Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Sets out Kurt Gödel's slingshot (collapsing) argument. The original argument—or, at least, the premisses of the argument that Neale attributes to Gödel—can be found in a fleeting footnote to a ...
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Sets out Kurt Gödel's slingshot (collapsing) argument. The original argument—or, at least, the premisses of the argument that Neale attributes to Gödel—can be found in a fleeting footnote to a discussion of the relationship between Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions and Theory of Facts. Usually each theory is viewed as quite independent of the other, but Gödel argues otherwise: that the viability of the latter depends upon the viability of the former (or at least upon the viability of some non‐referential theory of descriptions). Neale summarizes Gödel's standpoint as follows: ‘if a true sentence stands for a fact, then in order to avoid the collapse of all facts into one, the friend of facts must give up either (a) an intuitive and straightforward Fregean Principle of Composition or (b) the idea that definite descriptions are expressions that purport to stand for things.’ The sections of the chapter are: Elimination (linguistic and ontological); Facts and Descriptions; Identities in the Matrix; and The Eleatic One (the collapse of all facts into one).Less
Sets out Kurt Gödel's slingshot (collapsing) argument. The original argument—or, at least, the premisses of the argument that Neale attributes to Gödel—can be found in a fleeting footnote to a discussion of the relationship between Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions and Theory of Facts. Usually each theory is viewed as quite independent of the other, but Gödel argues otherwise: that the viability of the latter depends upon the viability of the former (or at least upon the viability of some non‐referential theory of descriptions). Neale summarizes Gödel's standpoint as follows: ‘if a true sentence stands for a fact, then in order to avoid the collapse of all facts into one, the friend of facts must give up either (a) an intuitive and straightforward Fregean Principle of Composition or (b) the idea that definite descriptions are expressions that purport to stand for things.’ The sections of the chapter are: Elimination (linguistic and ontological); Facts and Descriptions; Identities in the Matrix; and The Eleatic One (the collapse of all facts into one).
Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Examines the work of Bertrand Russell. It looks at Russell's idea that true sentences stand for facts (rather than truth‐values) and the philosophical and formal details of his Theory of Facts (the ...
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Examines the work of Bertrand Russell. It looks at Russell's idea that true sentences stand for facts (rather than truth‐values) and the philosophical and formal details of his Theory of Facts (the theory of facts as complexes) and Theory of Descriptions, both of which Neale describes as being poorly understood to this day. The six sections of the chapter are: Facts and their Parts; Representing Russellian Facts; The Theory of Descriptions; Abbreviation; Scope; Quantification and Notation. An appendix to the book looks further at Russell's definition of descriptions as incomplete symbols.Less
Examines the work of Bertrand Russell. It looks at Russell's idea that true sentences stand for facts (rather than truth‐values) and the philosophical and formal details of his Theory of Facts (the theory of facts as complexes) and Theory of Descriptions, both of which Neale describes as being poorly understood to this day. The six sections of the chapter are: Facts and their Parts; Representing Russellian Facts; The Theory of Descriptions; Abbreviation; Scope; Quantification and Notation. An appendix to the book looks further at Russell's definition of descriptions as incomplete symbols.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories ...
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Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Against facts examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, distinguished as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. Compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument are criticized in part I. Propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what Against facts calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on a Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment, are criticized in part II. Against facts argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.Less
Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Against facts examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, distinguished as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. Compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument are criticized in part I. Propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what Against facts calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on a Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment, are criticized in part II. Against facts argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.
Donna T. Andrew and Randall McGowen
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220621
- eISBN:
- 9780520923706
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220621.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter describes Mrs. Rudd's writings of her life. It notes that Mrs. Rudd wrote the first version of her life, her “Case”, just after her arrest in February. It adds that after the brothers' ...
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This chapter describes Mrs. Rudd's writings of her life. It notes that Mrs. Rudd wrote the first version of her life, her “Case”, just after her arrest in February. It adds that after the brothers' trial and her remand to Newgate she wrote another version, published this time as a pamphlet, “Facts”. It observes that a number of themes appeared repeatedly in her publications noting that the most prominent among the themes was the discussion she offered of her “two families”. It describes the two families where one family consisted of the aristocratic connections she claimed for herself, which played the largest role in constituting her own identity; the other was the family she had created with Daniel and their three children including the other Perreaus.Less
This chapter describes Mrs. Rudd's writings of her life. It notes that Mrs. Rudd wrote the first version of her life, her “Case”, just after her arrest in February. It adds that after the brothers' trial and her remand to Newgate she wrote another version, published this time as a pamphlet, “Facts”. It observes that a number of themes appeared repeatedly in her publications noting that the most prominent among the themes was the discussion she offered of her “two families”. It describes the two families where one family consisted of the aristocratic connections she claimed for herself, which played the largest role in constituting her own identity; the other was the family she had created with Daniel and their three children including the other Perreaus.
