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This chapter considers judicial protection from European sanctions based on UN lists of terrorist suspects. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 sets out the (potential) friction that the multi-layered adoption procedure of sanctions giving effect to UN lists creates between the European legal order and international law. Section 2 turns to the perspective of international law on the binding force and on the status of Security Council resolutions. Section 3 examines the perspective of European law. It demonstrates that neither the European Treaties nor the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) justify the Community itself being bound by decisions of the Security Council. Section 4 discusses alternatives to the positions of the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the ECJ Section 5 places the EU courts' decisions in context. It analyses the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and of a selection of national Supreme Courts concerning the review of domestic acts implementing Security Council resolutions.

The previous chapter showed how transnational activity, the adjudication of the European Community (EC) law, and EC lawmaking had developed symbiotically to determine much of what is important about European integration. This chapter provides a more detailed sectoral account of how the adjudication of one class of trading disputes gradually, but authoritatively, undermined the intergovernmental aspects of the EC, while enhancing the polity's supranational, or federal, character. Assesses the impact of adjudicating the freer movement of goods provisions of the Treaty of Rome on integration and supranational governance, focusing on the problem of non‐tariff barriers, as governed by Arts. 28–30 (EC). Proceeds as follows: first, the treaty rules on intra‐EC trade are examined, hypotheses derived about how the domain could be expected to evolve, and the argument advanced is contrasted with alternatives; second, in a section ‘Judicial Governance and Market‐Building’, the emergence is tracked of the basic doctrinal framework (the Dassonville framework) governing the domain, an analysis made of the aggregate data on adjudication in the sector, and the impact traced of the European Court of Justice's case law on the decision‐making of other actors, including the European Commission and Member State governments; third, the mutation of the framework that occurred in the 1990s is discussed – an event that was heavily conditioned by the endogenous development of the law itself; the chapter concludes with an assessment of the findings in light of the pertinent scholarly debates about the impact of the European legal system on the greater course of market‐building and political integration.

The evolution is charted, through adjudication, of the rules governing sex equality in European Community (EC) law. The first section, ‘The Normative Structure’, provides an overview of the Treaty of Rome rules and secondary legislation that constitute the domain of sex equality, while the second examines how Art. 141 (which provides that male and female workers shall receive equal pay for equal work) evolved once it had been constitutionalized by the European Court of Justice. Section III, ‘Judicialization: The Court and the Legislator’, focuses on the relationship between the Court, its case law on sex equality, and the production of directives by the EC legislator; the impact is also briefly discussed of the Court's rulemaking on national judicial and legislative processes; topics included are indirect discrimination, occupational pensions, pregnancy and maternity rights. In the fourth section, ‘Adjudicating Sex Equality Law’, an analysis is made of the aggregate data on litigation and adjudication in the field, focusing on how precedent‐based lawmaking has organized the development of this area. The conclusion addresses a range of theoretical issues.

Focuses on the role of European case law in fostering an integrated market. Through a series of landmark cases, including Cassis De Dijon, Dassonville, and Keck, the European Court of Justice has supported trade and commerce in determining whether national legislation is protectionist or serves a legitimate function in promoting health, safety, and other public policy objectives. Analogies with the US are also discussed, particularly in promoting interstate commerce by addressing trade discrimination, and in developing legal principles to balance sovereign state powers with the need for integrated markets. The central argument is that a common framework of market rules has been pursued within a setting of well‐defined legal and judicial mechanisms, which have also provided mechanisms of enforcement and compliance with treaty goals. Of central importance is that legal reasoning shifted the focus of market integration from harmonization to mutual recognition as a key trade strategy to integrate markets. The role of law has been critical in sustaining a market economy, and case law shapes both states and markets, determining the constitutional limits to state intervention in markets and the level of government at which regulation is most appropriate and legitimate through legal mechanisms of non‐discrimination, balancing standards, and proportionality.

An examination is made of the way in which national courts have reacted to European Community law, in particular to the claim to supremacy over national law contained in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. The discussion begins with a brief account of the Community’s supremacy doctrine. This is followed by an analysis of the reaction of national courts to this claim. The focus then shifts from positive law to the normative evaluation of a number of issues central to this topic. The chapter concludes with an overview of the political science literature that has considered the reasons for the reaction of national courts to the claims made by the Community’s judicial institutions.

The American Restatements of the law have become a major textual authority of the American common law. Today, large parts of the law have been restated, and the Restatements are taken by the participants to the legal discourse as a valid expression of the law. This chapter shows that the American restatement approach has also influenced the developments of transnational restatements of the law. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has largely applied the terminology and formal style of the American Restatements for its Principles of International Commercial Contracts; and a similar approach was taken, on the European level, by the Lando Commission on European Contract Law. Today, the Restatements' formal style is used by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and by the Acquis Group, the main non-legislative actors in the current political process of unifying European private law.

Assesses the interaction between developments in EU law and the politics of integration, and is primarily concerned with the impacts of the courts on the evolution of EU institutions (rules and procedures). It gives a broad‐gauge overview of the development of the legal system and considers the impact of adjudicating European law on EU political developments. Stone Sweet then relates both European integration theory and methodology, identifying if, how, and why these theories can help understanding of the evolution of the EU legal system. Proceeds as follows: the first section, Integration and the Courts, examines the sources and consequences of the constitutionalization of the legal system; the second and third sections (The Evolution of the Treaty of Rome, and The Legislative Process) evaluate the role of the courts in the institutional evolution of the EU, and the impact of that evolution on the treaty revision and legislative processes; the Conclusion briefly considers the Europeanization of the law, an important phenomenon implicated in various ways throughout the chapter.

