Jason A. Springs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395044
- eISBN:
- 9780199866243
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395044.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Toward a Generous Orthodoxy provides a refined exposition of Hans Frei's christologically motivated engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Erich Auerbach, his use of ...
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Toward a Generous Orthodoxy provides a refined exposition of Hans Frei's christologically motivated engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Erich Auerbach, his use of ordinary language philosophy and nonfoundational philosophical insights, while illuminating and expanding his orientational indebtedness to Karl Barth's theology. By placing Frei's work into critical conversation with developments in pragmatist thought and cultural theory since his death, the rereading of Frei offered here aims to correct and resolve many of the complaints and misunderstandings that vex his theological legacy. The result is a clarification of the unity and coherence of Frei's work over the course of his career; a reframing of the complex relationship of his work to that of his Yale colleague George Lindbeck and successive "postliberal" theological trends; demonstration that Frei's uses of Barth, Wittgenstein, Auerbach, and Geertz do not relegate his theological approach to critical quietism, methodological separatism, epistemic fideism, or a so-called "theological ghetto"; explication and development of Frei's account of the "plain sense" of Scripture that evades charges of narrative foundationalism and essentialism on one hand and, on the other, avoids criticisms that any account so emphasizing culture, language, and practice will reduce scriptural meaning to the ways the text is used in Christian practice and community. What emerges from Toward a Generous Orthodoxy is a sharpened account of the christologically anchored, interdisciplinary, and conversational character of Frei's theology, which he came to describe as a "generous orthodoxy," modeling a way for academic theological voices to take seriously both their vocation to the Christian church and their roles as interlocutors in the academic discourse.Less
Toward a Generous Orthodoxy provides a refined exposition of Hans Frei's christologically motivated engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Erich Auerbach, his use of ordinary language philosophy and nonfoundational philosophical insights, while illuminating and expanding his orientational indebtedness to Karl Barth's theology. By placing Frei's work into critical conversation with developments in pragmatist thought and cultural theory since his death, the rereading of Frei offered here aims to correct and resolve many of the complaints and misunderstandings that vex his theological legacy. The result is a clarification of the unity and coherence of Frei's work over the course of his career; a reframing of the complex relationship of his work to that of his Yale colleague George Lindbeck and successive "postliberal" theological trends; demonstration that Frei's uses of Barth, Wittgenstein, Auerbach, and Geertz do not relegate his theological approach to critical quietism, methodological separatism, epistemic fideism, or a so-called "theological ghetto"; explication and development of Frei's account of the "plain sense" of Scripture that evades charges of narrative foundationalism and essentialism on one hand and, on the other, avoids criticisms that any account so emphasizing culture, language, and practice will reduce scriptural meaning to the ways the text is used in Christian practice and community. What emerges from Toward a Generous Orthodoxy is a sharpened account of the christologically anchored, interdisciplinary, and conversational character of Frei's theology, which he came to describe as a "generous orthodoxy," modeling a way for academic theological voices to take seriously both their vocation to the Christian church and their roles as interlocutors in the academic discourse.
Michael A Bishop and J. D. Trout
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195162295
- eISBN:
- 9780199835539
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195162293.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the subsequent chapters in this book which will discuss topics such as epistemological theory, Statistical Prediction Rules, Strategic Reliabilism, ...
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This introductory chapter presents an overview of the subsequent chapters in this book which will discuss topics such as epistemological theory, Statistical Prediction Rules, Strategic Reliabilism, and Standard Analytic Epistemology.Less
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the subsequent chapters in this book which will discuss topics such as epistemological theory, Statistical Prediction Rules, Strategic Reliabilism, and Standard Analytic Epistemology.
Larry Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780231178402
- eISBN:
- 9780231542142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231178402.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
There are many who believe Moses parted the Red Sea and Jesus came back from the dead. Others are certain that exorcisms occur, ghosts haunt attics, and the blessed can cure the terminally ill. ...
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There are many who believe Moses parted the Red Sea and Jesus came back from the dead. Others are certain that exorcisms occur, ghosts haunt attics, and the blessed can cure the terminally ill. Though miracles are immensely improbable, people have embraced them for millennia, seeing in them proof of a supernatural world that resists scientific explanation.