Jason Turner
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- April 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199682812
- eISBN:
- 9780191817267
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682812.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book develops and defends in detail a factalist ontological picture, according to which reality’s ultimate constituents are structureless atomic facts. The existence (or appearances as) of ...
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This book develops and defends in detail a factalist ontological picture, according to which reality’s ultimate constituents are structureless atomic facts. The existence (or appearances as) of non-facts are ultimately grounded in a system of quasi-geometric relations that the facts participate in. Axioms for this quasi-geometric system are given, and a representation theorem is proven. It establishes that if the facts satisfy the axioms, then they have a unique (up to isomorphism) ‘object-and-property’ representation: each fact can be thought of as though it were made up of individuals and properties (or relations), even though it is not. The metaphysical picture also makes room for an attractive combinatorial modal theory, according to which possibilities are simply collections of (possible) facts.Less
This book develops and defends in detail a factalist ontological picture, according to which reality’s ultimate constituents are structureless atomic facts. The existence (or appearances as) of non-facts are ultimately grounded in a system of quasi-geometric relations that the facts participate in. Axioms for this quasi-geometric system are given, and a representation theorem is proven. It establishes that if the facts satisfy the axioms, then they have a unique (up to isomorphism) ‘object-and-property’ representation: each fact can be thought of as though it were made up of individuals and properties (or relations), even though it is not. The metaphysical picture also makes room for an attractive combinatorial modal theory, according to which possibilities are simply collections of (possible) facts.
Paul W. Kahn
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780300212082
- eISBN:
- 9780300220841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300212082.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter argues that the most important facts in the opinion are not those established by a trial court as it builds the record. Rather, the important facts are constitutive of the context or ...
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This chapter argues that the most important facts in the opinion are not those established by a trial court as it builds the record. Rather, the important facts are constitutive of the context or horizon from within which the relevant law is to be seen. A case often involves a conflict over the appropriate context. For example, do we see abortion against the horizon of infanticide or that of reproductive freedom? The work of establishing a horizon is often done through the use of analogies–a dominant form of legal argument.
Less
This chapter argues that the most important facts in the opinion are not those established by a trial court as it builds the record. Rather, the important facts are constitutive of the context or horizon from within which the relevant law is to be seen. A case often involves a conflict over the appropriate context. For example, do we see abortion against the horizon of infanticide or that of reproductive freedom? The work of establishing a horizon is often done through the use of analogies–a dominant form of legal argument.
Krister Dylan Knapp
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781469631240
- eISBN:
- 9781469631264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469631240.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
Chapter four examines James's role as an investigator of physical mediums purporting to levitate tables and materialize ghostly forms of the deceased, and recounts the instances when he revealed ...
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Chapter four examines James's role as an investigator of physical mediums purporting to levitate tables and materialize ghostly forms of the deceased, and recounts the instances when he revealed several of them to be frauds including the notorious Eusapia Palladino.Less
Chapter four examines James's role as an investigator of physical mediums purporting to levitate tables and materialize ghostly forms of the deceased, and recounts the instances when he revealed several of them to be frauds including the notorious Eusapia Palladino.
Paul W. Kahn
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780300212082
- eISBN:
- 9780300220841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300212082.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter argues that the most important facts in the opinion are not those established by a trial court as it builds the record. Rather, the important facts are constitutive of the context or ...
More
This chapter argues that the most important facts in the opinion are not those established by a trial court as it builds the record. Rather, the important facts are constitutive of the context or horizon from within which the relevant law is to be seen. A case often involves a conflict over the appropriate context. For example, do we see abortion against the horizon of infanticide or that of reproductive freedom? The work of establishing a horizon is often done through the use of analogies–a dominant form of legal argument.Less
This chapter argues that the most important facts in the opinion are not those established by a trial court as it builds the record. Rather, the important facts are constitutive of the context or horizon from within which the relevant law is to be seen. A case often involves a conflict over the appropriate context. For example, do we see abortion against the horizon of infanticide or that of reproductive freedom? The work of establishing a horizon is often done through the use of analogies–a dominant form of legal argument.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804769129
- eISBN:
- 9780804777810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804769129.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory of “communicative action” and sets it within a concept of society he calls “lifeworld.” In both his Theory of Communicative ...
