Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ...
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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.Less
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.
Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199268559
- eISBN:
- 9780191601415
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926855X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the ...
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Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.Less
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.
Stephen E. Lahey
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195183313
- eISBN:
- 9780199870349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183313.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
One of the most difficult elements of Wyclif’s thought is resolution of the tension between his deterministic understanding of the nature of the church and his call for ecclesiastical reform. ...
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One of the most difficult elements of Wyclif’s thought is resolution of the tension between his deterministic understanding of the nature of the church and his call for ecclesiastical reform. Augustine theology has long been defined by the problem of predestination, and Bradwardine had famously attacked the “Pelagianism” of the Ockhamists in his strongly deterministic De Causa Dei. Wyclif’s thought is an attempt at balancing Bradwardine’s determinism by a carefully articulated modal account of necessity, allowing for a stronger degree of reciprocity between God’s necessary understanding of creation and human free will than Bradwardine had allowed. This opened Wyclif’s conception of the church as the unknowable body of the Elect to the possibility of reform. While his writings are filled with references to Antichrist, Wyclif followed Augustine in rejecting millennialism, arguing that Antichrist’s threat in the form of papalism and friars was ongoing, but ultimately able to be resolved.Less
One of the most difficult elements of Wyclif’s thought is resolution of the tension between his deterministic understanding of the nature of the church and his call for ecclesiastical reform. Augustine theology has long been defined by the problem of predestination, and Bradwardine had famously attacked the “Pelagianism” of the Ockhamists in his strongly deterministic De Causa Dei. Wyclif’s thought is an attempt at balancing Bradwardine’s determinism by a carefully articulated modal account of necessity, allowing for a stronger degree of reciprocity between God’s necessary understanding of creation and human free will than Bradwardine had allowed. This opened Wyclif’s conception of the church as the unknowable body of the Elect to the possibility of reform. While his writings are filled with references to Antichrist, Wyclif followed Augustine in rejecting millennialism, arguing that Antichrist’s threat in the form of papalism and friars was ongoing, but ultimately able to be resolved.
Hugh J. McCann
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199590629
- eISBN:
- 9780191731280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued ...
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This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued that the three most common treatments of this kind are all unsatisfactory in that none of them provides sufficiently for God's omniscience and sovereignty. Boethian views preserve an omniscient God, but deprive him of any control over what exercises of creaturely freedom will occur. Openness theories deprive God of both omniscience and sovereignty. Finally, Molinist treatments largely fail to provide for either perfection, in that so‐called counterfactuals or subjunctives of freedom often lack grounding, and cannot be known by God prior to creation.Less
This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued that the three most common treatments of this kind are all unsatisfactory in that none of them provides sufficiently for God's omniscience and sovereignty. Boethian views preserve an omniscient God, but deprive him of any control over what exercises of creaturely freedom will occur. Openness theories deprive God of both omniscience and sovereignty. Finally, Molinist treatments largely fail to provide for either perfection, in that so‐called counterfactuals or subjunctives of freedom often lack grounding, and cannot be known by God prior to creation.
Christian Wüthrich
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577439
- eISBN:
- 9780191730603
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Is the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. ...
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Is the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. While results from classical physics are neither fully relevant nor conclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism beyond doubt. However, whether the quantum world is indeterministic crucially depends on how the measurement problem is solved. There are both deterministic and indeterministic contenders in this field, some of them empirically equivalent to another one. This is shown using the deterministic Bohm theory and Nelsonsion mechanics, which is indeterministic. Two arguments that purport to establish indeterminism and that rely on Gleason's theorem and on Conway and Kochen's recent Free Will Theorem are shown to be wanting.Less
Is the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. While results from classical physics are neither fully relevant nor conclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism beyond doubt. However, whether the quantum world is indeterministic crucially depends on how the measurement problem is solved. There are both deterministic and indeterministic contenders in this field, some of them empirically equivalent to another one. This is shown using the deterministic Bohm theory and Nelsonsion mechanics, which is indeterministic. Two arguments that purport to establish indeterminism and that rely on Gleason's theorem and on Conway and Kochen's recent Free Will Theorem are shown to be wanting.
