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The whole of this chapter is devoted to various aspects of de Gaulle's (and France's) challenge to US hegemony in the years 1962–1969. The account starts in 1962, rather than in 1958 when the general first came to power, because Washington was initially quite favourable towards de Gaulle. The first two sections of the chapter discuss this first period of transition, and examine the relationship between France and the US before 1962. The third section looks at the crisis years in the American–French relationship between 1962 and 1967, and includes discussion of the increased closeness of France and Germany and the Franco‐German treaty of 1963, and of de Gaulle's attitude to Britain's membership of the EEC—which was seen by the US as a very important element in strengthening the Atlantic framework. The fourth section discusses the US economy in relation to that of France, Germany, and the EEC, and the last one the final years of the de Gaulle regime.

This chapter deals with the period between the 1923 economic crisis and an even more severe economic breakdown in 1929. This period saw an engagement of the United States in Europe that had not been possible in the immediate postwar years, generating a few years of relative stability and prosperity in which American manufacturing companies and banks played a major role. It was the phase in which the United States succeeded in deploying its superior industrial and financial power in an attempt to uplift the economies of Europe. During those five years it was not only American ideas and practices of rationalized mass production that came to Europe through massive foreign direct investments; rather Europe, again for the first time, got a taste of mass consumption, even if it was still quite limited in terms of affordable consumer durables.

This chapter examines the state of American and European economies during the outbreak of World War I until the Genoa Conference was convened in 1922. It first considers the military–political origins of the war before analyzing the role the international business community played at the time of the war's outbreak. Hereafter the chapter focuses on the American perspectives, as it studies the ambiguities of American neutrality, the state of the American economy and its eventual entry into the war, and the beginnings of a strain on the Anglo-American relationship at the Paris Peace Conference. The chapter then returns the focus to the international stage as postwar reconstruction begins, highlighting the attempts at European recovery and the role of American businesses in these endeavors.

This chapter examines the dynamics of the early modern European economy in order to highlight both the possibilities for development and the constraints of the old European world. It first considers population and climate, focusing on two main changes: saving land, which implied a transition in the kind of energy carriers, and saving labor, which indicated a transition in the kind of converters used to engender mechanical work. The chapter proceeds by discussing the demographic transition in Europe, the last phase of the Little Ice Age, and the output of the soil in Europe. It also assesses energy scarcity, taking into account energy prices, real wages and living conditions, fuels, the decline in energy consumption per head, and the rise in efficiency. Finally, it describes the use of coal and peat in Europe.

This chapter describes the development of the European political economy since the 1957 Rome treaty. It uses econometric and historical case evidence to build the argument that European integration has advanced both from the top down and from the bottom up. The first part presents several measures of European integration to address the question of how we know integration when we see it. The second part describes two mechanisms of integration: redistribution from the top down via the European Social Fund, and integration from the bottom up through the formation of the Euro-Regions. The third part describes the development of a convergent European economy, where macroeconomic differences have been reduced through European integration, especially before the 1980s, and especially if economies are weighted by their populations.

This chapter discusses different measures of guild strength, in terms of guild numbers, producer—merchant relations, guilds' internal cohesiveness, their relationship with the state, characteristics of towns, interaction with the countryside, and the role of guild-free enclaves. It also examines how guild strength and weakness were associated with economic performance across pre-industrial Europe. First, European societies with relatively weak guilds saw comparatively rapid economic growth from the late medieval period onwards. Second, economic performance differed more modestly between societies with intermediate guilds and those with strong ones. Third, strong guilds were not associated with high per capita GDP or rapid economic growth at any point between 1300 and 1850. This casts doubt on the notion that guilds generated net benefits for European economies, even in their medieval inception.

This chapter examines the trends in income distribution observed since 1989 in the European economies in transition and in China, as well as the factors responsible for the systemic difference in income distribution. It then examines policy reforms which have been carried out and the emerging patterns of changes in income distribution from 1989 to 1997. It analyses changes in income structure and changes in the dispersion of main income components. The chapter argues that differences in the pace and pattern of institutional development explain in part the variation in trends in income inequality and growth performance of the transitional economies over the last decade.

This chapter focuses on Germany's adaptation of centralized controls of European raw materials, industry, and transport. German economic controls aim to utilize all resources of occupied Europe, manpower, raw materials, machines and machine tools, railroads and other vehicles, industrial capacities, etc., for the German war effort. To achieve this, the report explains that the Germans have applied two methods: centralized machinery operating from Berlin and indigenous economic institutions that have been transformed so as to correspond to the German control patterns. Some of the major agencies regularly operating in German-occupied Europe are the Ministry of Armaments and Armament Production, German Purchasing Commissions for the Armed Forces under the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the organization of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Commissioner General for Labor Supply. The chapter considers the technical and administrative problems involved in Germany's immediate post-war control over the European economy.

This chapter takes issue with the claim that European economic integration necessarily induces neoliberal outcomes. Using an approach that treats economic spaces as socio-discursive constructions, it shows that the character, meaning and personality of the ‘European economy’ continue to be contested within the EU institutions and amongst the component member state political economies. Although the analysis suggests that there is considerable space for the articulation of alternative ‘solidaristic’, ‘sustainable’ and ‘moral’ versions of the European economy within alternative conceptions of globalisation, the paper seeks to show how rationalities (technical and normative; internal and external) associated with neoliberal versions of Europe might become normalised and increasingly difficult to negotiate.