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In his Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory of “communicative action” and sets it within a concept of society he calls “lifeworld.” In both his Theory of Communicative Action and later in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas describes the “lifeworld” as the basic conception of society, to be amended or supplemented only for cause. In addition, Habermas argues that in the course of social evolution, systems of economic and political action arise whereby action is coordinated by the consequences of self-interested action, rather than consensual understanding. This chapter explores Habermas's idea of such “systems” based on his reading of Talcott Parsons. It also examines how Habermas integrates the lifeworld and system concepts into his model of system/lifeworld interchange. It argues that the critical model developed by Habermas in Theory of Communicative Action is more functionalist than straightforwardly normative.Less
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory of “communicative action” and sets it within a concept of society he calls “lifeworld.” In both his Theory of Communicative Action and later in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas describes the “lifeworld” as the basic conception of society, to be amended or supplemented only for cause. In addition, Habermas argues that in the course of social evolution, systems of economic and political action arise whereby action is coordinated by the consequences of self-interested action, rather than consensual understanding. This chapter explores Habermas's idea of such “systems” based on his reading of Talcott Parsons. It also examines how Habermas integrates the lifeworld and system concepts into his model of system/lifeworld interchange. It argues that the critical model developed by Habermas in Theory of Communicative Action is more functionalist than straightforwardly normative.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804769129
- eISBN:
- 9780804777810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804769129.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Following the publication of his Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas has joined the growing discussion about the role of religion in public political discourse. This endeavor was prompted in ...
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Following the publication of his Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas has joined the growing discussion about the role of religion in public political discourse. This endeavor was prompted in part by his 1995 debate with John Rawls, whose 1993 book Political Liberalism sparked controversy. Habermas has also sought to come to terms with multiculturalism and has explored the possibilities of democracy in the so-called “postnational constellation,” focusing his attention on the integration project of the European Union. His discussion of the postnational constellation extends to a reformulation of Immanuel Kant's program of “perpetual peace.” This chapter examines each of these extensions of Habermas's project, first by looking at Rawls's political liberalism and the views of Robert Audi, Paul Weithman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. It then tackles Habermas's arguments about multiculturalism and constitutional patriotism before concluding with an analysis of democracy, postnational constellation, nation-states, and the constitutionalization of international law.Less
Following the publication of his Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas has joined the growing discussion about the role of religion in public political discourse. This endeavor was prompted in part by his 1995 debate with John Rawls, whose 1993 book Political Liberalism sparked controversy. Habermas has also sought to come to terms with multiculturalism and has explored the possibilities of democracy in the so-called “postnational constellation,” focusing his attention on the integration project of the European Union. His discussion of the postnational constellation extends to a reformulation of Immanuel Kant's program of “perpetual peace.” This chapter examines each of these extensions of Habermas's project, first by looking at Rawls's political liberalism and the views of Robert Audi, Paul Weithman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. It then tackles Habermas's arguments about multiculturalism and constitutional patriotism before concluding with an analysis of democracy, postnational constellation, nation-states, and the constitutionalization of international law.
Henry G. Gole
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780813141763
- eISBN:
- 9780813142418
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813141763.003.0020
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Chapter Twenty follows the publishing of Smith's autobiography, The Facts of Life, a list of some of his major pieces of writing, and a number of the vacations and cruises the Smith's took in their ...
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Chapter Twenty follows the publishing of Smith's autobiography, The Facts of Life, a list of some of his major pieces of writing, and a number of the vacations and cruises the Smith's took in their later years. It also covers Smith's last trip to Germany shortly before the assassination of President Kennedy. Numerous letters and the names of Smith's correspondents are showcased, including Clare Boothe Luce and Herbert Hoover.Less
Chapter Twenty follows the publishing of Smith's autobiography, The Facts of Life, a list of some of his major pieces of writing, and a number of the vacations and cruises the Smith's took in their later years. It also covers Smith's last trip to Germany shortly before the assassination of President Kennedy. Numerous letters and the names of Smith's correspondents are showcased, including Clare Boothe Luce and Herbert Hoover.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter fixes what compositional facts are and what they are for. Five semantic roles are distinguished that entities can play in the theoretical space at the intersection of language and world, ...
