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This chapter examines three Supreme Court cases involving teacher loyalty oaths—from Florida, Washington, and Arizona—that set the stage for Keyishian v. Board of Regents. Before discussing how Keyishian essentially led to the demise of statewide anti-subversive programs, the chapter considers the “Feinberg certificate,” which required employees to acknowledge that they had read New York's rules implementing the Feinberg Law and that these rules were terms of their employment. The Feinberg certificate required employees to deny that they were members of the Communist Party or, if they ever had been, to state that they had disclosed this fact to the president of the State University of New York. The chapter also looks at the Supreme Court case Baggett v. Bullitt, which challenges Washington State's two loyalty oaths and concludes with an analysis of Keyishian and its ramifications for academic freedom.

This chapter examines the New York Teachers Union's (TU) legal challenge to the Feinberg Law and the law's implications for academic freedom. The Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions in the 1930s and 1940s emboldened the TU in its fight against the Feinberg Law and filed suit in Brooklyn, with union president Abe Lederman as the lead plaintiff. Two other lawsuits were filed in Albany, one by the Communist Party and the other by state senator Fred Morritt on behalf of four teachers, a principal, and a former member of the New York City Board of Education. This chapter considers the early legal victories of the TU and other opponents of the Feinberg Law, with particular emphasis on the decisions of Judges Harry Schirick and Murray Hearn temporarily stopping the New York State Board of Regents from implementing the law. It also discusses the New York City Board of Education's attack on the TU and various teachers whom it accused of insubordination and “conduct unbecoming.”

This chapter examines three Supreme Court cases involving teacher loyalty oaths—from Florida, Washington, and Arizona—that set the stage for Keyishian v. Board of Regents. Before discussing how Keyishian essentially led to the demise of statewide anti-subversive programs, the chapter considers the “Feinberg certificate,” which required employees to acknowledge that they had read New York's rules implementing the Feinberg Law and that these rules were terms of their employment. The Feinberg certificate required employees to deny that they were members of the Communist Party or, if they ever had been, to state that they had disclosed this fact to the president of the State University of New York. The chapter also looks at the Supreme Court case Baggett v. Bullitt, which challenges Washington State's two loyalty oaths and concludes with an analysis of Keyishian and its ramifications for academic freedom.

This chapter focuses on the New York Teachers Union (TU) and its battles with the New York City Board of Education over the Feinberg Law during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1946, New York City Mayor William O'Dwyer filled a slot on the Board of Education with the appointment of George Timone, who would go on to spearhead the anti-communist purge throughout the city. This chapter looks at the case of the University of Washington to highlight the issue of academic freedom, in particular whether long-tenured, outstanding professors should be fired simply for being communists. It also examines the TU's opposition to the Feinberg Law and concludes by analyzing Supreme Court decisions in First Amendment cases in the 1940s, including United States v. Lovett.

This chapter focuses on the New York Teachers Union (TU) and its battles with the New York City Board of Education over the Feinberg Law during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1946, New York City Mayor William O'Dwyer filled a slot on the Board of Education with the appointment of George Timone, who would go on to spearhead the anti-communist purge throughout the city. This chapter looks at the case of the University of Washington to highlight the issue of academic freedom, in particular whether long-tenured, outstanding professors should be fired simply for being communists. It also examines the TU's opposition to the Feinberg Law and concludes by analyzing Supreme Court decisions in First Amendment cases in the 1940s, including United States v. Lovett.

This chapter examines events that set the stage for the Supreme Court decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents invalidating New York State's Feinberg Law. It begins by discussing Arizona's perjury law and Barbara Elfbrandt's political and religious objections to it, along with the Supreme Court decision in the case that came to be known as Elfbrandt v. Russell. It then considers Richard Lipsitz's efforts to make Keyishian look as different as possible from Adler v. Board of Education, which had upheld the Feinberg Law. It also analyzes the Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions in Keyishian as well as the reactions to the decision. Finally, it assesses the impact of Keyishian on academic freedom as a part of the First Amendment.

This chapter examines the New York Teachers Union's (TU) legal challenge to the Feinberg Law and the law's implications for academic freedom. The Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions in the 1930s and 1940s emboldened the TU in its fight against the Feinberg Law and filed suit in Brooklyn, with union president Abe Lederman as the lead plaintiff. Two other lawsuits were filed in Albany, one by the Communist Party and the other by state senator Fred Morritt on behalf of four teachers, a principal, and a former member of the New York City Board of Education. This chapter considers the early legal victories of the TU and other opponents of the Feinberg Law, with particular emphasis on the decisions of Judges Harry Schirick and Murray Hearn temporarily stopping the New York State Board of Regents from implementing the law. It also discusses the New York City Board of Education's attack on the TU and various teachers whom it accused of insubordination and “conduct unbecoming.”

This book examines the political, cultural, and legal events that gave rise to academic freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment. Focusing on the inquisitions of New York professors and teachers during the twentieth century, it discusses the loyalty purges at schools and universities during the worst years of the Red Scare and the landmark Supreme Court decisions in two cases that revolved around the Feinberg Law: Adler v. Board of Education and Keyishian v. Board of Regents. It argues that we must defend the First Amendment principle of academic freedom as a limit on what administrators of public institutions and other government officials can do to their teachers and students.

