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Toward a Generous Orthodoxy provides a refined exposition of Hans Frei's christologically motivated engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Erich Auerbach, his use of ordinary language philosophy and nonfoundational philosophical insights, while illuminating and expanding his orientational indebtedness to Karl Barth's theology. By placing Frei's work into critical conversation with developments in pragmatist thought and cultural theory since his death, the rereading of Frei offered here aims to correct and resolve many of the complaints and misunderstandings that vex his theological legacy. The result is a clarification of the unity and coherence of Frei's work over the course of his career; a reframing of the complex relationship of his work to that of his Yale colleague George Lindbeck and successive "postliberal" theological trends; demonstration that Frei's uses of Barth, Wittgenstein, Auerbach, and Geertz do not relegate his theological approach to critical quietism, methodological separatism, epistemic fideism, or a so-called "theological ghetto"; explication and development of Frei's account of the "plain sense" of Scripture that evades charges of narrative foundationalism and essentialism on one hand and, on the other, avoids criticisms that any account so emphasizing culture, language, and practice will reduce scriptural meaning to the ways the text is used in Christian practice and community. What emerges from Toward a Generous Orthodoxy is a sharpened account of the christologically anchored, interdisciplinary, and conversational character of Frei's theology, which he came to describe as a "generous orthodoxy," modeling a way for academic theological voices to take seriously both their vocation to the Christian church and their roles as interlocutors in the academic discourse.

There are many who believe Moses parted the Red Sea and Jesus came back from the dead. Others are certain that exorcisms occur, ghosts haunt attics, and the blessed can cure the terminally ill. Though miracles are immensely improbable, people have embraced them for millennia, seeing in them proof of a supernatural world that resists scientific explanation. Helping us to think more critically about our belief in the improbable, The Miracle Myth casts a skeptical eye on attempts to justify belief in the supernatural, laying bare the fallacies that such attempts commit. Through arguments and accessible analysis, Larry Shapiro sharpens our critical faculties so we become less susceptible to tales of myths and miracles and learn how, ultimately, to evaluate claims regarding vastly improbable events on our own. Shapiro acknowledges that belief in miracles could be harmless, but cautions against allowing such beliefs to guide how we live our lives. His investigation reminds us of the importance of evidence and rational thinking as we explore the unknown.

Archaeologists routinely interpret the archaeological record in terms of microscale processes – individual-level processes that operate within the human lifespan. In embracing this goal, archaeologists have borrowed an agenda designed by, and for, disciplines that study humans in the present-time and use data with a quality that is orders of magnitude different than archaeological data. By forcing such an agenda on the record, archaeologists are offering explanations for the human past that are merely consistent with the record, instead of being supported beyond a reasonable doubt by a smoking gun. As a result, their research suffers from an inordinate equifinality. This book addresses this problem by developing a theory of the various pathways leading to equifinality and underdetermination, that links them to various aspects of the quality of the archaeological record, and that articulates how these different aspects are shaped by various forces such as site formation processes. Using published literature, archaeological data are found to be dominated with sampling intervals and resolutions in the order of 102-3 years – too long for the study of microscale processes. The history of archaeology, archaeologists’ view of uniformitarianism, and the way they are trained to confirm hypotheses have allowed archaeologists to ignore the underdetermination problem that plagues their research. I argue that archaeologists should recalibrate their research program to the quality of the archaeological record by focusing primarily on cultural historical reconstruction and macroarchaeology, i.e. the search for macroscale patterns and processes in the global archaeological record.

The book makes a critical comparison of fundamental trends in modern epistemology with the epistemological concerns of critical theory of the Frankfurt School. It comprises five chapters, which refer to phenomenology, structuralism and poststructuralism, modernism and postmodernism, systems’ theory and critical realism.It follows the course of development of modern epistemology, considering basic conceptions such as dialectics, theory and practice in science, and the potential for a political epistemology based on the arguments of critical theory. It can certainly be used as a textbook because each chapter tallies with a major trend in modern epistemology, and provides a concrete analysis of the comparison it draws with the work of leading figures of the Frankfurt School such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas.The present volume addresses the reader of political theory, epistemology, social theory and it also raises key questions on methodology in science and research. Therefore, it can prove beneficial for students, researchers and academics that deal with issues of theory, practice, and method in science. The contents of the volume were meticulously constructed in order to be of practical use both for undergraduate and postgraduate students, and each chapter includes basic graphs that condense the basic argument for each thematic circle on modern epistemology and methodology.The book contains unpublished critique and information provided to the writer in recent interviews she conducted with Jürgen Habermas (providing analysis on systems theory), William Outhwaite and Stefan Müller-Doohm (both the latter clarified issues and contributed valuable information on critical realism and the Frankfurt School, respectively).