Eddy Nahmias
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Nahmias shows how different parts of science raise distinct challenges from determinism, epiphenomenalism, naturalism, and rationality. In the end, he proposes a nuanced limited-free-will view ...
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Nahmias shows how different parts of science raise distinct challenges from determinism, epiphenomenalism, naturalism, and rationality. In the end, he proposes a nuanced limited-free-will view according to which we retain some free will but less than we usually think we have. Nahmias's claim that we retain even limited free will is questioned by Gunnar Björnsson and Derk Pereboom from the viewpoint of philosophy and then by Erman Misirlisoy and Patrick Haggard from the viewpoint of neuroscience. Nahmias replies by arguing that our ordinary understanding of free will does not require as much as his critics claim.Less
Nahmias shows how different parts of science raise distinct challenges from determinism, epiphenomenalism, naturalism, and rationality. In the end, he proposes a nuanced limited-free-will view according to which we retain some free will but less than we usually think we have. Nahmias's claim that we retain even limited free will is questioned by Gunnar Björnsson and Derk Pereboom from the viewpoint of philosophy and then by Erman Misirlisoy and Patrick Haggard from the viewpoint of neuroscience. Nahmias replies by arguing that our ordinary understanding of free will does not require as much as his critics claim.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions ...
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Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.Less
Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.
Victoria K. Lee and Lasana T. Harris
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Lee and Harris argue that people's overall positions on free will depend less on arguments and more on social rewards, so members of a coherent social group will end up holding similar positions on ...
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Lee and Harris argue that people's overall positions on free will depend less on arguments and more on social rewards, so members of a coherent social group will end up holding similar positions on free will and moral responsibility that conflict with positions held just as strongly by members of other social groups. They apply this point to academic disputes among scholars trained in different disciplines, especially philosophy, law, neuroscience, and psychology. Social psychologists Chapman and Cunningham largely agree and provide further support from accounts of complex decisionmaking, including moral decisionmaking. In contrast, Vargas, a philosopher, doubts that academic debates can be understood completely in terms of social “groupishness.” Lee and Harris reply by suggesting that many of the points made counter to their argument actually support their position.Less
Lee and Harris argue that people's overall positions on free will depend less on arguments and more on social rewards, so members of a coherent social group will end up holding similar positions on free will and moral responsibility that conflict with positions held just as strongly by members of other social groups. They apply this point to academic disputes among scholars trained in different disciplines, especially philosophy, law, neuroscience, and psychology. Social psychologists Chapman and Cunningham largely agree and provide further support from accounts of complex decisionmaking, including moral decisionmaking. In contrast, Vargas, a philosopher, doubts that academic debates can be understood completely in terms of social “groupishness.” Lee and Harris reply by suggesting that many of the points made counter to their argument actually support their position.
Roy F. Baumeister
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Baumeister discusses determinism and reductionism with emphases on self-regulation and conscious and meaningful causation of behavior. Baumeister concludes that freedom exists but can only be seen by ...
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Baumeister discusses determinism and reductionism with emphases on self-regulation and conscious and meaningful causation of behavior. Baumeister concludes that freedom exists but can only be seen by looking at the proper level of analysis. In their comments, Holton questions some of Baumeister's philosophical moves, and then Payne and Cameron suggest new psychological methods (centrally the process dissociation procedure) to better understand conscious intentions and their causal roles. Baumeister responds appreciatively but defends his claim that “rational choice deserves a role in a psychological theory of free will.”Less
Baumeister discusses determinism and reductionism with emphases on self-regulation and conscious and meaningful causation of behavior. Baumeister concludes that freedom exists but can only be seen by looking at the proper level of analysis. In their comments, Holton questions some of Baumeister's philosophical moves, and then Payne and Cameron suggest new psychological methods (centrally the process dissociation procedure) to better understand conscious intentions and their causal roles. Baumeister responds appreciatively but defends his claim that “rational choice deserves a role in a psychological theory of free will.”