Helping us to think more critically about our belief in the improbable, The Miracle Myth casts a skeptical eye on attempts to justify belief in the supernatural, laying bare the fallacies that such attempts commit. Through arguments and accessible analysis, Larry Shapiro sharpens our critical faculties so we become less susceptible to tales of myths and miracles and learn how, ultimately, to evaluate claims regarding vastly improbable events on our own. Shapiro acknowledges that belief in miracles could be harmless, but cautions against allowing such beliefs to guide how we live our lives. His investigation reminds us of the importance of evidence and rational thinking as we explore the unknown.Less
There are many who believe Moses parted the Red Sea and Jesus came back from the dead. Others are certain that exorcisms occur, ghosts haunt attics, and the blessed can cure the terminally ill. Though miracles are immensely improbable, people have embraced them for millennia, seeing in them proof of a supernatural world that resists scientific explanation.
Helping us to think more critically about our belief in the improbable, The Miracle Myth casts a skeptical eye on attempts to justify belief in the supernatural, laying bare the fallacies that such attempts commit. Through arguments and accessible analysis, Larry Shapiro sharpens our critical faculties so we become less susceptible to tales of myths and miracles and learn how, ultimately, to evaluate claims regarding vastly improbable events on our own. Shapiro acknowledges that belief in miracles could be harmless, but cautions against allowing such beliefs to guide how we live our lives. His investigation reminds us of the importance of evidence and rational thinking as we explore the unknown.
Anastasia Marinopoulou
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781526105370
- eISBN:
- 9781526128157
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781526105370.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The book makes a critical comparison of fundamental trends in modern epistemology with the epistemological concerns of critical theory of the Frankfurt School. It comprises five chapters, which refer ...
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The book makes a critical comparison of fundamental trends in modern epistemology with the epistemological concerns of critical theory of the Frankfurt School. It comprises five chapters, which refer to phenomenology, structuralism and poststructuralism, modernism and postmodernism, systems’ theory and critical realism.It follows the course of development of modern epistemology, considering basic conceptions such as dialectics, theory and practice in science, and the potential for a political epistemology based on the arguments of critical theory. It can certainly be used as a textbook because each chapter tallies with a major trend in modern epistemology, and provides a concrete analysis of the comparison it draws with the work of leading figures of the Frankfurt School such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas.The present volume addresses the reader of political theory, epistemology, social theory and it also raises key questions on methodology in science and research. Therefore, it can prove beneficial for students, researchers and academics that deal with issues of theory, practice, and method in science. The contents of the volume were meticulously constructed in order to be of practical use both for undergraduate and postgraduate students, and each chapter includes basic graphs that condense the basic argument for each thematic circle on modern epistemology and methodology.The book contains unpublished critique and information provided to the writer in recent interviews she conducted with Jürgen Habermas (providing analysis on systems theory), William Outhwaite and Stefan Müller-Doohm (both the latter clarified issues and contributed valuable information on critical realism and the Frankfurt School, respectively).Less
The book makes a critical comparison of fundamental trends in modern epistemology with the epistemological concerns of critical theory of the Frankfurt School. It comprises five chapters, which refer to phenomenology, structuralism and poststructuralism, modernism and postmodernism, systems’ theory and critical realism.It follows the course of development of modern epistemology, considering basic conceptions such as dialectics, theory and practice in science, and the potential for a political epistemology based on the arguments of critical theory. It can certainly be used as a textbook because each chapter tallies with a major trend in modern epistemology, and provides a concrete analysis of the comparison it draws with the work of leading figures of the Frankfurt School such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas.The present volume addresses the reader of political theory, epistemology, social theory and it also raises key questions on methodology in science and research. Therefore, it can prove beneficial for students, researchers and academics that deal with issues of theory, practice, and method in science. The contents of the volume were meticulously constructed in order to be of practical use both for undergraduate and postgraduate students, and each chapter includes basic graphs that condense the basic argument for each thematic circle on modern epistemology and methodology.The book contains unpublished critique and information provided to the writer in recent interviews she conducted with Jürgen Habermas (providing analysis on systems theory), William Outhwaite and Stefan Müller-Doohm (both the latter clarified issues and contributed valuable information on critical realism and the Frankfurt School, respectively).
Judah Schept
- Published in print:
- 1942
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781479810710
- eISBN:
- 9781479802821
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479810710.003.0006
- Subject:
- Sociology, Law, Crime and Deviance
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the production of local knowledge about crime and incarceration to better account for the role of that knowledge in shaping the county’s carceral politics. Chapter 5 looks at ...