This chapter examines one major market failure that guilds might have helped solve: the potential for information asymmetries between producers and consumers about the quality of goods and services. Many guilds erected market regulations. To address such concerns, guilds required producers and products to be guild-certified, inspected workshops or wares, and penalized quality violations. Guilds also engaged in many unrelated activities which affected quality unintentionally. The chapter then assesses the evidence on information asymmetries about quality, the institutional mechanisms available to solve them, and the outcomes in different sectors of the European economy. It argues that guilds shed light on the balance between market failures, state failures, and the failure of particularized institutions in intermediating between producers and consumers.

This chapter describes the European political geography of invention, upon which the Anglo-Dutch-American process would draw. Much of the technology underpinning the rise of early modern Europe, including printing, navigation, and gunpowder, developed in China first. Yet in China, long-range voyaging was suppressed, as was printing in Constantinople. These were successful political attempts to control the movement of people and of ideas. In Europe, there was no central power capable of exercising such control, even had the will existed to do so. On the contrary, despite strenuous attempts to shield valuable information from rivals, in Europe new developments and discoveries tended to unleash a field of competitive response. As a result, the early modern acquisition of global empire was the work of many powers, rather than one. Political and (from 1517) religious competition were primary motors of the process, driving it faster and further than would otherwise have been the case.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the political economy of European integration and to examine the EU’s competence within employment and social policy. It argues that the EU’s involvement in social policy and labour can best be understood as a European social dimension (ESD) – that is, although there is considerable political activity at EU level in terms of employment and social policy, unlike the SEM or Monetary Union, integration within the field is a work in progress. Its current and future developments are therefore very much dependent upon the EU’s political constellations. The chapter concludes by identifying the 2004 and 2007 new member States as a potential threat to the ESD.

This concluding chapter discusses how the Anglo-Dutch revolution of 1649–1702 stood at the centre of a succession of wider transformations which were agricultural, political, and commercial. All of these had their origins in the Netherlands before spreading to south-eastern England and across the Atlantic. Understanding their development and diffusion has required attention to religion, migration, and war as well as to economic, social, and cultural life. The result connected a series of unique local human environments, including the Dutch water world, the city of London, and the American frontier into a world-altering imperial system. By the later eighteenth century the Atlantic reorientation of the European economy had thrown the Baltic into relative decline, sparking the dramatic growth of Liverpool, Manchester, and Glasgow while Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Amsterdam stagnated.

In Sweden, the exchange rate to a large extent has acted to destabilize rather than to stabilize the economy, pointing to the potential risks of an independent monetary policy. This chapter details the report of the Calmfors Commission, the government commission assigned to study the consequences of EMU membership in 1995 and 1996 and summarizes the main conclusions of the Commission, and provides an updated evaluation of the arguments made in the report. Some of these arguments speak more strongly in favor of Swedish EMU membership today than in 1996, while others more clearly speak against membership. It concerns European business cycles and discusses the comovement between the Swedish and European economies. European business cycles are closely correlated with each other, suggesting that business cycles in Europe are largely driven by common shocks. This evidence indicates that membership in EMU would not be very costly for Sweden, and not more so than for some current EMU members. The estimated model suggests that country-specific shocks are an important source of Swedish business cycle fluctuations, and therefore that participation in the monetary union may be costly. The model interprets most fluctuations in the exchange rate as caused by shocks to the exchange rate risk premium, rather than endogenous movements that help the economy adjust after disturbances to other sectors in the economy.

This chapter presents an analysis of the European economy. Europe is a very important piece of the global economic landscape. Taken together, the countries of the European Union have an economy roughly equal in size to that of the United States. Europe and the United States together account for about half of the total GDP of the world. Most of the countries of the European Union now have a common currency. Entry into the monetary union carries conditions on fiscal policy about deficit financing and total debt levels. Thus, much of macroeconomic policy in Europe is harmonized. The ability of the European Union to discipline members not conforming to fiscal policy and whether that policy is flexible enough is currently being tested. Also being tested is whether one monetary policy can accommodate the different rates of growth among the members of the monetary union.

In the conclusion it is argued that the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have had a profound impact on the clash of capitalisms surrounding the ESD. With few exceptions the CEE states joined the liberal coalition during the three case study negotiations. The outcome has been a strengthening of the liberal coalition, which has made policy outcomes of a more substantive nature for EU employment and social policy more difficult to achieve. The second section considers why the CEE states are supportive of the liberal coalition and the final part of the chapter explores the future of the ESD in the context of enlargement and the EU’s current political climate.

This chapter discusses the role of Europe's monetary union in creating a crisis that first erupted in US mortgages. Because of their monetary union, European economies racked up greater risks in the 2000s boom than they would have done had they kept their individual currencies. The factors invoked to blame the euro include the destabilising effect of a single interest rate for the entire eurozone; the misalignment of real exchange rates when nominal exchange rates could no longer adjust; the ability to run current account deficits that were too large and lasted too long; and, finally, the fact that debt was accumulated in a currency that could not be printed at will by national central banks. The chapter argues that all these factors have been commonly misunderstood.