Search Results

Addresses the doubt about whether, even if legitimately enforceable, a constitutional right to an adequate environment is necessary. The European Union (EU) is taken as a context in which that doubt would seem particularly strongly motivated. For the range of existing environmental and human rights provisions which are binding on member states of the EU might already provide the protections that a formally declared right to an adequate environment would aim for. Shows that while those provisions offer significant protections, these nonetheless fall short of what a substantive environmental right with constitutional force would aim to achieve, and so the latter would not be nugatory.

Discussed in this chapter are US and EU views on democracy and international democratization, as well as normative and instrumental beliefs about the benefits and intrinsic merits of democracy as a political system that underlie the US and EU frames. Despite the growing strategic importance of Central Asia for both the US and EU, the official discourses of American and European administrations have framed democracy assistance as a necessary, if not inevitable, element of foreign policy. Western-sponsored foundations and NGOs pursued a range of liberalization and democracy-enhancement projects in Central Asia that were similar to those introduced in other former Soviet territories. The IMF and World Bank also became heavily involved in advising all the Central Asian governments on the macro-level reforms required for rapid economic liberalization. This chapter names democracy, good governance, and the rule of law as the focus of US and EU engagement with the region. There are, however, important differences in terms of views on democracy and expectations in Central Asia that must be supported to facilitate these countries' democratic transformation, conveyed through the language of discourse.

This chapter investigates the connections that may be forged between sustainability, labour standards and trade. It offers a history of ‘social sustainability’ considering the opportunities presented by the SDGs. The approaches taken by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the European Union (EU) are compared and contrasted, considering recent developments, such as the ILO centenary reports and instruments, alongside EU commitments to enforcement of selected ILO standards. The chapter concludes by considering how the trade and policy coherence objectives set out in SDG 17 can be achieved and how the common and divergent approaches of the ILO and EU may yet evolve. It is suggested that SDG 16 could guide the processes for dialogue that are necessary to forge connections and solutions.

Current tensions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the EU are explored with reference to capitalist political economy and historical constructions of a continental divide. While ‘populist’ politicians in the countries of the Visegrád cooperation celebrate their nations and Christian civilisation, the Wertegemeinschaft espoused by the EU mainstream is a form of liberal cosmopolitanism. These contrasting imaginaries of Europe are reinforced by structural inequalities, accentuated by the eurozone (as analysed by W. Streeck and C. Offe). EU elites conceptualize Asia as a distinct continent, and Hungarian leaders invoke the Asian roots of the Magyars when it suits their legitimation strategies. The chapter concludes by drawing attention to long-term commonalities extending across the entire landmass of Eurasia, and the potential of this civilizational heritage for creating new forms of political cooperation.

Chapter eight analyses the relevance of the theory of multi-level governance (MLG) to explain the role of the European Union (EU) in Northern Ireland and contends that the EU successfully engages Northern Ireland as a region of a member state without threatening that state’s sovereignty or power. The EU has increasingly become successful because of its accommodation with the British state, and the British state allows the EU as a mechanism to reconcile communities in Northern Ireland. MLG emphasises the multi-level nature of EU politics and attaches significance to the role played by subnational units and supranational institutions in the policy process. The model also proposes new forms of governance which offers a specific conception of EU politics based on an altered relationship between state and non-state actors, where the latter have become increasingly influential. The MLG model may not fully capture some of the internal constraints, complexities, and divisions which are characteristic of Northern Ireland’s recent political experience and which are reflected in its evolving relationship with the EU.

This chapter explains how the Equality Act 2010 has a direct relationship with the UK’s international human rights obligations at regional and global levels in the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, and the United Nations (UN). It is thus vital to the understanding, interpretation, and application of the Act to appreciate how it interacts with: EU equality and human rights law, before and after the UK ceasing its membership of the European Union (Brexit); the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which implements the ECHR; and the key United Nations Conventions which relate to issues of equality of particular groups. The UK’s membership of the EU ended on 31 January 2020. This will have a fundamental effect on the application of EU equality and human rights law to the Act. It should be noted, however, that the UK’s departure from the EU does not in any way affect its membership of the Council of Europe, or being a party to the ECHR. The ECHR has been implemented into the UK’s domestic law by the enactment of the HRA.