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Chapters 5 and 6 examine the production of local knowledge about crime and incarceration to better account for the role of that knowledge in shaping the county’s carceral politics. Chapter 5 looks at the circulation of technocratic discourses in and through local experts and media that restructured local knowledge into support for the justice campus and other expansionist policies. One longer section within the chapter examines the discourse of evidence-based practices and considers the ways that both supporters of expansion and community organizers opposed to it approached the discursive terrain of such specialized and technocratic language.Less
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the production of local knowledge about crime and incarceration to better account for the role of that knowledge in shaping the county’s carceral politics. Chapter 5 looks at the circulation of technocratic discourses in and through local experts and media that restructured local knowledge into support for the justice campus and other expansionist policies. One longer section within the chapter examines the discourse of evidence-based practices and considers the ways that both supporters of expansion and community organizers opposed to it approached the discursive terrain of such specialized and technocratic language.
Judah Schept
- Published in print:
- 1942
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781479810710
- eISBN:
- 9781479802821
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479810710.003.0007
- Subject:
- Sociology, Law, Crime and Deviance
Chapter 6 is devoted entirely to a close examination of the substantial history of national and state corrections consultants in the county, paying particular attention to the two consultants whose ...
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Chapter 6 is devoted entirely to a close examination of the substantial history of national and state corrections consultants in the county, paying particular attention to the two consultants whose work was instrumental in shaping the expansion projects that receive the most attention in the book. Both chapters 5 and 6 engage debates about exclusionary languages and practices of late modernity and map them onto ethnographic examples of policy discussions that abstracted human lives into penological concerns with management and control and that privileged experts at the expense of alternative-and very real-understandings of incarceration. In examining consultants’ official reports, practitioners’ testimonies, and editorials and news stories in the media, these chapters trace the epistemological processes by which local carceral politics came to embrace and resemble the carceral state, even as many people in the community claimed a certain degree of knowledge about mass incarceration that absolved them of any complicity in its local replication.Less
Chapter 6 is devoted entirely to a close examination of the substantial history of national and state corrections consultants in the county, paying particular attention to the two consultants whose work was instrumental in shaping the expansion projects that receive the most attention in the book. Both chapters 5 and 6 engage debates about exclusionary languages and practices of late modernity and map them onto ethnographic examples of policy discussions that abstracted human lives into penological concerns with management and control and that privileged experts at the expense of alternative-and very real-understandings of incarceration. In examining consultants’ official reports, practitioners’ testimonies, and editorials and news stories in the media, these chapters trace the epistemological processes by which local carceral politics came to embrace and resemble the carceral state, even as many people in the community claimed a certain degree of knowledge about mass incarceration that absolved them of any complicity in its local replication.
Cyriel M. A. Pennartz
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029315
- eISBN:
- 9780262330121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029315.003.0011
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical ...
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Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical positions such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism. We discuss dualist arguments such as the case of philosophical 'zombies'. However, while these seem conceivable, they are argued not to be realizable: the construction of neural machinery appropriate for zombies would inevitably give rise to consciousness. Following a discussion of Jackson’s argument on “Mary the Color Scientist”, the reality of phenomenal experience is acknowledged as much as the reality of neural levels of processing, placing the theory away from eliminative materialism and classic functionalism. This characterizes the theory as a non-reductive, multilevel, neurobiological form of representationalism ('neurorepresentationalism'). Although representationalists have not been typically concerned with the problem of how neural aggregates give rise to consciousness, the “externalist” stream in this school is much more distant from the current view than the “narrow” stream emphasizing that representations are generated in and by the brain. Finally, we discuss consciousness in animals and in human-made inventions such as computers and robots, and on future treatment of disorders of consciousness.Less
Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical positions such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism. We discuss dualist arguments such as the case of philosophical 'zombies'. However, while these seem conceivable, they are argued not to be realizable: the construction of neural machinery appropriate for zombies would inevitably give rise to consciousness. Following a discussion of Jackson’s argument on “Mary the Color Scientist”, the reality of phenomenal experience is acknowledged as much as the reality of neural levels of processing, placing the theory away from eliminative materialism and classic functionalism. This characterizes the theory as a non-reductive, multilevel, neurobiological form of representationalism ('neurorepresentationalism'). Although representationalists have not been typically concerned with the problem of how neural aggregates give rise to consciousness, the “externalist” stream in this school is much more distant from the current view than the “narrow” stream emphasizing that representations are generated in and by the brain. Finally, we discuss consciousness in animals and in human-made inventions such as computers and robots, and on future treatment of disorders of consciousness.
David Webb
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780748624218
- eISBN:
- 9780748684472
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624218.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The book proposes that Foucault's archaeology is a direct response to the predicament for thought in modernity that he described in the closing chapters of The Order of Things, and that science and ...
