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This chapter provides an overview of freedom of information as it is practiced in Scotland, with particular emphasis on access to environmental information. Before the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA) was enacted, people already had certain statutory entitlements to environmental information. Comprehensive rights were delivered by the Environmental Information Regulations (EIRs) first introduced in 1992 and amended in 1998 which gave the public the right to ask for information which ‘relates to the environment’. Access to environmental regime advanced still further when the UK signed the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention) in 1998. There are three ‘pillars’ which form the key principles behind the Aarhus Convention: the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters. In Scotland, the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 give the public rights of access to environmental information held by public authorities. All of the exceptions under the EIRs are qualified by being subject to a ‘public interest’ test.

This chapter provides an overview of freedom of information (FOI) as it is practiced in Scotland, with particular emphasis on the issue of charging for information being requested. In Scotland, FOI laws and regulations which mandate up-front administrative fees or prohibitive charges for information can deter requests or exclude those with no capacity to pay. The fee-charging structure under the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA) is strongly regulated and reasonably generous to the applicant. This chapter considers the approach used to charge for environmental information under the Environmental Information Regulations (EIRs). It also discusses issues such as whether public authorities are entitled to charge, whether an authority has informed the public of its charging regime, or whether the charge is reasonable or excessive. Finally, it assesses the future of charging under FOISA, paying special attention to ‘deterrence’ charging, the likelihood that the cost of responding to a request for information would breach the upper limit, and the capacity to aggregate requests.

Environmental activism has intensified across the Middle East and North Africa over the past few decades, focusing primarily on environmental issues that affect public health and livelihoods. While intrusive security states limit information and stifle civil society, expanding educational opportunities, growing cities, and new means of communication have enabled environmental activism. This includes small-scale, informal, and localized activism to demand access to natural resources and environmental services; the spread of environmental nongovernmental organizations; and the coordinated popular resistance campaign that includes direct action, media outreach, and lobbying. State elites and official media often portray environmental mobilization as a threat to national security and state integrity, but sometimes tolerate it as an informal enforcement mechanism to pressure polluting firms and nonresponsive officials. As elsewhere, state and corporate actors also increasingly deploy their own discourses and interventions, generally focused on technocratic solutions rather than questions of political economy and environmental justice.

This chapter provides an overview of how the Scottish Information Commissioner evaluates the country’s public authorities in terms of dealing with complaints from applicants requesting for information. The Commissioner may assess whether a public authority is following good practice; if not, he may give it a practice recommendation. An authority that fails to comply with the provisions in the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA), such as not responding on time or failing to inform the applicant of the right of appeal, may be cited in the decision notice, even if the authority is not required to take any action in respect of that specific failure. In such cases, the Commissioner may conduct ‘technical investigations’ and require the authority to remedy the failing by complying with the request for information. The revised Code of Practice includes good practice guidance on both FOISA and the Environmental Information Regulations. This chapter discusses the Commissioner’s programme of practice assessments, or performance audits, of public authorities.

The Toxics Release Inventory, created in the aftermath of the Bhopal poisonous gas tragedy in India, is a cornerstone of the environmental right-to-know program in the U.S. TRI is the nation’s first program to use information as an explicit tool of public policy. The program incorporates several novel features, but does not require companies to reduce toxic pollution. However, the “report card” aspect of publicly-available information has spurred substantial reductions nonetheless.

This chapter provides an overview of freedom of information as it is practiced in Scotland, with particular emphasis on the application of contents-based exemptions and exceptions. Many of the provisions in the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA) and the Environmental Information Regulations (EIRs) which allow information to be withheld require authorities to demonstrate not only that the consequences of information being released into the public domain would be harmful, but that the nature and extent of the harm would be substantial. The question ‘Where is the harm in disclosure?’ has been at the core of many decisions. This chapter considers contents-based FOISA exemptions that apply only where disclosure ‘would or would be likely to prejudice substantially’. It also discusses the ‘harm’ test and the degree of harm that must be weighed against the likelihood of its occurrence, along with harm-based exemption in relation to ‘prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs’.

Increasingly since the 1930s, various industries around the world that generate large volumes of liquid byproducts have disposed of their wastes by injecting them into the subsurface of sedimentary basins. In the United States, according to a 1985 survey by Brower et al. (1989), 411 “Class I” wells were licensed to inject hazardous and nonhazardous waste into deep strata, and 48 more were proposed or under construction. Legal restrictions on the practice vary geographically, as does the suitability of geologic conditions. Nonetheless, the practice of deep-well injection had increased over time, partly in response to environmental laws that emphasize protection of surface water and shallow groundwater. More restrictive regulations introduced in the late 1980s and 1990s have begun to cause a decrease in the number of operating Class I wells. Some injected wastes are persistent health hazards that need to be isolated from the biosphere indefinitely. For this reason, and because of the environmental and operational problems posed by loss of permeability or formation caving, well operators seek to avoid deterioration of the formation accepting the wastes and its confining layers. When wastes are injected, they are commonly far from chemical equilibrium with the minerals in the formation and, therefore, can be expected to react extensively with them (Boulding, 1990). The potential for subsurface damage by chemical reaction, nonetheless, has seldom been considered in the design of injection wells. According to Brower et al. (1989; Fig. 21.1), nine wells at seven industrial sites throughout the state of Illinois were in use in the late 1980s for injecting industrial wastes into deeply buried formations; these wells accepted about 300 million gallons of liquid wastes per year. In this chapter, we look at difficulties stemming from reaction between waste water and rocks of the host formation at several of these wells and consider how geochemical modeling might be used to help predict deterioration and prevent blowouts. Velsicol Chemical Corporation maintained two injection wells at its plant near Marshall, Illinois, to dispose of caustic wastes from pesticide production, as well as contaminated surface runoff. In September 1965, the company began to inject the wastes into Devonian dolomites of the Grand Tower Formation at a depth of about 2600 feet.