Adina L. Roskies
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Roskies discusses an important method in neuroscience that is too often left out of free will debates: single-neuron recordings. Roskies explains classic experiments on perceptual decision making and ...
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Roskies discusses an important method in neuroscience that is too often left out of free will debates: single-neuron recordings. Roskies explains classic experiments on perceptual decision making and asks whether brain processes are stochastic, but she ends up siding with compatibilism over libertarianism. In their comments, Kane defends his brand of libertarianism against Roskies's compatibilism, and Shadlen proposes further lessons from his work on perceptual decision making. In her reply, Roskies defends her compatibilism as well as her interpretation of the science.Less
Roskies discusses an important method in neuroscience that is too often left out of free will debates: single-neuron recordings. Roskies explains classic experiments on perceptual decision making and asks whether brain processes are stochastic, but she ends up siding with compatibilism over libertarianism. In their comments, Kane defends his brand of libertarianism against Roskies's compatibilism, and Shadlen proposes further lessons from his work on perceptual decision making. In her reply, Roskies defends her compatibilism as well as her interpretation of the science.
Gavin Rae
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474445320
- eISBN:
- 9781474465205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445320.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Early Christian attempts to resolve the problem of evil initially led to a turn away from the ‘soft’ metaphysical dualism of Christianity to the ‘hard’ dualism of Manicheism. This, however, led to a ...
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Early Christian attempts to resolve the problem of evil initially led to a turn away from the ‘soft’ metaphysical dualism of Christianity to the ‘hard’ dualism of Manicheism. This, however, led to a resurgence in Christian attempts to incorporate the problem of evil within a monotheistic framework, the most important of these, both historically and conceptually, was Augustine’s. This chapter focuses on his insistence that ‘evil’ entails a privation of being and is a choice of individual free will. Two problems are, however, identified with this formulation: first, by claiming that ‘evil’ entails a privation, it seems to disavow the reality of evil, and, second, it is not clear that making individuals responsible for ‘evil’ is compatible with the Christian claim that God is omnipotent.Less
Early Christian attempts to resolve the problem of evil initially led to a turn away from the ‘soft’ metaphysical dualism of Christianity to the ‘hard’ dualism of Manicheism. This, however, led to a resurgence in Christian attempts to incorporate the problem of evil within a monotheistic framework, the most important of these, both historically and conceptually, was Augustine’s. This chapter focuses on his insistence that ‘evil’ entails a privation of being and is a choice of individual free will. Two problems are, however, identified with this formulation: first, by claiming that ‘evil’ entails a privation, it seems to disavow the reality of evil, and, second, it is not clear that making individuals responsible for ‘evil’ is compatible with the Christian claim that God is omnipotent.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This collection of original essays, comments, and replies brings together philosophers and scientists to discuss the relevance of recent neuroscience and psychology to traditional debates about free ...
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This collection of original essays, comments, and replies brings together philosophers and scientists to discuss the relevance of recent neuroscience and psychology to traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility. These prominent authors clearly show that free will and moral responsibility raise many issues that need to be distinguished, and none of them can be addressed adequately without both philosophy and science. Various chapters concern whether free will requires rationality, whether responsibility is fundamentally social, whether the origins of actions in the brain depend on stochastic processes, whether mental states can cause bodily movements, whether free will requires dualism, whether control is enough by itself for responsibility, whether addicts and monkeys have free will, and how social groups shape people's views on free will and moral responsibility. These lively exchanges among well-known experts are a model of fruitful interdisciplinary exchange. This collection will be useful in undergraduate and graduate classes and will interest anyone who is intellectually curious.Less
This collection of original essays, comments, and replies brings together philosophers and scientists to discuss the relevance of recent neuroscience and psychology to traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility. These prominent authors clearly show that free will and moral responsibility raise many issues that need to be distinguished, and none of them can be addressed adequately without both philosophy and science. Various chapters concern whether free will requires rationality, whether responsibility is fundamentally social, whether the origins of actions in the brain depend on stochastic processes, whether mental states can cause bodily movements, whether free will requires dualism, whether control is enough by itself for responsibility, whether addicts and monkeys have free will, and how social groups shape people's views on free will and moral responsibility. These lively exchanges among well-known experts are a model of fruitful interdisciplinary exchange. This collection will be useful in undergraduate and graduate classes and will interest anyone who is intellectually curious.