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The book proposes that Foucault's archaeology is a direct response to the predicament for thought in modernity that he described in the closing chapters of The Order of Things, and that science and mathematics are fundamental to the possibility of this response. Centered around the figure of man, Foucault described thinking in modernity as split between empirical and transcendental forms of enquiry, neither of which is able to secure a foundation. To understand how Foucault responds to this situation, the book sets out a series of key ideas in the work of Gaston Bachelard, Jean Cavaillès, and Michel Serres that pave the way for Foucault's account of the historical character of the formal conditions of knowledge. In this way, Foucault's conception of discourse, and above all of the historical a priori, can be understood against the background of what he calls the mathematical a priori. The book also provides an analysis of what Foucault calls ‘temporal dispersion’, tracing this idea back to his critique of Kant. Employing these ideas, the book goes on to provide a detailed commentary on Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge.Less
The book proposes that Foucault's archaeology is a direct response to the predicament for thought in modernity that he described in the closing chapters of The Order of Things, and that science and mathematics are fundamental to the possibility of this response. Centered around the figure of man, Foucault described thinking in modernity as split between empirical and transcendental forms of enquiry, neither of which is able to secure a foundation. To understand how Foucault responds to this situation, the book sets out a series of key ideas in the work of Gaston Bachelard, Jean Cavaillès, and Michel Serres that pave the way for Foucault's account of the historical character of the formal conditions of knowledge. In this way, Foucault's conception of discourse, and above all of the historical a priori, can be understood against the background of what he calls the mathematical a priori. The book also provides an analysis of what Foucault calls ‘temporal dispersion’, tracing this idea back to his critique of Kant. Employing these ideas, the book goes on to provide a detailed commentary on Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge.
Timothy Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256563
- eISBN:
- 9780191598678
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925656X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The book develops a conception of epistemology in which the notion of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental. It reverses the traditional programme of trying to analyse knowledge as a combination of ...
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The book develops a conception of epistemology in which the notion of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental. It reverses the traditional programme of trying to analyse knowledge as a combination of truth, belief, and other factors, such as justification. Rather, belief is a state whose successful form is knowledge, and justification is on the basis of knowledge, which is acquainted with evidence. Knowing is as much a mental state as believing, but it is world‐involving because one can know only what is true; the book extends the externalist conception of mind from the contents of mental states to the attitudes to those contents. As with other mental states, one cannot always know whether one is in the state of knowing. It is argued that this is a special case of a much more general phenomenon; no non‐trivial conditions are such that one is always in a position to know that they obtain whenever they in fact do so. This result has disturbing implications for the nature of rationality, because one is not always in a position to know what it is rational to do. Traditional arguments for scepticism fail because they assume that one is always in a position to know what one's evidence is. The speech act of assertion is also governed by a norm of knowledge. A final chapter explores the limits on what can be known that are revealed by the so‐called paradox of knowability.Less
The book develops a conception of epistemology in which the notion of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental. It reverses the traditional programme of trying to analyse knowledge as a combination of truth, belief, and other factors, such as justification. Rather, belief is a state whose successful form is knowledge, and justification is on the basis of knowledge, which is acquainted with evidence. Knowing is as much a mental state as believing, but it is world‐involving because one can know only what is true; the book extends the externalist conception of mind from the contents of mental states to the attitudes to those contents. As with other mental states, one cannot always know whether one is in the state of knowing. It is argued that this is a special case of a much more general phenomenon; no non‐trivial conditions are such that one is always in a position to know that they obtain whenever they in fact do so. This result has disturbing implications for the nature of rationality, because one is not always in a position to know what it is rational to do. Traditional arguments for scepticism fail because they assume that one is always in a position to know what one's evidence is. The speech act of assertion is also governed by a norm of knowledge. A final chapter explores the limits on what can be known that are revealed by the so‐called paradox of knowability.
Jeremy Barris
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780823262144
- eISBN:
- 9780823266647
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823262144.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Sometimes Always True aims to resolve three connected problems. First, we need an undogmatic pluralist standpoint in political theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. But genuine pluralism suffers ...
