contrary to the ...
More
This chapter explains a disagreement that Cohen had with his teacher and friend, Isaiah Berlin, about freedom and, more particularly, about the relationship between freedom and money. Contrary to the very influential things that Isaiah wrote, Cohen argues that lack of money, poverty, carries with it lack of freedom. He regards this as an overwhelmingly obvious truth, one that is worth defending only because it has been so influentially denied. While lack of money, poverty, is not the only circumstance that restricts a person's freedom, it is one of them, and one of the most important of them. To put the point more precisely—there are lots of things that, because they are poor, poor people are not free to do, things that nonpoor people are, by contrast, indeed free to do.Less
This chapter explains a disagreement that Cohen had with his teacher and friend, Isaiah Berlin, about freedom and, more particularly, about the relationship between freedom and money. Contrary to the very influential things that Isaiah wrote, Cohen argues that lack of money, poverty, carries with it lack of freedom. He regards this as an overwhelmingly obvious truth, one that is worth defending only because it has been so influentially denied. While lack of money, poverty, is not the only circumstance that restricts a person's freedom, it is one of them, and one of the most important of them. To put the point more precisely—there are lots of things that, because they are poor, poor people are not free to do, things that nonpoor people are, by contrast, indeed free to do.
Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199565801
- eISBN:
- 9780191725463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and ...
More
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, and Jonathan Wolff. Key concepts such as responsibility (individual and collective), luck (thin and thick; brute and option), control, desert, and equality of opportunity are delineated, and the implementation of responsibility-sensitive accounts of justice is considered. The chapters of this book are positioned in relation to the wider literature on responsibility and distributive justice, and a brief outline of the chapters is provided.Less
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, and Jonathan Wolff. Key concepts such as responsibility (individual and collective), luck (thin and thick; brute and option), control, desert, and equality of opportunity are delineated, and the implementation of responsibility-sensitive accounts of justice is considered. The chapters of this book are positioned in relation to the wider literature on responsibility and distributive justice, and a brief outline of the chapters is provided.
G. A. Cohen
Michael Otsuka (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148700
- eISBN:
- 9781400838660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter is a reply to “Equality and Capability,” in which Ronald Dworkin responded to some of the criticisms of his work that the Cohen made in “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” It ...
More
This chapter is a reply to “Equality and Capability,” in which Ronald Dworkin responded to some of the criticisms of his work that the Cohen made in “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” It begins by distinguishing two broad criticisms of equality of welfare that Dworkin has developed, one surrounding the indeterminacy of the concept of welfare and one surrounding the problem of expensive taste. It then explains what the phrase “expensive taste” means within the present debate. The remainder of the chapter discusses brute taste, that is, taste that is not guided by judgment; refutes the principal argument that Dworkin deploys against compensation for expensive judgmental taste; explains why the dispute about expensive taste matters; and offers a fragment of a taxonomy that distinguishes contrasting degrees of control that people display over the acquisition and the persistence of their tastes.Less
This chapter is a reply to “Equality and Capability,” in which Ronald Dworkin responded to some of the criticisms of his work that the Cohen made in “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” It begins by distinguishing two broad criticisms of equality of welfare that Dworkin has developed, one surrounding the indeterminacy of the concept of welfare and one surrounding the problem of expensive taste. It then explains what the phrase “expensive taste” means within the present debate. The remainder of the chapter discusses brute taste, that is, taste that is not guided by judgment; refutes the principal argument that Dworkin deploys against compensation for expensive judgmental taste; explains why the dispute about expensive taste matters; and offers a fragment of a taxonomy that distinguishes contrasting degrees of control that people display over the acquisition and the persistence of their tastes.
G. A. Cohen
Michael Otsuka (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148700
- eISBN:
- 9781400838660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter argues that libertarians misuse the concept of freedom. That is not, as it stands, a comment on the attractiveness of the institutions they severally favor, but on the rhetoric they use ...
More
This chapter argues that libertarians misuse the concept of freedom. That is not, as it stands, a comment on the attractiveness of the institutions they severally favor, but on the rhetoric they use to describe those institutions. If, however, they misdescribe those institutions, then a correct description of them might make them appear less attractive, and then the critique of the defensive rhetoric would indirectly be a critique of the institutions the rhetoric defends. The principal contention is that, while liberals and libertarians see the freedom which is intrinsic to capitalism, they overlook the unfreedom which necessarily accompanies capitalist freedom. To expose this failure of perception, the chapter begins by criticizing a description of the libertarian position provided by the libertarian philosopher Antony Flew in his Dictionary of Philosophy.Less
This chapter argues that libertarians misuse the concept of freedom. That is not, as it stands, a comment on the attractiveness of the institutions they severally favor, but on the rhetoric they use to describe those institutions. If, however, they misdescribe those institutions, then a correct description of them might make them appear less attractive, and then the critique of the defensive rhetoric would indirectly be a critique of the institutions the rhetoric defends. The principal contention is that, while liberals and libertarians see the freedom which is intrinsic to capitalism, they overlook the unfreedom which necessarily accompanies capitalist freedom. To expose this failure of perception, the chapter begins by criticizing a description of the libertarian position provided by the libertarian philosopher Antony Flew in his Dictionary of Philosophy.
