Search Results

This concluding chapter reviews the overall predicaments of the European dilemma as the EU faces the dual challenge of national-ethnic diversity and social crisis. It focuses on the issues of European moral-political identity and the future of a multinational-multi-ethnic democracy. It asks which moral-political values and institutional strategies may actually guide the future integration of one of the world’s most powerful economic and political blocs. The discussion reconnects with the overall issue of the dual crisis of the welfare state and the nation, contending that the dual crisis needs to be restated as also encompassing a crisis for the EU-European supra-nation. With the character of currently dominant EU policies and the emergent ‘post-national workfare regime’ of the Union in mind, the authors elaborate on the potential capacity of the European supra-nation to offer a viable and democratic alternative. They question today’s strong tendency to seek solutions to an apparent crisis of neo-liberal strategies in stringent immigration and asylum measures, and retrograde policies of ethno-cultural entrenchment. This serves to highlight the crucial question as to which moral-political ‘creed’ will actually prevail in the 21st century.

This Introduction spells out some of the supranational aspects of the multi-level constellation that makes up the European Union, which distinguish it from an ordinary international organization. Then, the presumption of democracy as the legitimation principle of power is outlined, and the question of why constitutionalism rather than state sovereignty comes to the fore in a post-Westphalian order is discussed. Thereafter, theories of European democracy are revisited and three different positions are outlined. Lastly, an overview of the following chapters is presented.

The purpose of this chapter is to place contemporary debate about European democracy in a wider historical context by considering how analyses of the institutions that underpin democracy in Europe have evolved over time in tandem with political developments. It is said that those who neglect history are doomed to repeat it, and that can be also true of social science. We depend on the insights of successive generations of scholars for much of what we know about democracy, and by examining how their analyses shifted as European governance itself evolved, we can develop perspectives with which to understand the problems confronting Europe today. The survey is necessarily brief survey, but references are provided that lead to deeper debates. The different sections of the chapter are: The Feasibility of Popular Government; The Importance of Culture, Organization, and Social Conditions; Technocracy, Neo–Corporatism, and the Romantic Revolt; The Move to the Market; and Contemporary European Democracy.

Examines the social policies associated with 'third ways' in European social democracy. It focuses on the Third Way in terms of discourse (e.g. a rhetoric of reconciliation), values (e.g. solidarity, equity), and policy goals and mechanisms (e.g. maximizing employment; containing public spending and strengthening the social investment component of welfare states). Our main conclusion is that the current position is best represented by one-third way with several variants, and that there is greater similarity on the level of policy content than on values or discourse.

This chapter explores how European social democracy is threatened to be undermined and overrun by radical left-wing competitors and right-wing populist opponents. The pan-European rise of right-wing populism has had far-reaching consequences. First of all, the political and public agenda has shifted from a socioeconomic perspective to a cultural perspective. Right-wing populism is ‘culturalising’ all political issues, and is characterised by a nativist focus on putting its ‘own people first’. Second, right-wing populism portrays and demonises social democracy as forming the elite ‘which betrays ordinary people’. It also depicts social democratic parties as being simply parties for migrants. By doing so, right-wing populists deliberately seek to distance traditional social democratic voters from social democratic parties. Third, the rise of right-wing populism is increasing opportunities for right-wing or Conservative governments.

Deeply rooted demands on democracy emerge regularly in advanced democracies. This chapter summarizes the analyses of the former three chapters, providing a synthetic diagnosis of considerable political instability. The chapter examines in addition the consequences of European integration for democracy at the supranational and the national levels. European economic integration has responded late and poorly to the economic crisis that started in 2008—six years after the euro was established. No sanctions and rewards existed for decision-makers at the European level. However, national differences in economic performance and in income distribution have not been due to supranational causes, but to policies undertaken at the national level. Yet the confusion of the politics within European institutions has contributed to particular difficulties of national electorates to attribute political responsibilities for decisions and non-decisions. The asymmetry of information between politician and citizens increased substantially. Electoral verdicts were thus largely unconnected to the past performance of governments.

This chapter assesses the different discourses about Western European democracy that developed during the 1960s—some of which contributed to the radicalism of 1968, while others emphatically did not. The dissenting voices of the 1960s focused on the perceived failings of the existing political structures, questioning whether the vertical hierarchies of representation through parliaments, parties, and interest groups were the best means of achieving the goals of individual freedom, social justice, and a participatory democratic culture. But debates about means also became debates about ends. In particular, a radical cultural and political critique emerged that questioned the forms of authority—explicit and implicit—within modern societies. This also challenged the nature of the post-war settlement. Far from creating a new democratic culture, the changes after 1945, these critics argued, had dismantled the authoritarian regimes while retaining the edifice of state power, and a society of regimented and limited freedoms.

This chapter views New Labour as a ‘post-Thatcherite’ party. It is argued that many of the themes of New Labour are not exactly ‘new’ to the ‘old’ European social democracy. The discussion points to an impassive record on employment, and claims that while the impact of government policy on the distribution of income has been equalising, the income gap has been widening. It also points out the differences within Labour, suggesting that Brown's Britain may be different in terms of choice, diversity, and competition, as compared to Blair's Britain. It is then suggested that Blairite modernisation does not necessarily undermine the social democratic political economy.

This chapter situates the politics, successes and failures of the broader Indian left in comparative historical perspective. The Janata Party, National Front and United Front governments, and the terms of art employed by comparative studies and coalition theory, deserve critical reappraisal. Crafting stable national coalition governments in India, given the diverse regional forces and complex institutional compulsions, poses unparalleled challenges. Equally, complex ideological differences and tougher material conditions made it harder to forge a broad progressive coalition like the red-green alliance that enabled European social democracy. The predicament of the broader Indian left since the 1970s recalls the fate of Eurocommunists. Yet the vicissitudes of Third Front governments in India shows that regional parties are not inherently destabilizing forces, suggesting theoretical lessons for other parliamentary democracies, such as Britain, where contemporary processes of regionalization and demands for federalism may fragment national mandates in the future. Strategic realism and better political judgment would have enabled the socialists and communists to grasp the possibilities at key junctures, including unprecedented opportunities to exercise national power, advancing their causes to a greater degree. The book concludes by reflecting on the prospects of social democratic politics in India in the years ahead.

The epilogue sketches a few scenarios on potential geopolitical consequences of the global paradigm shift toward multiple online platform “spheres.” Currently, the neoliberal US-based platform ecosystem dominates. This ecosystem revolves around the promotion of individualism and minimal state interference, leaving checks and balances to the market. On the other end of the ideological spectrum is the Chinese ecosystem, in which the autocratic regime controls the platform ecosystem via regulated censorship of tech corporations. Squeezed between the US and the Chinese models is the European Union, whose member states neither own nor operate any major platforms in either ecosystem. For European democracies to survive in the information age, its cities, national governments, and supranational legislature need to collaborate on a blueprint for a common digital strategy toward markets and public sectors.