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Sometimes Always True aims to resolve three connected problems. First, we need an undogmatic pluralist standpoint in political theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. But genuine pluralism suffers from the contradiction that making room for fundamental differences in outlook means making room for outlooks that exclude pluralism. Second, philosophy involves reflecting on the world and meaning as a whole, yet this means adopting a vantage point in some way outside of meaning. Third, our lived experience of the sense of our lives similarly undermines its own sense, as it involves having a vantage point in some way wholly outside ourselves. In detailed engagement with, among others, Davidson, Rorty, Heidegger, Foucault Wilde, and gender and sexuality theory, the book argues that these contradictions are so thoroughgoing that, like the Liar’s Paradox, they cancel the bases of their own meaning. Consequently, it argues, they resolve themselves, and do so in a way that produces a vantage point on these issues that is not dogmatically circular because it is, workably, both within and outside these issues’ sense. The solution to a genuinely undogmatic pluralism, then, is to enter into these contradictions and the process of their self-resolution.Less
Sometimes Always True aims to resolve three connected problems. First, we need an undogmatic pluralist standpoint in political theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. But genuine pluralism suffers from the contradiction that making room for fundamental differences in outlook means making room for outlooks that exclude pluralism. Second, philosophy involves reflecting on the world and meaning as a whole, yet this means adopting a vantage point in some way outside of meaning. Third, our lived experience of the sense of our lives similarly undermines its own sense, as it involves having a vantage point in some way wholly outside ourselves. In detailed engagement with, among others, Davidson, Rorty, Heidegger, Foucault Wilde, and gender and sexuality theory, the book argues that these contradictions are so thoroughgoing that, like the Liar’s Paradox, they cancel the bases of their own meaning. Consequently, it argues, they resolve themselves, and do so in a way that produces a vantage point on these issues that is not dogmatically circular because it is, workably, both within and outside these issues’ sense. The solution to a genuinely undogmatic pluralism, then, is to enter into these contradictions and the process of their self-resolution.
Steve Woolgar
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262525381
- eISBN:
- 9780262319157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262525381.003.0015
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Technology and Society
This chapter comprises brief commentaries by seven authors with long-standing and formative roles in studies of representational practice. Lorraine Daston speaks of intractable conceptual problems ...
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This chapter comprises brief commentaries by seven authors with long-standing and formative roles in studies of representational practice. Lorraine Daston speaks of intractable conceptual problems associated with the very idea of representation and argues that we need to shift from epistemological to ontological treatments of images. Michael Lynch reflects on the ways in which philosophical pictures hold us captive, in earlier times with respect to reference, and more recently with respect to information. Steve Woolgar looks back on various attempts to problematize and displace the notion of representation since the publication of the earlier volume. Lucy Suchman calls for a greater measure of reflexivity in our studies of representation, to understand what exclusions we generate through our own practices of articulating and bounding the phenomena we study. John Law asks us to attend to the “collateral realities” that are being “done” at the periphery of what representation in scientific practice is ostensibly about. Martin Kemp discusses how visual images and graphics are used to evoke “reality,” as though directly on the page or screen. Bruno Latour argues that the supposed “gap” between previously unknown realities and visual images is densely populated by “long cascades of successive traces.” These seven short pieces comment on the nature and prospects of studies of representation in general. In this vein, they reference the “big” themes of representation— for example, epistemology, ontology, visualization, and trust. The commentaries thus provide an interesting complement to the empirical case studies in the book. Whereas the latter deliver a crucial deflationary effect— “science” is brought down to earth, made commonplace and subject to epistemic leveling; the “elevator words” in philosophy of science are unloaded at the ground floor (Hacking 1999, 21ff)— these final commentaries remind us about the traps, troubles, and taken-for-granted assumptions that continue to characterize even the very best empirical studies of representational work. Reference Hacking, Ian. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Less
This chapter comprises brief commentaries by seven authors with long-standing and formative roles in studies of representational practice. Lorraine Daston speaks of intractable conceptual problems associated with the very idea of representation and argues that we need to shift from epistemological to ontological treatments of images. Michael Lynch reflects on the ways in which philosophical pictures hold us captive, in earlier times with respect to reference, and more recently with respect to information. Steve Woolgar looks back on various attempts to problematize and displace the notion of representation since the publication of the earlier volume. Lucy Suchman calls for a greater measure of reflexivity in our studies of representation, to understand what exclusions we generate through our own practices of articulating and bounding the phenomena we study. John Law asks us to attend to the “collateral realities” that are being “done” at the periphery of what representation in scientific practice is ostensibly about. Martin Kemp discusses how visual images and graphics are used to evoke “reality,” as though directly on the page or screen. Bruno Latour argues that the supposed “gap” between previously unknown realities and visual images is densely populated by “long cascades of successive traces.” These seven short pieces comment on the nature and prospects of studies of representation in general. In this vein, they reference the “big” themes of representation— for example, epistemology, ontology, visualization, and trust. The commentaries thus provide an interesting complement to the empirical case studies in the book. Whereas the latter deliver a crucial deflationary effect— “science” is brought down to earth, made commonplace and subject to epistemic leveling; the “elevator words” in philosophy of science are unloaded at the ground floor (Hacking 1999, 21ff)— these final commentaries remind us about the traps, troubles, and taken-for-granted assumptions that continue to characterize even the very best empirical studies of representational work. Reference Hacking, Ian. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sharon Luk
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780520296237
- eISBN:
- 9780520968820
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520296237.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This book explores the life-worlds sustained through letter correspondence within the evolution of racism and mass incarceration in California history. Across three cases, this investigation uncovers ...