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This chapter fixes what compositional facts are and what they are for. Five semantic roles are distinguished that entities can play in the theoretical space at the intersection of language and world, and compositional facts are characterized as entities able to play two such roles (sentence-object, and truthmaker). A reconstruction of Armstrong’s argument in favor of compositional facts as truthmakers is then offered, and in this connection, seven ontological characteristics are individuated that facts are taken to possess. These ontological characteristics distinguish facts from neighboring entities (propositions, states of affairs, tropes, events, integral wholes and complexes) and form, taken together, the seven conditions of the (working) definition of the notion of compositional fact. A compositional fact is characterized as a complex entity with a fixed number of constituents (minimally two) that is part of the furniture of the world, and whose composition is formal, nonmereological, and heterogeneous both from the ontological point of view and from the point of view of the categories involved.Less
This chapter fixes what compositional facts are and what they are for. Five semantic roles are distinguished that entities can play in the theoretical space at the intersection of language and world, and compositional facts are characterized as entities able to play two such roles (sentence-object, and truthmaker). A reconstruction of Armstrong’s argument in favor of compositional facts as truthmakers is then offered, and in this connection, seven ontological characteristics are individuated that facts are taken to possess. These ontological characteristics distinguish facts from neighboring entities (propositions, states of affairs, tropes, events, integral wholes and complexes) and form, taken together, the seven conditions of the (working) definition of the notion of compositional fact. A compositional fact is characterized as a complex entity with a fixed number of constituents (minimally two) that is part of the furniture of the world, and whose composition is formal, nonmereological, and heterogeneous both from the ontological point of view and from the point of view of the categories involved.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This Chapter introduces the Unity Problem: what is the ontological ground of the difference between two objects taken together (their mereological sum or ‘mere aggregate’) and their real unity (the ...
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This Chapter introduces the Unity Problem: what is the ontological ground of the difference between two objects taken together (their mereological sum or ‘mere aggregate’) and their real unity (the ‘really unified’ complex of the two objects)? The attempts at answering this question are presented by means of a Master Argument, and ranked using a flow chart, which shows as best Armstrong’s solution accepting compositional facts as primitive unities of their constituents with a special nonmereological composition. A first step to dismiss Armstrong’s solution as ad hoc is taken in this chapter by drawing upon elements of the debate on material constitution, and concluding that there are no direct or indirect arguments in favor of the special nonmereological composition of facts that are independent of the need to solve the unity problem. The last section of the chapter establishes that states of affairs are, a fortiori, more problematic entities than facts with respect to the Unity Problem.Less
This Chapter introduces the Unity Problem: what is the ontological ground of the difference between two objects taken together (their mereological sum or ‘mere aggregate’) and their real unity (the ‘really unified’ complex of the two objects)? The attempts at answering this question are presented by means of a Master Argument, and ranked using a flow chart, which shows as best Armstrong’s solution accepting compositional facts as primitive unities of their constituents with a special nonmereological composition. A first step to dismiss Armstrong’s solution as ad hoc is taken in this chapter by drawing upon elements of the debate on material constitution, and concluding that there are no direct or indirect arguments in favor of the special nonmereological composition of facts that are independent of the need to solve the unity problem. The last section of the chapter establishes that states of affairs are, a fortiori, more problematic entities than facts with respect to the Unity Problem.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that there is no reference to facts by means of that-clauses because that-clauses are non-referential parts of speech. Four necessary conditions for an expression to be a singular ...
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This chapter argues that there is no reference to facts by means of that-clauses because that-clauses are non-referential parts of speech. Four necessary conditions for an expression to be a singular term are discussed and shown not to apply to that-clauses. It is also argued that the expression ‘the fact that p’ is not a singular term and that the expression ‘is a fact’ is not a predicate. With this, the first condition of the Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment in the argument from nominal reference for facts is shown to be unmet, and the argument as not going through.Less
This chapter argues that there is no reference to facts by means of that-clauses because that-clauses are non-referential parts of speech. Four necessary conditions for an expression to be a singular term are discussed and shown not to apply to that-clauses. It is also argued that the expression ‘the fact that p’ is not a singular term and that the expression ‘is a fact’ is not a predicate. With this, the first condition of the Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment in the argument from nominal reference for facts is shown to be unmet, and the argument as not going through.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Conclusion sums up Against Facts’ main findings: in part I and II Armstrong’s truthmaker argument and the argument from nominal reference have been shown to be unsound. The two kinds of ...
