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This chapter attempts to apply some of the theories described to the European context. The main argument is that most of the scenarios provided by a range of respected economists will generate pressures for the improvement of the economic role of the centre including fiscal centralization. In addition, economists' analyses of the functioning of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Stability Pact, suggest that within the European Monetary Union (EMU) area the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy will become central to economic strategy. It specifically summarizes the policy implications of competing economic scenarios and places these implications in political context by evaluating the capacity of the European Union (EU) institutional structure and especially the European party system to accommodate them. Relevant survey data on levels of support for EU institutions is also explained. There is little evidence to suggest that, as a whole, the peoples of Europe have obtained a level of identity with European institutions that is in any way equivalent to their identification with existing nation states and regions.

This chapter assesses the Eurozone debt crisis as a conflict between creditor and debtor countries, pitting northern member states against the southern periphery, before looking at the distributional politics of austerity in the smaller southern Eurozone states of Greece and Portugal. The Eurozone crisis placed the European Union under extraordinary strain, as markets panicked, leaving the weaker and more indebted member states struggling to avoid financial collapse. The bailouts of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal may have saved them from crashing out of the single currency, but the price was harsh austerity for their citizens and an accumulation of debt comparable to wartime. Meanwhile, the political costs of the euro crisis can be seen in the destabilization of European party systems. Not only did Greece embrace anti-system politics, electing a government opposed to the bailout regime, but the northern European countries that had put up much of the money for the rescues also saw their own political backlash.

This concluding chapter reflects on what conditions make it more or less likely that minority political incorporation has significant impacts on intergroup relations, the identities of parties, and the electoral alignments underpinning party systems. The discussion highlights that parties' recruitment strategies can meaningfully affect majority perceptions of the minority, minority views about the political system, and minority social integration. The waning of traditional structures of mobilization—in particular the decline of trade unions—raises the relative attractiveness of minority bloc votes and associated ethnically based campaign styles. Larger, more slow-moving, political and economic forces that shape linkages between the majority electorate and political parties thus also help determine whether and in what ways minorities are brought into the party system. The chapter then posits under what circumstances this incorporation will trigger electoral realignments and, in the process, generate a reordering of European party systems.

This chapter presents the profile and the condensed history of the 41 currently functioning party systems. Here we discuss the dynamics of the changes, and relate them to the ideological configurations and alliance structures. We show that the changes in closure figures indicate well the transformations of party politics, we link developments in the governmental arena to the conflicts in the party system in general, and we associate each party system with a specific trajectory of closure development and a specific party system type. We show how the plurality of currently functioning party systems fit into a bipolar configuration that puts them on track towards a robust path of continuous stabilization until reaching full systemic institutionalization.

The fourth chapter presents the profile and the condensed history of the 21 historical party systems that ceased to be democratic. Here we discuss the dynamics of the changes, and relate them to the ideological configurations and alliance structures. We show that the changes in closure figures indicate well the transformations of party politics, we link developments in the governmental arena to the conflicts in the party system in general, and we associate each party system with a specific trajectory of closure development and a specific party system type. We show how, in clear contrast to currently functioning European party systems, the plurality of historical party systems fit into a multi-polar configuration that impeded them from reaching higher levels of systemic stability. Tellingly, we find no instances of consistent growth and high-level stabilization or grand coalitions. Two-party and two-plus-one party systems, so common in currently functioning party systems, were also extremely rare among the collapsed systems.