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This book explores the life-worlds sustained through letter correspondence within the evolution of racism and mass incarceration in California history. Across three cases, this investigation uncovers how letter correspondence facilitates a form of communal life for groups targeted for racialized confinement in different phases of development in the U.S. West: “Detained” focuses on migrants from Southern China during peak years of U.S. Chinese Exclusion; “Interned” focuses on families of Japanese ancestry during the WWII period; and “Imprisoned” focuses on socialities of Blackness in the post-Civil Rights era. This study clarifies how mass incarceration functions as a process of systematic social dismantling, situating research on letters within global capitalist movements, multiple racial logics, and overlapping modes of social control that have taken distinctive form in California. Framing letters within this political violence that qualifies them, this book examines how the structural, physical, ideological, and affective labor internalized in the letter creates alternative conditions to reinvent people’s own ways of life: a “poetics” or art of becoming, mediated in and through the letter and the interaction of literature with history, that prioritizes the dynamics of creative essence to generate an other kind of social power bound to the unfathomable.Less
This book explores the life-worlds sustained through letter correspondence within the evolution of racism and mass incarceration in California history. Across three cases, this investigation uncovers how letter correspondence facilitates a form of communal life for groups targeted for racialized confinement in different phases of development in the U.S. West: “Detained” focuses on migrants from Southern China during peak years of U.S. Chinese Exclusion; “Interned” focuses on families of Japanese ancestry during the WWII period; and “Imprisoned” focuses on socialities of Blackness in the post-Civil Rights era. This study clarifies how mass incarceration functions as a process of systematic social dismantling, situating research on letters within global capitalist movements, multiple racial logics, and overlapping modes of social control that have taken distinctive form in California. Framing letters within this political violence that qualifies them, this book examines how the structural, physical, ideological, and affective labor internalized in the letter creates alternative conditions to reinvent people’s own ways of life: a “poetics” or art of becoming, mediated in and through the letter and the interaction of literature with history, that prioritizes the dynamics of creative essence to generate an other kind of social power bound to the unfathomable.
Peter Hylton
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198240181
- eISBN:
- 9780191597763
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824018X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Deals with the evolution of Russell's metaphysical and epistemological views, from roughly 1906 to 1913. In metaphysics, he gives up on the primacy of propositions and the undefinability of truth; ...
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Deals with the evolution of Russell's metaphysical and epistemological views, from roughly 1906 to 1913. In metaphysics, he gives up on the primacy of propositions and the undefinability of truth; facts become fundamental, and truth defined. Epistemology becomes a far more central concern of Russell's than before and is dominated by the idea of acquaintance, a presuppositionless relation between the mind and entities outside the mind. In both fields, Russell develops a constructivist method, greatly influenced by logic, which was to have a far‐reaching influence on later analytic philosophy.Less
Deals with the evolution of Russell's metaphysical and epistemological views, from roughly 1906 to 1913. In metaphysics, he gives up on the primacy of propositions and the undefinability of truth; facts become fundamental, and truth defined. Epistemology becomes a far more central concern of Russell's than before and is dominated by the idea of acquaintance, a presuppositionless relation between the mind and entities outside the mind. In both fields, Russell develops a constructivist method, greatly influenced by logic, which was to have a far‐reaching influence on later analytic philosophy.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251582
- eISBN:
- 9780191598012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251584.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this essay, McGinn argues for a version of reliabilism, contending that a belief counts as knowledge just in case ‘it is produced by a method capable of yielding true beliefs in a range of ...
