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The events of the last quarter of the 16th century in the Kyivan metropolitanate largely determined the course of further ecclesiastical development, playing a decisive role in the history of the Ukrainian lands. The new era made unprecedented demands on the leaders of the Kyivan church, its institutions, and the mass of the faithful, while expanding contacts with the West brought the powerful influences of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation to bear on the Ukrainian lands. The impact of confessionalisation, which intensified both internal and external pressures on the old traditional structures of the Kyivan metropolitanate, proved overwhelming, and the church, failing to withstand them, split in two and sparked a religious crisis between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. One branch remained under the authority of the patriarchs of Constantinople, while the other subordinated itself to the pope of Rome. The growth of Counter-Reformation tendencies in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had a great influence on the development of religious life in Ukraine.

This chapter addresses liberalism and pluralism. It explains how traditionally dominant churches have handled the acceptance of a wider range of sexual difference, with the focus on homosexuality, and the growth of religious free markets. The chapter then investigates the role of Orthodoxy in civil-society-building in Russia and the experience of minority Orthodox communities in the USA. For all religious institutions, the pluralism associated with democratic political orders creates real problems. It is suggested that Eastern Orthodoxy has struggled with the democratic experiment in countries where it has traditionally been dominant. An impressionistic survey of the Orthodox experience in America largely mirrors that of the much larger Catholic community. The Russian Orthodox Church's political presence and anti-pluralist stance in a context of incomplete or ‘managed’ democratisation has been one of a number of factors that have hindered the full acceptance of social and political pluralism in Russia.

George Pagoulatos and Xenophon Yataganas argue that the prevalent European story among Greek public intellectuals has equated Europe with progress, identifying the country's modernization challenge with catching up with Europe. Consequently, pro‐European supranationalism has been the most vocal opposition pole of the debate, struggling against a long tradition of cultural gravitation towards Eastern Orthodoxy, ethnocentrism, a nostalgic communitarian vision of the past, a “culture of the underdog”, or the statist/national school of thought. The independence versus integration divide has been the most salient one in the Greek public intellectual debate. Such ideological polarization, however, has been mitigated by the emergence of a “third pole” of transnationalism which was given impetus by the increasing complexity and mishaps of the European integration project, and especially the disenchantment following the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty. This transnational school of thought is gathering pace among Greek intellectuals who are principally European scholars.

The eighth and final chapter briefly surveys the history of posthumous salvation after Augustine. Central is a story told about Pope Gregory the Great (sixth century), who supposedly uttered a prayer for the salvation of the pagan Roman emperor Trajan, who had lived in the second century. In Eastern Orthodoxy, this prayer is often combined with that of Thecla for Falconilla as two examples of God's mercy even upon dead pagans. In the west, because of Augustine's influence, the story is retold to include the resurrection of the body of Trajan, since without physical baptism, no one who lived after Christ can be saved.

Despite the fact that Muslims and Christians were determined to remain distinct, the most intimate connections that were developed between these communities in Anatolia were through religion. The boundaries between popular or local religion were porous, and this chapter sets out to explain why it is that the Greek Orthodox Christians could allow for ‘religious’ connections with local Muslims. One explanation is that the Orthodox laity have always had a license for create religious traditions, especially cults focused on icons and saints. Another has to do with popular religion being practical, as medical cures were most often sought through the procurement of miracles, and miracles were often available through Muslim sacra. Local religion is also seen here as reflecting a long running tension between the laity and clergy over the sacred. The former accounts for latter's inability to provide clearer answers about the supernatural, the afterlife, and the devil.

Whilst it is true that the Reformed Church of England had no exact parallel in Europe, it would be a mistake to assume that the two main branches of the European Reformation, the one Calvinist and the other Lutheran, produced two supranational Churches. On the contrary, both Calvinism and Lutheranism manifested themselves in different forms so that in effect every European nation with a Reformed Church had one with certain unique features. All these churches had some elements, doctrinal or liturgical or ministerial, in common and this included the Church of England which had some links with all the other Reformed Churches of Europe. The result of the Oxford Movement was the steering of the Church of England in a different direction, away from its links with continental Protestants, and into the position of a via media between Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, and Eastern Orthodoxy.

The appeal to sola scriptura, scripture alone, had devastating consequences for the canonical heritage of the Church within Western Christendom, systematically eroding and eliminating everything that could not be grounded in scripture. Thus, the great doctrines of the Church, like the doctrine of the Trinity, were now displaced by theories of revelation and inspiration. Paradoxically, doubt triumphed over fellowship and faith. The Reformers who failed to reach an agreement on critical issues of faith, found themselves cornered when asked to defend their foundationalism and divided the Church into a network of warring factions. Not surprisingly, friendly overtures to Eastern Orthodoxy failed.