To sustain a viable social science of law and courts, testable propositions, appropriate research designs for testing those hypotheses, and comparative materials are needed; Ch. 4, and the two papers within it, discuss and use three strategies for building theory through testing and comparing. This first paper, which was originally published in the University of Chicago Law Forum in 1992, discusses a mode of testing that involves constructing causal hypotheses to explain a major change that has occurred in one particular part of one particular legal system, and testing these comparatively either by predicting future developments in the same legal system, or (as here) by predicting that another legal system now displaying the same hypothesized conditions will experience in the future those results that occurred in the first system. Shapiro examines the ‘giving reasons requirement’ in European Community (EC) law by deriving predictions about European law from the evolution of American judicial review of administrative acts. The first part of the paper examines the giving reasons requirement in relation to administrative discretion and judicial review of administrative action in the United States. The second part goes on to compare US and EC law, looking at whether the EC giving reasons requirement is substantive as well as procedural, and examining the experience of the European Court of Justice with substantive review.

An examination is made of how tensions that develop between supranational and national governance structures are resolved, given the institutionalization taking place at the European level. The focus is on two national policy domains – state aids and regional development – and the author explains how, since the mid-1980s, European Union (EU) officials have succeeded in inducing their French counterparts to alter legislation and administrative practices once assumed to be fundamentally immune to external influence – a process that is increasingly referred to as the ‘Europeanization of the nation state’. The view taken is that Europeanization took place in a series of ‘rounds’ that have followed a common sequence: disagreement about the nature and scope of EU rules in national regimes; open contestation between supranational and national officials; the fixing of a new or clarified rule on the part of EU officials; and, finally, the grudging acceptance of the rule by the French. After each round, new patterns of French resistance emerged, but the rules of the game governing these interactions are fixed by the results of previous rounds, and come to be more or less taken for granted by actors at both levels; it is argued that the overall process tends to favour the expansion and diffusion of EU modes of governance, and the weakening of specifically national modes. The chapter is divided into three main sections: the first provides a summary overview of the development of EU competition policy and its intersections with state aids and regional policy; the second focuses on state aids in two sectors (French regional and industrial policy), which are analysed against the backdrop of the development of European competition law; and the third part discusses conflicts over the meaning of European rules in relation to the process of ‘endogenous’ institutional change.

Addresses the doubt about whether, even if legitimately enforceable, a constitutional right to an adequate environment is necessary. The European Union (EU) is taken as a context in which that doubt would seem particularly strongly motivated. For the range of existing environmental and human rights provisions which are binding on member states of the EU might already provide the protections that a formally declared right to an adequate environment would aim for. Shows that while those provisions offer significant protections, these nonetheless fall short of what a substantive environmental right with constitutional force would aim to achieve, and so the latter would not be nugatory.

The laws of other European states were from time to time the subject of valuable comparative analysis by the House of Lords. However, the principal European influence on the work of the House of Lords came not so much from these comparative excursions as from the law of the supranational organisations successively known as the European Economic Community, European Community, and European Union. It is European law in that sense with which this chapter is concerned.

This chapter focuses on the interpretive and normative pressures that the national judiciaries routinely exert on the European legal orders. These pressures are of interest for several reasons. First, although they constantly generate important effects on the two Europes, they function largely on the national judicial plane. As a result, we can keep our comparatists' eyes trained primarily on the French judicial system, even when discussing the pressures being exerted on the European one. Second, this focus allows us to observe the full extent to which national-legal and judicial actors now use the European system as a repository of particularly powerful arguments to be deployed as necessary within the national legal field. Third, this mushrooming use (and development) of European legal norms breaks down the artificial heuristic barrier between the French legal ‘inside’ and the European legal ‘outside’. The chapter concludes that the interpretive empowerment of national legal actors — including judges and litigants — generated by the operation of European law not only constructs at the national level a confluence of interests that reinforces the centrality of European law, but also creates a systemic demand for powerful and justiciable European legal norms.

In the late 1990s the European Commission set out on the most radical transformation of the enforcement of European competition law in forty years. The highly centralized enforcement regime where competition law was seen as a key tool in market integration was replaced with a decentralized, self-regulatory model with an emphasis on economic principles. The creation of a network of national competition authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission Directorate General for Competition (DGComp) was a key element in this reform. The European Competition Network (ECN) is the institutional form under which the efficient and smooth enforcement of European competition norms by all NCAs and the Commission is to be achieved, enforcement having been (re)delegated downwards to the national level as part of the modernization process. This chapter reflects on the constitutional implications of the modernization of European competition law with particular reference to the ECN, which as a form of network governance creates a number of constitutional challenges, notably relating to the questions of consistency and accountability. The chapter first addresses the constitutionalization of the EU before moving on to discuss the architecture of competition law enforcement in the EU. It then sets out how, primarily in functional terms, the ECN is seen as successful. The particular constitutional challenges posed by the operation of the network, notably consistency and accountability, are analysed. It then discusses the role the courts have played in endorsing and challenging the competition law enforcement governance structures before concluding.