Search Results

Addresses the question of how to translate the use of slogans in simultaneous support and opposition to the army from January well into the time of writing in August 2011. Through the varying terms of language (slogans, gestures, songs, and images) the author maps out how the fetishized myth of “the army and the people are one hand” is historically constructed and gradually undone even as demonstrators continue to make a difference between the army as “family” with its historic allegiance to the people and the authoritarian SCAF that is generally viewed as part of Mubarak's regime that continues to ally itself to the interests of the US and Israel instead of the demands of the people.

During the Second World War, the British military had vast army bases stationed in Gaza but they abandoned them in 1948. When Zionist forces attacked towns and villages throughout southern Palestine, tens of thousands of Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes. Many sought safety in a part of Gaza that was still held by the Egyptian army. Palestinian Arabs were being made to pay for the mistakes and bad politics of Europe. They had nowhere to go and no work to do. People needed food, clothing, bedding, tents, medicines, and medical care. The Egyptians had performed great deeds for relief, but could not do everything alone. Refugee relief was not the goal of the AFSC unit in Gaza. The AFSC had accepted the invitation to participate in the Gaza relief effort with the expectation of assisting in the repatriation and reconciliation process.

Before its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the American Friends Service Committee had delivered relief and political and moral assistance to hundreds of thousands of refugees in Europe and other parts of the world. When war loomed in Palestine, the United Nations looked to the AFSC to nominate a Quaker municipal commissioner for an internationalized Jerusalem, in the expectation that the nominee would be acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. The volunteers encountered numerous obstacles in Palestine and Israel but managed to learn from them and to adapt in ways that contain useful lessons for today's relief workers and peacemakers. In Gaza, the volunteers found themselves in a territory administered by the Egyptian army. The small-scale grassroots advocacy and unofficial diplomacy that the Quakers pioneered in the early years of the conflict remain for many activists—Israeli, Palestinian, and international—the best hope for reconciliation and resolution of the conflict.

This chapter, instead of a linear progress to revolution, highlights two traits: the return of Egypt's Ottoman attachment in public texts and the relationship of intellectuals to power. The Egyptian army's intervention into the affairs of governance made it possible to formulate national images in which the khedive no longer figured. This change symbolizes a break in ideology, or, in the learned imagination about the army, since legally the khedive remained the leader of the army but his loss of control had already been expressed on the Arabic stage. This was an unprecedented development: a radical change in the realm of ideas before the actual revolt. Through the intersection of patriotism and theater, the chapter then explores how revolutionary culture informed the forgotten origins of Egyptian stardom.

This section covers the crossing battle from the morning of October 17 through the early morning hours of October 18, when the battle ended. Even and Maoz note the lessons learned from the Chinese Farm Battle, planned and begun by the 162nd Division and fought by the 460th Brigade. Unfortunately, the paratroopers’ sacrifice did not enable the transport of the rafts to Akavish and Matzmed, and merely serves to whitewash the commanders who carelessly and irresponsibly sent fifty men to their deaths. The battle failed to achieve its mission, and in retrospect, it began before the commanders had successfully demonstrated that it was an unavoidable fight.

By midday on October 17, the Egyptian army realized the extent of the presence of the IDF and began assembling armor and infantry on the western bank in an attempt to contain the bridgehead. By the original plan, the 421st Brigade was to seize the western bridgehead on Havit Road; however, due to the increased presence of Egyptian forces, the 421st Brigade withdrew slightly to regroup. On the morning of October 18, the 162nd Division planned to be at the bridgehead west of the canal, and then to break through to the west and southwest—a highly unrealistic goal, given the Southern Command’s progress in the previous two weeks.

By the evening of October 12, reports surfaced of the Egyptians’ intent to dispatch commando units against various targets in order to attack the canal front and transfer armored reserves into Sinai. From that time until the October 14 sunrise, when nearly one thousand Egyptian tanks amassed on the eastern bank of the canal, the General Staff and Southern Command created a reserve force of around 750 tanks, deployed on the line from north to south. The ultimate goals of the Egyptian army’s offensive were lost to history when Egyptian president Anwar Sadat died, but Even and Maoz do their best to reconstruct the axes of the attack.