The chapter shows how, from the early beginnings of the efforts of the European idea’s founding fathers up until the present day, the European project has developed along three axes. The first follows the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the European Union (EU); the second follows the development of the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); the third follows the other European institutions, such as, for example, those concerned with military co-operation and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the Schengen area. The chapter shows how within a geographic space that has been enlarged considerably, the countries of Europe have attained a level of economic and political solidarity that undoubtedly surpasses the hopes of the founding fathers of the European project.

The European Union (EU) has become a community of citizens whose fates are massively affected by socioeconomic institutions they share in common. For this reason, the European Union will need to be governed not quite like a nation—which it will never be—but far more like a nation than like a mere international organization (IO)—which it no longer is and will never be again. That is, it should be governed far less through bargaining between member-states and far more through arguing between citizens and their representatives. This requires strengthening a common demos through such means as the pan-European election of some members of the European Parliament and the democratization of English as a lingua franca, while never losing sight of the fragmented nature of this demos. In this respect, the Swiss model should provide, if not guidance, at least inspiration.

In this chapter, alternative democracy promotion frames used by the US, EU, Russia, China, and the governments of the Central Asian states are assessed on several dimensions of effectiveness, including cultural compatibility, salience, consistency, and credibility. The effectiveness of the Central Asian governments' discursive frames is assessed against the beliefs, values, and dispositions of their own citizens, as determined by the survey instrument and focus groups. By looking at the limitations of the Western democracy promotion frames and the interest-based compatibility of ideas promoted by Russia and China, as well as by investigating the public resonance of national democracy frames, this chapter demonstrates that the alternative models for governance promoted by Russia and China enjoy greater support in Central Asia—just as the Central Asian governments' own models of democracy resonate strongly with their respective populations.

This paper exploits a detailed and original database to analyse the welfare and efficiency implications of the move to benchmark-based free allocation rules in EU ETS Phase 3(2013-20). It is shown empirically that the new allocation rules will lead to a material improvement of the distributional welfare properties of free allocation, by reducing the scope for windfall profits in non-electricity sectors of the EU ETS. Evidence also suggests that new rules have the potential to improve the economic efficiency of the EU ETS by forcing a larger share of installations to purchase allowances at the margin. However, although harmonised benchmarks help to reduce the scope for competitive distortions arising from differing allocation levels to installations in the same sector, the use of ex-ante output levels to determine allocations still leaves considerable scope for internal market distortions, as illustrated using the example of the cement sector.

The past thirty years and more has seen an extraordinary level of policy, legal, and regulatory activity in the telecommunications sector within the European Union (EU); with well over 100 different directives, decisions, regulations, recommendations, and resolutions, relating to every aspect of the industry, having been adopted since 1984. Such activity is a clear illustration that market liberalization should not be confused with concepts of market deregulation. While from a UK perspective, initial EU regulatory intervention in the telecommunications sector seldom impinged on the wider public consciousness, largely due to developments already commenced domestically, some Member States experienced significant political fall-out from Commission initiatives in the area, such as public sector industrial action.

This chapter begins with a discussion of international perspectives on democratization, premised on the assumption that the strategies of international actors determine the outcomes of democracy promotion abroad. It then offers a novel perspective on international democratization that relies on the concept of frames to discern the content of democracy promotion discourses. Specifically, this chapter looks at democracy promotion frames, which encompass a certain understanding of democracy, assumptions about why it is important, intended goals of democratization, and explanations of how to meet these democratic expectations. This chapter also outlines the various forms of research and analysis the author utilized for the study, including the process by which she examined texts produced by representatives of the US, EU, Russia, China, and the Central Asian governments, as well as her survey design.