Herman Philipse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697533
- eISBN:
- 9780191738470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Six C-inductive arguments for and against the existence of God are critically discussed in this chapter: the Argument from Consciousness, the Argument from Moral Truth, the Argument from Moral ...
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Six C-inductive arguments for and against the existence of God are critically discussed in this chapter: the Argument from Consciousness, the Argument from Moral Truth, the Argument from Moral Awareness, the Argument from Providence, the Argument from Evil, and the Argument from Hiddenness. The first four are either not correct C-inductive arguments for the existence of God because the relevance condition is not satisfied, or not good C-inductive arguments for the existence of God because the evidence has not been established. However, both the many prima facie pointless evils in the world, and the fact of God’s hiddenness, provide strong C-inductive arguments against God’s existence, in spite of the various defences put forward by Richard Swinburne.Less
Six C-inductive arguments for and against the existence of God are critically discussed in this chapter: the Argument from Consciousness, the Argument from Moral Truth, the Argument from Moral Awareness, the Argument from Providence, the Argument from Evil, and the Argument from Hiddenness. The first four are either not correct C-inductive arguments for the existence of God because the relevance condition is not satisfied, or not good C-inductive arguments for the existence of God because the evidence has not been established. However, both the many prima facie pointless evils in the world, and the fact of God’s hiddenness, provide strong C-inductive arguments against God’s existence, in spite of the various defences put forward by Richard Swinburne.
Han-luen Kantzer Komline
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190948801
- eISBN:
- 9780190948832
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190948801.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Chapter 1 introduces Augustine’s earliest conception of will, synthesizing his comments in a number of his key anti-Manichean works as well as in two of his early classics, Soliloquies and On Free ...
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Chapter 1 introduces Augustine’s earliest conception of will, synthesizing his comments in a number of his key anti-Manichean works as well as in two of his early classics, Soliloquies and On Free Will. Augustine’s conception of will in these texts is already both theological and biblically informed, though not in quite the same way as it will be in more mature periods. Augustine elaborates his understanding of will in these early works in light of, and in support of, general principles emerging from scripture as a whole—creation, God’s justice, the analogy between divine and creaturely being as expressed, for example, in the doctrine of the imago dei—whereas later he will rely to a greater extent on specific biblical pericopes. The resulting portrait of will accords it enormous importance, power, and potential for goodness. To speak in Augustine’s own terms, the will is a hinge (cardo) upon which the moral status of each act and the possibility of attaining fellowship with God depend.Less
Chapter 1 introduces Augustine’s earliest conception of will, synthesizing his comments in a number of his key anti-Manichean works as well as in two of his early classics, Soliloquies and On Free Will. Augustine’s conception of will in these texts is already both theological and biblically informed, though not in quite the same way as it will be in more mature periods. Augustine elaborates his understanding of will in these early works in light of, and in support of, general principles emerging from scripture as a whole—creation, God’s justice, the analogy between divine and creaturely being as expressed, for example, in the doctrine of the imago dei—whereas later he will rely to a greater extent on specific biblical pericopes. The resulting portrait of will accords it enormous importance, power, and potential for goodness. To speak in Augustine’s own terms, the will is a hinge (cardo) upon which the moral status of each act and the possibility of attaining fellowship with God depend.
Jenann Ismael
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199696499
- eISBN:
- 9780191744983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter addresses the worry that the existence of causal antecedents to your choices means that you are causally compelled to act as you do. It begins with the folk notion of cause, leads the ...