G. A. Cohen
Michael Otsuka (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148700
- eISBN:
- 9781400838660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines answers to the question posed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called “Equality of What?” Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to ...
More
This chapter examines answers to the question posed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called “Equality of What?” Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect(s) of a person's condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental? The chapter also advances the Cohen's own answer to Sen's question. This answer is the product of an immanent critique of Ronald Dworkin, one that rejects Dworkin's declared position because it is not congruent with its own underlying motivation.Less
This chapter examines answers to the question posed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called “Equality of What?” Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect(s) of a person's condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental? The chapter also advances the Cohen's own answer to Sen's question. This answer is the product of an immanent critique of Ronald Dworkin, one that rejects Dworkin's declared position because it is not congruent with its own underlying motivation.
G. A. Cohen
Michael Otsuka (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148700
- eISBN:
- 9781400838660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter argues that is impossible to explain to anybody how philosophy is to be done. The only way to teach people how to do it is by letting them watch, and listen, and imitate. The least ...
More
This chapter argues that is impossible to explain to anybody how philosophy is to be done. The only way to teach people how to do it is by letting them watch, and listen, and imitate. The least charitable explanation of the self-same fact is that because those who have learned how to do philosophy struggled so hard to get where they are, they are selfishly reluctant to share some of the fruits of their struggle for free: they think that others, too, should suffer. There may be some truth in each explanation. But however all that may be, Cohen gives some tips about how to do philosophy. After giving these preliminary tips about how to do philosophy in general, he turns to some tips about political philosophy in particular.Less
This chapter argues that is impossible to explain to anybody how philosophy is to be done. The only way to teach people how to do it is by letting them watch, and listen, and imitate. The least charitable explanation of the self-same fact is that because those who have learned how to do philosophy struggled so hard to get where they are, they are selfishly reluctant to share some of the fruits of their struggle for free: they think that others, too, should suffer. There may be some truth in each explanation. But however all that may be, Cohen gives some tips about how to do philosophy. After giving these preliminary tips about how to do philosophy in general, he turns to some tips about political philosophy in particular.
Donald L. Donham
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520213371
- eISBN:
- 9780520920798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520213371.003.0003
- Subject:
- Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology
How is one to understand Marxism? At the outset, it should be emphasized that any answer has to be constructed not only from Karl Marx's works, but from those of his critics. The notion of structure ...
More
How is one to understand Marxism? At the outset, it should be emphasized that any answer has to be constructed not only from Karl Marx's works, but from those of his critics. The notion of structure is an indispensable aspect of Marx's social theory. The level of productive powers “determines” the Produktionsverhältnisse, so-called relations of production. Produktionsverhältnisse are “productive inequalities,” which are relationships among groups that place some in materially superordinate positions in relation to others. We are forced to the conclusion that Marx's own reproduction schemata for capitalism include what he called the Überbau or superstructure, and more generally it is precisely the superstructure which allows for and that explains the reproduction of productive inequalities. Building on G. A. Cohen's work, this chapter presents proper interpretations of the key terms of historical materialism, Marx's concepts of “forces of production,” “relations of production,” and “determination.” It also describes the work of Claude Meillassoux. Cohen's distinction between rights and powers remains fundamental for historical materialism.Less
How is one to understand Marxism? At the outset, it should be emphasized that any answer has to be constructed not only from Karl Marx's works, but from those of his critics. The notion of structure is an indispensable aspect of Marx's social theory. The level of productive powers “determines” the Produktionsverhältnisse, so-called relations of production. Produktionsverhältnisse are “productive inequalities,” which are relationships among groups that place some in materially superordinate positions in relation to others. We are forced to the conclusion that Marx's own reproduction schemata for capitalism include what he called the Überbau or superstructure, and more generally it is precisely the superstructure which allows for and that explains the reproduction of productive inequalities. Building on G. A. Cohen's work, this chapter presents proper interpretations of the key terms of historical materialism, Marx's concepts of “forces of production,” “relations of production,” and “determination.” It also describes the work of Claude Meillassoux. Cohen's distinction between rights and powers remains fundamental for historical materialism.
