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The Puzzles: Informative Identity

Howard Wettstein

in The Magic Prism: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195160529
eISBN:
9780199835072
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195160525.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

“Cognitive significance” puzzles are especially problematic for anti-Fregean theories of reference, which, in particular, make it difficult to explain the informativeness of such identity sentences ... More


Talk About Natural Numbers

Thomas Hofweber

in Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780198769835
eISBN:
9780191822650
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769835.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

A puzzle about the different occurrences of number words in natural language, Frege’s other Puzzle, is presented and discussed in this chapter. It argues that popular attempts to sidestep the puzzle ... More


Referential Mechanics: Direct Reference and the Foundations of Semantics

Joseph Almog

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199314379
eISBN:
9780199349487
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199314379.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, General

The essay is focused on understanding a key new idea in modern semantics—direct reference—and its integration in a general semantics for natural language. In the first three chapters, three different ... More


Foundational Consequences: The Form of Semantics

Joseph Almog

in Referential Mechanics: Direct Reference and the Foundations of Semantics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199314379
eISBN:
9780199349487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199314379.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, General

The foundations of direct reference semantics are laid out. Two key puzzles pertaining to the fundamental notions are examined. The first puzzle, from Frege, concerns the notions of informativeness ... More


Millianism, Relationism, and Attitude Ascriptions

Ángel Pinillos

in On Reference

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780198714088
eISBN:
9780191782527
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714088.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter discusses Kit Fine’s Relationist solution to Frege’s puzzle concerning reference. Fine’s key insight is that versions of the puzzle that do not seem to involve coreference implicitly ... More


Perspectival reference

Ash Asudeh and Gianluca Giorgolo

in Enriched Meanings: Natural Language Semantics with Category Theory

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
November 2020
ISBN:
9780198847854
eISBN:
9780191882470
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198847854.003.0005
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics

This chapter is about substitutability of co-referential terms and argues that what is required is a general semantics of perspectives. It begins by reviewing the standard sort of puzzle, which ... More


Information and Content

Francesco Berto and Mark Jago

in Impossible Worlds

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198812791
eISBN:
9780191850585
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198812791.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter conceptualizes information in terms of ruling out scenarios. It discusses informative identity statements, which give rise to Frege’s puzzle, and the problem understanding how a valid ... More


Fine on Frege’s Puzzle

Gary Ostertag

in Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
November 2020
ISBN:
9780199652624
eISBN:
9780191889660
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199652624.003.0018
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The fact that (1) “Cicero = Tully” is informative whereas (2) “Cicero = Cicero” is not seems to resist explanation on traditional referentialist principles. According to Fine, the referentialist can ... More


Proper Names and Types of Reference Acts

Peter Hanks

in Propositional Content

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780199684892
eISBN:
9780191765179
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684892.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the concept of a semantic reference type and use it to give an account of the semantic contents of proper names. The resulting theory is neither Millian ... More


Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports

Cian Dorr

in Empty Representations

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199647057
eISBN:
9780191761041
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647057.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends the view that although the sentence ‘Superman is Clark Kent, but some people who believe that Superman flies do not believe that Clark Kent flies’ is logically inconsistent, we ... More


Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems about Saying What You Think Is False

Jessica Pepp

in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
November 2018
ISBN:
9780198743965
eISBN:
9780191866791
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying: the conflict of saying what you think is false. Traditionally, this is analyzed in terms of saying ... More


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