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Looking at the disruptions of industrialization and urbanization that occurred during the late 19th century, the development of the modern American state during this period has been described by Stephen Skowronek as the result of a process of “patchwork” and “reconstitution”. This chapter focuses on federalism, an often ignored aspect of the American institution, and looks at how it played a critical role during the end of the late 19th century to the early decades of the 20th century in the development of American state. The political and institutional order that developed due to federalism is termed by this chapter as the “First New Federalism”.

The aim of this book is described as to search for answers as to why the US Constitution was adopted. Like most other studies of this topic, it focusses on the Federalist argument, although it also takes the Antifederalist opposition into account. However, the conclusions reached deviate sharply from the mainstream interpretation of the Federalist persuasion in that the study aims to challenge the Madisonian interpretation of Federalism in two ways: it goes beyond the interpretation of The Federalist Papers of 1787–88 and James Madison's pre‐Convention writings to analyze a much broader sample of Federalist and Antifederalist writings; and based on this broader reading, it provides a new interpretation of what the Constitution and the Federalist argument were about. The major finding presented is that the Federalist argument was not a protoliberal call for minority rights and limited government but an argument about state formation or state building. The first two sections of the introduction discuss Madison's thoughts and writings on the Federalist dilemma, and the problems of the traditionalist interpretation of the Federalist position; the last two sections give an outline of the structure of the book and describe its intended audience.

The first two sections of this chapter discuss the two main approaches to the analysis of the ratification debate over the US Constitution. Until the late 1960s, the predominant interpretation described the debate over ratification as a conflict between “aristocratic” and “democratic” ideals and interests, but at about that time, scholars began to shift to a second approach that used the terms “liberalism” and “classical republicanism” to account for ideological differences during the revolutionary era; this shift was also accompanied by a change in the interpreters’ concerns away from social struggle toward the study of the development of political ideas. The argument presented here is that the terminology so far favored by historians and political scientists has obscured important aspects of the ideological differences between the Federalists and their opponents because it has drawn attention away from the actual issues debated during the ratification struggle. This claim can be supported in different ways, but the approach used here is to look closely at what prominent interpreters say about the limits of their own interpretation, even though this it risks being unfair to the perspectives reviewed. The last two sections of the chapter present an approach that promises better to capture the essence of the ideological disagreement between the Federalists and the Antifederalists as presented in the debate over ratification, and suggest that the debate is best seen as neither about democracy nor about liberalism, but about state formation.

In order to interpret the debate over the ratification of the US Constitution as a debate over state formation, it is necessary to know something both about the development of the European state in the early modern period and about the ideological response that this development generated. The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide a historical sociology of state building. The first three sections discuss the development of the British state after the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89 (the deposition of James II and the accession of William III and Mary II to the English throne), concentrating on Britain not because it was by far the most common point of reference in the ratification debate, but rather because no other government was nearly as successful as the British when it came to raising taxes and mobilizing resources and men. The emphasis on discussion of Britain is not meant to imply that the Constitution was adopted in order to introduce a British “fiscal‐military state” in America, but rather to demonstrate that there were certain limits to the expansion of the central government in the USA that did not apply in Britain. Precisely for this reason, the state created by the Federalists was very different from the contemporary British state, and the last two sections of the chapter address the basis of these differences.

It would be a fundamental mistake to assume a priori a complete correspondence between the historical sociology of state formation and the conceptual history of the “state,” or, in more general terms, between institutional and intellectual development, and between political reality and political rhetoric. Equally, it would be a mistake to assume that there is no relation whatsoever, and it would have been remarkable if the great expansion of the fiscal and military capacity of central government in Britain in the early modern period had gone unnoticed by contemporaries, so as to leave no mark on historical, political, and social reflection. Shows that the European process of state formation had indeed influenced political commentary in giving rise to arguments analyzing and criticizing the growth of the state, and that these arguments found their way across the Atlantic from Britain to the American colonies in the form of “Country” thought, which gave rise to a complete vocabulary with which to respond to the growth of the British fiscal‐military state in the Anglo‐American world of political discourse. In fact, Antifederalism can be described as an expression of Country thought, although it cannot at the same time be claimed that Federalism was a repetition of the contrasting central Court defense of state expansion.

Chapter 5 and the corresponding Ch. 10 in Part Three of the book provide background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, the background is given to the conflict between the Federalists and the Antifederalists over the military clauses of the US Constitution, a conflict that is analyzed in Chs 6–8 (the debate over the fiscal clauses is analyzed in Part Three of the book). It is argued that two principles frustrated the ability of the Confederation Congress to provide the union with the military capacity it needed to function: first, the sovereignty of the states; and, second, the strong aversion in the American political tradition to a peacetime standing army. In the end, these principles led Congress to become passive in foreign affairs. Ends with an attempt to locate the Federalist demand for an improved military capacity of the national state not in the context of militarism, but in the context of the promotion of commerce.

