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This chapter argues that the risk of terrorist attacks by transnational groups has been systematically invoked by EU bodies to justify the launch (or expansion) of a broad set of risk-management programmes and projects that involve a combination of inclusive and exclusionary practices. To begin with, those actors seen as vulnerable to, but not yet fully corrupted by, the anti-liberal ideas promoted by terrorist organizations are to be supported, monitored, and guided by the EU in an attempt to transform them into self-disciplined, ‘responsible’ liberal actors who are worthy of inclusion in liberal relations of community. Thus, in the contemporary security environment, the EU has sought to enhance its ability to construct ‘good’ (liberal) actors, both in Europe and abroad, and in so doing also to expand the broader security community of liberal-democratic values. Those inclusive practices are accompanied by attempts at enhancing the collective ability of members of the Union to identify and exclude from their territory — or at least contain and place beyond the realm of normal politics and liberal socio-economic activities — individuals and groups with alleged links to international terrorism.

As decision-making in European foreign and security policy has remained an intergovernmental process where unanimous decision-making is the norm, this policy field seems a likely case for becoming entangled in the ‘joint-decision trap’. Nevertheless, this chapter reveals that through various mechanisms, the member states have managed to escape the trap to an extent that many analysts had not expected. Besides functional adaptation to changed external circumstances, learning from joint foreign policy experiences — particularly from the failure to address joint problems — is identified as an important mechanism. Additionally, the institutionalization of European foreign policy cooperation has facilitated the emergence of important procedural and substantive EU norms which, through elite socialisation processes, influence the outcome of policy-making. This is illustrated in the case study on the EU's military mission EUFOR RD Congo, which was successfully deployed even though key participating states like Germany and Poland have no immediate defence interests in Africa.

This chapter sheds some light on a number of dimensions of the requirement of consistency and coherence which characterize the position of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU external relations system. First, it examines the normative dimension of consistency by outlining the effects that the substantive interaction between security policy and external relations law may have on the legal autonomy of the respective sets of rules. It then highlights the political dimension of the need for coherence by focusing on the interactions between development cooperation and conflict prevention. Finally, it identifies certain areas where EU institutions and the Member States have developed practical mechanisms aiming at managing the conduct of ESDP and its interactions with EU external relations in an efficient manner.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been one of the most active areas of European foreign policy in recent years, and has launched over 20 foreign security operations since 2003. However, as the EU treaties are fairly limited in describing how the CSDP is supposed to operate, the EU has had to engage in a high degree of institutional improvisation in attempting to implement CSDP operations. This development demands further examination in light of not only the growing ambitions of the EU itself but also in terms of the increasing demands for security assistance placed on a variety of IOs, such as the UN, NATO, and the OSCE. This chapter examines these processes of institutional learning and change, paying close attention to several key CSDP operations that involve a mix of civilian and military tools; this type of integrated or ‘comprehensive approach’ is in fact rapidly becoming a hallmark of CSDP operations and may yield useful lessons for other attempts at crisis intervention and state-building. This is a critical question not only for European affairs but also for scholars of world politics and international development in light of recent experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, and elsewhere.

This chapter analyses the fight against terrorism in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the possible role of the European Union as a regional organisation under international law. It investigates the following issues: first, the changes terrorism has made to the nature of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) against the background of the negotiations on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; second, the consistency of the EU military contribution to the fight against terrorism with general international law and the collective security system.

This chapter analyses the main legal aspects of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations launched since 2003. These operations are addressed in chronological order, starting with a general overview and followed by an analysis of their international mandate, the legal status of the force/mission, and the applicable law and the participation of third States in the operation. The chapter focuses on common elements on the one hand and on peculiar aspects on the other.

The field of foreign and security policy reveals the uneven impact of Franco-German bilateralism. The two countries successfully promoted treaty reforms to make foreign, security, and defense policy part of the EC/EU’s remit through establishing a European foreign and security policy regime. They found common ground for instruments for military and civilian crisis management and actively participated in international crisis management activities in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). However, it was Franco-British leadership, backed by Germany, that led to the establishment of the ESDP in 1999. And Paris and Berlin could not provide strong leadership during a number of post-Cold War international crises: the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Iraq War in 2003, or the civil war in Libya in 2011. Differences in foreign policy traditions, in geopolitically defined interests, and in strategic cultures and military resources explain France and Germany’s limited impact in shaping this domain of European affairs.

This chapter investigates the development and transformation of the Spanish armed forces since Spain's entry into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its purpose is to allow for observations of the continuities in the process despite changes of government. It also explains several reasons for this continuity, including the lack of serious debate on the issue and an absence of a solid defense culture among Spanish leaders. Spain actively participated in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The new approaches using effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) were endorsed to alter the armed forces. The Spanish military planned to benefit from goals in the EBAO. It is shown that NATO significantly played in the evolving Spanish defense doctrine. Spanish strategic culture has then suffered due to the absence of an authentic government strategy for the use of its armed forces in foreign policy.