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The case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is used as an example of the role of the oral arguments in deciding a case. A chronology of the case's development is provided. Excerpts from the oral arguments are used to illustrate the thinking of the justices. The impact of the oral arguments on the eventual decision is evaluated.

This chapter brings to the fore the current American perspective on taking away citizenship. In the past, expatriation was mainly enforced as a punishment for un-American activities. Even though there were only a few such instances, the publicity they attracted reinforced an ideology of belonging, sending a message about what it meant to be a good citizen–and a warning about what it could mean to fall short of that. Several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, beginning under Chief Justice Earl Warren, shifted the benchmarks for stripping away citizenship, placing new emphasis on the intent behind expatriation. These include the rulings in Trop v. Dulles, Afroyim v. Rusk, and Vance v. Terrazas. Following the Court's decisions, the U.S. Congress changed the expatriation policy so that citizenship can be revoked only after the state has shown that there was a voluntary intent to relinquish it. This chapter offers a close look at the conflicting political and philosophical ideals that govern this approach.

This chapter examines the significance of Mapp v. Ohio. Mapp was the first decision to interpret the Due Process Clause to impose on the states the same substantive constitutional criminal procedure standards that are imposed on the federal government. Once the Warren Court took this significant step, it “signaled the beginning of a due process revolution that was to transform the rules of state law enforcement and criminal procedure and provoke the [ ] protest [of the late 1960s] that the Supreme Court [was] coddling criminals and handcuffing the police.” After Mapp finally applied the Fourth Amendment to the states, the Court would inevitably also make the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states. Ultimately, the Warren Court would “bring almost the entire range of state police action within the detailed control of the Federal judiciary.” However, as important as Mapp was in 1961, it would meet its demise less than two decades after it was decided with the judicial retrenchment of the conservative justices of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.

Like the Court’s voluntariness test, Miranda failed to constrain lower courts. Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion not only provoked powerful, biting dissents but also was unable to establish the deep theoretical foundation needed to encourage a robust application. Three years earlier, Gideon v. Wainwright unanimously held that indigent felony defendants had a right to counsel at state expense. Gideon’s commonsense doctrine is more morally attractive and far easier to apply even-handedly than a rule that police are supposed to give warnings that they hope suspects will ignore. If Miranda’s goal was to protect suspects from police pressure, it largely failed because 80% of suspects talk to police even after being warned and are thus subject to police pressure just as in the days before Miranda. The chapter argues, however, that Miranda did achieve the important goal of giving suspects notice of their rights. It might be the best of all worlds if suspects know they can remain silent but go ahead and answer police questions.

The story of Brown v. Board of Education told from both sides: anti- and pro-segregation. The story begins with Briggs v. Elliott and continues through to the decision in Brown II. The chapter follows the briefs, oral arguments, and decisions in both cases, featuring the arguments of Thurgood Marshall and John W. Davis, and the opinions of John Parker, J. Waties Waring, and Earl Warren.

This chapter examines how the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, progressed from cautious incursions on some of the witch-hunt era's more drastic practices to its breakthrough decisions of June 17, 1957—so-called Red Monday—and the judicial retrenchment that followed. In the mid-1950s, the Supreme Court took cautious steps toward dismantling loyalty programs. The first sign of major change came in May 1957, in two cases where the Court found violations of due process and rejected the guilt-by-association rationale that had been critical to Vinson Court decisions upholding loyalty programs. One involved Rudolph Schware and the other, Raphael Konigsberg. Another case, this time involving Clinton Jencks, had major implications for the use of secret evidence in political cases. This chapter also discusses Warren's treatment of academic freedom in the case of Paul Sweezy and concludes with an analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving test or loyalty oaths.

This chapter examines how the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, progressed from cautious incursions on some of the witch-hunt era's more drastic practices to its breakthrough decisions of June 17, 1957—so-called Red Monday—and the judicial retrenchment that followed. In the mid-1950s, the Supreme Court took cautious steps toward dismantling loyalty programs. The first sign of major change came in May 1957, in two cases where the Court found violations of due process and rejected the guilt-by-association rationale that had been critical to Vinson Court decisions upholding loyalty programs. One involved Rudolph Schware and the other, Raphael Konigsberg. Another case, this time involving Clinton Jencks, had major implications for the use of secret evidence in political cases. This chapter also discusses Warren's treatment of academic freedom in the case of Paul Sweezy and concludes with an analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving test or loyalty oaths.