Chapter 6 and the corresponding Ch. 11 in Part Three of the book provide the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks more closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the U S Constitution, here the concern is only with the proposals for amendments to the Constitution that Antifederalists suggested, or that Federalists suggested as concessions to Antifederalist objections; the purpose of the chapter is to address the question of why the Federalists refused to accept limits to the army clauses of the Constitution. When the first Congress presented the states with the proposal for what would become the Bill of Rights, this contained a guarantee against the disarmament of the people, as well as a specification of what was involved in Congress's power to govern state militias; it also contained a restriction on the right of the national government to quarter troops in private houses. The first ten amendments, however, made no attempt to restrict the right of the national government to raise an army, and not because of oversight, since neither James Madison, nor anyone else present at the first Congress, could have been unaware of the strong reservations that Antifederalists had expressed against the unlimited power to raise and maintain armies that the Constitution vested in Congress. This power was central to the national state that the Federalists attempted to form, and in the debate over ratification they made clear why no limits could be placed on Congress's power of military mobilization.

Chapter 7 and the corresponding Ch. 12 in Part Three of the book present the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the US Constitution. The opponents of the Constitution never accepted the Federalist claim that the independence, liberty, and prosperity of the American republic depended on the creation and maintenance of a peace establishment consisting of regular troops, and did not believe that the union faced as serious threats as the Federalists claimed, keeping to the view that standing armies in time of peace were a threat to liberty. Both ancient and modern history had taught that “almost all” nations in Europe and Asia had lost their liberty because of the establishment of a standing army, so it hardly made sense for Americans to imitate them. To Antifederalists, it seemed that if the military clauses of the Constitution were adopted and the Federalists realized their plan to raise a standing army, the people of America would soon find that the Constitution's supporters would make use of it on the domestic rather than the international scene. The Antifederalist criticism of the army clauses therefore said little about commercial treaties and the importance of military strength in international relations; instead, they approached the issue from the traditional British Country perspective, claiming that standing armies in time of peace posed a threat to liberty, that transfer of military power from the states to Congress threatened both the state militia and the state assemblies, and that a standing army would make it possible for the national government to deprive people of their property without their consent by levying and collecting arbitrary taxes – in other words, a standing army in a time of peace was to the Antifederalists an objection to the centralization of power at the expense of the people's ability to withhold consent through their control of strong local institutions.

Chapter 8 and the corresponding Ch. 13 in Part Three of the book show how the Federalists responded to the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, thereby creating an understanding of the kind of state that was proper to American conditions. In their defense of the military clauses of the US Constitution, the Federalists argued for the need to maintain a peace establishment of regulars, also arguing that the national government had to possess an unrestricted power over mobilization; in Federalist minds, both military professionalism and the unlimited power over mobilization were necessary to preserve the independence, liberties, and interests of the American nation. The Antifederalists, by contrast, raised objections to the right of Congress to create and maintain a standing army in time of peace, and were also concerned about the unrestricted nature of Congress's military powers. Their objections can be subsumed under three headings: first, they believed that the new system of government would change the administration of the laws from an administration based on the consent of the governed to an administration based on coercion or the threat of force; second, they believed that the national government would create a large army while neglecting the state militia, so that as a consequence, the national government would become independent of the people and be able to establish tyrannical rule; and third, the critics of the Constitution believed that Congress had been granted too much power to interfere in the private lives of the citizens through its command over the militia. In the debate over ratification, the Federalists answered these objections, and in doing so, they argued that it was possible to create a strong state without abandoning traditional Anglo‐American ideals about free government; their answers are the subject of this chapter.

Chapter 9 and the corresponding Ch. 14 in Part Three of the book offer brief sketches of the institutionalization of the military and fiscal powers granted by the US Constitution, and of the uses made of them by the Federalists in the 1790s. Gives a historical account of the uses made by the national government during that period of the military powers that it was granted by the Constitution. Aims to make a judgment on the political achievement of the Federalists that hinges on the extent to which they managed to translate their principles into action when they transformed the articles of the Constitution into the policies and institutions of the new national government. Part of the discussion also addresses the fact that during the quarter century following the First US Congress, the USA had to respond repeatedly to events originating in Europe far beyond the federal government's control, and overall, drew advantage from the warfare that engulfed Britain, France, and Spain. It is noted that is not easy to answer the question of whether the federal government had any part in making this possible, but a cautious answer based on works of diplomatic history is that the reform of the federal government did make a difference to the actions of European governments.

Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, an account is given of the efforts of Congress to implement the fiscal clauses of the US Constitution, which shows that the national government created by the Articles of Confederation experienced serious difficulties in its ability to raise money, and in the end failed to raise sufficient money to meet its expenses. The focus of the chapter is on the means by which Congress raised money from the outbreak of the War of Independence up to the Philadelphia Convention, and also on how, one by one, these means were lost, so that by 1787 the insolvency of the national government was total. The first two parts of the chapter describe the attempts of Congress to raise money through fiat (printed) money, loans, and taxes, with the author contending that the Federalists accepted existing restrictions to taxation and formed a tax system that would be able to generate sufficient income for the national government without putting undue pressure on the American people. The last section of the chapter looks at the problem of the public debts run up by Congress and the states during the War of Independence, and at the reasons for the federal assumption of state debts – whether they were democratic or economic – and the reasons given by the Federalists as to why Congress had to resume payment of the public domestic and foreign debt.

Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks in greater depth at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, here the concern is solely with the restrictions to this power that they suggested in the form of amendments. The reasons are discussed as to why the Federalists refused to accept these Antifederalist amendments (and indeed any restrictions on the fiscal power of Congress other than those already written into the Constitution), repeatedly and forcefully making it clear why it was crucial that no restrictions be placed on the right of Congress to extract money from society by means of taxation. The different sections of the chapter argue that the need for an unbridled federal right to raise tax revenue arose from the conviction that Congress had to have full command over all the resources of the nation in times of crisis. Primarily, this was needed so that the government could borrow money abroad and at home, which suggests that the Federalists designed the Constitution as much for future challenges as for present problems, and that for this reason, they refused to let the powers of the national government be defined by the demands on the union existing in the late 1780s, but instead strove to create a government with powers sufficiently extensive to safeguard the union's future existence, in peace as well as in war.

Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, and the answers of the Federalists to these. Only rarely did the Antifederalists raise any objections to the right of Congress to borrow money, but the fact that they seemed to accept that public borrowing might sometimes be necessary did not mean that they accepted the need for an unlimited federal power over taxation. In their opposition to the Constitution's tax clauses, the Antifederalists continued an Anglo‐American political tradition of opposition against state growth that in turn is but an instant of a universal resistance to the centralization of power characteristic of early modern Europe. The Antifederalist opposition centered on the future role of the state legislatures: in Antifederalist thought the state assembly had come to take on the function filled by the House of Commons in English “Country” thought, so it was regarded as a crucial barrier against government abuse and as the only institution that made possible taxation with the consent of the governed.

Shows how the Federalists responded to the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, thereby creating an understanding of the kind of state that was proper to American conditions. In the debate over ratification of the US Constitution there was little discussion about the exact way in which the Federalists intended to organize the revenue administration, but nevertheless, it is the argument of this chapter that with the important exception of the assumption of the state debts, the general outline of Hamiltonian public finance was in place in 1787, and widely shared by the supporters of the Constitution. Thus, the idea that the least oppressive tax was also the most productive, the claim that adoption of the Constitution would mean a change in the structure of taxation from direct to indirect taxes and a reliance on the impost (customs duties), and the ideal of the federal government as a “waterfront state” hardly noticed by the people, were all among the most important points made in Federalist rhetoric on the fiscal powers of the Constitution. In the ratifying debate, the Federalists presented a solution to the equation of how to create a sufficiently powerful government without making unacceptable demands on society: the federal government had the right to mobilize the full resources of society at will, but in peacetime it would keep a very low profile while assuming the payment of the union's debts and the cost of defense using money raised by taxation. This federal assumption of expenses that had earlier been carried by the states, and the mode of raising the taxes to pay for it ensured that overall taxation would not increase, as the Antifederalists claimed, but would become less burdensome to the majority of the people.

Offers brief sketches of the institutionalization of the military and fiscal powers granted by the US Constitution, and of the uses made of them by the Federalists in the 1790s. Gives an outline of the fiscal and financial policy of the Federalists, thereby assessing Alexander Hamilton's claim to have restored public credit while reducing the tax pressure on the citizens. Also looks at the fate of the Federalist program after the Federalists had lost power to the Jeffersonian Republicans.

The conclusion ends the book with an explication of the Federalists’ idea of an American national state.

It starts by pointing out that the ratification of the US Constitution did not mean the end of politics, nor the end of the debate about the future course of the American republic, for now the Federalists faced the next step of state building: creating the institutions of government that would realize their ideas about a national state in America. The mainstream interpretation of the Federalist argument presents it as a call for limited government and protection of minority rights, but this study has offered a different interpretation. It sees the Federalist argument as an attempt to convince the American public about the need to build a powerful state and to explain how this state would work – the idea of an American national state that the Federalists developed during the ratification debate was the result of creative thinking in the face of serious challenges. This conclusion is devoted to an explication of both the challenge that the Federalists faced and the concept of the state they developed, but the basic issue may be summed up as follows: what the Federalists had to do, and what they did, in the debate over ratification, was to develop a conceptual framework that made it possible to accommodate the creation of a powerful national government to the strong anti‐statist current in the American political tradition.

This chapter explores the history of the American consciousness in search of what manifestations of the problems of the republican perspective may be found there. It follows the discussion in the eighteenth-century debate of the previous chapter, and then turns to the debates on virtue and corruption, as well as an apocalyptic dimension to Machiavellism. The fact that the apocalyptic discourse was still an available recourse illustrates how far American thought and speech still belonged to the Renaissance tradition studied earlier in this volume. The chapter then turns to the debates regarding the Federalist theory as well as the end of the Machiavellian moment in America—that is, the end of the quarrel with history in its distinctively American form.