The book proposes that Foucault's archaeology is a direct response to the predicament for thought in modernity that he described in the closing chapters of The Order of Things, and that science and mathematics are fundamental to the possibility of this response. Centered around the figure of man, Foucault described thinking in modernity as split between empirical and transcendental forms of enquiry, neither of which is able to secure a foundation. To understand how Foucault responds to this situation, the book sets out a series of key ideas in the work of Gaston Bachelard, Jean Cavaillès, and Michel Serres that pave the way for Foucault's account of the historical character of the formal conditions of knowledge. In this way, Foucault's conception of discourse, and above all of the historical a priori, can be understood against the background of what he calls the mathematical a priori. The book also provides an analysis of what Foucault calls ‘temporal dispersion’, tracing this idea back to his critique of Kant. Employing these ideas, the book goes on to provide a detailed commentary on Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge.

The book develops a conception of epistemology in which the notion of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental. It reverses the traditional programme of trying to analyse knowledge as a combination of truth, belief, and other factors, such as justification. Rather, belief is a state whose successful form is knowledge, and justification is on the basis of knowledge, which is acquainted with evidence. Knowing is as much a mental state as believing, but it is world‐involving because one can know only what is true; the book extends the externalist conception of mind from the contents of mental states to the attitudes to those contents. As with other mental states, one cannot always know whether one is in the state of knowing. It is argued that this is a special case of a much more general phenomenon; no non‐trivial conditions are such that one is always in a position to know that they obtain whenever they in fact do so. This result has disturbing implications for the nature of rationality, because one is not always in a position to know what it is rational to do. Traditional arguments for scepticism fail because they assume that one is always in a position to know what one's evidence is. The speech act of assertion is also governed by a norm of knowledge. A final chapter explores the limits on what can be known that are revealed by the so‐called paradox of knowability.

Sometimes Always True aims to resolve three connected problems. First, we need an undogmatic pluralist standpoint in political theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. But genuine pluralism suffers from the contradiction that making room for fundamental differences in outlook means making room for outlooks that exclude pluralism. Second, philosophy involves reflecting on the world and meaning as a whole, yet this means adopting a vantage point in some way outside of meaning. Third, our lived experience of the sense of our lives similarly undermines its own sense, as it involves having a vantage point in some way wholly outside ourselves. In detailed engagement with, among others, Davidson, Rorty, Heidegger, Foucault Wilde, and gender and sexuality theory, the book argues that these contradictions are so thoroughgoing that, like the Liar’s Paradox, they cancel the bases of their own meaning. Consequently, it argues, they resolve themselves, and do so in a way that produces a vantage point on these issues that is not dogmatically circular because it is, workably, both within and outside these issues’ sense. The solution to a genuinely undogmatic pluralism, then, is to enter into these contradictions and the process of their self-resolution.

This book explores the life-worlds sustained through letter correspondence within the evolution of racism and mass incarceration in California history. Across three cases, this investigation uncovers how letter correspondence facilitates a form of communal life for groups targeted for racialized confinement in different phases of development in the U.S. West: “Detained” focuses on migrants from Southern China during peak years of U.S. Chinese Exclusion; “Interned” focuses on families of Japanese ancestry during the WWII period; and “Imprisoned” focuses on socialities of Blackness in the post-Civil Rights era. This study clarifies how mass incarceration functions as a process of systematic social dismantling, situating research on letters within global capitalist movements, multiple racial logics, and overlapping modes of social control that have taken distinctive form in California. Framing letters within this political violence that qualifies them, this book examines how the structural, physical, ideological, and affective labor internalized in the letter creates alternative conditions to reinvent people’s own ways of life: a “poetics” or art of becoming, mediated in and through the letter and the interaction of literature with history, that prioritizes the dynamics of creative essence to generate an other kind of social power bound to the unfathomable.

This book argues for four main theses: (1) The Republic is not just a work that has a lot to say about education; it is a book that depicts Socrates as attempting to engage his interlocutors in such a way as to help to educate them and also engages us, the readers, in a way that helps to educate us. (2) Plato does not suppose that education, properly understood, should have as its primary aim putting knowledge into souls that do not already have it. Instead, the education that Plato discusses, represents occurring between Socrates and his interlocutors, and hopes to achieve in his readers is one that aims to arouse the power of knowledge in us and then to begin to train that power always to engage with what is more real, rather than what is less real. (3) Plato’s conception of knowledge is not the one typically presented in contemporary epistemology. It is, rather, the power of conceptualization via exemplar representation. (4) Plato engages this power of knowledge in the Republic in a way he represents as only a kind of second-best way to engage knowledge—and not as the best way, which would be dialectic. Instead, Plato uses images that summon the power of knowledge to begin the process by which the power may become fully realized. The full realization of the power of knowledge, however, is not provided in the work, and could not be achieved by anything like reading a work of this sort.

Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream ‘analytic’ philosophy – acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring contributions from many of the world’s leading experts in this area. The volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. This book features an extensive introduction by one of the editors, which provides some historical background as well as summarising the main debates and issues in contemporary philosophy where appeals to acquaintance are currently being made. The remaining thirteen essays are grouped thematically into the following four sections: (1) Phenomenal Consciousness, (2) Perceptual Experience, (3) Reference, (4) Epistemology.