This book examines the political, cultural, and legal events that gave rise to academic freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment. Focusing on the inquisitions of New York professors and teachers during the twentieth century, it discusses the loyalty purges at schools and universities during the worst years of the Red Scare and the landmark Supreme Court decisions in two cases that revolved around the Feinberg Law: Adler v. Board of Education and Keyishian v. Board of Regents. It argues that we must defend the First Amendment principle of academic freedom as a limit on what administrators of public institutions and other government officials can do to their teachers and students.

This chapter examines events that set the stage for the Supreme Court decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents invalidating New York State's Feinberg Law. It begins by discussing Arizona's perjury law and Barbara Elfbrandt's political and religious objections to it, along with the Supreme Court decision in the case that came to be known as Elfbrandt v. Russell. It then considers Richard Lipsitz's efforts to make Keyishian look as different as possible from Adler v. Board of Education, which had upheld the Feinberg Law. It also analyzes the Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions in Keyishian as well as the reactions to the decision. Finally, it assesses the impact of Keyishian on academic freedom as a part of the First Amendment.

This chapter focuses on the Cold War-era Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Fred Vinson. The early Vinson Court ruled in 1948 that the Constitution prohibits courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants—private agreements not to sell property to African Americans. Two years later, it struck down racial segregation in graduate schools and in railroad dining cars, paving the way for Brown v. Board of Education. However, the Vinson Court upheld the Feinberg Law and—with a few minor exceptions—rejected all constitutional challenges to loyalty programs, blacklists, and anti-communist legislative investigations across the nation. This chapter examines some of the cases related to the new loyalty apparatus that were taken up by the Vinson Court, including Dennis v. United States and those involving Dorothy Bailey, Irving Adler, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and section 9(h) of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.

This chapter focuses on the Cold War-era Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Fred Vinson. The early Vinson Court ruled in 1948 that the Constitution prohibits courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants—private agreements not to sell property to African Americans. Two years later, it struck down racial segregation in graduate schools and in railroad dining cars, paving the way for Brown v. Board of Education. However, the Vinson Court upheld the Feinberg Law and—with a few minor exceptions—rejected all constitutional challenges to loyalty programs, blacklists, and anti-communist legislative investigations across the nation. This chapter examines some of the cases related to the new loyalty apparatus that were taken up by the Vinson Court, including Dennis v. United States and those involving Dorothy Bailey, Irving Adler, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and section 9(h) of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.

This chapter examines how academic freedom is linked to the “living Constitution” debate even as the words “academic freedom” do not appear anywhere in the text of the U.S. Constitution. It first considers the notion that “academic freedom” should be treated as an “implied” First Amendment right by looking at the actual text of the First Amendment. It then discusses the debate over whether the Constitution is a living document by citing the right of privacy as implied in modern constitutional law. It also revisits the first mention of the phrase “academic freedom” in a Supreme Court case, Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York (1952), which upheld New York's “Feinberg Law.” Finally, it explores the Supreme Court's unwillingness to formally recognize academic freedom as a distinct right due inpart to an egalitarian, anti-elitist impulse in constitutional law.

This chapter examines how academic freedom is linked to the “living Constitution” debate even as the words “academic freedom” do not appear anywhere in the text of the U.S. Constitution. It first considers the notion that “academic freedom” should be treated as an “implied” First Amendment right by looking at the actual text of the First Amendment. It then discusses the debate over whether the Constitution is a living document by citing the right of privacy as implied in modern constitutional law. It also revisits the first mention of the phrase “academic freedom” in a Supreme Court case, Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York (1952), which upheld New York's “Feinberg Law.” Finally, it explores the Supreme Court's unwillingness to formally recognize academic freedom as a distinct right due inpart to an egalitarian, anti-elitist impulse in constitutional law.

This chapter focuses on the later adventures of some of the major players in the story that began with legal challenges to New York's Feinberg Law and anti-communist purges and ended with the Supreme Court invalidating the law in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. Following Keyishian, New York City teachers who had been fired in the 1950s began to seek compensation for actions now recognized as not only politically but legally unjust. Among them were Vera Shlakman, Frederic Ewen, Oscar Shaftel, and Dudley Straus, whose academic careers were “stopped in their tracks” because of their dismissal. A new round of petitions and lawsuits were initiated, arguing that teachers fired for insubordination and conduct unbecoming, for alleged membership in the Communist Party, or for invoking the Fifth Amendment should be reinstated or, if already at retirement age, granted pension rights. By 1958, the purge at the New York City Board of Education was winding down. Harry Gideonse resigned in 1966 as president of Brooklyn College.

This chapter focuses on the later adventures of some of the major players in the story that began with legal challenges to New York's Feinberg Law and anti-communist purges and ended with the Supreme Court invalidating the law in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. Following Keyishian, New York City teachers who had been fired in the 1950s began to seek compensation for actions now recognized as not only politically but legally unjust. Among them were Vera Shlakman, Frederic Ewen, Oscar Shaftel, and Dudley Straus, whose academic careers were “stopped in their tracks” because of their dismissal. A new round of petitions and lawsuits were initiated, arguing that teachers fired for insubordination and conduct unbecoming, for alleged membership in the Communist Party, or for invoking the Fifth Amendment should be reinstated or, if already at retirement age, granted pension rights. By 1958, the purge at the New York City Board of Education was winding down. Harry Gideonse resigned in 1966 as president of Brooklyn College.