Wayne A. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199261659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603099
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261652.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter begins an argument against the ‘Frege-Mill dichotomy’, the assumption that names have either a descriptive sense or no sense at all. Millian theories denying that names have a sense are ...
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This chapter begins an argument against the ‘Frege-Mill dichotomy’, the assumption that names have either a descriptive sense or no sense at all. Millian theories denying that names have a sense are considered, as well as Millian theories identifying sense with reference. Russell’s and Frege’s problems are the principal objections. Modal version of Millianism that identifies the meaning of a name with an intension or character function cannot avoid these problems without unrealistic existence and identity assumptions.Less
This chapter begins an argument against the ‘Frege-Mill dichotomy’, the assumption that names have either a descriptive sense or no sense at all. Millian theories denying that names have a sense are considered, as well as Millian theories identifying sense with reference. Russell’s and Frege’s problems are the principal objections. Modal version of Millianism that identifies the meaning of a name with an intension or character function cannot avoid these problems without unrealistic existence and identity assumptions.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199548774
- eISBN:
- 9780191721106
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
There are two closely related issues that a theory of intentional mental states and processes might reasonably be expected to address: Frege's problem and the problem of publicity. This chapter shows ...
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There are two closely related issues that a theory of intentional mental states and processes might reasonably be expected to address: Frege's problem and the problem of publicity. This chapter shows that that a LOT version of representational theory of mind (RTM) has the resources to cope with both of them. It presents a survey of the relevant geography as viewed from a LOT/RTM perspective.Less
There are two closely related issues that a theory of intentional mental states and processes might reasonably be expected to address: Frege's problem and the problem of publicity. This chapter shows that that a LOT version of representational theory of mind (RTM) has the resources to cope with both of them. It presents a survey of the relevant geography as viewed from a LOT/RTM perspective.
Wayne A. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199261659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603099
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261652.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on word reference, and shows that the meaning of an expression cannot be identified with its reference to things in the world, rather than its expression of ideas in the mind. It ...
More
This chapter focuses on word reference, and shows that the meaning of an expression cannot be identified with its reference to things in the world, rather than its expression of ideas in the mind. It looks at extensionalist versions of the referential theory that focus on objects in the actual world and sets thereof, as well as intensionalist versions that consider other possible worlds and/or properties and relations. It examines the Davidsonian theory, which used a Tarski-style axiomatization for languages to describe the compositionality of language. Truth-theoretic properties can be systematized in an ideational theory using a generative theory of thought, with phrase structure rules and Tarskian reference rules.Less
This chapter focuses on word reference, and shows that the meaning of an expression cannot be identified with its reference to things in the world, rather than its expression of ideas in the mind. It looks at extensionalist versions of the referential theory that focus on objects in the actual world and sets thereof, as well as intensionalist versions that consider other possible worlds and/or properties and relations. It examines the Davidsonian theory, which used a Tarski-style axiomatization for languages to describe the compositionality of language. Truth-theoretic properties can be systematized in an ideational theory using a generative theory of thought, with phrase structure rules and Tarskian reference rules.
