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This chapter explores the role of doctrine in military adaptation and how it prepares commanders and soldiers for the fog and friction of the battlefield. It argues that doctrine must remain flexible and open to change through a constant iterative process of improvement. Effective adaptation of doctrine also requires input from all levels of the chain of command and the ability to rapidly disseminate changes throughout the force. The chapter illustrates successful and failed adaptability of military doctrine using case studies of the French and German armies in World War II and the Egyptian and Israeli armies during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Addresses the question of how to translate the use of slogans in simultaneous support and opposition to the army from January well into the time of writing in August 2011. Through the varying terms of language (slogans, gestures, songs, and images) the author maps out how the fetishized myth of “the army and the people are one hand” is historically constructed and gradually undone even as demonstrators continue to make a difference between the army as “family” with its historic allegiance to the people and the authoritarian SCAF that is generally viewed as part of Mubarak's regime that continues to ally itself to the interests of the US and Israel instead of the demands of the people.

This chapter examines the extent to which the Free Officers formed a political ethos that inclined them toward intervention in civilian politics during the conspiratorial stage. The Free Officers' movement was the culmination of a dramatic political reorientation among the officer corps between 1936 and 1952. They represented the generation that turned away from the political establishment and rejected the leadership of its elders. The soldier's relationship to his country, to his people, to his commanding officers and king gave the young officers a particular perspective on the decay of the liberal order. This chapter first provides a historical background on the Egyptian military before discussing the organization of the Free Officers, along with its political activism, developing ideology, and ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

This chapter focuses on the author's childhood in 1956. On July 26, 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that he was nationalizing the Suez Canal and would use the income from the canal's operations to finance the construction of the new dam at Aswan. The broadcast of the speech was the signal for the takeover of the canal office by an Egyptian military commando unit. This episode has gone into the history books as the Suez Crisis, a highly euphemistic term, for the “crisis” was a proper war, with many dead, wounded, prisoners of war, and massive destruction. The author also describes her experiences adapting to a new environment as they move from Kafr al-Arab and Fariskur to Cairo, Egypt's capital and the cultural and political center of the Arab world at the time.

The armed forces serve as the iron fist of some dictatorships. For several reasons, a military whose primary mission is fighting the political enemy within is in a poor position to serve as a democratic catalyst. If the military has taken sides on domestic conflicts and is viewed as a partisan institution that enforces government policies—particularly unpopular ones—it risks cutting its ties to society. As a result the populace may outright reject the military’s attempts to promote democratic institution building. In contrast, a military that hasn’t been mired in domestic conflicts is more likely to be viewed as a legitimate state institution in an illegitimate state apparatus. In times of regime crisis, these militaries remain free of the stigma of having pushed people around. This credibility better allows the military to lead a democratic regime change.

This chapter argues that militaries will tend to support dictatorships when their interests are aligned. Even when the military doesn’t share the dictator’s ideology, military officers may support him if the dictator is willing to protect their interests. Support can be active or passive. The military can actively support an authoritarian government by taking affirmative steps to fend off domestic and foreign threats. Support can also be passive, as when the military merely tolerates the dictatorship and refrains from toppling the regime even though the opportunity presents itself. The military’s loyalty can be purchased. The dictator may shower the armed forces with social and financial perks, such as salary increases, better training, modern equipment, and promotions. Some dictators go beyond simply providing financial and social perks to the military and engage in active social engineering to ensure its loyalty. The military may also remain loyal to a dictatorship where the regime is strong and stable. Militaries rarely stage coups against stable governments. Only when a dictatorship begins to wobble does a coup become a possibility.