Barry Riley
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190228873
- eISBN:
- 9780190228903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190228873.003.0021
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
This chapter describes the many changes legislated for American food aid as, first, American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) succeeded in receiving expanded legislative authority to use food aid ...
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This chapter describes the many changes legislated for American food aid as, first, American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) succeeded in receiving expanded legislative authority to use food aid for development objectives; second, “food security” became the primary objective of all forms of American food aid; and, third, Title III, Section 416(b) and Title I dwindled into non-availability. The remaining forms (Title II, Food for Progress, and Food for Education) seemed primed to focus on development objectives linked to improving food security. Unfortunately, the combination of budget stringencies, the increasing cost of food, the unwillingness of Congress to “untie” food purchases from domestic American sources, and a rapid increase in emergency relief needs conspired to greatly reduce the amount of food available to NGO and WFP development programs.Less
This chapter describes the many changes legislated for American food aid as, first, American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) succeeded in receiving expanded legislative authority to use food aid for development objectives; second, “food security” became the primary objective of all forms of American food aid; and, third, Title III, Section 416(b) and Title I dwindled into non-availability. The remaining forms (Title II, Food for Progress, and Food for Education) seemed primed to focus on development objectives linked to improving food security. Unfortunately, the combination of budget stringencies, the increasing cost of food, the unwillingness of Congress to “untie” food purchases from domestic American sources, and a rapid increase in emergency relief needs conspired to greatly reduce the amount of food available to NGO and WFP development programs.
Barry Riley
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190228873
- eISBN:
- 9780190228903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190228873.003.0018
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
By the time Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977, American food aid had declined from 40 percent of U.S. agricultural exports in 1963 to less than 5 percent. Noted Harvard economic historian ...
More
By the time Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977, American food aid had declined from 40 percent of U.S. agricultural exports in 1963 to less than 5 percent. Noted Harvard economic historian Emma Rothschild was arguing in the New York Times that the time had come to end it, as it no longer promoted any significant American interests. Carter had different views and sought, with the aid of Senator Humphrey, to make it a tool for enhancing human rights in recipient countries and improving its effectiveness in combatting hunger. Title III was reformulated to reward governments willing to engage seriously in improving the economic prospects of their poorest citizens. The attempt would eventually fail. Ronald Reagan was more interested in utilizing the private sector in developing countries to promote economic development, and introduced a new Food for Progress program managed by USDA to promote private-sector-focused agricultural growth.Less
By the time Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977, American food aid had declined from 40 percent of U.S. agricultural exports in 1963 to less than 5 percent. Noted Harvard economic historian Emma Rothschild was arguing in the New York Times that the time had come to end it, as it no longer promoted any significant American interests. Carter had different views and sought, with the aid of Senator Humphrey, to make it a tool for enhancing human rights in recipient countries and improving its effectiveness in combatting hunger. Title III was reformulated to reward governments willing to engage seriously in improving the economic prospects of their poorest citizens. The attempt would eventually fail. Ronald Reagan was more interested in utilizing the private sector in developing countries to promote economic development, and introduced a new Food for Progress program managed by USDA to promote private-sector-focused agricultural growth.