Carsten Daugbjerg and Alan Swinbank
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199557752
- eISBN:
- 9780191721922
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557752.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Chapter 6 moves from the global to the EU level to analyse the way in which the ideational shift of the global farm trade regime has influenced the development of EU agricultural policy institutions ...
More
Chapter 6 moves from the global to the EU level to analyse the way in which the ideational shift of the global farm trade regime has influenced the development of EU agricultural policy institutions and the CAP. It demonstrates that the changed global context, emerging in the early 1990s, increasingly influenced CAP decision-making institutions that, in turn, affected the design of agricultural support measures. The MacSharry reform of 1992 changed the architecture of the CAP, switching from market price support to direct payments; and the Fischler reforms of 2003/04 resulted in a further decoupling of farm support.Less
Chapter 6 moves from the global to the EU level to analyse the way in which the ideational shift of the global farm trade regime has influenced the development of EU agricultural policy institutions and the CAP. It demonstrates that the changed global context, emerging in the early 1990s, increasingly influenced CAP decision-making institutions that, in turn, affected the design of agricultural support measures. The MacSharry reform of 1992 changed the architecture of the CAP, switching from market price support to direct payments; and the Fischler reforms of 2003/04 resulted in a further decoupling of farm support.
Carsten Daugbjerg and Alan Swinbank
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199557752
- eISBN:
- 9780191721922
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557752.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Chapter 7 shows how CAP reform, whilst driven by WTO concerns, feeds back into the WTO negotiations, setting limits to what can be agreed, but also providing enhanced opportunities for agreement. ...
More
Chapter 7 shows how CAP reform, whilst driven by WTO concerns, feeds back into the WTO negotiations, setting limits to what can be agreed, but also providing enhanced opportunities for agreement. From being defensive within the ‘old’ GATT, attempting to limit the damage that an agricultural agreement could cause to the CAP, the EU became more offensive in its relationship with the WTO. The EU's initial negotiating offer on agriculture in the Uruguay Round was very limited, reflecting its defence of the CAP, but the breakdown of the negotiations in December 1990 convinced EU decision-makers that the CAP had to change, allowing the EU and the United States to agree the Blair House accord. In the run-up to the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) the EU tried to establish multifunctionality as one of its non-trade concerns, but without success. In the Doha Round, it was much better placed to mount an offensive negotiation because the Fischler reforms had switched blue box payments into the green box.Less
Chapter 7 shows how CAP reform, whilst driven by WTO concerns, feeds back into the WTO negotiations, setting limits to what can be agreed, but also providing enhanced opportunities for agreement. From being defensive within the ‘old’ GATT, attempting to limit the damage that an agricultural agreement could cause to the CAP, the EU became more offensive in its relationship with the WTO. The EU's initial negotiating offer on agriculture in the Uruguay Round was very limited, reflecting its defence of the CAP, but the breakdown of the negotiations in December 1990 convinced EU decision-makers that the CAP had to change, allowing the EU and the United States to agree the Blair House accord. In the run-up to the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) the EU tried to establish multifunctionality as one of its non-trade concerns, but without success. In the Doha Round, it was much better placed to mount an offensive negotiation because the Fischler reforms had switched blue box payments into the green box.