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This chapter addresses the worry that the existence of causal antecedents to your choices means that you are causally compelled to act as you do. It begins with the folk notion of cause, leads the reader through recent developments in the scientific understanding of causal concepts, and argues that those developments undermine the threat from causal antecedents. The discussion is then used as a model for a kind of naturalistic metaphysics that takes its lead from science, letting everyday concepts be shaped and transformed by scientific developments.Less
This chapter addresses the worry that the existence of causal antecedents to your choices means that you are causally compelled to act as you do. It begins with the folk notion of cause, leads the reader through recent developments in the scientific understanding of causal concepts, and argues that those developments undermine the threat from causal antecedents. The discussion is then used as a model for a kind of naturalistic metaphysics that takes its lead from science, letting everyday concepts be shaped and transformed by scientific developments.
Kadri Vihvelin
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199795185
- eISBN:
- 9780199345250
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199795185.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book rescues compatibilists from the familiar charge of “quagmire of evasion” by arguing that the problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem with a metaphysical solution. ...
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This book rescues compatibilists from the familiar charge of “quagmire of evasion” by arguing that the problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem with a metaphysical solution. There is no good reason to think that determinism would rob us of the free will we think we have.Less
This book rescues compatibilists from the familiar charge of “quagmire of evasion” by arguing that the problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem with a metaphysical solution. There is no good reason to think that determinism would rob us of the free will we think we have.
Anne C. Dailey
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300188837
- eISBN:
- 9780300190083
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300188837.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter addresses the widespread misconception that psychoanalytic ideas about the unconscious are incompatible with the law’s presumption of free will. Free will is a foundational concept in ...
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This chapter addresses the widespread misconception that psychoanalytic ideas about the unconscious are incompatible with the law’s presumption of free will. Free will is a foundational concept in the law. We take it as a necessary postulate of our legal system that most individuals make conscious decisions about how to behave and, consequently, can and should be held accountable for their actions. Yet psychoanalytic ideas about the influence of the unconscious on waking life would seem to render successful collaboration between law and psychoanalysis impossible, for how can a person exercise free will while subject to the unavoidable and unrelenting control of the unconscious? But as this chapter shows, this conclusion is simply wrong. Using a case involving a woman prosecuted for drug trafficking despite having been ignorant of the drugs in her car, this chapter explains why the conflict thesis does not accurately reflect psychoanalytic ideas about the unconscious. The thesis rests upon three misguided assumptions: that the psychoanalytic unconscious is deterministic, irrational, and opaque to understanding. Properly understood, a psychoanalytic perspective on the unconscious leads us toward a more realistic, less harshly punitive, and more just criminal jurisprudence.Less
This chapter addresses the widespread misconception that psychoanalytic ideas about the unconscious are incompatible with the law’s presumption of free will. Free will is a foundational concept in the law. We take it as a necessary postulate of our legal system that most individuals make conscious decisions about how to behave and, consequently, can and should be held accountable for their actions. Yet psychoanalytic ideas about the influence of the unconscious on waking life would seem to render successful collaboration between law and psychoanalysis impossible, for how can a person exercise free will while subject to the unavoidable and unrelenting control of the unconscious? But as this chapter shows, this conclusion is simply wrong. Using a case involving a woman prosecuted for drug trafficking despite having been ignorant of the drugs in her car, this chapter explains why the conflict thesis does not accurately reflect psychoanalytic ideas about the unconscious. The thesis rests upon three misguided assumptions: that the psychoanalytic unconscious is deterministic, irrational, and opaque to understanding. Properly understood, a psychoanalytic perspective on the unconscious leads us toward a more realistic, less harshly punitive, and more just criminal jurisprudence.
Timothy D. Peters
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- May 2022
- ISBN:
- 9781474424004
- eISBN:
- 9781399509435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474424004.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This Chapter continues the consideration of law and science fiction by analysing the central theme of George Nolfi’s 2011 film The Adjustment Bureau (based on Philip K Dick’s short story): a ...