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The Conclusion sums up Against Facts’ main findings: in part I and II Armstrong’s truthmaker argument and the argument from nominal reference have been shown to be unsound. The two kinds of methodology used in the two parts of the book are highlighted, and certain enterprises in language-based descriptive metaphysics are criticised, namely enterprises that pretends to discover something about metaphysical entities by citing natural language analyses. It is argued that at least in case of technical philosophical terms like ‘fact’, ‘proposition’, ‘event’, and the like, reference collapses into fixing by stipulation a semantic value for those terms. The methodological proposal is made that we are entitled to take certain (categories of) entities as semantic value of certain expressions only if these entities are best-explanation players for the theoretical roles we deemed must indispensably be played, where indispensability is decided by criteria of theory choice agreed upon by the largest scientific community. It is concluded that defenders of facts have so far failed to show that facts should be given any place in metaphysics.Less
The Conclusion sums up Against Facts’ main findings: in part I and II Armstrong’s truthmaker argument and the argument from nominal reference have been shown to be unsound. The two kinds of methodology used in the two parts of the book are highlighted, and certain enterprises in language-based descriptive metaphysics are criticised, namely enterprises that pretends to discover something about metaphysical entities by citing natural language analyses. It is argued that at least in case of technical philosophical terms like ‘fact’, ‘proposition’, ‘event’, and the like, reference collapses into fixing by stipulation a semantic value for those terms. The methodological proposal is made that we are entitled to take certain (categories of) entities as semantic value of certain expressions only if these entities are best-explanation players for the theoretical roles we deemed must indispensably be played, where indispensability is decided by criteria of theory choice agreed upon by the largest scientific community. It is concluded that defenders of facts have so far failed to show that facts should be given any place in metaphysics.
Heather Hendershot
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226326771
- eISBN:
- 9780226326764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226326764.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter focuses on Dan Smoot, who was one of the most influential extremist broadcasters in the Cold War period. He was an ultraconservative, skilled at conducting verbal assaults on politicians ...
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This chapter focuses on Dan Smoot, who was one of the most influential extremist broadcasters in the Cold War period. He was an ultraconservative, skilled at conducting verbal assaults on politicians and policies he seemed to disagree with. Despite failing in his bid for public office, Smoot became a successful figure as a radio and television pundit. He started as the voice and face of H.L Hunt’s Facts Forum, but he resigned from the post and created his own. His weekly newsletter, the Dan Smoot Report also became a fifteen-minute radio program that aired in 1957. From this point on, Smoot decided to take the stance of the constitutional conservative, which is an ideology that opposes civil rights, communism, foreign aid, United Nations, and even the then Chief Justice Earl Warren.Less
This chapter focuses on Dan Smoot, who was one of the most influential extremist broadcasters in the Cold War period. He was an ultraconservative, skilled at conducting verbal assaults on politicians and policies he seemed to disagree with. Despite failing in his bid for public office, Smoot became a successful figure as a radio and television pundit. He started as the voice and face of H.L Hunt’s Facts Forum, but he resigned from the post and created his own. His weekly newsletter, the Dan Smoot Report also became a fifteen-minute radio program that aired in 1957. From this point on, Smoot decided to take the stance of the constitutional conservative, which is an ideology that opposes civil rights, communism, foreign aid, United Nations, and even the then Chief Justice Earl Warren.
George C. Davis and Elena L. Serrano
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- November 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199379118
- eISBN:
- 9780190876609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199379118.003.0001
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health
Chapter 1 begins by covering key concepts in nutrition, including the function of nutrients and foods in overall health and the leading causes of death in the US. It then discusses the major ...
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Chapter 1 begins by covering key concepts in nutrition, including the function of nutrients and foods in overall health and the leading causes of death in the US. It then discusses the major nutrition recommendation formats designed to ideally simplify healthy food choices, such as the Nutrition Facts Label, MyPlate, and the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The chapter closes with a presentation and discussion of some of the most common nutrition indices used in practice and research for measuring overall nutrient and diet quality.Less
Chapter 1 begins by covering key concepts in nutrition, including the function of nutrients and foods in overall health and the leading causes of death in the US. It then discusses the major nutrition recommendation formats designed to ideally simplify healthy food choices, such as the Nutrition Facts Label, MyPlate, and the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The chapter closes with a presentation and discussion of some of the most common nutrition indices used in practice and research for measuring overall nutrient and diet quality.
Michelle McDowell
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198723448
- eISBN:
- 9780191790096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723448.003.0019
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
People are frequently faced with the task of making a variety of health decisions, from decisions about preventative screening, to taking medications, or deciding whether or not to have a surgical ...
