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This chapter analyzes alternative strategies—multilateral and regional—pursued by the Central Asian countries to integrate into a wider economic circle, emphasizing the shift from being part of the highly integrated Soviet economy to regional disintegration in the 1990s and early 2000s and then, after 2006, steps towards greater cooperation and integration. In the 1990s and 2000s, despite the actual multilateralism, only the Kyrgyz Republic joined the World Trade Organization. At the same time, a number of regional agreements were signed, both among the Central Asian countries and between Central Asian countries and their neighbors, although none had much influence, until the Eurasian Economic Union was constructed after 2009. Meanwhile, high costs of international trade in Central Asia are a symptom and a cause of regional disintegration.

This chapter looks at the national economy and transition strategies of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic was the most explicit of the Central Asian countries in attempting a rapid transition from central planning. Economic performance was, however, disappointing due to limited resources and poor institutions. The country became highly dependent on revenues from a single goldmine, Kumtor, while other mineral and hydro resources remain poorly developed. The biggest symptom of economic distress was the rise in number of Kyrgyz migrating to Russia for work; by the end of the oil boom, the numbers were commonly thought to be around a million people and in 2014, the Kyrgyz Republic's remittances to GDP ratio was the third highest in the world. This left the country susceptible to Russian pressure to join the Eurasian Economic Union, which it did in 2015, and vulnerable to downturns in the Russian economy.

This chapter examines two Eurasian international organizations in comparison, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the more recent Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a project of more advanced economic integration. It starts with the puzzling observation that the CIS established an IPI, whereas the EAEU did not, in spite of higher authority. The CIS International Parliamentary Assembly is best explained by international diffusion, as an attempt to strengthen the international legitimacy of newly independent states. By contrast, international diffusion backfired in the EAEU case. The adoption of the European Parliament model in the Russian proposal for a Eurasian Parliament was opposed by the smaller member states, who feared that it would put EAEU on a track towards a general-purpose international organization, which would undermine their sovereignty in a Russia-dominated political union.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)—an international organization for regional economic integration in post-Soviet space—has a judicial body aimed at ensuring uniform application of law. The predecessor of the EAEU—the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC)—also had its own judicial body. This chapter presents findings on the impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the legal system of the EAEU through the lens of citations of CJEU cases by the EAEU and EURASEC courts. Both courts refer to CJEU case law extensively, sometimes even adopting similar approaches, albeit others choosing to pursue different paths. The chapter shows the relevant statistics, explores the relative impact of citations, presents several prominent examples of judgments, and provides possible explanations of the approaches taken.

Unlike the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union, which was set up in 2015, but follows a long line of regional organizations which existed since 1995, focuses exclusively on economic affairs. The chapter discusses the governance and the membership of the EAEU, as well as its economic and political implications. It analyzes possible influences of the EAEU on the political regimes of the member countries, and concludes that the EAEU itself does not seem to exercise autocracy-promoting influences. However, the chapter shows that, by studying the EAEU, it is important to take into account an indirect effect: the existence of the EAEU triggers changes in Russian foreign policy, which in turn can contribute to the stabilization of authoritarian regimes.

The chapter argues that a tectonic geo-economic shift is currently taking place in former Soviet space. It looks like post-Soviet Eurasian space is currently transformed by three concurrent processes. First, post-Soviet geo-economic space is gradually shrinking as a geo-economic entity. Some of the post-Soviet states clearly opted for deeper integration into the global economic system through either Asian (Uzbekistan) or European (Ukraine) markets. Second, even those post-Soviet republics that sought closer forms of post-Soviet integration (Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union) are gradually increasing their economic exchanges outside of the bloc. And even Russia seeks to balance growing Chinese presence by launching new fuzzy regional ideas such as greater Eurasia. Third, infrastructure projects such as the Silk Road Economic Belt flow away from Russia-centred routes southward. New infrastructure projects stretching from north to south further add to geographic reorienting of Eurasian space further integrating it into the web of global interactions.

This chapter lays the foundation for the analysis of the post-Soviet Eurasian regional organizations. First, it provides empirical details necessary for understanding the evolution of regionalism in this part of the world. Second, it identifies three specific factors affecting the development of Eurasian regionalism: the role of historical legacies of the Communist era; the role of the limiting factor as a specific feature of many economies in Eurasia; and the impact of territorial conflicts and secessionism. The chapter analyzes how these features affected the development trajectories of Eurasian regionalism, as well as discusses whether, because of these specific phenomena, a study of regionalism in Eurasia can produce generalizable results.

This chapter examines Russia’s tortured history and present with the idea of its own “Europeanness” and sense of belonging to Europe. It argues that we must see the period of 1989 as the newest iteration of a long historical cycle, wherein Russia is seen as both part of and central to, and also apart from and threating to, “Europe.” After a brief discussion of the historical trajectory of arguments about the level of Russian and Soviet “Europeanness,” the chapter identifies the four different discourses of Europe that are found in contemporary Russian self-identity and politics. It then examines Russia’s Europeanization efforts in the cultural-civilizational, political, and security realms, focusing in particular on Russia’s attempt to create “Euro-alternatives” to the EU and NATO in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

This chapter examines the place of economics in Russian national identity debates. On the one side are modernizers who believe that embracing Western market institutions is the only way to restore Russia’s standing in the world. On the other side are nationalists who hold that economic integration will erode the political institutions and cultural norms that are central to Russian identity. They argue that erecting barriers to Western economic influence is necessary to prevent the exploitation of the Russian economy. In the period 2000–2008 Putin was developing a third-way model of state corporatism plus international integration, but this model revealed its limitations following the 2008 financial crash. He tried to launch an alternative in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union. However, the 2014 change of government in Kyiv meant that Ukraine was pulling out. The subsequent military confrontation seems to have pushed Russia in the direction of autarky.

The chapter starts out by analysing Russia’s official self-image regarding international law as expressed in the government’s strategic documents and the leaders’ foreign policy discourse which is overwhelmingly positive and in some ways idiosyncratic. The government’s self-image is partly explained by Russian understanding of international law, which emphasizes different constitutional principles in international law than the West. Next, a critical survey of post-Soviet Russian state practice is made, going through practice in European human rights law, cases of international economic law, and jus ad bellum. It is demonstrated how the understanding of history and theory of international law in Russia helps to understand patterns in post-Soviet state practice as well, and how civilizational factors explain some of Russia’s differences from the West in the context of international law.

The EBRD-UNCITRAL Public Procurement Reform Initiative is a technical cooperation program of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Initiative promotes the modernization of national public procurement systems and supports reform projects in transition countries designed to develop modern public procurement policies. This chapter explains the EBRD-UNCITRAL Initiative’s unique technical cooperation concept and discusses the challenges faced by the Initiative’s experts’ team working in Armenia, in particular how the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law is used as a regulatory tool to bridge the gap between the regional and global trade agreements, that is, the Eurasian Economic Union Treaty (EEUT) and the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and their respective requirements for public procurement policies.