This chapter engages a series of texts that I determine illustrate what I call “incarnational ethics” and juxtaposes them to the larger discussion of Jewish ethics in Modern Jewish Thought. The Hasidic thinkers in question (Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk and Levi Yizhak of Berdichev) present a model of ethics that more closely resembles a Christian Orthodox ethics of “becoming divine” (theosis) and seeing the other as “divine” than the virtue or Kantian ethics that dominate modern Jewish Thought. The central point of this chapter is that this Hasidic ethics I am suggesting does not emerge from nor is it bound to, the law but is focused on the divine element on the self and other as its foundation. This would be a major departure from classical and modern conceptions of Jewish ethics.

The concluding chapter summarizes the book’s major contributions, addresses some important remaining issues, and anticipates how legislation is likely to proceed in the future. The chapter touches on three major religions (Eastern Orthodoxy, Hinduism, and Judaism), which do not receive much attention in other parts of the book. There is also a discussion of public opinion in Russia, which has received a lot of attention for its critical comments and policies. Additionally, this chapter examines cross-national developments in homosexuality-related legislation over the last twenty years. Across the world, many countries seem to be adopting friendlier policies, but there also appears to be a small backlash, often coming from nations with less political, economic, and media power. The backlash provides insight into why we should not expect all nations to march into the future with increasingly tolerant views.

In the Holy Orthodox Churches of the East ‘fool for Christ's sake’ is a hagiographical category like ‘martyr’, ‘virgin’, or ‘confessor’. The salos or yurodivy (the Greek and Russian technical terms for ‘holy fool’) is regarded as one called by God to obey the words of the apostle: ‘if any among you thinks that is he wise in age, let him become a fool that he may become wise’ (1 Cor.3:18). Folly for Christ's sake is an integral part of Orthodox spirituality, consciously celebrated and revered, and the fools are among the most beloved saints of the East. In recognizing holy folly as a true form of sanctity, Eastern Orthodoxy provides a technological schema for the study of this phenomenon in the west. This chapter tells the story of the holy fools of the East, from their first appearance in the deserts of Egypt and Syria to their spiritual invasion of Holy Russia.

Although Edwards was a Calvinist and a Puritan, he had more in common with Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy than one might expect. Similar to a number of Catholic theologians, discernment was an important theme throughout his writings. Likewise, the role of obedience as a “condition” in justification as well as metaphysical reflection on God as “being” bear some resemblance to the Catholic tradition. The role of beauty in his theology resonates with the Eastern Orthodox tradition. The same can be said of his Trinitarian metaphysics and adherence to divinization.

The chapter explores the issue of religious education in Bulgarian schools from a socio-historical perspective. It traces the models of teaching religion from the liberation of Bulgaria (1878) to the present day. The authors point to the specificities of the pre-Communist Bulgarian school system that is characterized by a secularist orientation and an unequal treatment of the majority and minority religions. Schnitter and Kalkandjieva’s major focus, however, is on the post–Cold War developments. The role of religious institutions in the public debate on the curricula and modes of teaching religion in school is discussed. In this regard, the authors pay special attention to the academic training of teachers of religion.

Drawing on an original analysis of the last three waves of World Values Survey, this chapter explores the role of a nation’s religious context and individual demographic factors for shaping cross-national attitudes. Ideas drawn from rational choice theories of religion and religious contextual effects provide theoretical insight into how personal religious beliefs and overall levels of religious belief shape attitudes. The analysis shows that more religious residents and residents of nations with high levels of religious belief are more likely to disapprove of homosexuality. Distinctions are also drawn between the various major religions. Nations with a substantial number of people who adhere to Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy, and a variety of Protestant faiths tend to have residents with more conservative views than those living in majority Catholic and mainline Protestant nations. The chapter ends by assessing the individual demographic factors that shape attitudes.

Early British travellers and traders in the Islamic world met people from different ethnicities, religions, and races. Unlike the internal uniformity of European countries, the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires were tolerant, heterogeneous, and welcomed foreign visitors unlike Christian Europe where they were scorned. The Islamic world was open to an internationalism that cut across religious and national lines. Among the communities that Britons met during their travels, three stood out: Jews, eastern Christians, and Shi'ites. Anglo-Protestants eagerly anticipated the conversion of the Jews, unable to separate them from biblical history and from apocalyptic prophecies. Greek and other Orthodox Christian communities tended to confuse the English, who were unsure whether they were primitive Christians to be admired, or proto-Catholics to be reviled or converted. Shi'ites were also confusing and little understood, though as with their views of Muslims generally, early Britons were prepared to suspend religious differences to support commerce.

Russian responses to the question of Greek Church independence demonstrate the centrality of religion to the foreign policy of St Petersburg during the reign of Nicholas I. Considering the relations between the two states as a whole, St Petersburg devoted more energy and resources to the church question than any other single issue. A direct challenge to Russia’s underpinning principles occurred in 1833, when a small group of Greek clerics unilaterally declared the Greek Church autocephalous from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, closed down the majority of monasteries, and announced the restructuring of the church administration. The Russian Foreign Ministry viewed these actions as grave errors that opened dangerous avenues for an influx of non-canonical practices and the unholy influences of non-Orthodox proselytizers. The issue was urgent, for it challenged the traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy and engaged Russia’s professed exclusive protectorate of the Orthodox world.