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In this essay, McGinn argues for a version of reliabilism, contending that a belief counts as knowledge just in case ‘it is produced by a method capable of yielding true beliefs in a range of relevant cases’. This view diverges from other versions of reliabilism, notably Robert Nozick's counter‐factionalist tracking theory, which, McGinn argues, ‘localizes the conditions for knowledge into a relation between the knower and a unique proposition’. Against this local analysis of propositional knowledge, McGinn presents a global reliabilism in which the notion of discrimination is basic. On McGinn's view, global reliability consists in a subject's capacity to distinguish the true from the false within a relevant class of propositions. McGinn concludes by considering the implications of his view for sceptical arguments—in particular, the claim that knowledge is not closed under known logical implication.Less
In this essay, McGinn argues for a version of reliabilism, contending that a belief counts as knowledge just in case ‘it is produced by a method capable of yielding true beliefs in a range of relevant cases’. This view diverges from other versions of reliabilism, notably Robert Nozick's counter‐factionalist tracking theory, which, McGinn argues, ‘localizes the conditions for knowledge into a relation between the knower and a unique proposition’. Against this local analysis of propositional knowledge, McGinn presents a global reliabilism in which the notion of discrimination is basic. On McGinn's view, global reliability consists in a subject's capacity to distinguish the true from the false within a relevant class of propositions. McGinn concludes by considering the implications of his view for sceptical arguments—in particular, the claim that knowledge is not closed under known logical implication.
Anthony Briggman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199641536
- eISBN:
- 9780191738302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641536.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies, Theology
While chapter 3 considered the features of Irneaeus’ theology of the Spirit in AH 3 that are less relevant to his later pneumatological development and our particular examination of it, this chapter ...
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While chapter 3 considered the features of Irneaeus’ theology of the Spirit in AH 3 that are less relevant to his later pneumatological development and our particular examination of it, this chapter addresses aspects of Irenaeus’ theology of the Spirit in AH 3 that continue to appear in one form or another over the course of his pneumatological development and throughout this study. The Holy Spirit anoints the humanity of Jesus so that he could fulfill his Messianic mission. As the Unction of Christ the Spirit anoints members of the church, uniting individuals into the one body of Christ and rendering them productive. The Spirit is the gift who vivifies those who receive him by uniting believers to himself and to the glorified Christ. Lastly, the agency of the Spirit in creation enables created beings to know the love and infinite kindness of God, while simultaneously marking the limit of that knowledge.Less
While chapter 3 considered the features of Irneaeus’ theology of the Spirit in AH 3 that are less relevant to his later pneumatological development and our particular examination of it, this chapter addresses aspects of Irenaeus’ theology of the Spirit in AH 3 that continue to appear in one form or another over the course of his pneumatological development and throughout this study. The Holy Spirit anoints the humanity of Jesus so that he could fulfill his Messianic mission. As the Unction of Christ the Spirit anoints members of the church, uniting individuals into the one body of Christ and rendering them productive. The Spirit is the gift who vivifies those who receive him by uniting believers to himself and to the glorified Christ. Lastly, the agency of the Spirit in creation enables created beings to know the love and infinite kindness of God, while simultaneously marking the limit of that knowledge.
Daniel M. Eaton and Timothy H. Pickavance
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806967
- eISBN:
- 9780191844461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Pragmatic encroachment, the view that knowledge is sensitive to one’s practical situation, is a marked departure from traditional epistemology. What follows from this view? This chapter gives a ...
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Pragmatic encroachment, the view that knowledge is sensitive to one’s practical situation, is a marked departure from traditional epistemology. What follows from this view? This chapter gives a partial answer by defending the following conditional: If pragmatic encroachment is true, then it takes more evidence to know that atheism is true than to know that God exists. The chapter begins by introducing and unpacking the technical term ‘practical adequacy’ and then uses it to define pragmatic encroachment. It then connects this version of pragmatic encroachment and Pascal’s Wager. The connection yields an argument for the thesis of the chapter. Importantly, no stand is taken here as to whether one ought to affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent of this conditional. Maybe it takes more to know that atheism is true, but maybe this version of pragmatic encroachment is false.Less
Pragmatic encroachment, the view that knowledge is sensitive to one’s practical situation, is a marked departure from traditional epistemology. What follows from this view? This chapter gives a partial answer by defending the following conditional: If pragmatic encroachment is true, then it takes more evidence to know that atheism is true than to know that God exists. The chapter begins by introducing and unpacking the technical term ‘practical adequacy’ and then uses it to define pragmatic encroachment. It then connects this version of pragmatic encroachment and Pascal’s Wager. The connection yields an argument for the thesis of the chapter. Importantly, no stand is taken here as to whether one ought to affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent of this conditional. Maybe it takes more to know that atheism is true, but maybe this version of pragmatic encroachment is false.
Larry Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780231178402
- eISBN:
- 9780231542142
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231178402.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Some beliefs are justified, some not. Some beliefs are true, some not. Even justified beliefs might be false, and even true beliefs might not be justified. These ideas are important for understanding ...
