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Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical positions such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism. We discuss dualist arguments such as the case of philosophical 'zombies'. However, while these seem conceivable, they are argued not to be realizable: the construction of neural machinery appropriate for zombies would inevitably give rise to consciousness. Following a discussion of Jackson’s argument on “Mary the Color Scientist”, the reality of phenomenal experience is acknowledged as much as the reality of neural levels of processing, placing the theory away from eliminative materialism and classic functionalism. This characterizes the theory as a non-reductive, multilevel, neurobiological form of representationalism ('neurorepresentationalism'). Although representationalists have not been typically concerned with the problem of how neural aggregates give rise to consciousness, the “externalist” stream in this school is much more distant from the current view than the “narrow” stream emphasizing that representations are generated in and by the brain. Finally, we discuss consciousness in animals and in human-made inventions such as computers and robots, and on future treatment of disorders of consciousness.

The aim of Chapter 4 is to decide whether Alvin Plantinga’s reformed objection to natural theology is successful for modern, well-educated Christian believers. Although there is a solution to the problem of generality for Plantinga’s externalist theory of warrant, it is argued that the problem of religious diversity introduces insuperable difficulties for the Extended Aquinas/Calvin model of warranted Christian belief, because other religions can function as defeaters. ‘Decent’ Christian believers cannot neutralize these defeaters unless they engage in natural theology and show that their creed is true. The A/C warrant for Christian belief cannot be an intrinsic neutralizer of the defeaters. Furthermore, mere negative apologetics will not suffice in order to restore the warrant of Christian belief if it is undercut by a defeating secular explanation of religious beliefs. In short, the positive apologetics of natural theology is indispensable to well-educated, contemporary Christians, even if they have read their Plantinga.

The central question of Chapter 5 is to which type of rationality natural theology (also called rational theology) should aspire. Many types of rationality are identified, and various notions of epistemic rationality specified. It is argued that the natural theologian should aspire to rationality₅ , that is, to acquiring beliefs the probability of which is determined by applying correctly the right rules of inference on the basis of an evidence-set that is obtained by an objectively adequate investigation. This requirement raises the question as to what are the best methods of research for natural theology, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

This conclusion summarizes the results achieved throughout the book. These include a defense of Perspectivalism, and a related defense of Optionalism. The resulting view is then compared with the more standard metatheories in recent epistemology. The view defended here is more akin to Coherentism than to Foundationalism, though it is incompatible with neither. Moreover, the view is more akin to Internalism than to Externalism, though it is not a version of Access Internalism and cites features of rationality that do not fit will with Mentalism.

This chapter introduces the theory to be developed in the book, namely, a novel theory of human emotional ontogenesis and expression and a metaphysics consistent with this. Human emotional ontogenesis takes place largely concurrently with language development and, by implication, symbolic thought. This concurrent development is due to the continuous interaction of inbuilt neonatal and maternal constraints repertoires which supports both the neurogenesis/maturation of neural circuits and the very close, linguistically-mediated social relationship of neonate and mother upon which further development depends. A radical externalist or transcranialist metaphysics supports this development. The chapter also outlines opposing perspectives in philosophy and psychology of emotion, and philosophy of mind, the problems associated with these positions and indicates how the new theory deals with them in the chapters which follow.

A local skepticism can be articulated along four dimensions—a class of propositions, an epistemic property, a collection of subjects, and a modality. This chapter defends one such local scepticism—that the Hypertime Hypothesis is an epistemic possibility: more specifically, that human persons cannot come to know the negation of the Hypertime Hypothesis by way of their perception, introspection, understanding, imagination, memory, a priori intuition, natural light of reason, faculty of commonsense, logic, science, or metaphysics. Historical and contemporary responses to a variety of skeptical scenarios abound and can be adapted to combat skepticism about the Hypertime Hypothesis, including Closure Denial, Reidian and Moorean replies, Semantic Externalism, Inference to the Best Explanation, Evidentialism, and Process Reliabilism. However, the chapter aims to show that, even if one concedes that these responses work against the local skepticisms they were originally introduced to oppose, they are not successful in this new context.

Like Descartes, many analytic epistemologists employ sceptical argument ‘methodologically’, affording undue respect to its illusory force in order to present their own theory as the way to avoid its conclusion. Like ‘fallibilism’ and ‘contextualism’, epistemological ‘externalism’ (or ‘reliabilism’) is commonly thus supported. Well-known argument by Fred Dretske is selected for critical examination, which leads into the assessment of externalist notions of defeasibility. Certain fundamental presuppositions of these externalist arguments are identified and questioned. The problem of how our belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable can be justified without circularity, and Ernest Sosa’s answer to it, are considered, and another, less intellectualist answer given. A final section turns to McDowell’s ‘internalist’ response to scepticism, broached in Chapter III, and his version of ‘disjunctivism’, a doctrine assessed as making a valid point misleadingly presented as semantic analysis. McDowell’s oddly quasi-externalist conception of defeasibility and justification is also assessed.