This chapter complements the previous one by analyzing the determinants of the mobility of high-skilled individuals. It examines based on a sample of European students who obtained a PhD in economics in the US, whether the best among them are less likely to return. The evidence is in favor of “elite non-return migration”. “Better” students are indeed more likely to stay in the US for their first job, at least if they can stay at a top institution. This suggests that the quality of the working environment is of crucial importance for the return migration decision of top researchers. In addition, the location choice made for the first job strongly predicts the location of the current job. Particularly for those students with a first job at a US top institute, later return is less likely even if their current job in the US is at a non-top institute. These findings have important policy implications for the EU: promoting return migration of researchers requires more top quality research institutions, and focusing on early career PhD holders is especially useful.

The end of the Cold War and the increasingly rapid pace of globalization transformed the transatlantic economic community. This chapter will trace some of the major economic developments of the past three decades, including the impact of regional integration, the Great Recession of 2007–2010, the uncertainties produced by Britain’s decision to leave the EU (Brexit) in 2016, and the Trump administration’s apparent tilt toward economic nationalism. Yet, the history of the transatlantic economic space is also one of deeper interconnectedness and continued accumulation of wealth. After three decades of post–Cold War transformation, the transatlantic economy remains the cockpit of the global economy, the largest and wealthiest market in the world. Indeed, the ultimate paradox of the transatlantic economic relationship may well be that closer economic integration and interdependence has produced more transatlantic competition and closer scrutiny over the other side’s trading practices and labor standards.

European integration has long been one of the most controversial and divisive issues in British Conservative politics. It caused the deepest divisions in the party since the Corn Laws, contributing to Thatcher's downfall and undermining the government of her successor. This chapter traces how this issue was handled between 1997 and 2010. Whilst most academic attention has focused on the intense divisions Europe caused in the Conservative Party during the Thatcher and Major governments, the chapter suggests that the issue was largely neutralised within the party in opposition, when the Conservatives settled on a broadly Thatcherite Eurosceptic position. However, it is argued that returning to office is likely to heighten tensions, highlighting the continuing significance of this issue for contemporary Conservatism.

This chapter presents global anti-corruption efforts. While the United States has influenced these global efforts in important ways, civil society was also important for their development. The chapter starts with the background of fighting corruption and the American domestic laws initiated in the 1970s. Given that anti-corruption efforts have been institutionalized in different international organizations, the chapter subsequently presents these different, partly overlapping regulations. All major organizations are covered in detail, for example the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Union, and the United Nations. A network analysis shows that the United States is the most central actor in a global network of anti-corruption efforts. The chapter confirms the hypothesized relationship outlined before, given that the institutional entrepreneurship of the United States and a policy that is both prescriptive and rationalized resulted in rather fragmented governance effort.

Delegated legislation is produced by the executive branch of government, usually under powers conferred by legislatures. Such powers have provoked controversy in most contemporary democracies. There is a widely perceived need to bolster the democratic legitimacy of law produced in this way, either through greater legislative oversight or enhanced participation, or both. This chapter explores how the organically evolved UK constitution has struggled to meet this challenge since the outset of the twentieth century. It examines how the powers to adopt delegated legislation arose, the constitutional tensions it produced, and how that prehistory relates to the dramatic resort to such powers in recent legislation adopted to facilitate the UK’s departure from the European Union. More specifically, it surveys the experience of making and laying delegated legislation before Parliament, and the track record of parliamentary scrutiny, before considering how that background may play an important role in how Brexit-related delegated legislation may fare in legal challenges in the coming years.

This contribution argues for a truly reciprocal social investment pact for Europe: member states should be committed to policies that respond to the need for social investment; simultaneously, member states’ efforts in this direction—notably efforts by those in a difficult budgetary context—should be supported in a tangible way. Social investment is a policy perspective that should be based on a broad consensus between people who may entertain certain disagreements regarding the level of their empirical and/or normative understanding of the social world. For that reason, the expression of an ‘overlapping consensus’ is used for delineating social investment advocacy. Data on education spending show that we are far removed from a social investment perspective at the European Union (EU) level. This underscores the fact that social investment advocates need to clearly consider the role the EU has to play in social investment progress.