Harold A. Feiveson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027748
- eISBN:
- 9780262319188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027748.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
To cap nuclear arsenals and make nuclear weapon reductions irreversible, it will be necessary to end the production of unsafeguarded highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. To achieve this ...
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To cap nuclear arsenals and make nuclear weapon reductions irreversible, it will be necessary to end the production of unsafeguarded highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. To achieve this goal, in 1993, the UN General Assembly instructed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This chapter explores the possible scope and verification challenges for an FMCT. These challenges include monitoring of operating and shutdown enrichment and reprocessing plants and ruling out potential clandestine production including at military nuclear facilities and in naval nuclear fuel programs in the nuclear weapon states. The latter two goals will pose some additional challenges beyond those of verifying the Non-proliferation Treaty in non-weapon states. Many non-weapon states also would like to see the nuclear weapon states place their pre-existing stocks of civilian and excess weapons material under international safeguards.Less
To cap nuclear arsenals and make nuclear weapon reductions irreversible, it will be necessary to end the production of unsafeguarded highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. To achieve this goal, in 1993, the UN General Assembly instructed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This chapter explores the possible scope and verification challenges for an FMCT. These challenges include monitoring of operating and shutdown enrichment and reprocessing plants and ruling out potential clandestine production including at military nuclear facilities and in naval nuclear fuel programs in the nuclear weapon states. The latter two goals will pose some additional challenges beyond those of verifying the Non-proliferation Treaty in non-weapon states. Many non-weapon states also would like to see the nuclear weapon states place their pre-existing stocks of civilian and excess weapons material under international safeguards.
Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank N. von Hippel
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027748
- eISBN:
- 9780262319188
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027748.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
The global stockpile, continued production and use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium – the fissile materials that are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons – facilitates proliferation, ...
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The global stockpile, continued production and use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium – the fissile materials that are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons – facilitates proliferation, increases the risk of nuclear terrorism and is an obstacle to achieving irreversible nuclear disarmament. The book begins by explaining how these materials are used in nuclear weapons, and describes the histories of fissile material production for weapons starting with the United States and including in historical order the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa. It also provides an overview of the current global stockpile of roughly 1900 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium – together sufficient for more than 100,000 nuclear weapons – by current or intended use in weapons and reactor fuel. The book then discusses the dangers associated with plutonium separation (reprocessing) and uranium enrichment, which put countries a short step away from nuclear weapons, and it offers a basis for policy initiatives to end the separation of plutonium in civilian nuclear power programs, and the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in research reactors and naval reactors. In its final section, the book assesses the technical and policy issues associated with negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons and options for the safe and irreversible disposal of current stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.Less
The global stockpile, continued production and use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium – the fissile materials that are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons – facilitates proliferation, increases the risk of nuclear terrorism and is an obstacle to achieving irreversible nuclear disarmament. The book begins by explaining how these materials are used in nuclear weapons, and describes the histories of fissile material production for weapons starting with the United States and including in historical order the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa. It also provides an overview of the current global stockpile of roughly 1900 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium – together sufficient for more than 100,000 nuclear weapons – by current or intended use in weapons and reactor fuel. The book then discusses the dangers associated with plutonium separation (reprocessing) and uranium enrichment, which put countries a short step away from nuclear weapons, and it offers a basis for policy initiatives to end the separation of plutonium in civilian nuclear power programs, and the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in research reactors and naval reactors. In its final section, the book assesses the technical and policy issues associated with negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons and options for the safe and irreversible disposal of current stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
