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This chapter briefly introduces the multiple intelligences theory, with an apology to Professor Howard Gardner for its brevity. Professor Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences was described in his groundbreaking, provocative, life-affirming, life-altering books: Frames of Mind, and Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice. Professor Gardner identified seven intelligences in his 1993 book and added an eighth intelligence in 1995. Many urban and rural students across the country are either failing the standardized tests or devoting most of their school day and time to passing these tests. In New York City, students are left back by the thousands, often two or more times, because they fail to meet the standards. This shows that not only are they failing to narrow the achievement gap, but in their obsession with these standardized tests, covering only linguistic skills and logical-mathematical skills, they are grossly overlooking, neglecting, and even abandoning most of the other intelligences.

There is an interesting dialectic between discussions of bodily awareness in the phenomenological tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind and scientific psychology. It shows, with particular reference to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, how phenomenological insights into bodily awareness and its role in agency can be developed and illuminated by research into somatic proprioception and motor control. The paper presents a taxonomy of different types and levels of bodily awareness and presents a model of the spatiality of bodily awareness that explains some of the fundamental differences that Merleau-Ponty identified between our experience of our bodies and our experience of non-bodily objects. The key to these differences is that bodily locations are given on a non-Cartesian frame of reference. The final section shows how this way of thinking about the phenomenology of bodily awareness has interesting and fruitful connections with current thinking about motor control.

In the last 20 years, a robust experimental paradigm has emerged for studying the structure of bodily experience, focusing primarily on what it is to experience one’s body as one’s own. The initial impetus came from the rubber hand illusion (RHI) first demonstrated by Botvinick and Cohen, subsequently extended by various researchers to generate illusions of ownership at the level of the body as a whole. This paper identifies some problems with how ownership is discussed in the context of bodily illusions, and then shows how those problems can be addressed through a model of the experienced space of the body. Section 1 briefly reviews the bodily illusions literature and its significance for cognitive science and philosophy. Section 2 expresses reservations with the concept of ownership in terms of which the RHI and other illusions are standardly framed. I offer three hypotheses for the source of our putative “sense of ownership”. The main body of the paper focuses on the third hypothesis, which is that judgments of ownership are grounded in the distinctive way that we experience the space of the body.

This chapter situates the Africa campaign tradition within broader media representations of Africa. The chapter argues that a key distinction between Africa campaigning and media reportage is the way each form of representation frames African state sovereignty: notably that sovereignty is not a strong concern in campaigning. The chapter finishes with a reflection on campaign prospects. The argument here is that campaigns need more than ever to reconcile themselves to communicating with a British public that is highly differentiated and also exposed to varied imagery of Africa. Basing itself on a key campaign report, Finding Frames, the chapter argues that appeals to a mass public will always been extremely limited in their ambition, and therefore campaigning should be based on more ‘niche’ and pluralised constituencies.

The chapter considers events and processes in Britain during the recession years. It looks at the Conservative Party (as well as the exigencies of coalition politics) and the fortunes of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the different core constituencies to which the right was tied, economic logics and the character of the institutional structures within which British policymaking was undertaken. In particular, the chapter surveys two ideational shifts. First, the Conservative leadership committed itself to radical and sustained fiscal retrenchment. This was however rationalized on largely pragmatic grounds. Then, second, it reframed retrenchment so that it became an explicit commitment to shrink and restructure the British state thereby reconfiguring its relationship with both the economy and civil society.

In the months following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, filmmaking itself looked to be an endangered art form. Some Iranian filmmakers left the country; Abbas Kiarostami stayed—though for a time he was not making films. He turned to photography and produced a distinguished body of landscape representation. Then he returned to filmmaking, working far from Tehran in the Iranian countryside and in a low-key, but powerful and passionate way distinct from his more urban pre-revolutionary work. This public interview (at Bard College) with Kiarostami focuses on his experimental film Five (2003), a film originally made for an event in honor of Japanese filmmaker Yasujirō Ozu. Five is made up of five very minimal scenes, filmed at the edge of the Caspian Sea: scenes of a quiet surf, of several dogs hanging out on the beach, of a gaggle of geese and ducks, of men walking on a boardwalk, and, in the longest scene, a full moon reflected in the water. Five now seems a premonition of the final film Kiarostami finished before his death in 2016, 24 Frames (2018).