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The Economic Monetary Union (EMU) has been famously portrayed as a ‘metaphor for the European Union’, involving high stakes for the integration process as a whole. Since its origins, the creation of the EMU was an eminently political project, with a direct bearing on the prospects of the European Union (EU) as a polity, its social model, and its constitutional identity. Yet, the main political aspects of the project were mostly discarded in the process that led to the establishment of the EMU’s institutional structure and its substantive rules. The creation of the common currency was not accompanied by the establishment of supranational institutions with a strong political mandate to accommodate conflicting interests, while the exercise of political autonomy at national level has been increasingly seen as a potential danger for the stability of the whole edifice. The crisis and the ensuing reform of the European economic governance consolidated the technocratic character of the EMU architecture and hardened its grip on national political processes.

In the conclusion it is argued that the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have had a profound impact on the clash of capitalisms surrounding the ESD. With few exceptions the CEE states joined the liberal coalition during the three case study negotiations. The outcome has been a strengthening of the liberal coalition, which has made policy outcomes of a more substantive nature for EU employment and social policy more difficult to achieve. The second section considers why the CEE states are supportive of the liberal coalition and the final part of the chapter explores the future of the ESD in the context of enlargement and the EU’s current political climate.

A number of contradictory elements mark the Finnish attitude to the EU and to Europeanisation. Every political party has its own opinions of the EU, and the political colour of the cabinet has an impact on the government's official strategies on the issue. In addition to these political factors, a few institutional factors affect Finnish attitudes to the EU. This chapter discusses the stand of Finland on the EU-related initiatives. Finnish responses to the European social dimensions have fluctuated. Finland is not willing to define some policy areas or issues as belonging to the realm of national decision making or competence, neither is it prepared to sacrifice central institutional elements of its own social policy model. This dual emphasis is visible in the discussions of the roles of economic and social issues. Despite the strong emphasis on opening up internal markets and prioritising economic growth, Finland does not openly accept this at the expense of social protection, labour protection, health, and the environment. The dual approach, as contradictory it may seem, tries to balance the two major objectives, and accurately describes Finnish attitudes and responses to European integration.

This epilogue critiques the standard books on Japan's final war against the Soviet Union, saying that they fail to present a theoretical framework that synthesizes the Pacific, Asian, and European dimensions of Japan's war. These works did not delve into the complex layers of Soviet–Japanese relations during the war. Nor did they discuss that the Soviet Union was Japan's most critic ally in the war in China as well as in the war against the United. The chapter concludes that as long as Japanese today continue to believe that during and shortly after World War II they were utterly ignorant or naive bystanders of the two superpowers' growing rivalry, the transitional period from World War II to the Cold War can never become an integral part of Japanese history.