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Some beliefs are justified, some not. Some beliefs are true, some not. Even justified beliefs might be false, and even true beliefs might not be justified. These ideas are important for understanding why beliefs in miracles, even if true, may not be justified.Less
Some beliefs are justified, some not. Some beliefs are true, some not. Even justified beliefs might be false, and even true beliefs might not be justified. These ideas are important for understanding why beliefs in miracles, even if true, may not be justified.
J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198716310
- eISBN:
- 9780191785023
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
“Knowledge-First” constitutes what is widely regarded as the most significant innovation in contemporary epistemology in the past twenty-five years. Knowledge-first epistemology is (in short) the ...
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“Knowledge-First” constitutes what is widely regarded as the most significant innovation in contemporary epistemology in the past twenty-five years. Knowledge-first epistemology is (in short) the idea that knowledge per se is an epistemic kind with theoretical importance that is not derivative from its relationship to other epistemic kinds such as rationality. Knowledge-first epistemology is rightly associated with Timothy Williamson in light of his influential book, Knowledge and Its Limits (KAIL). In KAIL, Williamson suggests that although knowing might be characterized as a very general kind of factive mental state, meeting the conditions for knowing is not constitutively explained by meeting the conditions for anything else, e.g. justified true belief. Accordingly, knowledge is conceptually and metaphysically prior to other cognitive and epistemic kinds. In this way, the concept know is a theoretical primitive. The status of know as a theoretical primitive makes it particularly suitable for using it to make substantive constitutive and causal explanations of a number of other phenomena, including the nature of belief, the nature of evidence, and the success of intentional actions. One of the principal virtues of the knowledge-first approach in epistemology is the way that it connects epistemology to other areas in philosophy. This virtue explains in part some of the wide-ranging impact the knowledge-first approach has had over the past decade or so, and it is a virtue that this volume shares. Specifically, the volume explores not merely the knowledge-first approach in epistemology, but also its ramifications for a variety of areas in philosophy, including the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the philosophy of action, and value theory.Less
“Knowledge-First” constitutes what is widely regarded as the most significant innovation in contemporary epistemology in the past twenty-five years. Knowledge-first epistemology is (in short) the idea that knowledge per se is an epistemic kind with theoretical importance that is not derivative from its relationship to other epistemic kinds such as rationality. Knowledge-first epistemology is rightly associated with Timothy Williamson in light of his influential book, Knowledge and Its Limits (KAIL). In KAIL, Williamson suggests that although knowing might be characterized as a very general kind of factive mental state, meeting the conditions for knowing is not constitutively explained by meeting the conditions for anything else, e.g. justified true belief. Accordingly, knowledge is conceptually and metaphysically prior to other cognitive and epistemic kinds. In this way, the concept know is a theoretical primitive. The status of know as a theoretical primitive makes it particularly suitable for using it to make substantive constitutive and causal explanations of a number of other phenomena, including the nature of belief, the nature of evidence, and the success of intentional actions. One of the principal virtues of the knowledge-first approach in epistemology is the way that it connects epistemology to other areas in philosophy. This virtue explains in part some of the wide-ranging impact the knowledge-first approach has had over the past decade or so, and it is a virtue that this volume shares. Specifically, the volume explores not merely the knowledge-first approach in epistemology, but also its ramifications for a variety of areas in philosophy, including the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the philosophy of action, and value theory.
Christopher A. Stephenson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199916795
- eISBN:
- 9780199980284
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916795.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Chapter 4 considers the method of making pneumatology the starting point for philosophical and fundamental theology. The representative of this approach is Amos Yong. Similar to Macchia, Yong ...
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Chapter 4 considers the method of making pneumatology the starting point for philosophical and fundamental theology. The representative of this approach is Amos Yong. Similar to Macchia, Yong explores traditional doctrinal loci from a pneumatological perspective; however, Yong also addresses metaphysical, epistemological, and hermeneutical issues that Macchia does not. By giving a pneumatological account of the God-world relationship (“foundational pneumatology”) and of human interpretation and knowing (“pneumatological imagination”), Yong lays the groundwork for a global theology that is characteristically pentecostal.Less
Chapter 4 considers the method of making pneumatology the starting point for philosophical and fundamental theology. The representative of this approach is Amos Yong. Similar to Macchia, Yong explores traditional doctrinal loci from a pneumatological perspective; however, Yong also addresses metaphysical, epistemological, and hermeneutical issues that Macchia does not. By giving a pneumatological account of the God-world relationship (“foundational pneumatology”) and of human interpretation and knowing (“pneumatological imagination”), Yong lays the groundwork for a global theology that is characteristically pentecostal.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ...
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This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.Less
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.