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This Chapter continues the consideration of law and science fiction by analysing the central theme of George Nolfi’s 2011 film The Adjustment Bureau (based on Philip K Dick’s short story): a theological consideration of freedom and free will. In contrast to the modern dismissal of religion, the film is overtly theological in nature with the God-figure (‘the Chairman’) intervening in the world through his angels (bureaucrats) so as to ensure adherence to his providential order (‘the plan’). The Chapter traces the theological and jurisprudential roots of ‘the Chairman’, following John Milbank, to shifts in medieval theology from a participatory to nominalist and voluntarist ontology that became influential on the later jurisprudence and political theology of Thomas Hobbes. However, The Adjustment Bureau critiques the modern theology of will which undergirds both modern secular sovereignty and the liberal legal subject, by introducing the theme of ‘true love conquers all’, opening up a different consideration of law and sovereignty based on love and relationality, as opposed to legal individualism. The Chapter therefore extends the book’s consideration of a love beyond the law, by presenting a theological jurisprudence that opens the possibility of a relation to law based on love rather than will.Less
This Chapter continues the consideration of law and science fiction by analysing the central theme of George Nolfi’s 2011 film The Adjustment Bureau (based on Philip K Dick’s short story): a theological consideration of freedom and free will. In contrast to the modern dismissal of religion, the film is overtly theological in nature with the God-figure (‘the Chairman’) intervening in the world through his angels (bureaucrats) so as to ensure adherence to his providential order (‘the plan’). The Chapter traces the theological and jurisprudential roots of ‘the Chairman’, following John Milbank, to shifts in medieval theology from a participatory to nominalist and voluntarist ontology that became influential on the later jurisprudence and political theology of Thomas Hobbes. However, The Adjustment Bureau critiques the modern theology of will which undergirds both modern secular sovereignty and the liberal legal subject, by introducing the theme of ‘true love conquers all’, opening up a different consideration of law and sovereignty based on love and relationality, as opposed to legal individualism. The Chapter therefore extends the book’s consideration of a love beyond the law, by presenting a theological jurisprudence that opens the possibility of a relation to law based on love rather than will.
John-Dylan Haynes
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Haynes summarizes his scientific research on the neural basis for intentions (including predictions of intentions) and suggests implications for epiphenomenalism, which implies that our mental ...
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Haynes summarizes his scientific research on the neural basis for intentions (including predictions of intentions) and suggests implications for epiphenomenalism, which implies that our mental intentions, choices, and will cannot really cause our bodily movements. In their comments, Bayne and Schroeder express doubts about whether Haynes's experiments really show as much as Haynes claims. Haynes replies by admitting some limitations but arguing further that the ability of neuroscientists to decode intentions and predict actions raises serious problems for traditional views of free will and moral responsibility.Less
Haynes summarizes his scientific research on the neural basis for intentions (including predictions of intentions) and suggests implications for epiphenomenalism, which implies that our mental intentions, choices, and will cannot really cause our bodily movements. In their comments, Bayne and Schroeder express doubts about whether Haynes's experiments really show as much as Haynes claims. Haynes replies by admitting some limitations but arguing further that the ability of neuroscientists to decode intentions and predict actions raises serious problems for traditional views of free will and moral responsibility.
James P. Sterba
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806967
- eISBN:
- 9780191844461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that ...
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This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it could be defended in terms of the freedom that it provides, or has provided, to its members. It takes no stand on whether the problem could be solved by arguing that the securing of some other good, or goods in an afterlife is the justification for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. This paper simply attempts to demonstrate the need for just such further work by showing that the freedom that exists, or has existed, in our world could not constitute a justification for the moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it.Less
This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it could be defended in terms of the freedom that it provides, or has provided, to its members. It takes no stand on whether the problem could be solved by arguing that the securing of some other good, or goods in an afterlife is the justification for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. This paper simply attempts to demonstrate the need for just such further work by showing that the freedom that exists, or has existed, in our world could not constitute a justification for the moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it.