This chapter brings to the fore the current American perspective on taking away citizenship. In the past, expatriation was mainly enforced as a punishment for un-American activities. Even though there were only a few such instances, the publicity they attracted reinforced an ideology of belonging, sending a message about what it meant to be a good citizen–and a warning about what it could mean to fall short of that. Several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, beginning under Chief Justice Earl Warren, shifted the benchmarks for stripping away citizenship, placing new emphasis on the intent behind expatriation. These include the rulings in Trop v. Dulles, Afroyim v. Rusk, and Vance v. Terrazas. Following the Court's decisions, the U.S. Congress changed the expatriation policy so that citizenship can be revoked only after the state has shown that there was a voluntary intent to relinquish it. This chapter offers a close look at the conflicting political and philosophical ideals that govern this approach.

This concluding section asks whether the Civil Rights revolution should be seen as a legal or as a political movement. It assesses the impact of that movement on the careers and reputations of judges and justices like Earl Warren, Felix Frankfurter, Frank Johnson Jr., and Elbert Tuttle, state politicians like Richard Russell, John Patterson, and Richard Ervin, and academics like Alexander Bickel, Derrick Bell, and Herbert Wechsler. Finally, it weighs issues raised by judicial review, the "countermajoritarian dilemma" and the role of lawyers in political life.

Given the chance to make the case for segregated schools, or at least for delay of desegregation, the attorneys general of the southern states marshaled evidence and argument, and presented it to the Supreme Court in the days between Brown I and Brown II. District court judges, charged with managing enforcement of desegregation, in some cases adopted the suggestions of the southern state authorities. In Congress, the Southern Caucus, led by Richard Russell, prepared a pseudo legal brief, commonly called the Southern Manifesto, against Brown v. Board. Massive resistance in some of the southern states and fillibusters in the Senate did not stop the progress of desegregation.

This chapter examines how Henry Cowell was pardoned in 1942, two years after he was released on parole from California's San Quentin Prison. Henry was originally sentenced to fifteen years in prison beginning in 1936 due to a morals charge involving a young man. Henry's wife Sidney was trying all she could for his pardon. However, she was accused of manipulating information to whitewash the case. In Henry's case, guilt was not an issue. The issues were whether the infractions he committed should be felonies; whether the other participant should also have been prosecuted, as California law demanded; whether imprisonment was an appropriate response to the infraction; and whether a sentence of fifteen years suited the offense. On November 3, 1942, Governor Culbert Olson was defeated in his reelection bid by a Republican hard-liner, the former state attorney general Earl Warren. Before he stepped down, however, Olson granted Henry pardon on December 28, 1942 through executive clemency. In her biography of Henry, Sidney reflected on the effect of the pardon.

Stassen’s immediate reaction when President Eisenhower offered him the post of director of mutual security was to be thrilled. His reaction was in keeping with the exuberance he had displayed after Eisenhower’s nomination as the Republican candidate for president. He predicted that Eisenhower would be a great president and even praised Senator Taft as a “great man and a great American.” He also cited his former rival, California governor Earl Warren, as worthy of his admiration. During Stassen’s confirmation hearings, Wayne Morse (I-OR) was only senator to sound a sour note. He accused Stassen of taking distinctly contradictory positions on whether US foreign aid would be used to put political pressure on the beneficiaries. At one time, Stassen had stated that aid should be withheld from “socialistic” countries. Morse was referring to the British Labour Party’s nationalization of the steel industry. Stassen responded by asserting that he would be faithful to Eisenhower’s statement in his inaugural address that the United States would never use its “strength to impress upon another people our own cherished political and social institutions.” Morse was not impressed, but he eventually joined his colleagues in approving Stassen’s appointment.