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People are frequently faced with the task of making a variety of health decisions, from decisions about preventative screening, to taking medications, or deciding whether or not to have a surgical procedure. For many health decisions, there is no single best option, and people need to be informed about their chances of experiencing the benefits and harms of each option. However, risk information is not always easy to find and numbers can be used to mislead, emphasizing benefits or reducing harms. Balanced and transparent presentation of risk information is essential for promoting risk literacy to help people understand and make good decisions about health risks. The Facts Box is a simple decision tool that presents data about the benefits and harms of treatments in a summary table and has been shown to facilitate comprehension and understanding of health information. Facts Boxes can be used by patients and health professionals alike.Less
People are frequently faced with the task of making a variety of health decisions, from decisions about preventative screening, to taking medications, or deciding whether or not to have a surgical procedure. For many health decisions, there is no single best option, and people need to be informed about their chances of experiencing the benefits and harms of each option. However, risk information is not always easy to find and numbers can be used to mislead, emphasizing benefits or reducing harms. Balanced and transparent presentation of risk information is essential for promoting risk literacy to help people understand and make good decisions about health risks. The Facts Box is a simple decision tool that presents data about the benefits and harms of treatments in a summary table and has been shown to facilitate comprehension and understanding of health information. Facts Boxes can be used by patients and health professionals alike.
Carol V. R. George
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190914769
- eISBN:
- 9780190914806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190914769.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity, Religion and Society
This chapter examines how Norman Vincent Peale’s message of practical Christianity intertwined with his conservative politics during the period 1935–1955. It argues that Peale’s populist religion and ...
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This chapter examines how Norman Vincent Peale’s message of practical Christianity intertwined with his conservative politics during the period 1935–1955. It argues that Peale’s populist religion and conservative politics were mutually reinforcing, whose own postwar bid for acceptance, entitlement, and power coincided with the fullest flowering of Peale’s ministry. The chapter first considers Peale’s Toryism and populism, and more specifically how he first warmed to partisan politics through Prohibition, before discussing his involvement with the National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government and with a politically partisan group called Spiritual Mobilization, his chairmanship of the Christian Freedom Foundation, and his participation in and eventual withdrawal from Facts Forum, the “educational” organization sponsored by Texas oilman H. L. Hunt.Less
This chapter examines how Norman Vincent Peale’s message of practical Christianity intertwined with his conservative politics during the period 1935–1955. It argues that Peale’s populist religion and conservative politics were mutually reinforcing, whose own postwar bid for acceptance, entitlement, and power coincided with the fullest flowering of Peale’s ministry. The chapter first considers Peale’s Toryism and populism, and more specifically how he first warmed to partisan politics through Prohibition, before discussing his involvement with the National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government and with a politically partisan group called Spiritual Mobilization, his chairmanship of the Christian Freedom Foundation, and his participation in and eventual withdrawal from Facts Forum, the “educational” organization sponsored by Texas oilman H. L. Hunt.
Kent Greenawalt
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199756162
- eISBN:
- 9780190608897
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756162.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
“Distinguishing Justification from Excuses” delves into nuances of circumstances when a person does not warrant negative treatment for failure to comply with the criminal law or other imposed duties. ...
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“Distinguishing Justification from Excuses” delves into nuances of circumstances when a person does not warrant negative treatment for failure to comply with the criminal law or other imposed duties. A justification means that a person acted properly; an excuse that he should not be blamed for his failure. The line can be less clear than sometimes suggested: an action may be appropriate based on reasonably perceived facts though regrettable as the actual facts turn out to be. People may disagree about whether certain permitted actions are justified or only excusable, for example, a right to shoot a housebreaker even in the absence of any evident threat to one’s life. Given the various complexities in drawing any precise line between the two categories, we should not regard it as worrisome that the criminal law fails to do so. However, some instances of placement in each category could be improved.Less
“Distinguishing Justification from Excuses” delves into nuances of circumstances when a person does not warrant negative treatment for failure to comply with the criminal law or other imposed duties. A justification means that a person acted properly; an excuse that he should not be blamed for his failure. The line can be less clear than sometimes suggested: an action may be appropriate based on reasonably perceived facts though regrettable as the actual facts turn out to be. People may disagree about whether certain permitted actions are justified or only excusable, for example, a right to shoot a housebreaker even in the absence of any evident threat to one’s life. Given the various complexities in drawing any precise line between the two categories, we should not regard it as worrisome that the criminal law fails to do so. However, some instances of placement in each category could be improved.