This chapter talks about the Egyptian army that poured out of Ascalon and onto the plain of Sharon. It describes the invasion of the Egyptiam army and advanced elements that attacked Ramla in order to flush out the Frankish garrison. It also mentions the local bishop, Robert of Rouen, who gave the first warning of the Egyptian attack to King Baldwin at Jaffa after seeing enemy scouts raiding around his monastery in Lydda. The chapter explains how the Fatimid army was underestimated and yet considered the largest and best-resourced military force facing the crusader states. It also illustrates the massive Fatimid military base at Ascalon on the southern fringes of the loosely defined border zone between the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and Egypt, which remained the only stronghold along the entire coastline by 1125.

Even and Maoz divide the Southern Command’s six-day defensive period into three sections. October 9 was a pseudodefensive during which the 143rd Division saw great violence. October 10–13 was a time of restive dormancy, and October 14 brought a role change and a reversal of fortune to the IDF. Physically, this period of the war featured low-intensity combat interspersed with furious fire at key points, while diplomatically, drama roiled, future moves were planned, and crucial issues were decided. During the division’s four days of dormancy, Sharon reorganized his brigades, absorbed reinforcements, repaired equipment, and formulated operational plans for the eventual canal crossing.

The chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces was prepared to surrender, but Egyptian president Anwar Sadat rejected their surrender, giving Israel no choice but to continue fighting. From then on, the defense minister, the chief of General Staff, and the commanding general of Southern Command resolved to achieve a decisive defeat of Egyptian army and end the conflict. Israeli strategists determined that the best option would be to cross the Suez Canal in an operation called Stouthearted Men. Operation Stouthearted Men, implemented on October 15, lasted until the ceasefire on October 25 that officially ended the war. The first battle of the operation was the crossing battle itself—a uniquely large, protracted, dramatic, and significant battle that is often described as “the crossing battle.”

The question of who to blame for the 1948 debacle was unequivocally answered by the prosecution and judges in the ‛Abd al-Hadi trial. The judges saw themselves as being in charge of reshaping the historical narrative on Egypt’s entry into the 1948 War. That is, the quasi-legal clarification of the prewar decision-making process aimed not only at discerning the colossal failure of government officials but also at justifying the process of overthrowing the corrupt government in a military coup “in the name of the people.” The judges took on the mantle of the historian and charted a new narrative that, while focusing on the past, painted a picture with clear implications for the present. However, contrary to the prevailing view in the literature, this rare documentation shows that the Free Officers did not fully absolve the army from all responsibility for the defeat.

This chapter focuses on the coordination of various moving parts to bring the crossing battle to completion. On the morning of October 16, the roller bridge was no longer seen as a viable option for crossing the canal, and Sharon commanded the 257th Battalion to detach from the 421st Brigade and go on to Matzmed. The Unifloat rafts were in good shape, and after their arrival at Akavish 55, the 630th Bridging Battalion was ordered to Matzmed to receive further instructions from Sharon. The Crocodile envoy arrived at Matzmed around 4 a.m. and commenced crossing to the western bank at 7 a.m. According to Even and Maoz, the Crocodile rafts saved Operation Stouthearted Men, the Israel Defense Forces, and Israel itself from a catastrophic defeat.

After the events of October 8, Sharon no longer trusted the chief of General Staff’s ability to lead the IDF on the southern front. Therefore, he ignored their directives and initiated offensive attacks as he saw fit. Sharon instructed his brigade commanders to commence blocking action against the Egyptian advance, and to demonstrate initiative by delivering aggression without direct attacks. Sharon’s goals for the day were twofold: to rescue the men in the Purkan stronghold, and to recapture the Hamutal and Makhshir localities, which had been forfeited by the 143rd Division but would be crucial for the eventual canal crossing.

The 143rd Division had two primary tasks to accomplish during the crossing battle on the night of October 15–16: to open and secure the Akavish and Tirtur Roads to access the bridgehead, and to bring their division, as well as the 162nd Division and other forces, to the western side of the canal in preparation for Operation Stouthearted Men. The second task was assigned to the 247th Brigade, which would begin by securing a bridgehead on the other side of the canal. Then the 421st Brigade would deploy the crossing equipment and the bridging battalions would construct and maintain bridges over the canal. This task was the linchpin of the division’s entire mission—the success of Operation Stouthearted Men and the crossing battle depended on the 247th Brigade’s ability to capture, secure, and defend the bridgehead.