Hugh J. McCann
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199590629
- eISBN:
- 9780191731280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued ...
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This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued that the three most common treatments of this kind are all unsatisfactory in that none of them provides sufficiently for God's omniscience and sovereignty. Boethian views preserve an omniscient God, but deprive him of any control over what exercises of creaturely freedom will occur. Openness theories deprive God of both omniscience and sovereignty. Finally, Molinist treatments largely fail to provide for either perfection, in that so‐called counterfactuals or subjunctives of freedom often lack grounding, and cannot be known by God prior to creation.Less
This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued that the three most common treatments of this kind are all unsatisfactory in that none of them provides sufficiently for God's omniscience and sovereignty. Boethian views preserve an omniscient God, but deprive him of any control over what exercises of creaturely freedom will occur. Openness theories deprive God of both omniscience and sovereignty. Finally, Molinist treatments largely fail to provide for either perfection, in that so‐called counterfactuals or subjunctives of freedom often lack grounding, and cannot be known by God prior to creation.
James P. Sterba
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806967
- eISBN:
- 9780191844461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that ...
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This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it could be defended in terms of the freedom that it provides, or has provided, to its members. It takes no stand on whether the problem could be solved by arguing that the securing of some other good, or goods in an afterlife is the justification for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. This paper simply attempts to demonstrate the need for just such further work by showing that the freedom that exists, or has existed, in our world could not constitute a justification for the moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it.Less
This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it could be defended in terms of the freedom that it provides, or has provided, to its members. It takes no stand on whether the problem could be solved by arguing that the securing of some other good, or goods in an afterlife is the justification for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. This paper simply attempts to demonstrate the need for just such further work by showing that the freedom that exists, or has existed, in our world could not constitute a justification for the moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on ...
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This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.Less
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by ...
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This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true). Because these fall-based theodicies conceive of humanity as having fallen at some point in history from a much more advanced state, they face a number of plausibility challenges rooted in modern science and theological tradition. Moreover and more decisively, these theodicies are implausible due to their overestimation of the extent to which finite human agents can bear primary responsibility for evils that are horrendous. The conclusion drawn is that the most influential contemporary theodicies fail either ethically or otherwise.Less
This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true). Because these fall-based theodicies conceive of humanity as having fallen at some point in history from a much more advanced state, they face a number of plausibility challenges rooted in modern science and theological tradition. Moreover and more decisively, these theodicies are implausible due to their overestimation of the extent to which finite human agents can bear primary responsibility for evils that are horrendous. The conclusion drawn is that the most influential contemporary theodicies fail either ethically or otherwise.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to ...
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Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies theodicies that depict God as permitting horrendous evil for pure benefit, risking horrendous evil for pure benefit, and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of greater harm. Each theodicy is summarized and an evaluation is made as to whether it is structurally promising with respect to horrendous evils, where structural promise denotes that God is ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true. The conclusion drawn is that the theodicies depicting God as permitting horrendous evils for pure benefit are structurally deficient; they do not depict God as ethically perfect even if they are true. Structural promise is identified in theodicies that depict God as risking horrendous evil for pure benefit and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of harm. In the next chapter the plausibility of these structurally promising approaches is considered.Less
Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies theodicies that depict God as permitting horrendous evil for pure benefit, risking horrendous evil for pure benefit, and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of greater harm. Each theodicy is summarized and an evaluation is made as to whether it is structurally promising with respect to horrendous evils, where structural promise denotes that God is ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true. The conclusion drawn is that the theodicies depicting God as permitting horrendous evils for pure benefit are structurally deficient; they do not depict God as ethically perfect even if they are true. Structural promise is identified in theodicies that depict God as risking horrendous evil for pure benefit and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of harm. In the next chapter the plausibility of these structurally promising approaches is considered.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible ...
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This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.Less
This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.
